20-436
2005
109TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Rept. 109-31
Union Calendar No. 14 |
APRIL 8, 2005- Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
20-436
2005
109TH CONGRESS 1ST SESSION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Rept. 109-31
Union Calendar No. 14 |
APRIL 8, 2005- Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
1st Session
Part 1
--BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005
[To accompany S. 256]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
CONTENTS | Page | |
Purpose and Summary | 2 | |
Background and Need for the Legislation | 3 | |
Hearings | 22 | |
Committee Consideration | 22 | |
Votes of the Committee | 22 | |
Committee Oversight Findings | 33 | |
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures | 33 | |
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate | 33 | |
Performance Goals and Objectives | 47 | |
Constitutional Authority Statement | 47 | |
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion | 47 | |
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported | 155 | |
Committee Jurisdiction Letters | 370 | |
Markup Transcript | 373 | |
Dissenting Views | 537 | |
Additional Dissenting Views | 591 | |
Additional Minority Views | 597 |
S. 256, the `Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,' is a comprehensive package of reform measures pertaining to both consumer and business bankruptcy cases. The purpose of the bill is to improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.
With respect to the interests of creditors, the proposed reforms respond to many of the factors contributing to the increase in consumer bankruptcy filings, such as lack of personal financial accountability, 1
[Footnote] the proliferation of serial filings, and the absence of effective oversight to eliminate abuse in the system. The heart of the bill's consumer bankruptcy reforms consists of the implementation of an income/expense screening mechanism (`needs-based bankruptcy relief' or `means testing'), which is intended to ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford. S. 256 also establishes new eligibility standards for consumer bankruptcy relief and includes provisions intended to deter serial and abusive bankruptcy filings. It substantially augments the responsibilities of those charged with administering consumer bankruptcy cases as well as those who counsel debtors with respect to obtaining such relief. In addition, the bill caps the amount of homestead equity a debtor may shield from creditors, under certain circumstances.
[Footnote 1: As one academic explained:]
[S]hoplifting is wrong; bankruptcy is also a moral act. Bankruptcy is a moral as well as an economic act. There is a conscious decision not to keep one's promises. It is a decision not to reciprocate a benefit received, a good deed done on the promise that you will reciprocate. Promise-keeping and reciprocity are the foundation of an economy and healthy civil society.
S. 256 also includes various consumer protection reforms. The bill penalizes a creditor who unreasonably refuses to negotiate a pre-bankruptcy debt repayment plan with a debtor. It strengthens the disclosure requirements for reaffirmation agreements (agreements by which debtors obligate themselves to repay otherwise dischargeable debts) so that debtors will be better informed about their rights and responsibilities. The legislation requires certain monthly credit card billing statements to include specified explanatory statements regarding the increased amount of interest and repayment time associated with making minimum payments. The bill requires certain home equity loan and credit card solicitations to include enhanced consumer disclosures. It also prohibits a creditor from terminating an open end consumer credit plan simply because the consumer has not incurred finance charges on the account. S. 256 allows debtors to shelter from the claims of creditors certain education IRA plans and retirement pension funds. It requires debtors to receive credit counseling before they can be eligible for bankruptcy relief so that they will make an informed choice about bankruptcy, its alternatives, and consequences. The bill also requires debtors, after they have filed for bankruptcy, to participate in financial management instructional courses so they can hopefully avoid future financial distress.
With respect to business bankruptcy, S. 256 includes several significant provisions intended to heighten administrative scrutiny and judicial oversight of small business bankruptcy cases, which often are the least likely to reorganize successfully. In addition, it contains provisions designed to reduce systemic risk in the financial marketplace, the enactment of which Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan described as being `extremely important.' 2
[Footnote] The bill includes heightened protections for family farmers facing financial distress and allows family fishermen to qualify for a specialized form of bankruptcy relief currently available only to family farmers. The bill also includes provisions concerning transnational insolvencies, bankrupt health care providers, the treatment of tax claims, and data collection. In response to the exponential increase in bankruptcy filings, the bill authorizes the creation of 28 additional bankruptcy judgeships.
[Footnote 2: Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board, to F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 3, 2002) (on file with the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law).]
On February 1, 2005, Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) (for himself and seven original cosponsors) introduced S. 256, the `Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.' Thereafter, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, (for himself and 60 original cosponsors) introduced legislation (H.R. 685) identical to S. 256 on February 9, 2005.
S. 256, as introduced, is substantively identical to legislation that the House passed in the prior Congress on two separate occasions with overwhelming bipartisan support. 3
[Footnote] It is also substantively similar to a modified version of a bankruptcy reform conference report that the House passed in the 107th Congress by a vote of 244 to 116. 4
[Footnote]
[Footnote 3: On March 19, 2003, the House passed H.R. 975, the `Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Prevention Act of 2003,' by a vote of 315 to 113. 149 CONG. REC. H2099-00 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003). Thereafter, the House, on January 28, 2004, passed S. 1920, as amended, the text of which was substituted with the text of H.R. 975, as passed by the House, by a vote of 265 to 99. 150 CONG. REC. H218-19 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004).]
[Footnote 4: H.R. Rep. No. 107-617 (2002). The modifications consisted of the deletion of two provisions, one dealing with unlawful protest activities and the other authorizing additional bankruptcy judgeships. The text of the conference report, as modified, was introduced as H.R. 5545, the `Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003.' H.R. 5545, 107th Cong. (2002). In turn, the text of H.R. 5545 was substituted as an amendment to H.R. 333. The House, thereafter, passed H.R. 333, as amended. 148 CONG. REC. H8876-77 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2002).]
Representing the most comprehensive set of reforms in more than 25 years, S. 256's consumer bankruptcy provisions respond to several factors. First, the recent escalation of consumer bankruptcy filings does not appear to be just a temporary event, but part of a generally consistent upward trend. 5
[Footnote] In 1998, for example, bankruptcy filings exceeded one million for the first time in our nation's history. Over the past decade, the number of bankruptcy filings has nearly doubled to more than 1.6 million cases filed in fiscal year 2004. 6
[Footnote] As a result, there is a growing perception that bankruptcy relief may be too readily available and is sometimes used as a first resort, rather than a last resort. 7
[Footnote] Despite the view of opponents of bankruptcy reform that abuse in the system is not widespread and that most bankruptcy filings result from causes beyond debtors' control, such as family illness, job loss or disruption, or divorce, 8
[Footnote] the Committee concluded that reforms were nevertheless necessary.
[Footnote 5: Press Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Record Breaking Bankruptcy Filings Reported in Calendar Year 2002, at 1 (Feb. 14, 2003) (noting that `[b]ankruptcy filings continue to break historic records').]
[Footnote 6: See Press Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Down in Fiscal Year 2004, at 1 (Dec. 3, 2004) (noting that `[d]espite the drop in filings, bankruptcies remain at historic highs, well above the 1.5 million record first set in 2002'); Becky Yerak, Bankrupt Filings in E. Mich. Skyrocket; High Debt, Slow Economy Spur 22% Increase in 2002, Biggest Jump in the United States, THE DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 24, 2003, at 1A (noting that in the Eastern District of Michigan alone, bankruptcy filings for 2002 increased by 22 percent over the prior year).]
[Footnote 7: See, e.g., Becky Yerak, Bankrupt Filings in E. Mich. Skyrocket; High Debt, Slow Economy Spur 22% Increase in 2002, Biggest Jump in the United States, THE DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 24, 2003, at 1A (noting that `[t]he stigma of filing for bankruptcy continues to abate while, at the same time, lenders impose few if any credit restrictions').]
[Footnote 8: See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 256 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Prof. Elizabeth Warren).]
Second, there are significant losses asserted to be associated with bankruptcy filings. As one witness explained during the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearing on S. 256 earlier this year:
[Footnote]
[Footnote 9: Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 256 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (prepared statement of Prof. Todd Zywicki).]
[Footnote] a figure when amortized on a yearly basis amounts to a loss of at least $110 million every day. 11
[Footnote] These losses, according to one estimate, translate into a $400 annual `tax' on every household in our nation. 12
[Footnote] In 2003, the Nilson Report (a credit industry newsletter) announced that issuers of proprietary and general purpose credit cards `lost $18.9 billion in 2002 from consumer bankruptcy filings,' an increase of 15.1 percent over the prior year. 13
[Footnote] The Credit Union National Association (CUNA) reported that credit unions, as of 2002, lost `nearly $3 billion from bankruptcies' since Congress began its consideration of bankruptcy reform legislation in 1998. 14
[Footnote] CUNA estimates that over 40% of all credit union losses in 2004 will be bankruptcy-related, and those losses will total approximately $900 million. 15
[Footnote]
[Footnote 10: Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 (Pt. I): Hearings on H.R. 3150 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 147 (1998) (statement of Mark Lauritano, Senior Vice President, WEFA, Inc.).]
[Footnote 11: Bankruptcy Reform: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 26 (1999) (statement of Dean Sheaffer on behalf of the National Retail Federation).]
[Footnote 12: Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 (Pt. I): Hearings on H.R. 3150 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 147 (1998) (statement of Mark Lauritano, Senior Vice President, WEFA, Inc.).]
[Footnote 13: Bankruptcy Losses on Cards, THE NILSON REPORT, Jan. 2003, at 1.]
[Footnote 14: John K. McKechnie, III, Letter to Editor, Credit Union J. 6 (June 24, 2002); see William R. Mapother, Counseling Could Overturn Losses, CREDIT UNION MAG. 34 (Dec. 2002) (quoting CUNA President Dan Mica).]
[Footnote 15: Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 256 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (prepared statement of Kenneth Beine).]
A third factor motivating comprehensive reform is that the present bankruptcy system has loopholes and incentives that allow and--sometimes--even encourage opportunistic personal filings and abuse. A civil enforcement initiative undertaken in 2002 by the United States Trustee Program (a component of the Justice Department charged with administrative oversight of bankruptcy cases) has `consistently identified' such problems as `debtor misconduct and abuse, misconduct by attorneys and other professionals, problems associated with bankruptcy petition preparers, and instances where a debtor's discharge should be challenged.' 16
[Footnote] According to the United States Trustee Program, `Abuse of the system is more widespread than many would have estimated.' 17
[Footnote] Such abuse ultimately hurts consumers as well as creditors.
[Footnote 16: Antonia G. Darling & Mark A. Redmiles, Protecting the Integrity of the System: the Civil Enforcement Initiative, AM. BANKR. INSTITUTE J. 12 (Sept. 2002).]
[Footnote 17: J. Christopher Marshall, Civil Enforcement: An Early Report, JOURNAL OF THE NAT'L ASS'N OF BANKR. TRUSTEES (NABTALK) 39 (Fall 2002).]
A fourth factor relates to the fact that some bankruptcy debtors are able to repay a significant portion of their debts, according to several studies. 18
[Footnote] Current law, however, has no clear mandate requiring these debtors to repay their debts. Accordingly, `[w]hile there is a universal agreement among the courts that an individual debtor's ability to repay his or her debts from future earnings is, at the very least, a factor in determining whether substantial abuse would occur in a chapter 7 case, there are differences among the courts as to the extent to which they rely on a debtor's ability to repay.' 19
[Footnote]
[Footnote 18: See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Pt. II): Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 298 (1999) (statement of Thomas S. Neubig, Ernst & Young LLP--Policy Economics and Quantitative Analysis Group, concluding that `large numbers of 1997 U.S. chapter 7 filers have the ability to repay large portions of their debts'); id. at 228-29 (statement of Michael E. Staten, Credit Research Center, concluding that `about 25 percent of chapter 7 debtors could have repaid at least 30 percent of their non-housing debts over a 5-year repayment plan, after accounting for monthly expenses and housing payments' and that `[a]bout 5 percent of chapter 7 filers appeared capable of repaying all of their non-housing debt over a 5-year plan,' although these `calculations assumed income would remain unchanged relative to expenses over the 5 years'); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking the New Consumer Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. BANKR. L. J. 27, 31 (1999) (concluding that 3.6% of sampled debtors `emerged as apparent can-pays').]
[Footnote 19: Robert C. Furr & Marc P. Barmat, 11 U.S.C. Section 707(b)--The U.S. Trustee's Weapon Against Abuse, NAT'L ASS'N BANKR. TRUSTEES (NABTALK) 11, 14 (Winter 2002-03).]
Proposed reforms to bankruptcy law and practice have been under consideration by Congress for nearly eight years 20
[Footnote] and have generally enjoyed broad support from the business community, banking and financial services industries as well as other groups such as family farmers and child support enforcement agencies. In Congress, support for bankruptcy reform legislation has likewise been overwhelming, bipartisan and bicameral.
[Footnote 20: Comprehensive bankruptcy reform legislation (H.R. 2500, the `Responsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act') was first formally introduced in the House on September 18, 1997. H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997).]
Since the 105th Congress, the House has passed bankruptcy reform legislation on eight separate occasions. In the 105th Congress, for example, the House passed both H.R. 3150, the `Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998,' and the conference report on that bill by veto-proof margins. 21
[Footnote] In the 106th Congress, the House passed H.R. 833, the successor to H.R. 3150, by a veto-proof margin of 313 to 108 22
[Footnote] and agreed to the conference report 23
[Footnote] by voice vote. 24
[Footnote] Although the Senate subsequently passed this legislation by a vote of 70 to 28, 25
[Footnote] President Clinton pocket-vetoed it. In the 107th Congress, the House again registered its overwhelming support for bankruptcy reform on two more occasions. On March 1, 2001, the House passed H.R. 333, the `Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,' by a vote of 306 to 108. 26
[Footnote] The House thereafter passed a modified version of the conference report on H.R. 333, as previously noted. 27
[Footnote] In the last Congress, the House passed H.R. 975, the `Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003,' by a vote of 315 to 113 and S. 1920, which consisted of the text of H.R. 975, as passed by the House, by a vote of 265 to 99. 28
[Footnote]
[Footnote 21: 144 CONG. REC. H4442 (daily ed. June 10, 1998) (vote on final passage of H.R. 3150 was 306 to 118); 144 CONG. REC. H10239-40 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1998) (vote on final passage of the conference report on H.R. 3150 was 300 to 125).]
[Footnote 22: 145 CONG. REC. H2771 (daily ed. May 5, 1999).]
[Footnote 23: H.R. REP. NO. 106-970 (2000).]
[Footnote 24: 146 CONG. REC. H9840 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000).]
[Footnote 25: 146 CONG. REC. S11730 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2000).]
[Footnote 26: 147 CONG. REC. H600-01 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001).]
[Footnote 27: See supra note 3.]
[Footnote 28: 149 CONG. REC. H2099-00 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2003);150 Cong. Rec. H218-19 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2004).]
Likewise, the Senate has on numerous occasions expressed strong bipartisan support for bankruptcy reform legislation. In the 105th Congress, the Senate passed bankruptcy reform legislation by a vote of 97 to 1. 29
[Footnote] In the 106th Congress, the Senate passed similar legislation by a vote of 83 to 14 30
[Footnote] and a subsequent conference report by a vote of 70 to 28. 31
[Footnote] In the 107th Congress, the Senate passed a bankruptcy reform bill by a vote of 82 to 16. 32
[Footnote] Last month, the Senate passed S. 256, as amended, by a vote of 74 to 25. 33
[Footnote]
[Footnote 29: 144 CONG. REC. S10767 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1998).]
[Footnote 30: 146 CONG. REC. S255 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2000).]
[Footnote 31: 146 CONG. REC. S11730 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2000).]
[Footnote 32: 147 CONG. REC. S2379 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 2001).]
[Footnote 33: 151 CONG. REC. S2474 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005).]
The Committee and the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law (Subcommittee), beginning in the 105th Congress, have held a total of 18 days of hearings on the operation of the bankruptcy system and the need for reform. 34
[Footnote] Eleven of these hearings were devoted solely to consideration of S. 256's predecessors, H.R. 3150 (105th Congress), H.R. 833 (106th Congress), H.R. 333 (107th Congress), and H.R. 975 (108th Congress). Over the course of these hearings, nearly 130 witnesses, representing nearly every major constituency in the bankruptcy community, testified. With regard to H.R. 833 alone, testimony was received from 69 witnesses, representing 23 organizations, with additional material submitted by other groups.
[Footnote 34: The dates and subject matters of these hearings are as follows:]
The Senate likewise has held numerous hearings on the subject of bankruptcy reform and related issues. Since the 105th Congress, the Senate has held eleven hearings, including a hearing held earlier this year on S. 256. 35
[Footnote] In fact, the inaugural hearing on H.R. 833 during the 106th Congress was held jointly by the Subcommittee together with the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts on March 11, 1999, 36
[Footnote] marking the first time in more than 60 years that a bicameral hearing was held on the subject of bankruptcy reform. 37
[Footnote]
[Footnote 35: The Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary conducted the following hearings:]
[Footnote 36: Representatives on behalf of the Commercial Law League of America, CUNA, MBNA America Bank, N.A., National Retail Federation, and the National Consumer Law Center also testified. Some of the nation's leading jurists and academics presented testimony as well. Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999).]
[Footnote 37: Senators testifying at the hearing included Charles Grassley (R-IA), Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Christopher Dodd (D-CT). House Members included Jim Moran (D-VA), Pete Sessions (R-TX) and Nick Smith (R-MI). Id.]
It is also important to note that bankruptcy reform legislation is the product of extensive bipartisan and bicameral negotiation and compromise. For example, conferees during the 106th Congress spent nearly seven months engaged in an informal conference to reconcile differences between the House and Senate passed versions of bankruptcy reform legislation. In the 107th Congress, conferees formally met on three occasions and ultimately agreed--after an 11-month period of negotiations--to a bipartisan conference report. 38
[Footnote]
[Footnote 38: H.R. REP. NO. 107-617 (2002). Signatories on behalf of the House included: F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-WI), Henry Hyde (R-IL), George Gekas (R-PA), Lamar Smith (R-TX), Steve Chabot (R-OH), Bob Barr (R-GA), Rick Boucher (D-VA), Michael Oxley (R-OH), Spencer Bachus (R-AL), Billy Tauzin (R-LA), Joe Barton (R-TX), John Boehner (R-OH), and Michael Castle (R-DE). Signatories on behalf of the Senate included: Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Joe Biden (D-DE), Charles Schumer (D-NY), Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Mike DeWine (R-OH), Jeff Sessions (R-AL), and Mitch McConnell (R-KY).]
On February 10, 2005, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on S. 256 that provided an opportunity to review the reasons why the current bankruptcy system needs reform and how this legislation would implement those reforms. 39
[Footnote] Testimony was received from eight witnesses, including: Kenneth Beine on behalf of CUNA; Maria Vullo, a partner with the New York law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP; Malcom Bennett on behalf of the National Multi Housing Council/National Apartment Association; Philip Strauss on behalf of the National Child Support Enforcement Association; Dave McCall on behalf of the United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO; R. Michael Stewart Menzies, Sr. on behalf of the Independent Community Bankers of America; Prof. Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; and Prof. Todd J. Zywicki, Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center.
[Footnote 39: Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 256 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005).]
Among the matters considered at the hearing were: (1) the adequacy of the current bankruptcy system with respect to the detection of fraud and abuse; (2) how abuse and fraud in the current bankruptcy system impact on American businesses and our nation's citizens generally; (3) whether the legislation adversely impacts individuals deserving of bankruptcy relief; (4) whether the proposed reforms would assist those who are charged with administrative oversight of bankruptcy cases and law enforcement matters; and (5) whether, given current economic circumstances, the need for comprehensive bankruptcy reform still exists.
On February 17, 2005, the Senate Judiciary Committee marked up S. 256 and ordered the bill, as amended, to be favorably reported by a vote of 12 to 5. Over the course of the markup, five amendments were passed. These amendments consisted of the following:
On March 10, 2005, the Senate passed S. 256, as amended, by a vote of 74 to 25. Nearly 130 amendments were filed. Of the amendments that were offered, 24 failed, 24 were withdrawn, eight were passed either by vote or unanimous consent. The amendments that were accepted consisted of the following:
[Footnote]
[Footnote 40: This amendment is similar to legislation considered by the House in the 108th Congress. H.R. 1529, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill was ordered favorably reported without amendment by the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. REP. NO. 108-110 (2003), and passed by voice vote by the House. 149 CONG. REC. H5104 (daily ed. June 10, 2003). The principal difference between this legislation and section 332 of the Act is that the bill would have permitted the court to expunge the case upon dismissal of the fraudulent involuntary petition.]
Consumer Creditor Bankruptcy Protections.
Needs-Based Reforms. Chapter 7 is a form of bankruptcy relief by which an individual debtor receives an immediate unconditional discharge of personal liability for certain debts in exchange for relinquishing his or her nonexempt assets to a bankruptcy trustee for liquidation and distribution to creditors. 41
[Footnote] This `unconditional discharge' in chapter 7 contrasts with the `conditional discharge' provisions of chapter 13, under which a debtor commits to repay some portion of his or her financial obligations in exchange for retaining nonexempt assets and receiving a broader discharge of debt than is available under chapter 7. Allowing consumer debtors in financial distress to choose voluntarily an `unconditional discharge' has been a part of American bankruptcy law since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 42
[Footnote]
[Footnote 41: Under the Bankruptcy Code, only an individual may obtain a chapter 7 discharge. Thus, a corporation is not eligible to receive a discharge under chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 727(a)(1).]
[Footnote 42: Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978). The rationale of an unconditional discharge was explained by Congress more than 100 years ago:]
[W]hen an honest man is hopelessly down financially, nothing is gained for the public by keeping him down, but, on the contrary, the public good will be promoted by having his assets distributed ratably as far as they will go among his creditors and letting him start anew.
The concept of needs-based bankruptcy relief has long been debated in the United States. President Herbert Hoover, for instance, recommended to Congress in 1932, `The discretion of the courts in granting or refusing discharges should be broadened, and they should be authorized to postpone discharges for a time and require bankrupts, during the period of suspension, to make some satisfaction out of after-acquired property as a condition to the granting of a full discharge.' 43
[Footnote] In 1938, chapter XIII (the predecessor to chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code) was enacted as a purely voluntary form of bankruptcy relief that allowed a debtor to propose a plan to repay creditors out of future earnings. 44
[Footnote]
[Footnote 43: President's Special Message to the Congress on Reform of Judicial Procedure, 69 Pub. Papers 83, 90 (Feb. 29, 1932).]
[Footnote 44: Chandler Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).]
Over the ensuing years, there continued to be repeated expressions of support for and opposition to means-testing bankruptcy reform. 45
[Footnote] In 1967, various organizations testifying before Congress in support of such reform included the American Bar Association, the American Bankers Association, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, CUNA, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, and the American Industrial Bankers Association. 46
[Footnote] The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, while supporting the concept that repayment plans should be `fostered,' nevertheless concluded in 1973 that `forced participation by a debtor in a plan requiring contributions out of future income has so little prospect for success that it should not be adopted as a feature of the bankruptcy system.' 47
[Footnote] The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 48
[Footnote] retained the principle that a debtor's decision to choose relief premised on repayment to creditors should be `completely voluntary.' 49
[Footnote]
[Footnote 45: See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES--JULY 1973, H.R. DOC. NO. 93 137, pt. I, at 158 (1973) (observing that `proposals have been made to Congress from time to time that a debtor able to obtain relief under chapter XIII [predecessor of chapter 13] should be denied relief in straight bankruptcy').]
[Footnote 46: Hearings on H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771 Before the Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. (1967).]
[Footnote 47: See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES--JULY 1973, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. I, at 159 (1973).]
[Footnote 48: Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).]
[Footnote 49: H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 120 (1977) (observing that `[t]he thirteenth amendment prohibits involuntary servitude' and suggesting that `a mandatory chapter 13, by forcing an individual to work for creditors, would violate this prohibition').]
Although the Bankruptcy Code as originally enacted in 1978 provided that a chapter 7 case could only be dismissed for `cause,' the Code was amended in 1984 to permit the court to dismiss a chapter 7 case for `substantial abuse.' 50
[Footnote] This provision, codified in section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 51
[Footnote] was added `as part of a package of consumer credit amendments designed to reduce perceived abuses in the use of chapter 7.' 52
[Footnote] It was intended to respond `to concerns that some debtors who could easily pay their creditors might resort to chapter 7 to avoid their obligations.' 53
[Footnote] In 1986, section 707(b) was further amended to allow a United States trustee (a Department of Justice official) to move for dismissal. 54
[Footnote]
[Footnote 50: Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, Sec. 312, 98 Stat. 333, 335 (1984).]
[Footnote 51: 11 U.S.C. Sec. 707(b).]
[Footnote 52: 6 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY Sec. 707.LH[2], at 707-30 (15th ed. rev. 2002).]
[Footnote 53: Id. at Sec. 707.04.]
[Footnote 54: Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, Sec. 219, 100 Stat. 3088, 3101 (1986).]
The utility of section 707(b) is limited for several reasons. Under current law, neither the court nor the United States trustee is required to file a motion to dismiss a chapter 7 case for substantial abuse under section 707(b). In addition, other parties in interest, such as chapter 7 trustees and creditors, are prohibited from filing such motions. In fact, section 707(b) specifies that a motion under that provision may not even be made `at the request or suggestion of any party in interest.' 55
[Footnote] The standard for dismissal--substantial abuse--is inherently vague, which has lead to its disparate interpretation and application by the bankruptcy bench. 56
[Footnote] Some courts, for example, hold that a debtor's ability to repay a significant portion of his or her debts out of future income constitutes substantial abuse and therefore is cause for dismissal; 57
[Footnote] others do not. 58
[Footnote] A further reason militating against filing section 707(b) motions is that the Bankruptcy Code codifies a presumption that favors granting a debtor a discharge. 59
[Footnote]
[Footnote 55: 11 U.S.C. Sec. 707(b).]
[Footnote 56: See, e.g., David White, Disorder in the Court: Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, 1995-96 ANN. SURVEY OF BANKR. L. 333, 355 (1996) (noting that the courts `have taken divergent views in an attempt to define the term' and have resorted to `a variety of methods' in applying it to specific cases); Robert C. Furr & Marc P. Barmat, 11 U.S.C. Section 707(b)--The U.S. Trustee's Weapon Against Abuse, NAT'L ASS'N BANKR. TRUSTEES (NABTALK) 11, 14 (Winter 2002-03).]
[Footnote 57: See, e.g., Zolg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1988) (observing that the `principal factor to be considered in determining substantial abuse is the debtor's ability to repay debts for which a discharge is sought').]
[Footnote 58: See, e.g., In re Braley, 103 B.R. 758 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 110 B.R. 211 (E.D. Va. 1990). Notwithstanding the fact that the debtors in Braley had disposable monthly income of nearly $2,700, the bankruptcy court did not dismiss the case for substantial abuse. Id. at 760. The court concluded, `Based upon this legislative history, we are persuaded that no future income tests exists [sic] in 707(b) and if it did, as a finding of fact, the Braley family has insufficient future income to merit barring the door in light of the circumstances of this Navy family.' Id. at 762.]
[Footnote 59: Section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code mandates that `[t]here shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.' 11 U.S.C. Sec. 707(b).]
Over the course of its hearings since the 105th Congress, the Committee received testimony explaining that if needs-based reforms and other measures were implemented, the rate of repayment to creditors would increase as more debtors were shifted into chapter 13 (a form of bankruptcy relief where the debtor commits to repay a portion or all of his debts in exchange for receiving a broad discharge of debt) as opposed to chapter 7 (a form of bankruptcy relief where the debtor receives an immediate discharge of personal liability on certain debts in exchange for turning over his or her nonexempt assets to the bankruptcy trustee for distribution to creditors).
Needs-based reforms would amend section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to permit a court, on its own motion, or on motion of the United States trustee, private trustee, bankruptcy administrator, or other party in interest (including a creditor), to dismiss a chapter 7 case for abuse if it was filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts. Alternatively, the chapter 7 case could be converted to a case under chapter 11 or chapter 13 on consent of the debtor.
In addition, these reforms contemplate replacing the current law's presumption in favor of the debtor with a mandatory presumption of abuse that would arise under certain conditions. As amended, section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code would require a court to presume that abuse exists if the amount of the debtor's remaining income, after certain expenses and other specified amounts are deducted from the debtor's current monthly income (a defined term) 60
[Footnote] when multiplied by 60, exceeds the lower of the following: (1) 25 percent of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims, or $6000 (whichever is greater); or (2) $10,000. Section 102 mandates that the debtor's expenses include reasonably necessary expenditures for health insurance, disability insurance, and health savings accounts for the debtor, the debtor's spouse, and dependents of the debtor. In addition, the debtor's expenses must include those incurred to maintain the safety of the debtor and the debtor's family from family violence as identified in section 309 of the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act or other applicable law. In addition to other specified expenses, 61
[Footnote] the debtor's monthly expenses--exclusive of any payments for debts (unless otherwise permitted)--must be the applicable monthly amounts set forth in the Internal Revenue Service Financial Analysis Handbook 62
[Footnote] as Necessary Expenses 63
[Footnote] under the National 64
[Footnote] and Local Standards 65
[Footnote] categories and the debtor's actual monthly expenditures for items categorized as Other Necessary Expenses. 66
[Footnote]
[Footnote 60: Section 102(b) of the bill defines `current monthly income' as the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives (or, in a joint case, the debtor and the debtor's spouse receive), without regard to whether it is taxable income, in the six-month period preceding the bankruptcy filing. It includes any amount paid on a regular basis by any entity (other than the debtor or, in a joint case, the debtor and the debtor's spouse) to the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents and, in a joint case, the debtor's spouse, if not otherwise a dependent. It excludes Social Security Act benefits and payments to victims of war crimes or crimes against humanity on account of their status as victims of such crimes. It also excludes payments to victims of international terrorism or domestic terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2331) on account of their status as victims of such terrorism.]
[Footnote 61: Under section 102(a), a debtor's monthly expenses may also include:]
[Footnote 62: INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL--Financial Analysis Handbook pt. 5.15.1 (rev. May 1, 2004).]
[Footnote 63: The Internal Revenue Manual defines the term `necessary expenses' as expenses:]
that are necessary to provide for a taxpayer's and his or her family's health and welfare and/or production of income. The expenses must be reasonable. The total necessary expenses establish the minimum a taxpayer and family need to live.
[Footnote 64: The Internal Revenue Manual's `National Standards' establish standards for five types of expenses: food (includes all meals, home and away), housekeeping supplies (includes laundry and cleaning supplies; other household products such as cleaning and toilet tissue, paper towels and napkins; lawn and garden supplies; postage and stationary), apparel and services (includes shoes and clothing, laundry and dry cleaning, and shoe repair), personal care products and services (includes hair care products, haircuts, oral hygiene products, electric personal care appliances), and miscellaneous (a discretionary allowance of $100 for one person and $25 for each additional person in a taxpayer's family). Except for miscellaneous expenses, these expense standards are derived from Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey and are stratified by income and household size. Id. at pt. 5.15.1.8.]
[Footnote 65: `Local Standards,' under the Internal Revenue Manual, establish expense standards for housing (e.g., mortgage or rent, property taxes, interest, parking, necessary maintenance and repair, homeowner's or renter's insurance, and homeowner dues and condominium fees) and transportation expenditures (e.g., vehicle insurance, vehicle payment, maintenance, fuel, state and local registration, parking fees, tolls, driver's license fees, and public transportation). Utilities (e.g., gas, electricity, water, fuel, oil, bottled gas, wood and other fuels, trash and garbage collection, septic cleaning, and telephone) are included under the housing expense category. Housing standards are established for each county within a state. Transportation standards are determined on a regional basis. Id. at pt. 5.15.1.9.]
[Footnote 66: The Internal Revenue Manual does not establish monetary amounts with regard to necessary expenses that it characterizes as `Other Expenses.' Rather, it provides a non-exclusive list of these expenses, that must otherwise satisfy the `necessary expense test,' described in note 63 supra. The list includes expenditures for certain accounting and legal fees, child care, dependent care for an elderly or disabled person, health care, taxes, court-ordered payments, life insurance, involuntary deductions (e.g., union dues, uniforms, work shoes), charitable contributions, and certain education expenses. Id. at pt. 5.15.1.10.]
The means test permits the mandatory presumption of abuse to be rebutted only if: (1) the debtor demonstrates special circumstances justifying any additional expense or adjustment to the debtor's current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative; and (2) such additional expense or income adjustment caused the debtor's current monthly income (reduced by various amounts) when multiplied by 60 to be less than the lesser of either: (i) 25 percent of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims, or $6,000 (whichever is greater), or (ii) $10,000. 67
[Footnote] Special circumstances include such factors as whether the debtor has a serious medical condition or is on active duty in the Armed Services to the extent these factors justify adjustment to income or expenses.
[Footnote 67: The debtor must itemize and provide documentation of each additional expense or income adjustment as well as explain the special circumstances that make such expense or income adjustment reasonable and necessary. In addition, the debtor must attest under oath to the accuracy of any information provided to demonstrate that such additional expenses or adjustments to income are required.]
Where the mandatory presumption of abuse does not apply or has been rebutted, the court, in order to determine whether the granting of relief under chapter 7 would constitute an abuse, must consider: (1) whether the debtor filed the chapter 7 case in bad faith; or (2) whether the totality of circumstances of the debtor's financial situation (including whether the debtor seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial need for such rejection) demonstrates abuse.
Should a court grant a section 707(b) motion made by a trustee and find that the action of the debtor's counsel in filing the chapter 7 case violated Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011, 68
[Footnote] S. 256 authorizes the court to order the attorney to reimburse the trustee for all reasonable costs in prosecuting the motion, including reasonable attorneys' fees. In addition, the court may assess an appropriate civil penalty. 69
[Footnote]
[Footnote 68: Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011. This rule is the bankruptcy analog to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which authorizes a court to impose sanctions against an attorney or party who commences a frivolous actions or files other inappropriate documents in violation of this Rule's requirements.]
[Footnote 69: Section 102(a) of S. 256 specifies that the signature of an attorney on a bankruptcy petition, pleading, or written motion constitutes a certification that the attorney has: (1) performed a reasonable investigation into the circumstances giving rise to such petition, pleading or motion; and (2) determined that the document is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and does not constitute an abuse under section 707(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to section 102(a), the signature of an attorney on a bankruptcy petition constitutes a certification that the attorney has no knowledge after an inquiry that the information in the schedules filed with such petition is incorrect.]
Two types of `safe harbors' apply to the means test. One provides that only a judge, United States trustee, bankruptcy administrator, or private trustee may file a motion to dismiss a chapter 7 case under section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code if the debtor's income (or in a joint case, the income of debtor and the debtor's spouse) does not exceed the state median family income for a family of equal or lesser size (adjusted for larger sized families), or the state median family income for one earner in the case of a one-person household. The second safe harbor provides that no motion under section 707(b)(2) (dismissal based on a chapter 7 debtor's ability to repay) may be filed by a judge, United States trustee, bankruptcy administrator, private trustee, or other party in interest if the debtor (including the circumstance where the debtor is a veteran) and the debtor's spouse combined have income that does not exceed the state median family income for a family of equal or lesser size (adjusted for larger sized families), or the state median family income for one earner in the case of a one-person household. 70
[Footnote] In addition, the bill includes a safe harbor from the bill's needs-based test for a disabled veteran whose indebtedness occurred primarily during a period when the individual was on active duty (as defined in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 101(d)(1)) or performing a homeland defense activity (as defined in 32 U.S.C. 901(1)).
[Footnote 70: In a case that is not a joint case, current monthly income of the debtor's spouse is not considered if the debtor and the debtor's spouse are separated under applicable nonbankruptcy law or the debtor and the debtor's spouse are living separate and apart (other than for the purpose of evading this provision) and the debtor files a statement under penalty of perjury containing certain specified information.]
Other Reforms Dealing with Abuse. S. 256 contains various reforms tailored to remedy certain types of fraud and abuse within the present bankruptcy system. For example, the bill substantially limits a debtor's ability to file successive bankruptcy cases. It also addresses abusive practices by consumer debtors who, for example, knowingly load up with credit card purchases or recklessly obtain cash advances and then file for bankruptcy relief. In addition, S. 256 prevents the discharge of debts based on fraud, embezzlement, and malicious injury in a chapter 13 case. Other abuse reforms include a provision authorizing the court to dismiss a chapter 7 case filed by an individual debtor convicted of a crime of violence or a drug trafficking crime on motion of the victim, under certain circumstances. And, the court, as a condition of confirming a chapter 13 plan, must find that the debtor filed the chapter 13 case in good faith.
The bill also restricts the so-called `mansion loophole.' Under current bankruptcy law, debtors living in certain states can shield from their creditors virtually all of the equity in their homes. In light of this, some debtors actually relocate to these states just to take advantage of their `mansion loophole' laws. S. 256 closes this loophole for abuse by requiring a debtor to be a domiciliary in the state for at least two years before he or she can claim that state's homestead exemption; the current requirement can be as little as 91 days. 71
[Footnote] The bill further reduces the opportunity for abuse by requiring a debtor to own the homestead for at least 40 months before he or she can use state exemption law; current law imposes no such requirement. 72
[Footnote] S. 256 prevents securities law violators and others who have engaged in criminal conduct from shielding their homestead assets from those whom they have defrauded or injured. If a debtor was convicted of a felony, violated a securities law, or committed a criminal act, intentional tort, or engaged in reckless misconduct that caused serious physical injury or death, the bill overrides state homestead exemption law and caps the debtor's homestead exemption at $125,000. To the extent a debtor's homestead exemption was obtained through the fraudulent conversion of nonexempt assets (e.g., cash) during the ten-year period preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case, S. 256 requires such exemption to be reduced by the amount attributable to the debtor's fraud.
[Footnote 71: See 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(b)(2)(2)(A).]
[Footnote 72: If the debtor owns the homestead for less than 40 months, the provision imposes a $125,000 homestead cap. In effect, this provision overrides state exemption law authorizing a homestead exemption in excess of this amount and allows such law to control if it authorizes a homestead exemption in a lesser amount.]
S. 256 also authorizes a trustee to avoid any transfer of property that a debtor made to a self-settled trust (of which the debtor is a beneficiary) within the ten-year period preceding the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy case if the debtor made the transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor of the debtor.
Protections for Creditors--In General. S. 256 includes provisions intended to provide greater protections for creditors, while ensuring that the claims of those creditors entitled to priority treatment, such as spousal and child support claimants, are not adversely impacted. These include provisions: (1) ensuring that creditors receive proper and timely notice of important events and proceedings in a bankruptcy case; (2) prohibiting abusive serial filings and extending the period between successive discharges; and (3) implementing various provisions designed to improve the accuracy of the information contained in debtors' schedules, statements of financial affairs. They also clarify that creditors holding consumer debts may participate without counsel at the section 341 meeting of creditors (which provides an opportunity for creditors to examine the debtor under oath).
Enforcement of Family Support Obligations. S. 256 accords domestic and child support claimants a broad spectrum of special protections. The legislation creates a uniform and expanded definition of domestic support obligations to include debts that accrue both before or after a bankruptcy case is filed. It gives the highest payment priority for these debts (current law only accords them a seventh-level priority), 73
[Footnote] with allowance for the payment of trustee administrative expenses, under certain conditions. In addition, the bill mandates that a debtor must be current on postpetition domestic support obligations to confirm a chapter 11, chapter 12 (family farmer) or chapter 13 plan of reorganization. To facilitate the domestic support collection efforts by governmental units, the legislation creates various exceptions to automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (which enjoin many forms of creditor collection activities). It also broadens the categories of nondischargeable family support obligations with the result that these debts will not be extinguished at the end of the bankruptcy process. The legislation, in addition, mandates that spousal and child support claimants as well as state child support agencies receive specified information and notices relevant to pending bankruptcy cases.
[Footnote 73: 11 U.S.C. Sec. 507(a)(7).]
Protections for Secured Creditors. S. 256's protections for secured creditors include a prohibition against bifurcating a secured debt incurred within the 910-day period preceding the filing of a bankruptcy case if the debt is secured by a purchase money security interest in a motor vehicle acquired for the debtor's personal use. Where the collateral consists of any other type of property having value, S. 256 prohibits bifurcation of specified secured debts if incurred during the one-year period preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case. The bill clarifies current law to specify that the value of a claim secured by personal property is the replacement value of such property without deduction for the secured creditor's costs of sale or marketing. In addition, the bill terminates the automatic stay with respect to personal property if the debtor does not timely reaffirm the underlying obligation or redeem the property. 74
[Footnote] S. 256 also specifies that a secured claimant retains its lien in a chapter 13 case until the underlying debt is paid or the debtor receives a discharge.
[Footnote 74: Redemption is a method by which a chapter 7 debtor can retain certain types of personal property by paying the holder of a lien on such property the allowed amount of the holder's secured lien. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 722.]
Protections for Lessors. With respect to the interests of lessors, S. 256 requires chapter 13 debtors to remain current on their personal property leases and to provide proof of adequate insurance. The bill specifies that a lessor may condition assumption of a personal property lease on cure of any outstanding default and it provides that a lessor is not required to permit such assumption. The bill also addresses a problem faced by thousands of large and small residential landlords across the nation whose tenants file for bankruptcy relief solely for the purpose of staying pending eviction proceedings so that they can live `rent free.'
Consumer Debtor Bankruptcy Protections. The bill's consumer protections include provisions strengthening professionalism standards for attorneys and others who assist consumer debtors with their bankruptcy cases. S. 256 mandates that certain services and specified notices be given to consumers by professionals and others who provide bankruptcy assistance. To ensure compliance with these provisions, the bill institutes various enforcement mechanisms.
In addition, S. 256 amends the Truth in Lending Act to require certain credit card solicitations, monthly billing statements, and related materials to include important disclosures and explanatory statements regarding introductory interest rates and minimum payments, among other matters. These additional disclosures are intended to give debtors important information to enable them to better manage their financial affairs.
S. 256 contains provisions to help debtors better understand their rights and obligations with respect to reaffirmation agreements. To enforce these protections, the bill requires the Attorney General to designate a United States Attorney for each judicial district and a FBI agent for each field office to have primary law enforcement responsibility regarding abusive reaffirmation practices, among other matters.
The legislation also expands a debtor's ability to exempt certain tax-qualified retirement accounts and pensions. It creates a new provision that allows a consumer debtor to exempt certain education IRAs and state tuition plans for his or her child's postsecondary education from the claims of creditors.
Most importantly, S. 256 requires debtors to participate in credit counseling programs before filing for bankruptcy relief (unless special circumstances do not permit such participation). The legislation's credit counseling provisions are intended to give consumers in financial distress an opportunity to learn about the consequences of bankruptcy--such as the potentially devastating effect it can have on their credit rating 75
[Footnote] --before they decide to file for bankruptcy relief. The bill also requires debtors, after they file for bankruptcy relief, to receive financial management training that will provide them with guidance about how to manage their finances, so that they can avoid future financial difficulties. The mandatory credit counseling and financial management training requirements do not apply if the debtor is unable to complete these requirements because of incapacity or disability, or because he or she is on active duty in a military combat zone.
[Footnote 75: Under current law, for example, a bankruptcy filing may be reported on a consumer's credit report for ten years. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681c (2002).]
Other debtor protections include expanded notice requirements for consumers. Under the bill, individuals with primarily consumer debts must receive notice of alternatives to bankruptcy relief before they file for bankruptcy and it requires them to be informed of other matters pertaining to the integrity of the bankruptcy system. The legislation also permits certain filing fees and related charges to be waived, in appropriate cases, for individuals who lack the ability to pay these costs.
Highlights of Business Bankruptcy Reforms.
S. 256 contains a comprehensive set of reforms pertinent to business bankruptcies. They include provisions addressing the special problems presented by small business bankruptcies and single asset real estate debtors as well as provisions dealing with business bankruptcy cases in general. S. 256 establishes a new form of bankruptcy relief for transnational insolvencies intended to promote international comity and greater certainty. It also includes provisions concerning the treatment of certain financial contracts under the banking laws as well as under the Bankruptcy Code. S. 256 responds to the special needs of family farmers by making chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code (a form of bankruptcy relief available only to eligible family farmers) permanent. For the first time, it also allows certain family fishermen to qualify for chapter 12 relief.
Protections Against Excessive Payments To a Debtor's Insiders and Fraud by a Debtor's Management. S. 256 significantly restricts a corporate debtor's ability to pay bonuses, severance payments, and other payments to insiders of the debtor after the bankruptcy case is filed and requires the court to approve any such payment. In addition, it requires the United States trustee to apply for the appointment of a trustee if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that current members of a chapter 11 debtor's governing body, chief executive officer, chief financial officer, or members of the debtor's governing body who selected the debtor's chief executive officer or chief financial officer participated in actual fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct in the management of the debtor or the debtor's public financial reporting.
Protections for Employees. S. 256 provides heightened protections for employees. It requires certain back pay awards granted as a result of a debtor's violation of Federal or state law to receive one of the highest payment priorities in a bankruptcy case. In addition, the bill streamlines the appointment of an ERISA administrator for an employee benefit plan, under certain circumstances, to minimize the disruption that results when an employer files for bankruptcy relief. S. 256 also increases the monetary cap on wage and employee benefit claims entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Code from $4,650 to $10,000 and lengthens the reachback period for wage claims from 90 days to 180 days. The bill amends the Bankruptcy Code to facilitate the recovery of avoidable transfers and excessive pre- and post-petition compensation, such as bonuses, paid to insiders of a debtor. In addition, S. 256 limits the ability of chapter 11 debtors to unilaterally terminate retiree benefit plans on the eve of bankruptcy.
Small Business/Single Asset Real Estate Debtors. S. 256 includes provisions with respect to small business and single asset real estate debtors largely derived from recommendations of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. 76
[Footnote]
[Footnote 76: See generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, at 303-706 (Oct. 20, 1997).]
Most chapter 11 cases are filed by small business debtors. Although the Bankruptcy Code envisions that creditors should play a major role in the oversight of chapter 11 cases, this often does not occur with respect to small business debtors. The main reason is that creditors in these smaller cases do not have claims large enough to warrant the time and money to participate actively in these cases. The resulting lack of creditor oversight creates a greater need for the United States trustee to monitor these cases closely. Nevertheless, the monitoring of these debtors by United States trustees varies throughout the nation. S. 256 addresses the special problems presented by small business cases by instituting a variety of time frames and enforcement mechanisms designed to weed out small business debtors who are not likely to reorganize. It also requires these cases to be more actively monitored by United States trustees and the bankruptcy courts.
With regard to the Bankruptcy Code's treatment of single asset real estate debtors, S. 256 makes several amendments. First, it eliminates the monetary cap from the single asset real estate debtor definition. Second, it makes these debtors subject to the bill's small business reforms. Third, S. 256 amends the automatic stay provisions by permitting a single asset real estate debtor to make requisite interest payments out of rents or other proceeds generated by the real property.
Financial Contracts. S. 256 contains a series of provisions pertaining to the treatment of certain financial transactions under the Bankruptcy Code and relevant banking laws. 77
[Footnote] These provisions are intended to reduce `systemic risk' in the banking system and financial marketplace. 78
[Footnote] To minimize the risk of disruption when parties to these transactions become bankrupt or insolvent, the bill amends provisions of the banking and investment laws, as well as the Bankruptcy Code, to allow the expeditious termination or netting of certain types of financial transactions. Many of these provisions are derived from recommendations issued by the President's Working Group on Financial Markets 79
[Footnote] and revisions espoused by the financial industry.
[Footnote 77: In addition to the Bankruptcy Code, the bill amends the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, the Federal Reserve Act, and the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1971.]
[Footnote 78: The report on H.R. 4393, a bill substantially similar to title IX of S. 256 that was introduced in the 105th Congress, explained as follows:]
Systemic risk is the risk that the failure of a firm or disruption of a market or settlement system will cause widespread difficulties at other firms, in other market segments or in the financial system as a whole. If participants in certain financial activities are unable to enforce their rights to terminate financial contracts with an insolvent entity in a timely manner, or to offset or net their various contractual obligations, the resulting uncertainty and potential lack of liquidity could increase the risk of an inter-market disruption.
[Footnote 79: The Working Group's members included representatives from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Department of the Treasury, including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. at 1.]
Family Farmers and Family Fishermen. S. 256 helps small family farmers facing financial distress. While current bankruptcy law has a specialized form of bankruptcy relief--chapter 12--that is specifically designed for family farmers, its benefits for farmers are limited because of its restrictive eligibility requirements. S. 256 responds to this problem in several key respects: it more than doubles the debt eligibility limit and requires it to be periodically adjusted for inflation; it lowers the requisite percentage of a farmer's income that must be derived from farming operations; and it gives farmers more flexibility with respect to how certain creditors can be repaid. As a result, many more deserving family farmers facing financial hard times will be able to avail themselves of chapter 12. In addition, S. 256 makes chapter 12 a permanent component of the bankruptcy laws and extends the benefits of this form of bankruptcy relief to family fishermen.
Transnational Insolvencies. In response to the increasing globalization of business enterprises and operations, S. 256 establishes a separate chapter under the Bankruptcy Code devoted to transnational insolvencies. These provisions are intended to provide greater legal certainty for trade and investment as well as to provide for the fair and efficient administration of these cases. They reflect consensus recommendations of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. 80
[Footnote]
[Footnote 80: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, at 351-70 (Oct. 20, 1997).]
Protections for Small Business Owners. Under current bankruptcy law, a business can be sued by a bankruptcy trustee and forced to pay back--as a preferential transfer--monies previously paid to it by a firm that later files for bankruptcy protection. S. 256 contains provisions making it easier--particularly for small businesses--to defend against these suits. These provisions largely reflect recommendations of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. 81
[Footnote]
[Footnote 81: Id. at 793-803.]
Health Care Providers. S. 256 adds a provision to the Bankruptcy Code intended to give patients of bankrupt health care providers various protections. These include provisions specifying requirements for the disposal of patient records so that a patient's privacy and the confidentiality of such records when they are in the custody of a health care business in bankruptcy are protected. In addition, the bill includes a provision according administrative expense priority to the actual, necessary costs and expenses of closing a health care business (including the disposal of patient records or transferral of patients) incurred by a trustee, Federal agency, or a department or state agency. If warranted, it also authorizes the court to order the appointment of an ombudsman to monitor the quality of patient care and to represent the interests of the patients. Other provisions include the requirement that a bankruptcy trustee use all reasonable and best efforts to transfer patients from a health care business that is being closed to an appropriate alternative facility that meets certain specified criteria.
Other Provisions Having General Impact.
Privacy Protections. Under current law, nearly every item of information filed in a bankruptcy case is made available to the public. S. 256 restricts public access to certain personal information pertaining to an individual contained a bankruptcy case file to the extent the court finds that disclosure of such information would create undue risk of identity theft or other unlawful injury to the individual or the individual's property. In addition, the bill prohibits the disclosure of the names of the debtor's minor children and requires such information to be kept in a nonpublic record, which can be made available for inspection only by the court and certain other designated entities. Further, S. 256 prohibits the sale of customers' personally identifiable information by a business debtor unless certain conditions are satisfied.
Additional Bankruptcy Judgeships. S. 256 authorizes 28 additional bankruptcy judgeships on a temporary basis and extends three currently existing temporary judgeships. 82
[Footnote] This provision responds to the 59 percent increase in the caseload of bankruptcy judges since 1992, reported by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 83
[Footnote]
[Footnote 82: Districts authorized additional bankruptcy judgeships under S. 256 include the following: Eastern District of California (one), Central District of California (three), Delaware (four), Southern District of Florida (two), Southern District of Georgia (one), Maryland (three), Eastern District of Michigan (one), Southern District of Mississippi (one), New Jersey (one), Nevada (one), Eastern District of New York (one), Northern District of New York (one), Southern District of New York (one), Eastern District of North Carolina (one), Eastern District of Pennsylvania (one), Middle District of Pennsylvania (one), Puerto Rico (one), South Carolina (one), Western District of Tennessee (one), Eastern District of Virginia (one).]
[Footnote 83: Press Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Record Breaking Bankruptcy Filings Reported in Calendar Year 2002 (Feb. 14, 2003) (noting that `no new bankruptcy judgeships have been created since 1992').]
Miscellaneous Provisions. Under current law, an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision must be heard by a Federal district court or bankruptcy appellate panel before it may be heard by a Federal court of appeals. S. 256 authorizes a direct appeal from a bankruptcy court decision to the court of appeals, under certain circumstances. Other general provisions include allowing attorneys to share compensation with bona fide public service attorney referral programs, and mandating that a bankruptcy court conduct scheduling conferences in a bankruptcy case if necessary to further its expeditious and economical resolution. In addition, the bill requires the United States Trustee Program to compile various statistics regarding chapter 7, 11 and 13 cases and to make these data available to the public. S. 256 also permits a court to seal all public records pertaining to a fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy petition, under certain circumstances, and to prohibit a consumer reporting agency from issuing a consumer report containing any reference to such petition.
The Committee on the Judiciary held no hearings on S. 256.
On March 16, 2005, the Committee met in open session and ordered favorably reported the bill S. 256 without an amendment by a recorded vote of 22 to 13, a quorum being present.
In compliance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee notes that the following roll call votes occurred during the Committee's consideration of S. 256.
1. An amendment by Mr. Conyers disallowing: (a) claims resulting from an assignment of a debtor's right to receive military pay, or military pension or disability benefits; (b) certain claims owed by a servicemember or a dependent of a servicemember that are either secured or conditioned upon a personal check held for future deposit or electronic access to a bank account; or (3) claims owed by a servicemember or dependent of a servicemember requiring the payment of interest and other charges in excess of 36 percent. The amendment also allows the discharge of certain debts based on the debtor's right to receive military pay, or military pension or disability benefits. Defeated 15 to 20.
ROLLCALL NO. 1
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Ayes Nays Present
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Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas) X
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus X
Mr. Inglis X
Mr. Hostettler X
Mr. Green
Mr. Keller X
Mr. Issa X
Mr. Flake X
Mr. Pence X
Mr. Forbes X
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert X
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman X
Mr. Boucher
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren X
Ms. Jackson Lee X
Ms. Waters X
Mr. Meehan X
Mr. Delahunt X
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez X
Mr. Smith X
Mr. Van Hollen X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 15 20
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2. An amendment by Mr. Watt and Mr. Delahunt disallowing a claim for a debt based on an extension of credit on which the annual rate of interest in excess of 50 percent was imposed or in excess of a limit on allowable interest under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Defeated 9 to 15.
ROLLCALL NO. 2
----------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
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Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas) X
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus
Mr. Inglis
Mr. Hostettler X
Mr. Green X
Mr. Keller
Mr. Issa X
Mr. Flake
Mr. Pence
Mr. Forbes
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert X
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman
Mr. Boucher
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee X
Ms. Waters
Mr. Meehan X
Mr. Delahunt X
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Weiner
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez X
Mr. Smith (Washington)
Mr. Van Hollen
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 9 15
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3. An amendment by Mr. Watt amending section 102 of the bill to permit a debtor to claim as an expense, in addition to elementary and secondary school educational expenses, the actual tuition costs per each child (exclusive of room and board) to attend a postsecondary education institution, and certain other educational programs. Defeated 10 to 17.
ROLLCALL NO. 3
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Ayes Nays Present
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Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas)
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus X
Mr. Inglis
Mr. Hostettler X
Mr. Green X
Mr. Keller X
Mr. Issa X
Mr. Flake
Mr. Pence
Mr. Forbes
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert X
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman
Mr. Boucher X
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee X
Ms. Waters
Mr. Meehan X
Mr. Delahunt X
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez X
Mr. Smith (Washington)
Mr. Van Hollen
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 10 17
----------------------------------------------
4. An amendment by Mr. Nadler amending sections 404, 411, 417, 436, 437, and 438 of the bill to permit the court, under specified circumstances, to extend certain time periods specified therein. Defeated 13 to 18.
ROLLCALL NO. 4
----------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas) X
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus X
Mr. Inglis X
Mr. Hostettler X
Mr. Green X
Mr. Keller X
Mr. Issa X
Mr. Flake
Mr. Pence
Mr. Forbes
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert X
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman X
Mr. Boucher
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee
Ms. Waters X
Mr. Meehan X
Mr. Delahunt X
Mr. Wexler X
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez X
Mr. Smith (Washington) X
Mr. Van Hollen
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 13 18
----------------------------------------------
5. An amendment by Mr. Schiff amending section 102 of the bill to prohibit a judge, United States trustee, trustee, or other party in interest from dismissing a chapter 7 case on the basis of the debtor's ability to repay if the debtor is an identity theft victim, under certain circumstances. Defeated 13 to 15.
ROLLCALL NO. 5
----------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas) X
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus X
Mr. Inglis X
Mr. Hostettler
Mr. Green X
Mr. Keller
Mr. Issa
Mr. Flake
Mr. Pence
Mr. Forbes
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert X
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman X
Mr. Boucher
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee
Ms. Waters X
Mr. Meehan X
Mr. Delahunt X
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez X
Mr. Smith (Washington) X
Mr. Van Hollen X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 13 15
----------------------------------------------
6. An amendment by Mr. Delahunt amending Bankruptcy Code section 548 to authorize a trustee to avoid a transfer of an interest of a debtor made within the ten-year period preceding the bankruptcy filing to an asset protection trust if the amount of the transfer or aggregate amount of all transfers during such period exceeds $125,000, with certain exceptions. Defeated 10 to 15.
ROLLCALL NO. 6
----------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas)
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus
Mr. Inglis
Mr. Hostettler X
Mr. Green
Mr. Keller X
Mr. Issa
Mr. Flake X
Mr. Pence
Mr. Forbes X
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman X
Mr. Boucher X
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee X
Ms. Waters X
Mr. Meehan
Mr. Delahunt X
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez
Mr. Smith (Washington)
Mr. Van Hollen
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 10 15
----------------------------------------------
7. An amendment by Mr. Berman and Mr. Meehan amending Bankruptcy Code section 522 to create a uniform Federal homestead exemption floor in the amount of $150,000 for a medically distressed debtor. Defeated 13 to 18.
ROLLCALL NO. 7
----------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas)
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Chabot
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus X
Mr. Inglis X
Mr. Hostettler X
Mr. Green X
Mr. Keller X
Mr. Issa X
Mr. Flake X
Mr. Pence
Mr. Forbes X
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman X
Mr. Boucher X
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee X
Ms. Waters X
Mr. Meehan X
Mr. Delahunt X
Mr. Wexler X
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez
Mr. Smith (Washington)
Mr. Van Hollen X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 13 18
----------------------------------------------
8. An amendment by Mr. Nadler amending Bankruptcy Code section 523(a) to provide that a debt that results from any judgment, order, consent order, or decree entered in any Federal or state court or contained in any settlement agreement entered into by the debtor that arises from: (a) the violation of certain specified offenses under title 18 of the United States Code; (b) an offense under state law that would be a civil rights crime (as described in the preceding clause); (c) a violation under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983; or (d) the intentional actions of a debtor that violate a valid court order enforcing a civil rights law described in (a) or (b). It also amends Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(13) to include an order of restitution under the criminal law of a state. Defeated 11 to 17.
ROLLCALL NO. 8
----------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas) X
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus X
Mr. Inglis
Mr. Hostettler X
Mr. Green X
Mr. Keller
Mr. Issa
Mr. Flake
Mr. Pence
Mr. Forbes X
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert X
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman X
Mr. Boucher X
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee
Ms. Waters X
Mr. Meehan X
Mr. Delahunt X
Mr. Wexler X
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez
Mr. Smith (Washington)
Mr. Van Hollen
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 11 17
----------------------------------------------
9. An amendment by Mr. Meehan amending section 102 of the bill to provide that the needs-based requirements under Bankruptcy Code section 707(b)(2)(A) through (C) (as amended by section 102) shall not apply to, and the court may not dismiss or convert a chapter 7 case filed by, a debtor who is a disabled veteran based on any form of means testing, under certain specified circumstances. Defeated 12 to 19.
ROLLCALL NO. 9
----------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas) X
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus X
Mr. Inglis X
Mr. Hostettler X
Mr. Green
Mr. Keller X
Mr. Issa X
Mr. Flake
Mr. Pence
Mr. Forbes X
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert X
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman X
Mr. Boucher X
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee X
Ms. Waters X
Mr. Meehan X
Mr. Delahunt
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez X
Mr. Smith (Washington)
Mr. Van Hollen X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 12 19
----------------------------------------------
10. An amendment by Ms. Jackson Lee amending section 102 of the bill to increase the amount of actual expenses a chapter 7 debtor may claim under the provision's needs-based test for certain educational costs for a debtor's dependent child from $1,500 to $3,000. Defeated 12 to 21.
ROLLCALL NO. 10
----------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas) X
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte X
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus X
Mr. Inglis X
Mr. Hostettler
Mr. Green X
Mr. Keller X
Mr. Issa X
Mr. Flake
Mr. Pence X
Mr. Forbes X
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert X
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman X
Mr. Boucher X
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee X
Ms. Waters X
Mr. Meehan
Mr. Delahunt
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez X
Mr. Smith (Was1hington) X
Mr. Van Hollen X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 12 21
----------------------------------------------
11. Three en bloc amendments by Ms. Jackson Lee as follows: (a) amending Bankruptcy Code section 523(a) to provide that a debt arising from certain sex offenses in which the victim was an individual who had not attained the age of 17 years is nondischargeable; (b) amending Bankruptcy Code section 523(a) to provide that a debt arising from a judicial, administrative, or other action related to the consumption or consumer purchase of a tobacco product that is based in whole or in part on false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud is nondischargeable; and (c) amending section 708 of the bill to provide that the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan under Bankruptcy Code section 1141 does not discharge a debtor that is corporation from a debt specified in Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(9). Defeated 9 to 20.
ROLLCALL NO. 11
----------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas) X
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte X
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus X
Mr. Inglis X
Mr. Hostettler
Mr. Green
Mr. Keller X
Mr. Issa X
Mr. Flake
Mr. Pence X
Mr. Forbes X
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert X
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman X
Mr. Boucher X
Mr. Nadler
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee X
Ms. Waters X
Mr. Meehan X
Mr. Delahunt
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff
Ms. Sanchez
Mr. Smith (Washington)
Mr. Van Hollen X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 9 20
----------------------------------------------
12. Motion to report S. 256 favorably. Passed 22 to 13.
ROLLCALL NO. 12
----------------------------------------------
Ayes Nays Present
----------------------------------------------
Mr. Hyde
Mr. Coble X
Mr. Smith (Texas) X
Mr. Gallegly X
Mr. Goodlatte X
Mr. Chabot X
Mr. Lungren X
Mr. Jenkins X
Mr. Cannon X
Mr. Bachus X
Mr. Inglis X
Mr. Hostettler
Mr. Green X
Mr. Keller X
Mr. Issa X
Mr. Flake X
Mr. Pence X
Mr. Forbes X
Mr. King X
Mr. Feeney X
Mr. Franks X
Mr. Gohmert X
Mr. Conyers X
Mr. Berman X
Mr. Boucher X
Mr. Nadler X
Mr. Scott X
Mr. Watt X
Ms. Lofgren
Ms. Jackson Lee X
Ms. Waters X
Mr. Meehan X
Mr. Delahunt X
Mr. Wexler
Mr. Weiner X
Mr. Schiff X
Ms. Sanchez X
Mr. Smith (Washington)
Mr. Van Hollen X
Mr. Sensenbrenner, Chairman X
Total 22 13
----------------------------------------------
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of Rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report.
In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee adopts as its own the estimate of budget authority, or tax expenditures or revenues contained in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office pursuant to section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to the bill, S. 256, the following estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974:
Hon. F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Chairman,
Committee on the
Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 256, the `Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,' as reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary. This version of S. 256 is identical to the legislation as passed by the Senate on March 10, 2005.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Gregory Waring (for Federal spending), who can be reached at 226-2860, Annabelle Bartsch (for Federal revenues), who can be reached at 226-2720, Melissa Merrell (for the State and local impact), who can be reached at 225-3220, and Paige Piper/Bach (for the private-sector impact), who can be reached at 226-2940.
Sincerely,
Douglas Holtz-Eakin.
S. 256--Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.
CBO estimates that implementing S. 256 would result in gross discretionary costs of $392 million over the 2006-2010 period, primarily to pay for increased responsibilities of the United States Trustees (U.S. Trustees), assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. At the same time, the act would increase the fees charged for filing certain bankruptcy cases and would change how some of these fees are currently recorded in the budget during the first 5 years after enactment. We estimate that implementing the act would increase the amount of bankruptcy fees that are treated as an offset to appropriations by $75 million over the 5-year period, resulting in an estimated net increase in discretionary spending of approximately $318 million over this period.
In addition, CBO estimates that enacting S. 256 would increase revenues by about $60 million over the 2006-2010 period and by about $140 million over the 2006-2015 period primarily because of provisions that temporarily amend the Treasury's allocation of filing fees. Finally, enactment of S. 256 would authorize additional judgeships, and we estimate that the mandatory pay and benefits for those positions would cost $26 million over the next 5 years and $45 million over the 2006-2015 period.
On balance and assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts to implement the act, CBO estimates that its enactment would increase budget deficits by about $280 million over the 2006-2010 period.
S. 256 contains two intergovernmental mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), but CBO estimates that the costs would be insignificant and would not exceed the threshold established in UMRA ($62 million in 2005, adjusted annually for inflation). Overall, CBO expects that enacting this bill would benefit State and local governments by enhancing their ability to collect outstanding obligations in bankruptcy cases.
S. 256 would impose private-sector mandates, as defined in UMRA, on bankruptcy attorneys, creditors, bankruptcy petition preparers, debt-relief agencies, consumer reporting agencies, and credit and charge-card companies. CBO estimates that the direct costs of those mandates would exceed the annual threshold established by UMRA ($123 million in 2005, adjusted annually for inflation).
In addition to establishing means-testing for determining eligibility for chapter 7 bankruptcy relief, S. 256 would:
Other provisions would make various changes affecting the bankruptcy provisions for municipalities and the treatment of tax liabilities in bankruptcy cases.
As shown in Table 1, CBO estimates that implementing S. 256 would result in a net increase in discretionary spending of about $318 million over the 2006-2010 period, subject to future appropriation actions. In addition, we estimate that mandatory spending for the salaries and benefits of bankruptcy judges would increase by less than $100,000 in 2005 and by $26 million over the 2006-2010 period. Enacting the legislation's provisions for adjusting filing fees would increase revenues by about $60 million over the next 5 years. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 750 (administration of justice).
TABLE 1. ESTIMATED BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF S. 256
By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Means-Testing (Section 102)
Estimated Authorization Level 0 16 24 39 39 36
Estimated Outlays 0 14 23 39 39 36
Studies by U.S. Trustees, GAO, and SBA (Sections 103, 230, and 443)
Estimated Authorization Level 0 1 * 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays 0 1 * 0 0 0
Debtor Financial Management Training (Section 105)
Estimated Authorization Level 0 3 1 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays 0 2 1 * 0 0
Credit Counseling Certification (Section 106)
Estimated Authorization Level 0 4 7 8 8 7
Estimated Outlays 0 4 6 8 8 7
Maintenance of Tax Returns (Section 315)
Estimated Authorization Level 0 2 2 2 2 2
Estimated Outlays 0 2 2 2 2 2
Changes in Bankruptcy Filing Fees (Sections 325 and 418)
Estimated Authorization Level 0 -46 -49 6 7 7
Estimated Outlays 0 -46 -49 6 7 7
U.S. Trustee Site Visits (Section 439)
Estimated Authorization Level 0 3 3 3 3 3
Estimated Outlays 0 3 3 3 3 3
Compiling and Publishing Data (Sections 601-602)
Estimated Authorization Level 0 1 7 8 8 8
Estimated Outlays 0 1 7 8 8 8
Audit Procedures (Section 603)
Estimated Authorization Level 0 0 16 17 17 16
Estimated Outlays 0 0 16 17 17 16
Additional Judgeships--Support Costs (Section 1223)
Estimated Authorization Level * 8 17 17 18 18
Estimated Outlays * 7 16 17 18 18
FTC Toll-Free Hotline (Section 1301)
Estimated Authorization Level 0 2 1 1 1 1
Estimated Outlays 0 2 1 1 1 1
Total Discretionary Changes
Estimated Authorization Level * -6 29 101 103 98
Estimated Outlays * -10 26 101 103 98
CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING
Additional Judgeships (Section 1223)
Estimated Budget Authority * 3 6 6 6 6
Estimated Outlays * 3 5 6 6 6
CHANGES IN REVENUES
Changes in Revenue from Filing Fees
Estimated Revenues 0 -6 -12 30 24 24
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For this estimate, CBO assumes that S. 256 will be enacted by July 2005 and that the amounts necessary to implement the act will be appropriated for each fiscal year. Many of the act's new provisions would be effective 180 days after enactment. However, a few provisions would be effective 18 months after enactment. CBO assumes those provisions would take effect in fiscal year 2007.
Spending Subject to Appropriation
Most of the estimated increases in discretionary spending under S. 256 would be required to fund the additional workload that would be imposed on the U.S. Trustees. Those increases would be partially offset for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 by changes in bankruptcy filing fees that would be recorded as offsetting collections under the act. CBO estimates that implementing S. 256 would result in a net increase in discretionary costs of about $318 million over the 2006-2010 period, with most of the increase falling after 2007.
Means-Testing (Section 102). This section would establish a system of means-testing for determining a debtor's eligibility for relief under chapter 7. Under the proposed means test, if the amount of debtor income remaining after certain expenses and other specified amounts are deducted from the debtor's current monthly income exceeds the threshold specified in section 102, then the debtor would be presumed ineligible for chapter 7 relief. A debtor who could not demonstrate `special circumstances,' which would cause the expected disposable income to fall below the threshold, could file under other chapters of the bankruptcy code.
Although the private trustees would be responsible for conducting the initial review of a debtor's income and expenses and filing the majority of motions for dismissal or conversion, CBO expects that the workload of the U.S. Trustees would increase under the means-testing provision. The U. S. Trustees would provide increased oversight of the work performed by the private trustees, file additional motions for dismissal or conversion, and take part in additional litigation that is expected to occur as the courts and debtors debate allowable expenses and other related issues. Although CBO cannot predict the amount of such litigation, we expect that, during the first few years following enactment of the act, the amount of litigation could be significant as parties test the new law's standards. In subsequent years, litigation could begin to subside as precedents are established. Based on information from the U.S. Trustees, CBO estimates that the U.S. Trustees would require 200 additional attorneys, paralegals, and analysts to address the increased workload. As a result, CBO estimates that implementing this provision would cost about $150 million over the 2006-2010 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary funds.
Studies by the U.S. Trustees, Government Accountability Office (GAO), and Small Business Administration (SBA) (Sections 103, 205, 230, and 443). Section 103 would require the U.S. Trustees to conduct a study regarding the use of Internal Revenue Service expense standards for determining a debtor's current monthly expenses and the impact of those standards on debtors and bankruptcy courts. Section 230 would require GAO to conduct a study regarding the feasibility of requiring trustees to provide the Office of Child Support Enforcement information about outstanding child support obligations of debtors. Section 205 would require GAO to conduct a study on the treatment of consumers by creditors with respect to reaffirmation agreements. Section 443 would require the Administrator of SBA, in consultation with the Attorney General, the U.S. Trustees, and the AOUSC, to conduct a study on small business bankruptcy issues. Based on information from the U.S. Trustees, GAO, and SBA, CBO estimates that completing the necessary studies would cost about $1 million in 2006 and less than $500,000 in 2007, subject to the availability of appropriated funds.
Debtor Financial Management Test Training Program (Section 105). This section would require the U.S. Trustees to establish a test training program to educate debtors on financial management. The test training program would be authorized for six judicial districts over an 18-month period. Based on information from the U.S. Trustees, CBO estimates that about 90,000 debtors would participate if such a program were administered by the U.S. Trustees in fiscal years 2006 and 2007. At a projected cost of about $40 per debtor, CBO estimates that implementing this provision would cost nearly $4 million over the 2006-2007 period.
Credit Counseling Certification (Section 106). This section would require the U.S. Trustees to certify, on an annual basis, that certain credit counseling services could provide adequate services to potential debtors. Based on information from the U.S. Trustees, CBO estimates that the U.S. Trustees would require additional attorneys and analysts to handle the greater workload associated with certification. CBO estimates that implementing this provision would cost $33 million over the 2006-2010 period.
Maintenance of Tax Returns (Section 315). This section would authorize the AOUSC to receive and retain debtors' tax returns for the year prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy for chapter 7 and chapter 13 filings. Such collection and storage of tax returns would commence only at the request of a creditor. Based on information from the AOUSC, CBO expects that creditors will request tax information in about 25 percent of such cases. CBO estimates that implementing section 315 would cost $10 million over the 2006-2010 period to store and provide access to about two million tax returns.
Changes in Bankruptcy Filing Fees (Sections 325 and 418). Section 325 would increase chapter 7 and chapter 11 bankruptcy filing fees, decrease the chapter 13 filing fee, and change the distribution of such fees during the first 5 years after enactment. Considering the expected reduction in the use of chapter 7 because of means-testing and a provision in section 418 that would allow fee waivers, CBO estimates that implementing the new fee structure and changes in fee classifications would result in a net increase in offsetting collections totaling $75 million over the 2006-2010 period.
Current Law Filing Fees. Under current law, the filing fee for chapter 7 and chapter 13 is $155 and is divided between the U.S. Trustee System Fund (recorded as an offsetting collection), the AOUSC (recorded as an offsetting receipt), the private trustee assigned to the case, and the remainder is recorded as a governmental receipt (i.e., revenue). The filing fee for chapter 11 relief is currently set at $800 and is divided between the U.S. Trustee System Fund and the AOUSC, and the remainder is also recorded as a governmental receipt. Section 325 would change the filing fees for chapters 7, 13, and 11 to $200, $1,000, and $150, respectively.
Distribution of Filing Fees. During the first 2 years after enactment, the S. 256 would allow the U.S. Trustee System Fund to retain (as an offset to appropriations) a larger portion of the current-law chapter 7, 13, and 11 filing fees. At the same time, the act would temporarily reduce for 2 years the percentage of current-law filing fees allocated to the AOUSC, and, because current law sets the private trustee's portion of the filing fee at a flat amount ($45), no portion of the current-law filing fees would be recorded as governmental receipts during fiscal years 2006 and 2007. After 2 years, the distribution of the filing fees under S. 256 would revert to the distribution formula in current law.
Under S. 256, the general fund of the Treasury would receive any increase in bankruptcy filing fees due to enactment of the legislation over the 2006-2010 period. Beginning in 2011, the full amount of the proposed fees would be allocated according to the formula specified in current law. Of the $200 fee for chapter 7 filers, about $55 would be recorded as an offsetting collection to the appropriation for the U.S. Trustees System Fund, and almost $68 would be recorded as an offsetting receipt and spent without further appropriation by the AOUSC. The private trustee assigned to the case would receive $45 and the remainder of the fee would be recorded as a governmental receipt. Of the $150 fee for a chapter 13 case, the U.S. Trustee System Fund would receive about $41, and the AOUSC would receive almost $51 per case to spend without further appropriation. Finally, of the $1,000 fee per chapter 11 case, the U.S. Trustee System Fund would receive $500, the AOUSC would receive $250, and the remainder of the fee would be recorded as a governmental receipt.
Fee Waivers. Section 418 would permit a bankruptcy court or district court to waive the chapter 7 filing fee and other fees for a debtor who is unable to pay such fees in installments. Based on information from the AOUSC, CBO expects that, in fiscal year 2006, chapter 7 filing fees would be waived for about 3.5 percent of all chapter 7 filers and that the percentage waived would gradually increase to about 10 percent by fiscal year 2009.
U.S. Trustee Site Visits in Chapter 11 Cases (Section 439). This section would expand the responsibilities of the U.S. Trustees in small business bankruptcy cases to include site visits to inspect the debtor's premises, review records, and verify that the debtor has filed tax returns. Based on information from the U.S. Trustees, CBO estimates that implementing section 439 would require about 20 additional analysts to conduct over 2,300 site visits each year. CBO estimates that implementing this provision would cost about $15 million over the 2006-2010 period for the salaries, benefits, and travel expenses associated with those additional personnel.
Compilation and Publication of Bankruptcy Data and Statistics (Sections 601-602). Beginning 18 months after enactment, the act would require the AOUSC to collect data on chapter 7, chapter 11, and chapter 13 cases and the U.S. Trustees to make such information available to the public. CBO estimates that it would cost about $32 million over the 2006-2010 period to meet these requirements. Of the total estimated cost, about $25 million would be required for additional legal clerks, analysts, and data base support. The remainder would be incurred by the U.S. Trustees for compiling data and providing Internet access to records pertaining to bankruptcy cases.
Audit Procedures (Section 603). Beginning 18 months after enactment, S. 256 would require that at least one out of every 250 bankruptcy cases under chapter 7 and chapter 13, plus other selected cases under those chapters, be audited by an independent certified public accountant. Based on information from the U.S. Trustees, CBO estimates that less than 1 percent of about 1.6 million cases a year would be subject to potential audits. Each audit would cost roughly $1,000 (in 2005 dollars). CBO also expects that the U.S. Trustees would need about 10 additional analysts and attorneys to support the follow-up work associated with the audits. We estimate that implementing this provision would cost $66 million over the 2006-2010 period.
Additional Judgeships--Support Costs (Section 1223). This provision would extend four temporary bankruptcy judgeships and authorize 28 new temporary bankruptcy judgeships. Based on information from the AOUSC, CBO assumes that about half of the 28 new positions would be filled by the beginning of fiscal year 2006 and the rest would be filled by the start of fiscal year 2007. Also, we anticipate that all four temporary judgeships would be filled by fiscal year 2007. We expect that discretionary expenditures for support costs associated with each judgeship would average about $500,000 annually (in 2005 dollars). CBO estimates that the administrative support of additional bankruptcy judges would cost less than $200,000 in fiscal year 2005 and $76 million over the 2006-2010 period. (Salaries and benefits for the judges are classified as mandatory spending, and those costs are described below.)
Federal Trade Commission Toll-Free Hotline (Section 1301). This section would require the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to operate a toll-free number for consumers to calculate how long it would take to pay off a credit card debt if they were to make only the minimum monthly payments. Based on information from the FTC about the demand for similar services, CBO expects that the FTC would receive about 20,000 calls each month. CBO estimates that the equipment and personnel necessary to serve this volume of inquires would cost $2 million in 2006 and $6 million over the 2006-2010 period, subject to appropriation of the necessary amounts.
Direct Spending and Revenues
By adding additional judgeships and changing the budgetary classification of bankruptcy filing fees, CBO estimates that enacting S. 256 would increase direct spending by about $45 million over the 2006-2015 period and increase revenues by approximately $140 million over the 2006-2015 period as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2. ESTIMATED CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING AND REVENUES UNDER S. 256
By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
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CHANGES IN DIRECT SPENDING
Additional Judgeships (Section 1223)
Estimated Budget Authority * 3 6 6 6 6 6 5 3 3 2
Estimated Outlays * 3 5 6 6 6 6 5 3 3 2
CHANGES IN REVENUES
Changes in Revenue from Filing Fees
Estimated Revenues 0 -6 -12 30 24 24 16 16 16 16 16
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Additional Judgeships (Section 1223). CBO estimates that enacting the means-testing provision (section 102) would impose some additional workload on the courts. Section 128 would authorize 28 new temporary bankruptcy judgeships and extend four existing temporary judgeships. Based on information from the AOUSC and other bankruptcy experts, CBO expects that the increase in the number of bankruptcy judges would be sufficient to meet the increased workload. Assuming that the salary and benefits of a bankruptcy judge would average about $177,000 a year (in 2005 dollars), CBO estimates that the mandatory costs associated with the salaries and benefits of those additional judgeships would be less than $100,000 in fiscal year 2005, about $26 million over the 2006-2010 period, and about $45 million over the 2006-2015 period.
Changes in Bankruptcy Filing Fees (Sections 102, 325, and 418). Section 325 would increase the fees charged for filing bankruptcy cases and change the classification of where bankruptcy filing fees are recorded in the budget. Under current law, filing fees are divided between the U.S. Trustee System Fund, the AOUSC, the private trustee assigned to the case, and the remainder are recorded as governmental receipts (i.e., revenues). The percentage of the fees allocated to those different parts of the budget varies by chapter.
During the first 5 years of the new fee structure proposed in S. 256, the increase in the chapter 7, chapter 11, and chapter 13 filing fees above the amounts expected to be collected under current law would be recorded as revenues. During the first 2 years after enactment of S. 256, however, the portion of the fees charged under current law for chapters 7, 13, and 11 that are now recorded as revenues would be recorded as offsetting collections or offsetting receipts. The allocation of those fees would return to the same allocation as under current law after 2 years. In sum, CBO estimates that enacting S. 256 would increase revenues by about $60 million over the 2006-2010 period and by about $144 million over the 2006-2015 period. (The change in offsetting receipts would be matched by additional spending, resulting in no net change in direct spending.)
Tax Provisions (Title VII). Title VII of S. 256 would alter several provisions related to tax claims. It would alter the treatment of certain tax liens, disallow the discharge of taxes resulting from fraudulent tax returns under chapter 11 or chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code, require periodic cash payments of priority tax claims, and specify the rate of interest on tax claims. Title VII also would change the status of assessment periods for tax claims and would alter various administrative requirements. Based on information from the Internal Revenue Service and the Joint Committee on Taxation, CBO estimates that these provisions would increase revenues, but that any increase would be negligible.
S. 256 contains intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA, but CBO estimates that any resulting costs would not be significant and would not exceed the threshold established in UMRA ($62 million in 2005, adjusted annually for inflation). Overall, CBO expects that enacting this act would benefit State and local governments by enhancing their ability to collect outstanding obligations in bankruptcy cases.
Mandates
Section 227 of the act would preempt State laws governing contracts between a debt relief agency and a debtor but only to the extent that those State laws are inconsistent with the Federal requirements set forth in S. 256. Such preemptions are mandates as defined in UMRA. Because the preemption would not require States to take any action, CBO estimates that the costs to comply with this mandate would not be significant.
Section 719 would require State and local income tax procedures to conform to the Internal Revenue Code with regard to dividing tax liabilities and responsibilities between the estate and the debtor, the tax consequences of partnerships and transfers of property, and the taxable period of the debtor. CBO estimates that this provision would increase costs for the administration of State and local tax laws but would not require State and local tax rates to conform to the Federal rates. Such administrative costs would not be significant and would likely be offset by increased collections by State and local governments.
Other Impacts
The changes to bankruptcy law in the act would affect State and local governments primarily as creditors and holders of claims against debtors for taxes or child support payments. In addition, it would change some of the State statutes that govern which of a debtor's assets are protected from creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding.
According to the Federation of Tax Administrators, while total bankruptcy filings have increased in the last decade, the proportion of claims collected by States from taxpayers in bankruptcy has remained relatively constant--about 5 percent of claims owed. CBO cannot predict how much more money might be collected under this legislation; however, we think that it is likely that State and local governments would collect a greater share of future claims than they would under current law.
Domestic Support Obligations. S. 256 would enhance a State's ability to collect domestic support obligations, including child support. Domestic support obligations owed to State or local governments would be given priority over all other claims except those same obligations owed to individuals. The act would make those debts nondischargeable (not able to be written-off at the end of bankruptcy). The act also would require that filers under chapter 11 and 13 cases pay domestic support obligations owed to government agencies or individuals in order to receive a discharge of outstanding debts. In addition, under S. 256, the automatic stay that is triggered by filing bankruptcy would not apply to domestic support obligations owed by debtors or withheld from regular income as it currently does. The act also would require bankruptcy trustees to notify individuals with domestic support claims of their right to use the services of a State child support enforcement agency and to notify the agency that it has done so. The last known address of the debtor would be a part of the notification.
Exemptions. Although bankruptcy is regulated according to Federal statute, States are allowed to provide debtors with certain exemptions for property, insurance, and other items that are different from those allowed under the Federal bankruptcy code. (Exempt property remains in possession of the debtor and is not available to pay off creditors.) In some States debtors can choose the Federal or State exemption; other States require a debtor to use only the State exemptions. The act would reduce the value of a debtor's homestead exemption under certain circumstances. It also would place a monetary cap on the value of certain property that the debtor may claim as exempt under State or local law. The act would exempt certain types of retirement and education savings as well as contributions to specified employee benefit plans.
These exemption standards would apply regardless of the State policy on exemptions. The new property-value limitations could make more money available to creditors in some cases, while the exemptions on some retirement, education, and other savings generally would make less money available.
Time Limits on Tax Collection. Under some circumstances, a tax claim can qualify for priority status, making it more likely that a State or local government can collect the debt. However, this status is granted only if a tax is assessed within a specific period of time from the date of the bankruptcy filing. If that filing is subsequently dismissed and a new filing is made, the tax claim may lose its priority status. The act would make adjustments to this provision, allowing more time to pass in some circumstances, thus increasing the likelihood that State or local tax claims would maintain their priority status.
Taxes and Administrative Expenses. Under current law, certain expenses and the priority of claims reduce the funds that would otherwise be available to pay tax liens on property. The act would increase the priority of those liens in certain circumstances against certain expenses and claims, thereby making it more likely that funds would remain available to cover tax obligations. The act would allow State and local governments to claim administrative expenses for costs incurred by closing a health care business. The act would provide for a more uniform interest rate on all tax claims and administrative expenses, determined in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law rather than at the discretion of a bankruptcy judge.
Tax Return Filing. A number of provisions in the act would require debtors to have filed tax returns before a bankruptcy case may continue. Those provisions would help States identify potential claims in bankruptcy cases where they may be owed delinquent taxes.
Priority of Payments. In some circumstances under current law, debtors have borrowed money or incurred some new obligation that is dischargeable (able to be written-off at the end of bankruptcy) to pay for an obligation that would not be dischargeable. S. 256 would give the new debt the same priority as the underlying debt. If the underlying debt had a priority higher than that of State or local tax liabilities, State and local governments could lose access to some funds. However, it is possible that the underlying debt could be for a tax claim, in which case, the taxing authority would face no loss. Because it is unclear what types of nondischargeable debts are covered by new debt and the degree to which this new provision would discourage such activity, CBO can estimate neither the direction nor the magnitude of the provision's impact on States and localities.
Municipal Bankruptcy. Title V would clarify regulations governing municipal bankruptcy actions and allow municipalities that have filed for bankruptcy to liquidate certain financial contracts.
Fuel Tax Claims. Under current law, all States owed fuel tax under the International Fuel Tax Agreement must file separate claims against debtors under the bankruptcy code. A provision in title VII would allow a State designated under the agreement to file a single claim on behalf of all States owed the fuel taxes. That provision would simplify the filing process.
Single Asset Cases. Title XII includes a provision that would allow expedited bankruptcy proceedings in certain cases where the debtor's principal asset is some form of real estate. Enacting this provision could benefit State and local governments to the extent that real property is returned to productive tax rolls earlier.
S. 256 would establish means-testing of individual debtors for determining eligibility for relief under chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code. Under UMRA, duties arising from participation in voluntary Federal programs are not mandates. The bankruptcy process is largely voluntary for debtors, and debtor-initiated bankruptcies are equivalent to participation in a voluntary Federal program. Consequently, new duties imposed by the act on individuals who file as debtors do not meet the definition of private-sector mandates, and additional cost for debtors would not be counted as direct costs for purposes of UMRA.
Mandates
S. 256 would impose private-sector mandates on bankruptcy attorneys, creditors, preparers of bankruptcy petitions, debt-relief agencies, consumer reporting agencies, and credit and charge-card companies. Under the act:
In addition, the act would prohibit credit and charge-card companies from terminating a consumer credit account before its expiration date because the consumer has not incurred finance charges. CBO estimates that the direct costs of the mandates in the act would exceed the annual threshold established by UMRA ($123 million in 2005, adjusted annually for inflation).
Requirements For Attorneys. Section 102 of the act would make bankruptcy attorneys liable for misleading statements and inaccuracies in schedules and documents submitted to the court or to the trustee. To avoid sanctions and potential civil penalties, attorneys would need to verify the information given to them by their clients regarding the list of creditors, assets and liabilities, and income and expenditures. Completing a reasonable investigation of debtors' financial affairs and, for chapter 7 cases, computing debtor eligibility, would require attorneys to expend additional effort. Information from the American Bar Association indicates that this requirement would increase attorney costs by $150 to $500 per case. Based on the 1.6 million projected filings under chapter 7 (liquidation) and chapter 13 (rehabilitation), CBO estimates that the direct cost of complying with this mandate would be between $240 million and $800 million in fiscal year 2007, the first full year of implementation, and would remain in that range through fiscal year 2010. CBO expects that some of the additional costs incurred by attorneys would most likely be passed on to their clients.
Notice and Disclosure Requirements. The act would require certain notices to be disclosed as part of the bankruptcy process. Section 203 would require a creditor with an unsecured consumer debt seeking a reaffirmation agreement with a debtor to provide certain disclosures. The agreement reaffirms the debt discharged in bankruptcy between a holder of a claim and the debtor. Those disclosures must be made clearly and conspicuously in writing and include certain advisories and explanations. The required disclosures could be incorporated into existing standard reaffirmation agreements. Section 221 would require preparers of bankruptcy petitions who are not attorneys to give debtors written notice explaining that the preparer may not provide legal advice. Section 228 would require a debt-relief agency providing bankruptcy assistance to give certain written notices to those assisted and to execute written contracts. The act also would require such agencies also to supply certain advisories and explanations regarding the bankruptcy process. Most attorneys and debt-relief counselors currently provide similar information, and CBO estimates that the direct costs of complying with those mandates would be small.
S. 256 also would require credit lenders to provide additional disclosures to consumers. It would require credit and charge-card companies to include certain disclosures in billing statements with respect to various open-end credit plans regarding the disadvantages of making only the minimum payment. Other disclosures would be required to be included in application and solicitation materials involving introductory rate offers, Internet-based credit card solicitations, credit extensions secured by a dwelling, and for late payment deadlines and penalties. Based on information from credit lenders, CBO estimates that the incremental costs of complying with the additional disclosure requirements would not be substantial.
Prohibition on Consumer Reporting Agencies. Section 332 would give Federal bankruptcy judges the authority to prohibit consumer reporting agencies from issuing a report containing any information relating certain involuntary bankruptcy petitions the court has dismissed. In the event that the court uses such authority, the duty to comply with the prohibition would be considered a private-sector mandate under UMRA. According to industry representatives, the current practice of consumer reporting agencies is to not report any information when a court dismisses an involuntary bankruptcy petition. Therefore, CBO estimates that the cost of complying with such a mandate would be minimal if any.
Requirement for Closing Credit Accounts. In addition, S. 256 would prohibit termination of a credit account before its expiration date because the consumer has not incurred finance charges. According to industry representatives, credit and charge-card companies do not close accounts based solely on the fact that a consumer has not incurred any finance charges. Thus, CBO expects there would be no direct cost to comply with this prohibition.
Other Impacts on the Private Sector
S. 256 also contains many provisions that would benefit creditors. Most significant for creditors are provisions that are expected to shift some debtors from chapter 7 to chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings and provisions that would expand the types of debts that would be nondischargeable. By expanding the types of debts that are nondischargeable, some creditors would continue to receive payments on debts that would be discharged under current law. Means-testing in the bankruptcy system would likely result in more individuals being required to seek relief under chapter 13 rather than chapter 7. Because chapter 13 requires debtors to develop a plan to repay creditors over a specified period, the total pool of funds available for distribution for creditors would likely increase. As long as the likelihood of repayment by debtors and the pool of funds increases by an amount greater than the cost to creditors of administering the new bankruptcy code, creditors would be made better off under the act.
On February 28, 2005, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for S. 256 as ordered reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on February 17, 2005. The House Committee on the Judiciary approved the same version of S. 256 as passed by the Senate on March 10, 2005. The Senate-passed version of the legislation and the version ordered reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee have different provisions regarding the distribution of bankruptcy filing fees. Our cost estimates reflect those differences.
The private-sector mandates and cost estimates in the two versions of S. 256 are identical, except for the mandate in section 332 of the House Judiciary version. That mandate, prohibiting consumer reporting agencies from issuing a report containing any information relating to certain involuntary bankruptcy petitions the court has dismissed, was not in the previous version. CBO estimates that the aggregate cost of mandates in each version of S. 256 would exceed UMRA's annual threshold for private-sector mandates.
Federal Spending: Gregory Waring (226-2860)
Federal Revenues: Annabelle Bartsch (226-2720)
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell (225-3220)
Impact on the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach (226-2940)
Peter H. Fontaine
Deputy Assistant Director for Budget Analysis
The Committee states that pursuant to clause 3(c)(4) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, S. 256 is intended to improve the bankruptcy system by deterring abuse, setting enhanced standards for bankruptcy professionals, and streamlining case administration. It authorizes the appointment of 28 temporary bankruptcy judgeships to address the 59 percent increase in the caseload of bankruptcy judges since 1992, when additional bankruptcy judgeships were last authorized.
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for this legislation in Article I, Section 8, Clauses 3 and 4 of the Constitution.
Section 102 of the Act revises current law in several significant respects. First, it amends section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to permit--in addition to the court and the United States trustee--a trustee, bankruptcy administrator, or a party in interest to seek dismissal or conversion of a chapter 7 case to one under chapter 11 or 13 on consent of the debtor, under certain circumstances. In addition, section 102 of the Act changes the current standard for dismissal from `substantial abuse' to `abuse.' Section 102 of the Act also amends Bankruptcy Code section 707(b) to mandate a presumption of abuse if the debtor's current monthly income (reduced by certain specified amounts) when multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of 25 percent of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims or $6,000 (whichever is greater), or $10,000.
To determine whether the presumption of abuse applies under section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, section 102(a) of the Act specifies certain monthly expense amounts that are to be deducted from the debtor's `current monthly income' (a defined term). These expense items include:
With respect to secured debts, Section 102(a)(2)(C) of the Act specifies that the debtor's average monthly payments on account of secured debts is calculated as the sum of the following divided by 60: (1) all amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors for each month of the 60-month period following filing of the case; and (2) any additional payments necessary, in filing a plan under chapter 13, to maintain possession of the debtor's primary residence, motor vehicle or other property necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents, that serves as collateral for secured debts.
With respect to priority claims, section 102(a)(2)(C) of the Act specifies that the debtor's expenses for payment of such claims (including child support and alimony claims) is calculated as the total of such debts divided by 60.
The provision permits a debtor, if applicable, to deduct from current monthly income the continuation of actual expenses paid by the debtor that are reasonable and necessary for the care and support of an elderly, chronically ill, or disabled household member or member of the debtor's immediate family (providing such individual is unable to pay for these expenses).
Under section 102, a debtor may also deduct the actual expenses for each dependent child of a debtor to attend a private or public elementary or secondary school up to $1,500 per child if the debtor: (1) documents such expenses, and (2) provides a detailed explanation of why such expenses are reasonable and necessary. In addition, the debtor must explain why such expenses are not already accounted for under any of the Internal Revenue Service National and Local Standards, and Other Expenses categories.
Other expenses that a debtor may claim include additional housing and utilities allowances based on the debtor's actual home energy expenses if the debtor documents such expenses and demonstrates that they are reasonable and necessary.
While the Act replaces the current law's presumption in favor of granting relief requested by a chapter 7 debtor with a presumption of abuse (if applicable under the income and expense analysis previously described), it does provide that this presumption may be rebutted under certain circumstances. Section 102(a)(2)(C) of the Act amends Bankruptcy Code section 707(b) to provide that the presumption of abuse may be rebutted only if: (1) the debtor demonstrates special circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces, to the extent such special circumstances justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative; and (2) the additional expenses or adjustments cause the product of the debtor's current monthly income (reduced by the specified expenses) when multiplied by 60 to be less than the lesser of 25 percent of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims, or $6,000 (whichever is greater); or $10,000. In addition, the debtor must itemize and document each additional expense or income adjustment as well as provide a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make such expense or adjustment necessary and reasonable. Further, the debtor must attest under oath to the accuracy of any information provided to demonstrate that such additional expense or adjustment to income is required.
To implement these needs-based reforms, the Act requires the debtor to file, as part of the schedules of current income and current expenditures, a statement of current monthly income. This statement must show: (1) the calculations that determine whether a presumption of abuse arises under section 707(b) (as amended), and (2) how each amount is calculated.
An exception to the needs-based test applies with respect to a debtor who is a disabled veteran whose indebtedness occurred primarily during a period when the individual was on active duty (as defined in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 101(d)(1)) or performing a homeland defense activity (as defined in 32 U.S.C. 901(1)).
In a case where the presumption of abuse does not apply or has been rebutted, section 102(a)(2)(C) of the Act amends Bankruptcy Code section 707(b) to require a court to consider whether: (1) the debtor filed the chapter 7 case in bad faith; or (2) the totality of the circumstances of the debtor's financial situation demonstrates abuse, including whether the debtor wants to reject a personal services contract and the debtor's financial need for such rejection.
Under section 102(a)(2)(C) of the Act, a court may on its own initiative or on motion of a party in interest in accordance with rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, order a debtor's attorney to reimburse the trustee for all reasonable costs incurred in prosecuting a section 707(b) motion if: (1) a trustee files such motion; (2) the motion is granted; and (3) the court finds that the action of the debtor's attorney in filing the case under chapter 7 violated rule 9011. If the court determines that the debtor's attorney violated rule 9011, it may on its own initiative or on motion of a party in interest in accordance with such rule, order the assessment of an appropriate civil penalty against debtor's counsel and the payment of such penalty to the trustee, United States trustee, or bankruptcy administrator. This provision clarifies that a motion for costs or the imposition of a civil penalty must be made by a party in interest or by the court itself in accordance with rule 9011.
Section 102(a)(2)(C) of the Act provides that the signature of an attorney on a petition, pleading or written motion shall constitute a certification that the attorney has: (1) performed a reasonable investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to such document; and (2) determined that such document is well-grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law and does not constitute an abuse under section 707(b)(1). In addition, such attorney's signature on the petition constitutes a certification that the attorney has no knowledge after an inquiry that the information in the schedules filed with the petition is incorrect.
Section 102(a)(2)(C) of the Act amends section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to permit a court on its own initiative or motion by a party in interest in accordance with rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to award a debtor reasonable costs (including reasonable attorneys' fees) in contesting a section 707(b) motion filed by a party in interest (other than a trustee, United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator) if the court: (1) does not grant the section 707(b) motion; and (2) finds that either the movant violated rule 9011, or the attorney (if any) who filed the motion did not comply with section 707(b)(4)(C) and such was made solely for the purpose of coercing a debtor into waiving a right guaranteed under the Bankruptcy Code to such debtor. An exception applies with respect to a movant that is a `small business' with a claim in an aggregate amount of less than $1,000. A small business, for purposes of this provision, is defined as an unincorporated business, partnership, corporation, association or organization that engages in commercial or business activities and employs less than 25 full-time employees. The number of employees of a wholly owned subsidiary includes the employees of the parent and any other subsidiary corporation of the parent. Section 102(a)(2)(C) of the Act clarifies that the motion for costs must be made by a party in interest or by the court. The use of the phraseology in this provision, `in accordance with rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,' is intended to indicate that the procedures for the motion of a party in interest or a court acting on its own initiative are the procedures outlined in rule 9011(c).
The Act includes two `safe harbors' with respect to its needs-based reforms. One safe harbor allows only a judge, United States trustee, or bankruptcy administrator to file a section 707(b) motion (based on the debtor's ability to repay, bad faith, or the totality of the circumstances) if the chapter 7 debtor's current monthly income (or in a joint case, the income of the debtor and the debtor's spouse) falls below the state median family income for a family of equal or lesser size (adjusted for larger sized families), or the state median family income for one earner in the case of a one-person household.
The Act's second safe harbor only pertains to a motion under section 707(b)(2), that is, a motion to dismiss based on a debtor's ability to repay. It does not allow a judge, United States trustee, bankruptcy administrator or party in interest to file such motion if the income of the debtor (including a veteran, as that term is defined in 38 U.S.C. Sec. 101) and the debtor's spouse is less than certain monetary thresholds. This provision does not consider the nonfiling spouse's income if the debtor and the debtor's spouse are separated under applicable nonbankruptcy law, or the debtor and the debtor's spouse are living separate and apart, other than for the purpose of evading section 707(b)(2). The debtor must file a statement under penalty of perjury specifying that he or she meets one of these criteria. In addition, the statement must disclose the aggregate (or best estimate) of the amount of any cash or money payments received from the debtor's spouse attributed to the debtor's current monthly income.
Section 102(b) of the Act amends section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code to define `current monthly income' as the average monthly income that the debtor receives (or in a joint case, the debtor and debtor's spouse receive) from all sources, without regard to whether it is taxable income, in a specified six-month period preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case. The Act specifies that the six-month period is determined as ending on the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case, if the debtor files the statement of current income required by Bankruptcy Code section 521. If the debtor does not file such schedule, the court determines the date on which current income is calculated.
`Current monthly income' includes any amount paid by any entity other than the debtor (or, in a joint case, the debtor and the debtor's spouse if not otherwise a dependent) on a regular basis for the household expenses of the debtor or the debtor's dependents (and, the debtor's spouse in a joint case, if not otherwise a dependent). It excludes Social Security Act benefits and payments to victims of war crimes or crimes against humanity on account of their status as victims of such crimes. In addition, the Act provides that current monthly income does not include payments to victims of international or domestic terrorism as defined in section 2331 of title 18 of the United States Code on account of their status as victims of such terrorism.
Section 102(c) of the Act amends section 704 of the Bankruptcy Code to require the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator in a chapter 7 case where the debtor is an individual to: (1) review all materials filed by the debtor; and (2) file a statement with the court (within ten days following the meeting of creditors held pursuant to section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code) as to whether or not the debtor's case should be presumed to be an abuse under section 707(b). The court must provide a copy of such statement to all creditors within five days after its filing. Within 30 days of the filing of such statement, the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator must file either: (1) a motion under section 707(b); or (2) a statement setting forth the reasons why such motion is not appropriate in any case where the debtor's filing should be presumed to be an abuse and the debtor's current monthly income exceeds certain monetary thresholds.
In a chapter 7 case where the presumption of abuse applies under section 707(b), section 102(d) of the Act amends Bankruptcy Code section 342 to require the clerk to provide written notice to all creditors within ten days after commencement of the case stating that the presumption of abuse applies in such case.
Section 102(e) of the Act provides that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code limits the ability of a creditor to give information to a judge (except for information communicated ex parte, unless otherwise permitted by applicable law), United States trustee, bankruptcy administrator, or trustee.
Section 102(f) of the Act adds a provision to Bankruptcy Code section 707 to permit the court to dismiss a chapter 7 case filed by a debtor who is an individual on motion by a victim of a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of title 18 of the United States Code) or a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c)(2) of title 18 of the United States Code). The case may be dismissed if the debtor was convicted of such crime and dismissal is in the best interest of the victim, unless the debtor establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the filing of the case is necessary to satisfy a claim for a domestic support obligation.
Section 102(g) of the Act amends section 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to require the court, as a condition of confirming a chapter 13 plan, to find that the debtor's action in filing the case was in good faith.
Section 102(h) of the Act amends section 1325(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code to specify that the court must find, in confirming a chapter 13 plan to which there has been an objection, that the debtor's disposable income will be paid to unsecured creditors. It also amends section 1325(b)(2)'s definition of disposable income. As defined under this provision, the term means income received by the debtor (other than child support payments, foster care payments, or certain disability payments for a dependent child) less amounts reasonably necessary to be expended for: (1) the maintenance or support of the debtor or the debtor's dependent; (2) a domestic support obligation that first becomes due after the case is filed; (3) charitable contributions (as defined in Bankruptcy Code section 548(d)(3)) to a qualified religious or charitable entity or organization (as defined in Bankruptcy Code section 548(d)(4)) in an amount that does not exceed 15 percent of the debtor's gross income for the year in which the contributions are made; and (4) if the debtor is engaged in business, the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of the business. Section 1325(b)(3) provides that the amounts reasonably necessary to be expended under section 1325(b)(2) are determined in accordance with section 707(b)(2)(A) and (B) if the debtor's income exceeds certain monetary thresholds.
Section 102(i) of the Act amends Bankruptcy Code section 1329(a) to require the amounts paid under a confirmed chapter 13 plan to be reduced by the actual amount expended by the debtor to purchase health insurance for the debtor and the debtor's dependents (if those dependents do not otherwise have such insurance) if the debtor documents the cost of such insurance and demonstrates such expense is reasonable and necessary, and the amount is not otherwise allowed for purposes of determining disposable income under section 1325(b). If the debtor previously paid for health insurance, the debtor must demonstrate that the amount is not materially greater than the amount the debtor previously paid. If the debtor did not previously have such insurance, the amount may not be not materially larger than the reasonable cost that would be incurred by a debtor with similar characteristics. Upon request of any party in interest, the debtor must file proof that a health insurance policy was purchased.
Section 102(j) of the Act amends section 104 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide for the periodic adjustment of monetary amounts specified in sections 707(b) and 1325(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended by this Act.
Section 102(k) adds to section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code a definition of `median family income.'
A debtor may be temporarily exempted from this requirement if he or she submits to the court a certification that: (1) describes exigent circumstances meriting a waiver of this requirement; (2) states that the debtor requested credit counseling services from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency, but was unable to obtain such services within the five-day period beginning on the date the debtor made the request; and (3) is satisfactory to the court. This exemption terminates when the debtor meets the requirements for credit counseling participation, but not longer than 30 days after the case is filed, unless the court, for cause, extends this period up to an additional 15 days.
In addition, the mandatory credit counseling requirement does not apply to a debtor whom the court determines, after notice and a hearing, is unable to complete this requirement because of incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone. Incapacity, under this provision, means the debtor is impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency so that the debtor is incapable of realizing and making rational decisions with respect to his or her financial responsibilities. Disability, under this provision, means the debtor is so physically impaired as to be unable, after reasonable effort, to receive credit counseling whether by participating in person, or via telephone or Internet briefing.
Section 106(b) of the Act amends section 727(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to deny a discharge to a chapter 7 debtor who fails to complete a personal financial management instructional course. This provision, however, does not apply if the debtor resides in a district where the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator has determined that the approved instructional courses in that district are not adequate. Such determination must be reviewed annually by the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator. In addition, it does not apply to a debtor whom the court determines, after notice and a hearing, is unable to complete this requirement because of incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone.
Section 106(c) of the Act amends section 1328 of the Bankruptcy Code to deny a discharge to a chapter 13 debtor who fails to complete a personal financial management instructional course. This requirement does not apply if the debtor resides in a district where the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator has determined that the approved instructional courses in that district are not adequate. Such determination must be reviewed annually by the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator. In addition, it does not apply to a debtor whom the court determines, after notice and a hearing, is unable to complete this requirement because of incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone.
Section 106(d) of the Act amends section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code to require a debtor who is an individual to file with the court: (1) a certificate from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency describing the services it provided the debtor pursuant to section 109(h); and (2) a copy of the repayment plan, if any, that was developed by the agency pursuant to section 109(h).
Section 106(e) of the Act adds section 111 to the Bankruptcy Code requiring the clerk to maintain a publicly available list of approved: (1) credit counseling agencies that provide the services described in section 109(h) of the Bankruptcy Code; and (2) personal financial management instructional courses. Section 106(e) further provides that the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator may only approve an agency or course provider under this provision pursuant to certain specified criteria. These include, for example, if a fee is charged for such services by the agency or course provider, the fee must be reasonable and such services must be provided without regard to ability to pay the fee. If such agency or provider course is approved, the approval may only be for a probationary period of up to six months. At the conclusion of the probationary period, the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator may only approve such agency or instructional course for an additional one-year period and, thereafter for successive one-year periods, which has demonstrated during such period that it met the standards set forth in this provision and can satisfy such standards in the future.
Within 30 days after any final decision occurring after the expiration of the initial probationary period or after any subsequent period, an interested person may seek judicial review of such decision in the appropriate United States district court. In addition, the district court, at any time, may investigate the qualifications of a credit counseling agency and request the production of documents to ensure the agency's integrity and effectiveness. The district court may remove a credit counseling agency that does not meet the specified qualifications from the approved list. The United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator must notify the clerk that a credit counseling agency or instructional course is no longer approved and the clerk must remove such entity from the approved list.
Section 106(e) prohibits a credit counseling agency from providing information to a credit reporting agency as to whether an individual debtor has received or sought personal financial management instruction. A credit counseling agency that willfully or negligently fails to comply with any requirement under the Bankruptcy Code with respect to a debtor shall be liable to the debtor for damages in an amount equal to: (1) actual damages sustained by the debtor as a result of the violation; and (2) any court costs or reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in an action to recover such damages.
Section 106(f) of the Act amends section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that if a chapter 7, 11, or 13 case is dismissed due to the creation of a debt repayment plan, the presumption that a case was not filed in good faith under section 362(c)(3) shall not apply to any subsequent bankruptcy case commenced by the debtor. It also provides that the court, on request of a party in interest, must issue an order under section 362(c) confirming that the automatic stay has terminated.
Subtitle A. Penalties for Abusive Creditor Practices
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Bankruptcy Code, section 203(a) permits a creditor to accept payments from a debtor: (1) before and after the filing of a reaffirmation agreement with the court; or (2) pursuant to a reaffirmation agreement that the creditor believes in good faith to be effective. It further provides that the requirements specified in subsections (c)(2) and (k) of section 524 are satisfied if the disclosures required by these provisions are given in good faith.
Where the amount of the scheduled payments due on the reaffirmed debt (as disclosed in the debtor's statement) exceeds the debtor's available income, it is presumed for 60 days from the date on which the reaffirmation agreement is filed with the court that the agreement presents an undue hardship. The court must review such presumption, which can be rebutted by the debtor by a written statement explaining the additional sources of funds that would enable the debtor to make the required payments on the reaffirmed debt. If the presumption is not rebutted to the satisfaction of the court, the court may disapprove the reaffirmation agreement. No reaffirmation agreement may be disapproved without notice and hearing to the debtor and creditor. The hearing must be concluded before the entry of the debtor's discharge. The requirements set forth in this paragraph do not apply to reaffirmation agreements if the creditor is a credit union.
Section 203(b) amends title 18 of the United States Code to require the Attorney General to designate a United States Attorney for each judicial district and to appoint a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent for each field office to have primary law enforcement responsibilities for violations of sections 152 and 157 of title 18 with respect to abusive reaffirmation agreements and materially fraudulent statements in bankruptcy schedules that are intentionally false or misleading. In addition, section 203(b) provides that the designated United States Attorney has primary responsibility with respect to bankruptcy investigations under section 3057 of title 18. Section 203(b) further provides that the bankruptcy courts must establish procedures for referring any case in which a materially fraudulent bankruptcy schedule has been filed.
Subtitle B. Priority Child Support
With respect to chapter 12 cases, section 213(2) of the Act amends section 1208(c) of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that the failure of a debtor to pay any domestic support obligation that first becomes payable postpetition is cause for conversion or dismissal of the case. Section 213(3) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1222(a) to permit a chapter 12 debtor to propose a plan paying less than full payment of all amounts owed for a claim entitled to priority under Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(1)(B) if all of the debtor's projected disposable income for a five-year period is applied to make payments under the plan. Section 213(4) of the Act amends Bankruptcy Code section 1222(b) to permit a chapter 12 debtor to propose a plan that pays postpetition interest on claims that are nondischargeable under Section 1228(a), but only to the extent that the debtor has disposable income available to pay such interest after payment of all allowed claims in full. Section 213(5) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1225(a) to provide that if a chapter 12 debtor is required by judicial or administrative order or statute to pay a domestic support obligation, then the debtor must pay such obligations pursuant to such order or statute that became payable postpetition as a condition of confirmation. Section 213(6) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1228(a) to condition the granting of a chapter 12 discharge upon the debtor's payment of certain postpetition domestic support obligations.
With respect to chapter 13 cases, section 213(7) of the Act amends Bankruptcy Code section 1307(c) to provide that the failure of a debtor to pay any domestic support obligation that first becomes payable postpetition is cause for conversion or dismissal of the debtor's case. Section 213(8) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1322(a) to permit a chapter 13 debtor to propose a plan paying less than the full amount of a claim entitled to priority under Bankruptcy Code section 507(a)(1)(B) if the plan provides that all of the debtor's projected disposable income over a five-year period will be applied to make payments under the plan. Section 213(9) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1322(b) to permit a chapter 13 debtor to propose a plan that pays postpetition interest on nondischargeable debts under section 1328(a), but only to the extent that the debtor has disposable income available to pay such interest after payment in full of all allowed claims. Section 213(10) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1325(a) to provide that if a chapter 13 debtor is required by judicial or administrative order or statute to pay a domestic support obligation, then the debtor must pay all such obligations pursuant to such order or statute that became payable postpetition as a condition of confirmation. Section 213(11) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1328(a) to condition the granting of a chapter 13 discharge on the debtor's payment of certain postpetition domestic support obligations.
Section 219(a) requires a chapter 7 trustee to provide written notice to a domestic support claimant of the right to use the services of a state child support enforcement agency established under sections 464 and 466 of the Social Security Act in the state where the claimant resides for assistance in collecting child support during and after the bankruptcy case. The notice must include the agency's address and telephone number as well as explain the claimant's right to payment under the applicable chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, the trustee must provide written notice to the claimant and the agency of such claim and include the name, address, and telephone number of the child support claimant. At the time the debtor is granted a discharge, the trustee must notify both the child support claimant and the agency that the debtor was granted a discharge as well as supply them with the debtor's last known address, the last known name and address of the debtor's employer, and the name of each creditor holding a debt that is not discharged under section 523(a)(2), (4) or (14A) or holding a debt that was reaffirmed pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 524. A claimant or agency may request the debtor's last known address from a creditor holding a debt that is not discharged under section 523(a)(2), (4) or (14A) or that is reaffirmed pursuant to section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code. A creditor who discloses such information, however, is not liable to the debtor or any other person by reason of such disclosure. Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section 219 of the Act impose comparable requirements for chapter 11, 12, and 13 trustees.
Subtitle C. Other Consumer Protections
[Footnote] or other state or Federal law. Subsection (a) of section 224 of the Act amends section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code to permit a debtor to exempt certain retirement funds to the extent those monies are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and that have received a favorable determination pursuant to Internal Revenue Code section 7805 that is in effect as of the date of the commencement of the case. If the retirement monies are in a retirement fund that has not received a favorable determination, those monies are exempt if the debtor demonstrates that no prior unfavorable determination has been made by a court or the Internal Revenue Service, and the retirement fund is in substantial compliance with the applicable requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. If the retirement fund fails to be in substantial compliance with applicable requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, the debtor may claim the retirement funds as exempt if he or she is not materially responsible for such failure. This section also applies to certain direct transfers and rollover distributions. In addition, this provision ensures that the specified retirement funds are exempt under state as well as Federal law.
[Footnote 84: 504 U.S. 753 (1992).]
Section 224(b) amends section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to except from the automatic stay the withholding of income from a debtor's wages pursuant to an agreement authorizing such withholding for the benefit of a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other employer-sponsored plan established under Internal Revenue Code section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(c) to the extent that the amounts withheld are used solely to repay a loan from a plan as authorized by section 408(b)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or subject to Internal Revenue Code section 72(p) or with respect to a loan from certain thrift savings plans. Section 224(b) further provides that this exception may not be used to cause any loan made under a governmental plan under section 414(d) or a contract or account under section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code to be construed to be a claim or debt within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 224(c) amends Bankruptcy Code section 523(a) to except from discharge any amount owed by the debtor to a pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, or other plan established under Internal Revenue Code section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(c) under a loan authorized under section 408(b)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or subject to Internal Revenue Code section 72(p) or with respect to a loan from certain thrift savings plans. Section 224(c) further provides that this exception to discharge may not be used to cause any loan made under a governmental plan under section 414(d) or a contract or account under section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue Code to be construed to be a claim or debt within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 224(d) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1322 to provide that a chapter 13 plan may not materially alter the terms of a loan described in section 362(b)(19) and that any amounts required to repay such loan shall not constitute `disposable income' under section 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 224(e) amends section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code to impose a $1 million cap (periodically adjusted pursuant to section 104 of the Bankruptcy Code to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index) on the value of the debtor's interest in an individual retirement account established under either section 408 or 408A of the Internal Revenue Code (other than a simplified employee pension account under section 408(k) or a simple retirement account under section 408(p) of the Internal Revenue Code) that a debtor may claim as exempt property. This limit applies without regard to amounts attributable to rollover contributions made pursuant to section 402(c), 402(e)(6), 403(a)(4), 403(a)(5), or 403(b)(8) of the Internal Revenue Code and earnings thereon. The cap may be increased if required in the interests of justice.
Section 226(b) amends section 104(B)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code to permit the monetary amount set forth in the definition of an `assisted person' to be automatically adjusted to reflect the change in the Consumer Price Index.
In addition, section 227 imposes penalties for the violation of section 526, 527 or 528 of the Bankruptcy Code. First, any contract between a debt relief agency and an assisted person that does not comply with these provisions is void and may not be enforced by any state or Federal court or by any person, except an assisted person. Second, a debt relief agency is liable to an assisted person, under certain circumstances, for any fees or charges paid by such person to the agency, actual damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The chief law enforcement officer of a state who has reason to believe that a person has violated or is violating section 526 may seek to have such violation enjoined and recover actual damages. Third, section 227 provides that the United States district court has concurrent jurisdiction of certain actions under section 526. Fourth, section 227 provides that sections 526, 527 and 528 preempt inconsistent state law. In addition, it provides that these provisions do not limit or curtail the authority of a Federal court, a state, or a subdivision or instrumentality of a state, to determine and enforce qualifications for the practice of law before the Federal court or under the laws of that state.
Subsection (a) amends Bankruptcy Code section 363(b)(1) to provide that if a debtor, in connection with offering a product or service, discloses to an individual a policy prohibiting the transfer of personally identifiable information to persons unaffiliated with the debtor, and the policy is in effect at the time of the bankruptcy filing, then the trustee may not sell or lease such information unless either of the following conditions is satisfied: (1) the sale is consistent with such policy; or (2) the court, after appointment of a consumer privacy ombudsman (pursuant to section 332 of the Bankruptcy Code, as amended) and notice and hearing, the court approves the sale or lease upon due consideration of the facts, circumstances, and conditions of the sale or lease.
Section 231(b) amends Bankruptcy Code section 101 to add a definition of `personally identifiable information.' The term applies to information provided by an individual to the debtor in connection with obtaining a product or service from the debtor primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. It includes the individual's: (1) first name or initial and last name (whether given at birth or adoption or legally changed); (2) physical home address; (3) electronic address, including an e-mail address; (4) home telephone number; (5) Social Security account number; or (vi) credit card account number. The term also includes information if it is identified in connection with the above items: (1) an individual's birth date, birth or adoption certificate number, or place of birth; or (2) any other information concerning an identified individual that, if disclosed, will result in the physical or electronic contacting or identification of that person.
[Footnote] to except from discharge the filing fees and related costs and expenses assessed by a court in a civil case or appeal. As the result of a drafting error, however, this provision might be construed to apply to filing fees, costs or expenses incurred by any debtor, not solely by those who are prisoners. The amendment eliminates this ambiguity and makes other conforming changes to narrow its application in accordance with its original intent.
[Footnote 85: PUB. L. NO. 104-134, Sec. 804(b) (1996).]
For purposes of this provision, a case is presumptively not filed in good faith as to all creditors (but such presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence) if: (1) more than one bankruptcy case under chapter 7, 11 or 13 was previously filed by the debtor within the preceding one-year period; (2) the prior chapter 7, 11, or 13 case was dismissed within the preceding year for the debtor's failure to (a) file or amend without substantial excuse a document required under the Bankruptcy Code or court order, (b) provide adequate protection ordered by the court, or (c) perform the terms of a confirmed plan; or (3) there has been no substantial change in the debtor's financial or personal affairs since the dismissal of the prior case, or there is no reason to conclude that the pending case will conclude either with a discharge (if a chapter 7 case) or confirmation (if a chapter 11 or 13 case). In addition, section 302 provides that a case is presumptively deemed not to be filed in good faith as to any creditor who obtained relief from the automatic stay in the prior case or sought such relief in the prior case and such action was pending at the time of the prior case's dismissal. The presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. A similar presumption applies if two or more bankruptcy cases were pending in the one-year preceding the filing of the pending case.
Section 303(b) amends Bankruptcy Code section 362(b) to except from the automatic stay an act to enforce any lien against or security interest in real property within two years following the entry of an order entered under section 362(d)(4). A debtor, in a subsequent case, may move for relief from such order based upon changed circumstances or for other good cause shown after notice and a hearing. Section 303(b) also provides that the automatic stay does not apply in a case where the debtor: (1) is ineligible to be a debtor in a bankruptcy case pursuant to section 109(g) of the Bankruptcy Code; or (2) filed the bankruptcy case in violation of an order issued in a prior bankruptcy case prohibiting the debtor from being a debtor in a subsequent bankruptcy case.
Section 305(2) amends section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code to make the requirement to file a statement of intention applicable to all secured debts, not just secured consumer debts. In addition, it requires the debtor to effectuate his or her stated intention within 30 days from the first date set for the meeting of creditors. If the debtor fails to timely undertake certain specified actions with respect to property that a lessor or bailor owns and has leased, rented or bailed to the debtor or in which a creditor has a security interest (not otherwise avoidable under section 522(f), 544, 545, 547, 548 or 549 of the Bankruptcy Code), then nothing in the Bankruptcy Code shall prevent or limit the operation of a provision in a lease or agreement that places the debtor in default by reason of the debtor's bankruptcy or insolvency.
Section 306(b) adds a new paragraph to section 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code specifying that Bankruptcy Code section 506 does not apply to a debt incurred within the two and one-half year period preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case if the debt is secured by a purchase money security interest in a motor vehicle acquired for the personal use of the debtor within 910 days preceding the filing of the petition. Where the collateral consists of any other type of property having value, section 306(b) provides that section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply if the debt was incurred during the one-year period preceding the filing of the bankruptcy case.
Section 306(c)(1) amends section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code to define the term `debtor's principal residence' as a residential structure (including incidental property) without regard to whether or not such structure is attached to real property. The term includes an individual condominium or cooperative unit as well as a mobile or manufactured home, or a trailer.
Section 306(c)(2) amends section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code to define the term `incidental property' as property commonly conveyed with a principal residence in the area where the real property is located. The term includes all easements, rights, appurtenances, fixtures, rents, royalties, mineral rights, oil or gas rights or profits, water rights, escrow funds, and insurance proceeds. Further, the term encompasses all replacements and additions.
Section 309(b) amends section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that if a lease of personal property is rejected or not assumed by the trustee in a timely manner, such property is no longer property of the estate and the automatic stay under Bankruptcy Code section 362 with respect to such property is terminated. With regard to a chapter 7 case in which the debtor is an individual, the debtor may notify the creditor in writing of his or her desire to assume the lease. Upon being so notified, the creditor may, at its option, inform the debtor that it is willing to have the lease assumed and condition such assumption on cure of any outstanding default on terms set by the contract. If within 30 days after such notice the debtor gives written notice to the lessor that the lease is assumed, the debtor (not the bankruptcy estate) assumes the liability under the lease. Section 309(b) provides that the automatic stay of section 362 and the discharge injunction of section 524 are not violated if the creditor notifies the debtor and negotiates a cure under section 365(p)(2) (as amended). In a chapter 11 or 13 case where the debtor is an individual lessee with respect to a personal property lease and the lease is not assumed in the confirmed plan, the lease is deemed rejected as of the conclusion of the confirmation hearing. If the lease is rejected, the automatic stay under section 362 as well as the chapter 13 codebtor stay under section 1301 are automatically terminated with respect to such property.
Section 309(c)(1) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1325(a)(5)(B) to require that periodic payments pursuant to a chapter 13 plan with respect to a secured claim be made in equal monthly installments. Where the claim is secured by personal property, the amount of such payments shall not be less than the amount sufficient to provide adequate protection to the holder of such claim. Section 309(c)(2) amends section 1326(a) of the Bankruptcy Code to require a chapter 13 debtor to commence making payments within 30 days after the filing of the plan or the order for relief, whichever is earlier. The amount of such payment must be the amount proposed in the plan, scheduled in a personal property lease for that portion of the obligation that becomes due postpetition (which amount shall reduce the payment required to be made to such lessor pursuant to the plan), and provides adequate protection directly to a creditor holding an allowed claim secured by personal property to the extent the claim is attributable to the purchase of such property (which amount shall reduce the payment required to be made to such secured creditor pursuant to the plan). Payments made pursuant to a plan must be retained by the chapter 13 trustee until confirmation or denial of confirmation. Section 309(c)(2) provides that if the plan is confirmed, the trustee must distribute payments received from the debtor as soon as practicable in accordance with the plan. If the plan is not confirmed, the trustee must return to the debtor payments not yet due and owing to creditors. Pending confirmation and subject to section 363, the court, after notice and a hearing, may modify the payments required under this provision. Section 309(c)(2) requires the debtor, within 60 days following the filing of the bankruptcy case, to provide reasonable evidence of any required insurance coverage with respect to the use or ownership of leased personal property or property securing, in whole or in part, a purchase money security interest.
Section 311 gives tenants a reasonable amount of time after filing the petition to cure the default giving rise to the judgment for possession as long as there are circumstances in which applicable nonbankruptcy law allows a default to be cured after a judgment has been obtained. Where nonbankruptcy law applicable in the jurisdiction does not permit a tenant to cure a monetary default after the judgment for possession has been obtained, the automatic stay of section 362(a)(3) does not operate to limit action by a rental housing provider to proceed with, or a marshal, sheriff, or similar local officer to execute, the judgment for possession. Where the debtor claims that applicable law permits a tenant to cure after the judgment for possession has been obtained, the automatic stay operates only where the debtor files a certification with the bankruptcy petition asserting that applicable law permits such action and that the debtor or an adult dependent of the debtor has paid to the court all rent that will come due during the 30 days following the filing of the petition. If, within thirty days following the filing of the petition, the debtor or an adult dependent of the debtor certifies that the entire monetary default that gave rise to the judgment for possession has been cured, the automatic stay remains in effect. If a lessor has filed or wishes to file an eviction action based on the use of illegal controlled substances or property endangerment, the section allows the lessor in certain cases to file a certification of such circumstance with the court and obtain an exception to the stay.
For both the judgment based on monetary default and the controlled substance or endangerment exceptions, the section provides an opportunity for challenge by either the lessor or the tenant to certifications filed by the other party and a timely hearing for the court to resolve any disputed facts and rule on the factual or legal sufficiency of the certifications. Where the court finds for the lessor, the clerk shall immediately serve upon the parties a copy of the court's order confirming that an exception to the automatic stay is applicable. Where the court finds for the tenant, the stay shall remain in effect. It is the intent of this section that the clerk's certified copy of the docket or order shall be sufficient evidence that the exception under paragraph 22 or paragraph 23 is applicable for a marshal, sheriff, or similar local officer to proceed immediately to execute the judgment for possession if applicable law otherwise permits such action, or for an eviction action for use of illegal controlled substances or property endangerment to proceed. This section does not provide any new right to either landlords or tenants relating to evictions or defenses to eviction under otherwise applicable law.
Section 311 also excepts from the automatic stay a transfer that is not avoidable under Bankruptcy Code section 544 and that is not avoidable under Bankruptcy Code section 549. This amendment responds to a 1997 Ninth Circuit case in which two purchase money lenders (without knowledge that the debtor had recently filed an undisclosed chapter 11 case that was later converted to chapter 7), funded the debtor's acquisition of an apartment complex and recorded their purchase-money deed of trust immediately following recordation of the deed to the debtors. 86
[Footnote]
[Footnote 86: Thompson v. Margen (In re McConville), 110 F.3d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 966 (1997). The bankruptcy trustee sought to avoid the lien created by the lenders' deed of trust by asserting that the deed was an unauthorized, postpetition transfer under Bankruptcy Code section 549(a). The lenders claimed that the voluntary transfer to them was a transfer of real property to good faith purchasers for value, which thereby excepted it, under Bankruptcy Code section 549(c) from avoidance. The bankruptcy court held that the postpetition recordation of the lenders' deed of trust was without authorization under the Bankruptcy Code or by the court and was therefore avoidable under section 549(a) and that the lenders did not qualify under the section 549(c) exception as good faith purchasers of real property for value. The District Court subsequently affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling granting the trustee the authority to avoid the lenders' lien. McConville v. David Margen and Lawton Associates (In re McConville), No. C 94-3308, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18095 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1994). On appeal, the lower court's decision in McConville was initially affirmed. Thompson v. Margen (In re McConville), 84 F.3d 340 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit, however, subsequently issued an amended opinion, also affirming the lower court, Thompson v. Margen (In re McConville), 97 F.3d 316 (9th Cir. 1996), and finally issued an opinion withdrawing its prior opinion and deciding the case on other grounds. It held that by obtaining secured credit from the lenders after filing but before the appointment of a trustee, the debtors violated their fiduciary responsibility to their creditors. Thompson v. Margen (In re McConville), 110 F.3d 47 (9th Cir. 1997).]
In addition, section 315(a) specifies that an entity may file a notice with the court stating an address to be used generally by all bankruptcy courts for chapter 7 and 13 cases, or by particular bankruptcy courts, as specified by such entity. This address must be used by the court to supply notice in such cases within 30 days following the filing of such notice where the entity is a creditor. Notice given other than as provided in section 342 is not effective until it has been brought to the creditor's attention. If the creditor has designated a person or organizational subdivision to be responsible for receiving notices concerning bankruptcy cases and has established reasonable procedures so that these notices will be delivered to such person or subdivision, a notice will not be considered to have been brought to the attention of such creditor until it has been received by such person or subdivision. This provision also prohibits the imposition of any monetary penalty for violation of the automatic stay or for the failure to comply with the Bankruptcy Code sections 542 and 543 unless the creditor has received effective notice under section 342.
Section 315(b) amends section 521 to specify additional duties of a debtor. This provision requires the debtor to file a certificate executed by the debtor's attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer stating that the attorney or preparer supplied the debtor with the notice required under Bankruptcy Code section 342(b). If the debtor is not represented by counsel and did not use the services of a bankruptcy petition preparer, then the debtor must sign a certificate stating that he or she obtained and read such notice. In addition, the debtor must file: (1) copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment, if any, from any employer within 60 days preceding the bankruptcy filing; (2) a statement of the amount of monthly net income, itemized to show how such amount is calculated; and (3) a statement disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in income or expenditures in the 12-month period following the date of filing. Upon request of a creditor, section 315(b) of the Act requires the court to make the petition, schedules, and statement of financial affairs of an individual who is a chapter 7 or 13 debtor available to such creditor.
In addition, section 315(b) requires such debtor to provide the trustee not later than seven days before the date first set for the meeting of creditors a copy of his or her Federal income tax return or transcript (at the election of the debtor) for the latest taxable period ending prior to the filing of the bankruptcy case for which a tax return was filed. Should the debtor fail to comply with this requirement, the case must be dismissed unless the debtor demonstrates that such failure was due to circumstances beyond the debtor's control. Upon request, the debtor must provide a copy of the tax return or transcript to the requesting creditor at the time the debtor supplies the return or transcript to the trustee. A creditor in a chapter 13 case may, at any time, file a notice with the court requesting a copy of the plan. The court must supply a copy of the chapter 13 plan at a reasonable cost not later than 5 days after such request. In addition, the Act clarifies that this provision applies to Federal income tax returns.
During the pendency of a chapter 7, 11 or 13 case, the debtor must file with the court, at the request of the judge, United States trustee, or any party in interest, at the time filed with the taxing authority, copies of any Federal income tax returns (or transcripts thereof) that were not filed for the three-year period preceding the date on which the order for relief was entered. In addition, the debtor must file copies of any amendments to such tax returns.
In a chapter 13 case, the debtor must file a statement, under penalty of perjury, of income and expenditures in the preceding tax year and monthly income showing how the amounts were calculated. The statement must be filed on the date that is the later of 90 days after the close of the debtor's tax year or one year after the order for relief, unless a plan has been confirmed. Thereafter, the statement must be filed on or before the date that is 45 days before the anniversary date of the plan's confirmation, until the case is closed. The statement must disclose the amount and sources of the debtor's income, the identity of any person responsible with the debtor for the support of the debtor's dependents, the identity of any person who contributed to the debtor's household expenses, and the amount of any such contributions.
Section 315(b)(2) mandates that the tax returns, amendments thereto, and the statement of income and expenditures of an individual who is a chapter 7 or chapter 13 debtor be made available to the United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, the trustee, and any party in interest for inspection and copying, subject to procedures established by the Director of the Administrative Office for United States Courts within 180 days from the date of enactment of this Act. The procedures must safeguard the confidentiality of any tax information required under this provision and include restrictions on creditor access to such information. In addition, the Director must, within 540 days from the Act's enactment date, prepare and submit to Congress a report that assesses the effectiveness of such procedures and, if appropriate, includes recommendations for legislation to further protect the confidentiality of such tax information and to impose penalties for its improper use. If requested by the United States trustee or trustee, the debtor must provide a document establishing the debtor's identity, which may include a driver's license, passport, or other document containing a photograph of the debtor, and such other personal identifying information relating to the debtor.
Section 321(b) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1123 to require the chapter 11 plan of an individual debtor to provide for the payment to creditors of all or such portion of the debtor's earnings from personal services performed after commencement of the case or other future income that is necessary for the plan's execution.
Section 321(c) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1129(a) to include an additional requirement for confirmation in a chapter 11 case of an individual debtor upon objection to confirmation by a holder of an allowed unsecured claim. In such instance, the value of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim, as of the plan's effective date, must not be less than the amount of such claim; or be not less than the debtor's projected disposable income (as defined in section 1325(b)(2)) to be received during the five-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan or during the plan's term, whichever is longer. Section 321(c) also amends section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that an individual chapter 11 debtor may retain property included in the estate under section 1115 (as added by the Act), subject to section 1129(a)(14).
Section 321(d)(1) amends Bankruptcy Code section 1141(d) to provide that a discharge under chapter 11 does not discharge a debtor who is an individual from any debt excepted from discharge under Bankruptcy Code section 523. Section 321(d)(2) of the Act provides that in a chapter 11 individual debtor is not discharged until all plan payments have been made. The court may grant a hardship discharge if the value of property actually distributed under the plan--as of the plan's effective date--is not less than the amount that would have been available for distribution if the case was liquidated under chapter 7 on such date, and modification of the plan is not practicable.
Section 321(e) of the Act amends section 1127 to permit a plan in a chapter 11case of an individual debtor to be modified postconfirmation for the purpose of increasing or reducing the amount of payments, extending or reducing the time period for such payments, or altering the amount of distribution to a creditor whose claim is provided for by the plan. Such modification may be made at any time on request of the debtor, trustee, United States trustee, or holder of an allowed unsecured claim. The provision specifies that sections 1121 through 1129 apply to such modification. In addition, it provides that the modified plan shall become the confirmed plan only if: (1) there has been disclosure pursuant to section 1125 (as the court directs); (2) notice and a hearing; and (3) such modification is approved.
Section 322(a) further amends section 522 to add a provision that does not allow a debtor to exempt any amount of an interest in property described in the preceding paragraph in excess of $125,000 if any of the following applies:
An exception to the monetary limit applies to the extent the value of the homestead property is reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor. The monetary limitation set forth in section 322(a) is subject to automatic adjustment pursuant to section 104 of the Bankruptcy Code.
[Footnote]
[Footnote 87: Pub. L. No. 102-365, 106 Stat. 972 (1992).]
Section 328(b) amends section 1124(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code to clarify that a claim is not impaired if section 365(b)(2) (as amended by this Act) expressly does not require a default with respect to such claim to be cured. In addition, it provides that any claim or interest that arises from the failure to perform a nonmonetary obligation (other than a default arising from the failure to operate a nonresidential real property lease subject to section 365(b)(1)(A)), is impaired unless the holder of such claim or interest (other than the debtor or an insider) is compensated for any actual pecuniary loss incurred by the holder as a result of such failure.
[Footnote] In addition, the Fair Credit Reporting Act 89
[Footnote] permits credit reporting agencies to note the involuntary bankruptcy filing on a person's credit report for up to ten years. 90
[Footnote] Although the Fair Credit Reporting Act permits a consumer to have his or her credit report revised to reflect the fact, for instance, that the involuntary bankruptcy case was dismissed prior to the entry of an order for relief, the report may, nevertheless, still refer to the filing of the case. 91
[Footnote]
[Footnote 88: 11 U.S.C. Sec. 107(a).]
[Footnote 89: 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681.]
[Footnote 90: 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681c(a)(1).]
[Footnote 91: See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681i (2000); Letter from Ronald G. Isaac, Attorney, Federal Trade Commission--Division of Financial Practices/Bureau of Consumer Protection, to Anonymous (Nov. 5, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/frca/anon.htm.]
Unfortunately, tax protesters and other extremists, in addition to other forms of obstreperous litigation (such as filing false liens), are now resorting to filing fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy petitions against public officials and other innocent parties. In 2002, for example, one tax protester filed fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy petitions against 36 local public officials in Wisconsin, 92
[Footnote] some of whom did not find out about the petitions until `they attempted to use a credit card or execute some other financial transaction.' 93
[Footnote] These fraudulent involuntary petition filings were subsequently dismissed by the bankruptcy court, which found that they were filed in bad faith without legal basis and were commenced `for the sole purpose of harassment of the named public officials.' 94
[Footnote] Nevertheless, `[d]espite the fact that the [fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy] petitions are often dismissed,' as one State assistant attorney general observed, `the filings continue to cause financial problems for the victims.' 95
[Footnote] The devastating effect of a fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy filing on an innocent person's credit rating is illustrated by what occurred in Wisconsin and its aftermath. Although the bankruptcy court in dismissing these cases also directed all credit reporting agencies to expunge any record of these filings from the officials' credit reports, 96
[Footnote] the bankruptcy petition filings nevertheless `caused some officials' credit cards to be canceled, almost caused the sale of one supervisor's house to be stopped, and caused continuing credit problems for other officials.' 97
[Footnote]
[Footnote 92: See In re Kenealy, No. 02-26100-MDM (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 21, 2002). Involuntary petitions `were filed against all but one of the County Board supervisors,' the county corporation counsel, county sheriff, clerk of courts, and county circuit judge. Jeff Cole, Paperwork Used for Revenge; Protester's Bogus Bankruptcy Petitions Temporarily Disrupt Officials' Credit, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 6, 2002, at 1B. The protester also filed numerous liens in the amount of $15 million against these individuals as well. Jeff Cole, Man Charged with Filing False Documents; Town of Fredonia Protester's Case is 5th Brought by State, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 21, 2002, at 1B.]
[Footnote 93: Jeff Cole, Paperwork Used for Revenge; Protester's Bogus Bankruptcy Petitions Temporarily Disrupt Officials' Credit, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 6, 2002, at 1B.]
[Footnote 94: In re Kenealy, No. 02-26100-MDM (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 21, 2002).]
[Footnote 95: Roy Korte, Terrorism: A Law Enforcement Perspective, Anti-Defamation League (2002), available at http://www.adl.org/learn/columns/roy5%5korte.asp.]
[Footnote 96: In re Kenealy, No. 02-26100-MDM (Bankr. E.D. Wis. May 21, 2002).]
[Footnote 97: Jeff Cole, `Paper Terrorist' Gets Five Years in Prison, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 18, 2003, at 1B.]
Section 332 responds to these concerns by permitting the court to seal and subsequently expunge all records pertaining to a fraudulent involuntary petition. Section 332(a) sets forth the short title of the section as the `Involuntary Bankruptcy Improvement Act of 2005.' Section 332(b) amends Bankruptcy Code section 303 to permit the court, upon motion of the debtor, to seal all court records pertaining to an involuntary bankruptcy petition if: (1) the petition is false or contains any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement; (2) the debtor is an individual; and (3) the court dismisses the petition. The provision further permits the court, if the debtor is an individual, to prohibit any consumer reporting agency from making any consumer report that contains any information relating to such petition or to the case commenced by the filing of such petition. It further provides that upon the expiration of the statute of limitations described in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3282 for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 152 (concerning crimes for concealment of assets, false oaths and claims, and bribery) and 18 U.S.C. 157 (bankruptcy fraud), the court may, upon motion of the debtor and for good cause, expunge any records pertaining to such petition. Section 332(c) amends section 157 of title 18 to make it a criminal offense to file a fraudulent involuntary bankruptcy petition. Section 332 is similar to legislation considered by the House in the 108th Congress. 98
[Footnote]
[Footnote 98: H.R. 1529, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill was ordered favorably reported without amendment by the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. REP. NO. 108-110 (2003), and passed by voice vote by the House. 149 CONG. REC. H5104 (daily ed. June 10, 2003). The principal difference between this legislation and section 332 of the Act is that the bill would have permitted the court to expunge the case upon dismissal of the fraudulent involuntary petition.]
Subtitle A. General Business Bankruptcy Provisions
Section 404(b) amends section 365(f)(1) to assure that section 365(f) does not override any part of section 365(b). Thus, section 404(b) makes a trustee's authority to assign an executory contract or unexpired lease subject not only to section 365(c), but also to section 365(b), which is given full effect. Therefore, for example, assumption or assignment of a lease of real property in a shopping center must be subject to the provisions of the lease, such as use clauses.
Section 405(b) requires the committee to give creditors having claims of the kind represented by the committee access to information. In addition, the committee must solicit and receive comments from these creditors and, pursuant to court order, make additional reports or disclosures available to them.
[Footnote] to $15,000.
[Footnote 99: A consumer debt is defined as a `debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.' 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(8).]
Subtitle B. Small Business Bankruptcy Provisions
Section 435(b) requires the rules and forms to achieve a practical balance between the need for reasonably complete information by the bankruptcy court, United States trustee, creditors and other parties in interest, and the small business debtor's interest in having such forms be easy and inexpensive to complete. The forms should also be designed to help the small business debtor better understand its financial condition and plan its future.
Sec. 439. Duties of the United States Trustee. Section 439 of the Act amends section 586(a) of title 28 of the United States Code to require the United States trustee to perform the following additional duties with respect to small business debtors:
An exception to this provision applies to a chapter 11 case that is commenced involuntarily and involves no collusion between the debtor and the petitioning creditors. Also, it does not apply if the debtor proves by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the filing of the subsequent case resulted from circumstances beyond the debtor's control and which were not foreseeable at the time the prior case was filed; and (2) it is more likely than not that the court will confirm a feasible plan of reorganization (but not a liquidating plan) within a reasonable time.
In addition, the provision specifies an exception to the provision's mandatory requirement applies if: (1) the debtor or a party in interest objects and establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood that a plan will be confirmed within the time periods set forth in sections 1121(e) and 1129(e), or if these provisions are inapplicable, within a reasonable period of time; (2) the grounds for granting such relief include an act or omission of the debtor for which there exists a reasonable justification for such act or omission; and (3) such act or omission will be cured within a reasonable period of time.
The court must commence the hearing on a section 1112(b) motion within 30 days of its filing and decide the motion not later than 15 days after commencement of the hearing unless the movant expressly consents to a continuance for a specified period of time or compelling circumstances prevent the court from meeting these time limits. Section 442 provides that the term `cause' under section 1112(b), as amended by this provision, includes the following:
Section 442(b) creates an additional ground for the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee or examiner under section 1104(a). It provides that should the bankruptcy court determine cause exists to convert or dismiss a chapter 11 case, it may appoint a trustee or examiner if it is in the best interests of creditors and the bankruptcy estate.
Section 442(b) is designed to benefit creditors when a chapter 11 case would otherwise be dismissed or converted to a chapter 7 case pursuant to section 1112 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 442(b) allows the court to appoint a chapter 11 trustee or examiner, as an alternative to dismissing or converting the case to chapter 7, if in the best interest of creditors and the bankruptcy estate. Section 442(b) is not intended to ease the standards for appointing chapter 11 trustees. Practice under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 demonstrated that routine appointment of trustees deters the use of reorganization statutes and increases the likelihood that by the time a company resorts to bankruptcy relief, it must liquidate. It is therefore important for section 442(b) to be used only for cases that would otherwise be dismissed or converted to chapter 7, and not as an alternative method for attaining the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee.
Section 601 provides that the amendments in this provision take effect 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act.
Section 602 provides that final reports by trustees in chapter 7, 12, and 13 cases include the following information: (1) the length of time the case was pending; (2) assets abandoned; (3) assets exempted; (4) receipts and disbursements of the estate; (5) administrative expenses, including those associated with section 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the actual costs of administering chapter 13 cases; (6) claims asserted; (7) claims allowed; and (8) distributions to claimants and claims discharged without payment. With regard to chapter 11 cases, section 602 provides that periodic reports include the following information regarding:
Section 603(b) amends section 586 of title 28 of the United States Code to require the United States trustee to submit reports as directed by the Attorney General, including the results of audits performed under section 603(a). In addition, it authorizes the United States trustee to contract with auditors to perform the audits specified in this provision. Further, it requires the report of each audit to be filed with the court and transmitted to the United States trustee. The report must specify material misstatements of income, expenditures or assets. In a case where a material misstatement has been reported, the clerk must provide notice of such misstatement to creditors and the United States trustee must report it to the United States Attorney, if appropriate, for possible criminal prosecution. If advisable, the United States trustee must also take appropriate action, such as revoking the debtor's discharge.
Section 603(c) amends section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code to make it a duty of the debtor to cooperate with an auditor. Section 603(d) amends section 727 of the Bankruptcy Code to add, as a ground for revocation of a chapter 7 discharge the debtor's failure to: (a) satisfactorily explain a material misstatement discovered as the result of an audit pursuant to this provision; or (b) make available for inspection all necessary documents or property belonging to the debtor that are requested in connection with such audit. Section 603(e) provides that the amendments made by this provision take effect 18 months after the Act's date of enactment.
Sec. 604. Sense of Congress Regarding Availability of Bankruptcy Data. Section 604 expresses a sense of the Congress that it is a national policy of the United States that all data collected by bankruptcy clerks in electronic form (to the extent such data relates to public records pursuant to section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code) should be made available to the public in a useable electronic form in bulk, subject to appropriate privacy concerns and safeguards as determined by the Judicial Conference of the United States. It also states that a uniform bankruptcy data system should be established that uses a single set of data definitions and forms to collect such data and that data for any particular bankruptcy case should be aggregated in electronic format.
Section 701(b) amends section 505(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code to prevent a bankruptcy court from determining the amount or legality of an ad valorem tax on real or personal property if the applicable period for contesting or redetermining the amount of the claim under nonbankruptcy law has expired.
[Footnote] which held that the tax court did not have jurisdiction to hear a case involving a postpetition year. To address this issue, section 709 of the Act amends section 362(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code to specify that the automatic stay is limited to an individual debtor's prepetition taxes (taxes incurred before entering bankruptcy). The amendment clarifies that the automatic stay does not apply to an individual debtor's postpetition taxes. In addition, section 709 provides that the stay applies to both prepetition and postpetition tax liabilities of a corporation so long as it is a liability that the bankruptcy court may determine.
[Footnote 100: 96 T.C. 895 (1991).]
Section 716(c) amends section 1307 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that if a chapter 13 debtor fails to file a tax return as required by section 1308, the court must dismiss the case or convert it to one under chapter 7 (whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate) on request of a party in interest or the United States trustee after notice and a hearing.
Section 716(d) amends section 502(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that in a chapter 13 case, a governmental unit's tax claim based on a return filed under section 1308 shall be deemed to be timely filed if the claim is filed within 60 days from the date on which such return is filed. Section 716(e) states the sense of the Congress that the Judicial Conference of the United States should propose for adoption official rules with respect an objection by a governmental unit to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan when such claim pertains to a tax return filed pursuant to section 1308.
Title VIII of the Act adds a new chapter to the Bankruptcy Code for transnational bankruptcy cases. It incorporates the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency to encourage cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with respect to transnational insolvency cases. Title VIII is intended to provide greater legal certainty for trade and investment as well as to provide for the fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies, which protects the interests of creditors and other interested parties, including the debtor. In addition, it serves to protect and maximize the value of the debtor's assets.
[Footnote] Cases brought under chapter 15 are intended to be ancillary to cases brought in a debtor's home country, unless a full United States bankruptcy case is brought under another chapter. Even if a full case is brought, the court may decide under section 305 to stay or dismiss the United States case under the other chapter and limit the United States' role to an ancillary case under this chapter. 102
[Footnote] If the full case is not dismissed, it will be subject to the provisions of this chapter governing cooperation, communication and coordination with the foreign courts and representatives. In any case, an order granting recognition is required as a prerequisite to the use of sections 301 and 303 by a foreign representative.
[Footnote 101: The text of the Model Law and the Report of UNCITRAL on its adoption are found at U.N. G.A., 52d Sess., Supp. No. 17 (A/52/17) (`Report'). That Report and the Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, U.N. Gen. Ass., UNCITRAL 30th Sess. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/442 (1997) (`Guide'), which was discussed in the negotiations leading to the Model Law and published by UNCITRAL as an aid to enacting countries, should be consulted for guidance as to the meaning and purpose of its provisions. The development of the provisions in the negotiations at UNCITRAL, in which the United States was an active participant, is recounted in the interim reports of the Working Group that are cited in the Report.]
[Footnote 102: See section 1529 and commentary.]
[Footnote] It largely tracks the language of the Model Law with appropriate United States references. However, it adds in subsection (3) an exclusion of certain natural persons who may be considered ordinary consumers. Although the consumer exclusion is not in the text of the Model Law, the discussions at UNCITRAL recognized that such exclusion would be necessary in countries like the United States where there are special provisions for consumer debtors in the insolvency laws. 104
[Footnote]
[Footnote 103: Guide at 16-19.]
[Footnote 104: See id. at 18, 60; 19 66.]
The reference to section 109(e) essentially defines `consumer debtors' for purposes of the exclusion by incorporating the debt limitations of that section, but not its requirement of regular income. The exclusion adds a requirement that the debtor or debtor couple be citizens or long-term legal residents of the United States. This ensures that residents of other countries will not be able to manipulate this exclusion to avoid recognition of foreign proceedings in their home countries or elsewhere.
The first exclusion in subsection (c) constitutes, for the United States, the exclusion provided in article 1, subsection (2), of the Model Law. 105
[Footnote] Foreign representatives of foreign proceedings which are excluded from the scope of chapter 15 may seek comity from courts other than the bankruptcy court since the limitations of section 1509(b)(2) and (3) would not apply to them.
[Footnote 105: Id. at 17.]
The reference to section 109(b) interpolates into chapter 15 the entities governed by specialized insolvency regimes under United States law which are currently excluded from liquidation proceedings under title 11. Section 1501 contains an exception to the section 109(b) exclusions so that foreign proceedings of foreign insurance companies are eligible for recognition and relief under chapter 15 as they had been under section 304. However, section 1501(d) has the effect of leaving to State regulation any deposit, escrow, trust fund or the like posted by a foreign insurer under State law.
[Footnote]
[Footnote 106: See section 1505.]
The definition of `within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States' in subsection (7) is not taken from the Model Law. It has been added because the United States, like some other countries, asserts insolvency jurisdiction over property outside its territorial limits under appropriate circumstances. Thus a limiting phrase is useful where the Model Law and this chapter intend to refer only to property within the territory of the enacting state. In addition, a definition of `recognition' supplements the Model Law definitions and merely simplifies drafting of various other sections of chapter 15.
Two key definitions of `foreign proceeding' and `foreign representative,' are found in sections 101(23) and (24), which have been amended consistent with Model Law article 2. 107
[Footnote] The definitions of `establishment,' `foreign court,' `foreign main proceeding,' and `foreign non-main proceeding' have been taken from Model Law article 2, with only minor language variations necessary to comport with United States terminology. Additionally, defined terms have been placed in alphabetical order. 108
[Footnote] In order to be recognized as a foreign non-main proceeding, the debtor must at least have an establishment in that foreign country. 109
[Footnote]
[Footnote 107: Guide at 19-21, 67-68.]
[Footnote 108: See Guide at 19, (Model Law) 21 75 (concerning establishment); 21 74 (concerning foreign court); 21 72, 73 and 75 (concerning foreign main and non-main proceedings).]
[Footnote 109: See id. at 21, 75.]
[Footnote] Although this section makes an international obligation prevail over chapter 15, the courts will attempt to read the Model Law and the international obligation so as not to conflict, especially if the international obligation addresses a subject matter less directly related than the Model Law to a case before the court.
[Footnote 110: See id. at 22, Art. 3.]
[Footnote] Therefore, since the competent court has been determined in title 28, this section instead provides that a petition for recognition commences a `case,' an approach that also invokes a number of other useful procedural provisions. In addition, a new subsection (P) to section 157 of title 28 makes cases under this chapter part of the core jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts if referred by the district courts, thus completing the designation of the competent court. Finally, the particular bankruptcy court that will rule on the petition is determined pursuant to a revised section 1410 of title 28 governing venue and transfer. 112
[Footnote]
[Footnote 111: See id. at 23, Art. 4.]
[Footnote 112: New section 1410 of title 28 provides as follows:]
The title `ancillary' in the title of this section and in the title of this chapter emphasizes the United States policy in favor of a general rule that countries other than the home country of the debtor, where a main proceeding would be brought, should usually act through ancillary proceedings in aid of the main proceedings, in preference to a system of full bankruptcies (often called `secondary' proceedings) in each state where assets are found. Under the Model Law, notwithstanding the recognition of a foreign main proceeding, full bankruptcy cases are permitted in each country (see sections 1528 and 1529). In the United States, the court will have the power to suspend or dismiss such cases where appropriate under section 305.
[Footnote]
[Footnote 113: See Guide at 24.]
The related amendment to section 586(a)(3) of title 28 makes acting pursuant to authorization under this section an additional power of a trustee or debtor in possession. While the Model Law automatically authorizes an administrator to act abroad, this section requires all trustees and debtors to obtain court approval before acting abroad. That requirement is a change from the language of the Model Law, but one that is purely internal to United States law. 114
[Footnote] Its main purpose is to ensure that the court has knowledge and control of possibly expensive activities, but it will have the collateral benefit of providing further assurance to foreign courts that the United States debtor or representative is under judicial authority and supervision. This requirement means that the first-day orders in reorganization cases should include authorization to act under this section where appropriate.
[Footnote 114: See id. at 24, Art. 5.]
This section also contemplates the designation of an examiner or other natural person to act for the estate in one or more foreign countries where appropriate. One instance might be a case in which the designated person had a special expertise relevant to that assignment. Another might be where the foreign court would be more comfortable with a designated person than with an entity like a debtor in possession. Either are to be recognized under the Model Law. 115
[Footnote]
[Footnote 115: See id. at 23-24, 82.]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 116: See id. at 25.]
[Footnote] Subsection (2) makes the authority for additional relief (beyond that permitted under sections 1519-1521, below) subject to the conditions for relief heretofore specified in United States law under section 304, which is repealed. This section is intended to permit the further development of international cooperation begun under section 304, but is not to be the basis for denying or limiting relief otherwise available under this chapter. The additional assistance is made conditional upon the court's consideration of the factors set forth in the current subsection 304(c) in a context of a reasonable balancing of interests following current case law. The references to `estate' in section 304 have been changed to refer to the debtor's property, because many foreign systems do not create an estate in insolvency proceedings of the sort recognized under this chapter. Although the case law construing section 304 makes it clear that comity is the central consideration, its physical placement as one of six factors in subsection (c) of section 304 is misleading, since those factors are essentially elements of the grounds for granting comity. Therefore, in subsection (2) of this section, comity is raised to the introductory language to make it clear that it is the central concept to be addressed. 118
[Footnote]
[Footnote 117: Id. at 26.]
[Footnote 118: Id.]
[Footnote] Interpretation of this chapter on a uniform basis will be aided by reference to the Guide and the Reports cited therein, which explain the reasons for the terms used and often cite their origins as well. Uniform interpretation will also be aided by reference to CLOUT, the UNCITRAL Case Law On Uniform Texts, which is a service of UNCITRAL. CLOUT receives reports from national reporters all over the world concerning court decisions interpreting treaties, model laws, and other text promulgated by UNCITRAL. Not only are these sources persuasive, but they advance the crucial goal of uniformity of interpretation. To the extent that the United States courts rely on these sources, their decisions will more likely be regarded as persuasive elsewhere.
[Footnote 119: Id. at 26, 91.]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 120: See id. at 23, Art. 4, 79-83; 27 Art. 9, 93.]
Although a petition under current section 304 is the proper method for achieving deference by a United States court to a foreign insolvency proceeding under present law, some cases in state and Federal courts under current law have granted comity suspension or dismissal of cases involving foreign proceedings without requiring a section 304 petition or even referring to the requirements of that section. Even if the result is correct in a particular case, the procedure is undesirable, because there is room for abuse of comity. Parties would be free to avoid the requirements of this chapter and the expert scrutiny of the bankruptcy court by applying directly to a state or Federal court unfamiliar with the statutory requirements. Such an application could be made after denial of a petition under this chapter. This section concentrates the recognition and deference process in one United States court, ensures against abuse, and empowers a court that will be fully informed of the current status of all foreign proceedings involving the debtor. 121
[Footnote]
[Footnote 121: See id. at 27, Art. 9; 34-35, Art. 15 and 116-119; 39-40, Art. 18, 133-134; see also sections 1515(3), 1518.]
Subsection (d) has been added to ensure that a foreign representative cannot seek relief in courts in the United States after being denied recognition by the court under this chapter. Subsection (e) makes activities in the United States by a foreign representative subject to applicable United States law, just as 28 U.S.C. section 959 does for a domestic trustee in bankruptcy. 122
[Footnote] Subsection (f) provides a limited exception to the prior recognition requirement so that collection of a claim which is property of the debtor, for example an account receivable, by a foreign representative may proceed without commencement of a case or recognition under this chapter.
[Footnote 122: Id. at 27, 93.]
[Footnote] Article 11 does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary proceedings, but seems to have implicitly assumed an involuntary proceeding. 124
[Footnote] Subsection 1(a)(2) goes farther and permits a voluntary filing, with its much simpler requirements, if the foreign proceeding that has been recognized is a main proceeding.
[Footnote 123: See id. at 28, Art. 11.]
[Footnote 124: Id. at 38, 97-99.]
[Footnote] The effect of this section is to make the recognized foreign representative a party in interest in any pending or later commenced United States bankruptcy case. 126
[Footnote] Throughout this chapter, the word `case' has been substituted for the word `proceeding' in the Model Law when referring to cases under the United States Bankruptcy Code, to conform to United States usage.
[Footnote 125: Id. at 29, Art. 12.]
[Footnote 126: Id. at 29, 10-102.]
[Footnote] The law as to priority for foreign claims that fit within a class given priority treatment under section 507 (for example, foreign employees or spouses) is unsettled. This section permits the continued development of case law on that subject and its general principle of national treatment should be an important factor to be considered. At a minimum, under this section, foreign claims must receive the treatment given to general unsecured claims without priority, unless they are in a class of claims in which domestic creditors would also be subordinated. 128
[Footnote] The Model Law allows for an exception to the policy of nondiscrimination as to foreign revenue and other public law claims. 129
[Footnote] Such claims (such as tax and Social Security claims) have been traditionally denied enforcement in the United States, inside and outside of bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code is silent on this point, so the rule is purely a matter of traditional case law. It is not clear if this policy should be maintained or modified, so this section leaves this question to developing case law. It also allows the Department of the Treasury to negotiate reciprocal arrangements with our tax treaty partners in this regard, although it does not mandate any restriction of the evolution of case law pending such negotiations.
[Footnote 127: Id. at 30, 103.]
[Footnote 128: See id. at 30, 104.]
[Footnote 129: See id. at 31, 105.]
[Footnote] As `foreign creditor' is not a defined term, foreign addresses are used as the distinguishing factor. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (`Rules') should be amended to conform to the requirements of this section, including a special form for initial notice to such creditors. In particular, the Rules must provide additional time for such creditors to file proofs of claim where appropriate and require the court to make specific orders in that regard in proper circumstances. The notice must specify that secured claims must be asserted, because in many countries such claims are not affected by an insolvency proceeding and need not be filed. 131
[Footnote] If a foreign creditor has made an appropriate request for notice, it will receive notices in every instance where notices would be sent to other creditors who have made such requests. Subsection (d) replaces the reference to `a reasonable time period' in Model Law article 14(3)(a). 132
[Footnote] It makes clear that the Rules, local rules, and court orders must make appropriate adjustments in time periods and bar dates so that foreign creditors have a reasonable time within which to receive notice or take an action.
[Footnote 130: See Model Law, Art. 14; Guide at 31-32, 106-109.]
[Footnote 131: Guide at 33, 111.]
[Footnote 132: Id. at 31, Art. 14(3)(a).]
[Footnote] The Rules will require amendment to provide forms for some or all of the documents mentioned in this section, to make necessary additions to Rules 1000 and 2002 to facilitate appropriate notices of the hearing on the petition for recognition, and to require filing of lists of creditors and other interested persons who should receive notices. Throughout the Model Law, the question of notice procedure is left to the law of the enacting state. 134
[Footnote]
[Footnote 133: Id. at 33.]
[Footnote 134: See id. at 36, 121.]
[Footnote] Although sections 1515 and 1516 are designed to make recognition as simple and expedient as possible, the court may hear proof on any element stated. The ultimate burden as to each element is on the foreign representative, although the court is entitled to shift the burden to the extent indicated in section 1516. The word `proof' in subsection (3) has been changed to `evidence' to make it clearer using United States terminology that the ultimate burden is on the foreign representative. 136
[Footnote] `Registered office' is the term used in the Model Law to refer to the place of incorporation or the equivalent for an entity that is not a natural person. 137
[Footnote] The presumption that the place of the registered office is also the center of the debtor's main interest is included for speed and convenience of proof where there is no serious controversy.
[Footnote 135: Id. at 36]
[Footnote 136: Id. at 36, Art. 16(3).]
[Footnote 137: Id.]
[Footnote] The decision to grant recognition is not dependent upon any findings about the nature of the foreign proceedings of the sort previously mandated by section 304(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The requirements of this section, which incorporates the definitions in section 1502 and sections 101(23) and (24), are all that must be fulfilled to attain recognition. Reciprocity was specifically suggested as a requirement for recognition on more than one occasion in the negotiations that resulted in the Model Law. It was rejected by overwhelming consensus each time. The United States was one of the leading countries opposing the inclusion of a reciprocity requirement. 139
[Footnote] In this regard, the Model Law conforms to section 304, which has no such requirement.
[Footnote 138: Id. at 37.]
[Footnote 139: Report of the Working Group on Insolvency Law on the Work of Its Twentieth Session (Vienna, 7-18 Oct. 1996), at 6, 16-20.]
The drafters of the Model Law understood that only a main proceeding or a non-main proceeding meeting the standards of section 1502 (that is, one brought where the debtor has an establishment) were entitled to recognition under this section. The Model Law has been slightly modified to make this point clear by referring to the section 1502 definition of main and non-main proceedings, as well as to the general definition of a foreign proceeding in section 101(23). A petition under section 1515 must show that proceeding is a main or a qualifying non-main proceeding in order to obtain recognition under this section.
Consistent with the position of various civil law representatives in the drafting of the Model Law, recognition creates a status with the effects set forth in section 1520, so those effects are not viewed as orders to be modified, as are orders granting relief under sections 1519 and 1521. Subsection (4) states the grounds for modifying or terminating recognition. On the other hand, the effects of recognition (found in section 1520 and including an automatic stay) are subject to modification under section 362(d), made applicable by section 1520(2), which permits relief from the automatic stay of section 1520 for cause.
Paragraph 1(d) of section 17 of the Model Law has been omitted as an unnecessary requirement for United States purposes, because a petition submitted to the wrong court will be dismissed or transferred under other provisions of United States law. 140
[Footnote] The reference to section 350 refers to the routine closing of a case that has been completed and will invoke requirements including a final report from the foreign representative in such form as the Rules may provide or a court may order. 141
[Footnote]
[Footnote 140: Guide at 37, Art. 17(1)(d).]
[Footnote 141: Id.]
[Footnote] Judges in several jurisdictions, including the United States, have reported a need for a requirement of complete and candid reports to the court of all proceedings, worldwide, involving the debtor. This section will ensure that such information is provided to the court on a timely basis. Any failure to comply with this section will be subject to the sanctions available to the court for violations of the statute. The section leaves to the Rules the form of the required notice and related questions of notice to parties in interest, the time for filing, and the like.
[Footnote 142: Id. at 39-40, 133, 134.]
[Footnote] The bankruptcy court will have jurisdiction to grant emergency relief under Rule 7065 pending a hearing on the petition for recognition. This section does not expand or reduce the scope of section 105 as determined by cases under section 105 nor does it modify the sweep of sections 555 to 560. Subsection (d) precludes injunctive relief against police and regulatory action under section 1519, leaving section 105 as the only avenue for such relief. Subsection (e) makes clear that this section contemplates injunctive relief and that such relief is subject to specific rules and a body of jurisprudence. Subsection (f) was added to complement amendments to the Bankruptcy Code provisions dealing with financial contracts.
[Footnote 143: Id. at 40.]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 144: Id. at 42, Art. 20 1(a), (b).]
Subsections (a)(2) and (4) apply the Bankruptcy Code sections that impose the restrictions called for by subsection 1(c) of the Model Law. In both cases, the provisions are broader and more complete than those contemplated by the Model Law, but include all the restraints the Model Law provisions would impose. 145
[Footnote] As the foreign proceeding may or may not create an `estate' similar to that created in cases under this title, the restraints are applicable to actions against the debtor under section 362(a) and with respect to the property of the debtor under the remaining sections. The only property covered by this section is property within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States as defined in section 1502. To achieve effects on property of the debtor which is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, the foreign representative would have to commence a case under another chapter of this title.
[Footnote 145: Id. at 42, 45.]
By applying sections 361 and 362, subsection (a) makes applicable the United States exceptions and limitations to the restraints imposed on creditors, debtors, and other in a case under this title, as stated in article 20(2) of the Model Law. 146
[Footnote] It also introduces the concept of adequate protection provided in sections 362 and 363. These exceptions and limitations include those set forth in sections 362(b), (c) and (d). As a result, the court has the power to terminate the stay pursuant to section 362(d), for cause, including a failure of adequate protection. 147
[Footnote]
[Footnote 146: Id. at 42, Art. 20(2); 44, 148, 150.]
[Footnote 147: Id. at 42, Art. 20(3); 44-45, 151 152.]
Subsection (a)(2), by its reference to sections 363 and 552 adds to the powers of a foreign representative of a foreign main proceeding an automatic right to operate the debtor's business and exercise the power of a trustee under sections 363 and 542, unless the court orders otherwise. A foreign representative of a foreign main proceeding may need to continue a business operation to maintain value and granting that authority automatically will eliminate the risk of delay. If the court is uncomfortable about this authority in a particular situation, it can `order otherwise' as part of the order granting recognition.
Two special exceptions to the automatic stay are embodied in subsections (b) and (c). To preserve a claim in certain foreign countries, it may be necessary to commence an action. Subsection (b) permits the commencement of such an action, but would not allow for its further prosecution. Subsection (c) provides that there is no stay of the commencement of a full United States bankruptcy case. This essentially provides an escape hatch through which any entity, including the foreign representative, can flee into a full case. The full case, however, will remain subject to subchapters IV and V on cooperation and coordination of proceedings and to section 305 providing for stay or dismissal. Section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code provides the tolling protection intended by Model Law article 20(3), so no exception is necessary for claims that might be extinguished under United States law. 148
[Footnote]
[Footnote 148: Id.]
[Footnote] The exceptions in subsection (a)(7) relate to avoiding powers. The foreign representative's status as to such powers is governed by section 1523 below. The avoiding power in section 549 and the exceptions to that power are covered by section 1520(a)(2). The word `adequately' in the Model Law, articles 21(2) and 22(1), has been changed to `sufficiently' in sections 1521(b) and 1522(a) to avoid confusion with a very specialized legal term in United States bankruptcy, `adequate protection.' 150
[Footnote] Subsection (c) is designed to limit relief to assets having some direct connection with a non-main proceeding, for example where they were part of an operating division in the jurisdiction of the non-main proceeding when they were fraudulently conveyed and then brought to the United States. 151
[Footnote] Subsections (d), (e) and (f) are identical to those same subsections of section 1519. This section does not expand or reduce the scope of relief currently available in ancillary cases under sections 105 and 304 nor does it modify the sweep of sections 555 through 560.
[Footnote 149: Id. at 45-46, Art. 21.]
[Footnote 150: Id. at 46, Art. 21(2); 47, Art. 22(1).]
[Footnote 151: See id. at 46-47, 158, 160.]
[Footnote] It gives the bankruptcy court broad latitude to mold relief to meet specific circumstances, including appropriate responses if it is shown that the foreign proceeding is seriously and unjustifiably injuring United States creditors. For a response to a showing that the conditions necessary to recognition did not actually exist or have ceased to exist, see section 1517. Concerning the change of `adequately' in the Model Law to `sufficiently' in this section, see section 1521. Subsection (d) is new and simply makes clear that Bankruptcy Code section 1104(d) shall apply to the appointment of an examiner appointed in a case under chapter 15 and such examiner shall be subject to certain duties and bonding requirements based on those imposed on trustees and examiners under other chapters of this title.
[Footnote 152: Id. at 47.]
[Footnote] It confers standing on a recognized foreign representative to assert an avoidance action but only in a pending case under another chapter of this title. The Model Law is not clear about whether it would grant standing in a recognized foreign proceeding if no full case were pending. This limitation reflects concerns raised by the United States delegation during the UNCITRAL debates that a simple grant of standing to bring avoidance actions neglects to address very difficult choice of law and forum issues. This limited grant of standing in section 1523 does not create or establish any legal right of avoidance nor does it create or imply any legal rules with respect to the choice of applicable law as to the avoidance of any transfer of obligation. 154
[Footnote] The courts will determine the nature and extent of any such action and what national law may be applicable to such action.
[Footnote 153: Id. at 48-49.]
[Footnote 154: See id. at 49, 166.]
[Footnote] This section gives the foreign representative whose foreign proceeding has been recognized the right to intervene in United States cases, state or federal, where the debtor is a party. Recognition being an act under Federal bankruptcy law, it must take effect in state as well as Federal courts. This section does not require substituting the foreign representative for the debtor, although that result may be appropriate in some circumstances.
[Footnote 155: Id. at 49.]
[Footnote] The right of courts to communicate with other courts in worldwide insolvency cases is of central importance. This section authorizes courts to do so. This right must be exercised, however, with due regard to the rights of the parties. Guidelines for such communications are left to the Federal rules of bankruptcy procedure.
[Footnote 156: Id. at 50.]
[Footnote] The language in Model Law article 26 concerning the trustee's function was eliminated as unnecessary because it is always implied under United States law. The section authorizes the trustee, including a debtor in possession, to cooperate with other proceedings.
[Footnote 157: Id. at 51.]
[Footnote] United States bankruptcy courts already engage in most of the forms of cooperation described here, but they now have explicit statutory authorization for acts like the approval of protocols of the sort used in cases. 159
[Footnote]
[Footnote 158: Guide at 51, 53.]
[Footnote 159: See e.g., In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 93 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996).]
[Footnote] In a full bankruptcy case, the United States bankruptcy court generally has jurisdiction over assets outside the United States. Here that jurisdiction is limited where those assets are controlled by another recognized proceeding, if it is a main proceeding.
[Footnote 160: Guide at 54-55.]
The court may use section 305 of this title to dismiss, stay, or limit a case as necessary to promote cooperation and coordination in a cross-border case. In addition, although the jurisdictional limitation applies only to United States bankruptcy cases commenced after recognition of a foreign proceeding, the court has ample authority under the next section and section 305 to exercise its discretion to dismiss, stay, or limit a United States case filed after a petition for recognition of a foreign main proceeding has been filed but before it has been approved, if recognition is ultimately granted.
[Footnote] This provision is consistent with United States policy to act ancillary to a foreign main proceeding whenever possible.
[Footnote 161: Id. at 55-56.]
[Footnote] It ensures that a foreign main proceeding will be given primacy in the United States, consistent with the overall approach of the United States favoring assistance to foreign main proceedings.
[Footnote 162: Id. at 57.]
[Footnote] Where an insolvency proceeding has begun in the home country of the debtor, and in the absence of contrary evidence, the foreign representative should not have to make a new showing that the debtor is in the sort of financial distress requiring a collective judicial remedy. The word `proof' in this provision here means `presumption.' The presumption does not arise for any purpose outside this section.
[Footnote 163: Id. at 58.]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 164: Id. at 59.]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 165: Id. at 51-52, 71.]
Section 802(c) amends section 157(b)(2) of title 28 to provide that proceedings under chapter 15 will be core proceedings while other amendments to title 28 provide that the United States trustee's standing extends to cases under chapter 15 and that the United States trustee's duties include acting in chapter 15 cases. Although the United States will continue to assert worldwide jurisdiction over property of a domestic or foreign debtor in a full bankruptcy case under chapters 7 and 13 of this title, subject to deference to foreign proceedings under chapter 15 and section 305, the situation is different in a case commenced under chapter 15. There the United States is acting solely in an ancillary position, so jurisdiction over property is limited to that stated in chapter 15.
Section 802(d) amends section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code to permit recognition of foreign proceedings involving foreign insurance companies and involving foreign banks which do not have a branch or agency in the United States (as defined in 12 U.S.C. 3101). While a foreign bank not subject to United States regulation will be eligible for chapter 15 as a consequence of the amendment to section 109, section 303 prohibits the commencement of a full involuntary case against such a foreign bank unless the bank is a debtor in a foreign proceeding.
While section 304 is repealed and replaced by chapter 15, access to the jurisprudence which developed under section 304 is preserved in the context of new section 1507. On deciding whether to grant the additional assistance contemplated by section 1507, the court must consider the same factors specified in former section 304. The venue provisions for cases ancillary to foreign proceedings have been amended to provide a hierarchy of choices beginning with principal place of business in the United States, if any. If there is no principal place of business in the United States, but there is litigation against a debtor, then the district in which the litigation is pending would be the appropriate venue. In any other case, venue must be determined with reference to the interests of justice and the convenience of the parties.
Subsection (b) amends the definition of `securities contract' expressly to encompass margin loans, to clarify the coverage of securities options and to clarify the coverage of repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions. The inclusion of `margin loans' in the definition is intended to encompass only those loans commonly known in the securities industry as `margin loans,' such as credit permitted in a margin account under the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation T (whether or not effected in that account) or arrangements where a financial intermediary--a stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities agency--extends credit in connection with the purchase, sale, carrying, or trading of securities. `Margin loans' do not include, however, other loans that happen to be secured by securities collateral. The reference in subsection (b) to a `guarantee by or to any securities clearing agency' is intended to cover other arrangements, such as novation, that have an effect similar to a guarantee. The reference to a `loan' of a security in the definition is intended to apply to loans of securities, whether or not for a `permitted purpose' under margin regulations. The reference to `repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions' is intended to eliminate any inquiry under the qualified financial contract provisions of the FDIA or FCUA as to whether a repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction is a purchase and sale transaction or a secured financing. Repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions meeting certain criteria are already covered under the definition of `repurchase agreement' in the FDIA (and a regulation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)). Repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions on all securities (including, for example, equity securities, asset-backed securities, corporate bonds and commercial paper) are included under the definition of `securities contract.' Subsection (b) also specifies that purchase, sale and repurchase obligations under a participation in a commercial mortgage loan do not constitute `securities contracts.' While a contract for the purchase, sale or repurchase of a participation may constitute a `securities contract,' the purchase, sale or repurchase obligation embedded in a participation agreement does not make that agreement a `securities contract.'
A number of terms used in the qualified financial contract provisions, but not defined therein, are intended to have the meanings set forth in the analogous provisions of the Bankruptcy Code or Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (`FDICIA'), such as, for example, `securities clearing agency.' The term `person,' however, is not intended to be so interpreted. Instead, `person' is intended to have the meaning set forth in section 1 of title 1 of the United States Code.
Section 901(c) amends with respect the definition of `commodity contract' in section 11(e)(8)(D)(iii) of the FDIA and in section 207(c)(8)(D)(iii) of the FCUA. Section 901(d) amends section 11(e)(8)(D)(iv) of the FDIA and section 207(c)(8)(D)(iv) of the FCUA with respect to the definition of a `forward contract.'
Subsection (e) amends the definition of `repurchase agreement' in the FDIA and the FCUA to codify the substance of the FDIC's 1995 regulation defining repurchase agreement to include those on qualified foreign government securities. 166
[Footnote] The term `qualified foreign government securities' is defined to include those that are direct obligations of, or fully guaranteed by, central governments of members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as determined by rule, of the appropriate Federal banking agency. Subsection (e) reflects developments in the repurchase agreement markets, which increasingly use foreign government securities as the underlying asset. The securities are limited to those issued by or guaranteed by full members of the OECD, as well as countries that have concluded special lending arrangements with the International Monetary Fund associated with the Fund's General Arrangements to Borrow.
[Footnote 166: See 12 C.F.R. Sec. 360.5.]
Subsection (e) also amends the definition of `repurchase agreement' to include those on mortgage-related securities, mortgage loans and interests therein, and expressly to include principal and interest-only U.S. government and agency securities as securities that can be the subject of a `repurchase agreement.' The reference in the definition to United States government- and agency-issued or fully guaranteed securities is intended to include obligations issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) as well as all obligations eligible for purchase by Federal Reserve banks under the similar language of section 14(b) of the Federal Reserve Act. This amendment is not intended to affect the status of repos involving securities or commodities as securities contracts, commodity contracts, or forward contracts, and their consequent eligibility for similar treatment under the qualified financial contract provisions. In particular, an agreement for the sale and repurchase of a security would continue to be a securities contract as defined in the FDIA or FCUA, even if not a `repurchase agreement' as defined in the FDIA or FCUA. Similarly, an agreement for the sale and repurchase of a commodity, even though not a `repurchase agreement' as defined in the FDIA or FCUA, would continue to be a forward contract for purposes of the FDIA or FCUA.
Subsection (e), like subsection (b) for `securities contracts,' specifies that repurchase obligations under a participation in a commercial mortgage loan do not make the participation agreement a `repurchase agreement.' Such repurchase obligations embedded in participations in commercial loans (such as recourse obligations) do not constitute a `repurchase agreement.' A repurchase agreement involving the transfer of participations in commercial mortgage loans with a simultaneous agreement to repurchase the participation on demand or at a date certain one year or less after such transfer, however, would constitute a `repurchase agreement' as well as a `securities contract.'
Section 901(f) of the Act amends the definition of `swap agreement' to include an `interest rate swap, option, future, or forward agreement, including a rate floor, rate cap, rate collar, cross-currency rate swap, and basis swap; a spot, same day-tomorrow, tomorrow-next, forward, or other foreign exchange or precious metals agreement; a currency swap, option, future, or forward agreement; an equity index or equity swap, option, future, or forward agreement; a debt index or debt swap, option, future, or forward agreement; a total return, credit spread or credit swap, option, future, or forward agreement; a commodity index or commodity swap, option, future, or forward agreement; or a weather swap, weather derivative, or weather option.' As amended, the definition of `swap agreement' will update the statutory definition and achieve contractual netting across economically similar transactions that are the subject of recurring dealings in the swap agreements.
The definition of `swap agreement' originally was intended to provide sufficient flexibility to avoid the need to amend the definition as the nature and uses of swap transactions matured. To that end, the phrase `or any other similar agreement' was included in the definition. (The phrase `or any similar agreement' has been added to the definitions of `forward contract,' `commodity contract,' `repurchase agreement' and `securities contract' for the same reason.) To clarify this, subsection (f) expands the definition of `swap agreement' to include `any agreement or transaction that is similar to any other agreement or transaction referred to in [section 11(e)(8)(D)(vi) of the FDIA] and is of a type that has been, is presently, or in the future becomes, the subject of recurrent dealings in the swap markets . . . and that is a forward, swap, future, or option on one or more rates, currencies, commodities, equity securities or other equity instruments, debt securities or other debt instruments, quantitative measures associated with an occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency associated with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence, or economic or financial indices or measures of economic or financial risk or value.'
The definition of `swap agreement,' however, should not be interpreted to permit parties to document non-swaps as swap transactions. Traditional commercial arrangements, such as supply agreements, or other non-financial market transactions, such as commercial, residential or consumer loans, cannot be treated as `swaps' under the FDIA, the FCUA, or the Bankruptcy Code simply because the parties purport to document or label the transactions as `swap agreements.' In addition, these definitions apply only for purposes of the FDIA, the FCUA, and the Bankruptcy Code. These definitions, and the characterization of a certain transaction as a `swap agreement,' are not intended to affect the characterization, definition, or treatment of any instruments under any other statute, regulation, or rule including, but not limited to, the statutes, regulations or rules enumerated in subsection (f). Similarly, Section 17 and a new paragraph of Section 11(e) of the FDIA provide that the definitions of `securities contract,' `repurchase agreement,' `forward contract,' and `commodity contract,' and the characterization of certain transactions as such a contract or agreement, are not intended to affect the characterization, definition, or treatment of any instruments under any other statute, regulation, or rule including, but not limited to, the statutes, regulations or rules enumerated in subsection (f).
The definition also includes any security agreement or arrangement, or other credit enhancement, related to a swap agreement, including any guarantee or reimbursement obligation related to a swap agreement. This ensures that any such agreement, arrangement or enhancement is itself deemed to be a swap agreement, and therefore eligible for treatment as such for purposes of termination, liquidation, acceleration, offset and netting under the FDIA, FCUA, and the Bankruptcy Code. Similar changes are made in the definitions of `forward contract,' `commodity contract,' `repurchase agreement' and `securities contract.'
The use of the term `forward' in the definition of `swap agreement' is not intended to refer only to transactions that fall within the definition of `forward contract.' Instead, a `forward' transaction could be a `swap agreement' even if not a `forward contract.'
Section 901(g) amends the definition of `transfer' in the FDIA and FCUA, which is a key term used in both, to ensure that it is broadly construed to encompass dispositions of property or interests in property. The definition tracks the Bankruptcy Code's definition of this term in Bankruptcy Code section 101.
Section 901(h) makes clarifying technical changes to conform the receivership and conservatorship provisions of the FDIA and the FCUA. It also clarifies that the FDIA and the FCUA expressly protect rights under security agreements, arrangements or other credit enhancements related to one or more qualified financial contracts (QFCs). An example of a security arrangement is a right of setoff, and examples of other credit enhancements are letters of credit, guarantees, reimbursement obligations and other similar agreements.
Section 901(i) of the Act clarifies that no provision of Federal or state law relating to the avoidance of preferential or fraudulent transfers (including the anti-preference provision of the National Bank Act) can be invoked to avoid a transfer made in connection with any QFC of an insured depository institution in conservatorship or receivership, absent actual fraudulent intent on the part of the transferee.
The new FDIA and FCUA provisions specify that when the FDIC and NCUAB transfer QFCs that are cleared on or subject to the rules of a particular clearing organization, the transfer will not require the clearing organization to accept the transferee as a member of the organization. This provision gives the FDIC and NCUAB flexibility in resolving QFCs cleared on or subject to the rules of a clearing organization, while preserving the ability of such organizations to enforce appropriate risk reducing membership requirements. The amendment does not require the clearing organization to accept for clearing any QFCs from the transferee, except on the terms and conditions applicable to other parties permitted to clear through that clearing organization. `Clearing organization' is defined to mean a `clearing organization' within the meaning of FDICIA (as amended both by the CFMA and by Section 906 of the Act).
The new FDIA and FCUA provisions also permit transfers to an eligible financial institution that is a non-U.S. person, or the branch or agency of a non-U.S. person or a U.S. financial institution that is not an FDIC-insured institution if, following the transfer, the contractual rights of the parties would be enforceable substantially to the same extent as under the FDIA and the FCUA. It is expected that neither the FDIC nor the NCUAB would transfer QFCs to such a financial institution if there were an impending change of law that would impair the enforceability of the parties' contractual rights.
Section 903 amends the notification requirements following a transfer of the QFCs of a failed depository institution to require the FDIC and NCUAB to notify any party to a transferred QFC of such transfer by 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on the business day following the date of the appointment of the FDIC acting as receiver or following the date of such transfer by the FDIC or NCUAB acting as a conservator. This amendment is consistent with the policy statement on QFCs issued by the FDIC on December 12, 1989.
Section 903 amends the FDIA to clarify the relationship between the FDIA and FDICIA. There has been some uncertainty whether FDICIA permits counterparties to terminate or liquidate a QFC before the expiration of the time period provided by the FDIA during which the FDIC may repudiate or transfer a QFC in a conservatorship or receivership. Subsection (c) provides that a party may not terminate a QFC based solely on the appointment of the FDIC as receiver until 5:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) on the business day following the appointment of the receiver or after the person has received notice of a transfer under FDIA section 11(d)(9), or based solely on the appointment of the FDIC as conservator, notwithstanding the provisions of FDICIA. This provides the FDIC with an opportunity to undertake an orderly resolution of the insured depository institution. Section 903 makes a similar change to the FCUA.
Section 903 also prohibits the enforcement of rights of termination or liquidation that arise solely because of the insolvency of the institution or are based on the `financial condition' of the depository institution in receivership or conservatorship. For example, termination based on a cross-default provision in a QFC that is triggered upon a default under another contract could be rendered ineffective if such other default was caused by an acceleration of amounts due under that other contract, and such acceleration was based solely on the appointment of a conservator or receiver for that depository institution. Similarly, a provision in a QFC permitting termination of the QFC based solely on a downgraded credit rating of a party will not be enforceable in an FDIC or NCUAB receivership or conservatorship because the provision is based solely on the financial condition of the depository institution in default. However, any payment, delivery or other performance-based default, or breach of a representation or covenant putting in question the enforceability of the agreement, will not be deemed to be based solely on financial condition for purposes of this provision. The amendment is not intended to prevent counterparties from taking all actions permitted and recovering all damages authorized upon repudiation of any QFC by a conservator or receiver, or from taking actions based upon a receivership or other financial condition-triggered default in the absence of a transfer (as contemplated in Section 11(e)(10) of the FDIA). The amendment allows the FDIC or NCUAB to meet its obligation to provide notice to parties to transferred QFCs by taking steps reasonably calculated to provide notice to such parties by the required time. This is consistent with the existing policy statement on QFCs issued by the FDIC on December 12, 1989.
Finally, the amendment permits the FDIC or NCUAB to transfer QFCs of a failed depository institution to a bridge bank or a depository institution organized by the FDIC or NCUAB for which a conservator is appointed either (i) immediately upon the organization of such institution or (ii) at the time of a purchase and assumption transaction between the FDIC or NCUAB and the institution. This provision clarifies that such institutions are not to be considered financial institutions that are ineligible to receive such transfers under FDIA section 11(e)(9). This is consistent with the existing policy statement on QFCs issued by the FDIC on December 12, 1989.
FDICIA provides that a netting arrangement will be enforced pursuant to its terms, notwithstanding the failure of a party to the agreement. The current netting provisions of FDICIA, however, limit this protection to `financial institutions,' which include depository institutions. Section 906(a)(2) amends the FDICIA definition of covered institutions to include (i) uninsured national and State member banks, irrespective of their eligibility for deposit insurance and (ii) foreign banks (including the foreign bank and its branches or agencies as a combined group, or only the foreign bank parent of a branch or agency). The latter change will extend the protections of FDICIA to ensure that U.S. financial organizations participating in netting agreements with foreign banks are covered by the Act, thereby enhancing the safety and soundness of these arrangements. It is intended that a non-defaulting foreign bank and its branches and agencies be considered to be a single financial institution for purposes of the bilateral netting provisions of FDICIA (except to the extent that the non-defaulting foreign bank and its branches and agencies on the one hand, and the defaulting financial institution, on the other, have entered into agreements that clearly evidence an intention that the non-defaulting foreign bank and its branches and agencies be treated as separate financial institutions for purposes of the bilateral netting provisions of FDICIA).
Subsection (a)(3) amends the FDICIA to provide that, for purposes of FDICIA, two or more clearing organizations that enter into a netting contract are considered `members' of each other. This assures the enforceability of netting arrangements involving two or more clearing organizations and a member common to all such organizations, thus reducing systemic risk in the event of the failure of such a member. Under the current FDICIA provisions, the enforceability of such arrangements depends on a case-by-case determination that clearing organizations could be regarded as members of each other for purposes of FDICIA.
Section 906(a)(4) of the Act amends the FDICIA definition of netting contract and the general rules applicable to netting contracts. The current FDICIA provisions require that the netting agreement must be governed by the law of the United States or a State to receive the protections of FDICIA. Many of these agreements, however, particularly netting arrangements covering positions taken in foreign exchange dealings, are governed by the laws of a foreign country. This subsection broadens the definition of `netting contract' to include those agreements governed by foreign law, and preserves the FDICIA requirement that a netting contract not be invalid under, or precluded by, Federal law.
Section 906(b) and (c) establish two exceptions to FDICIA's protection of the enforceability of the provisions of netting contracts between financial institutions and among clearing organization members. First, the termination provisions of netting contracts will not be enforceable based solely on (i) the appointment of a conservator for an insolvent depository institution under the FDIA or FCUA, or (ii) the appointment of a receiver or liquidating agent for such institution under the FDIA or FCUA, if such receiver or liquidating agent transfers or repudiates QFCs in accordance with the FDIA or FCUA and gives notice of a transfer by 5:00 p.m. on the business day following such appointment. This change is made to confirm the FDIC's and FCUA's flexibility to transfer or repudiate the QFCs of an insolvent depository institution in accordance with the terms of the FDIA or FCUA. This modification also provides important legal certainty regarding the treatment of QFCs under the FDIA and FCUA, because the current relationship between these statutes and FDICIA is unclear.
The second exception provides that FDICIA does not override a stay order under SIPA with respect to foreclosure on securities (but not cash) collateral of a debtor (section 911 of the Act makes a conforming change to SIPA). There is also an exception relating to insolvent commodity brokers. Subsections (b) and (c) also clarify that a security agreement or other credit enhancement related to a netting contract is enforceable to the same extent as the underlying netting contract.
Section 906(d) of the Act adds a new section 407 to FDICIA. This new section provides that, notwithstanding any other law, QFCs with uninsured national banks, uninsured Federal branches or agencies, or Edge Act corporations, or uninsured State member banks that operate, or operate as, a multilateral clearing organization and that are placed in receivership or conservatorship will be treated in the same manner as if the contract were with an insured national bank or insured Federal branch for which a receiver or conservator was appointed. This provision will ensure that parties to QFCs with these institutions will have the same rights and obligations as parties entering into the same agreements with insured depository institutions. The new section also specifically limits the powers of a receiver or conservator for such an institution to those contained in 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(e)(8), (9), (10), and (11), which address QFCs.
While the amendment would apply the same rules that apply to insured institutions, the provision would not change the rules that apply to insured institutions. Nothing in this section would amend the International Banking Act, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the National Bank Act, or other statutory provisions with respect to receiverships of insured national banks or Federal branches.
In connection with the definition of `repurchase agreement,' the term `qualified foreign government securities' is defined to include securities that are direct obligations of, or fully guaranteed by, central governments of members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This language reflects developments in the repurchase agreement markets, which increasingly use foreign government securities as the underlying asset. The securities are limited to those issued by or guaranteed by full members of the OECD, as well as countries that have concluded special lending arrangements with the International Monetary Fund associated with the Fund's General Arrangements to Borrow.
Subsection (a)(1) also amends the definition of `repurchase agreement' to include those on mortgage-related securities, mortgage loans and interests therein, and to include principal and interest-only U.S. government and agency securities as securities that can be the subject of a `repurchase agreement.' The reference in the definition to United States government- and agency-issued or fully guaranteed securities is intended to include obligations issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) as well as all obligations eligible for purchase by Federal Reserve banks under the similar language of section 14(b) of the Federal Reserve Act.
This amendment is not intended to affect the status of repos involving securities or commodities as securities contracts, commodity contracts, or forward contracts, and their consequent eligibility for similar treatment under other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In particular, an agreement for the sale and repurchase of a security would continue to be a securities contract as defined in the Bankruptcy Code and thus also would be subject to the Bankruptcy Code provisions pertaining to securities contracts, even if not a `repurchase agreement' as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Similarly, an agreement for the sale and repurchase of a commodity, even though not a `repurchase agreement' as defined in the Bankruptcy Code, would continue to be a forward contract for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code and would be subject to the Bankruptcy Code provisions pertaining to forward contracts.
Subsection (a)(1) specifies that repurchase obligations under a participation in a commercial mortgage loan do not make the participation agreement a `repurchase agreement.' These repurchase obligations embedded in participations in commercial loans (such as recourse obligations) do not constitute a `repurchase agreement.' However, a repurchase agreement involving the transfer of participations in commercial mortgage loans with a simultaneous agreement to repurchase the participation on demand or at a date certain one year or less after such transfer would constitute a `repurchase agreement' (as well as a `securities contract').
The definition of `swap agreement' is amended to include an `interest rate swap, option, future, or forward agreement, including a rate floor, rate cap, rate collar, cross-currency rate swap, and basis swap; a spot, same day-tomorrow, tomorrow-next, forward, or other foreign exchange or precious metals agreement; a currency swap, option, future, or forward agreement; an equity index or equity swap, option, future, or forward agreement; a debt index or debt swap, option, future, or forward agreement; a total return, credit spread or credit swap, option, future, or forward agreement; a commodity index or commodity swap, option, future, or forward agreement; or a weather swap, weather derivative, or weather option.' As amended, the definition of `swap agreement' will update the statutory definition and achieve contractual netting across economically similar transactions.
The definition of `swap agreement' originally was intended to provide sufficient flexibility to avoid the need to amend the definition as the nature and uses of swap transactions matured. To that end, the phrase `or any other similar agreement' was included in the definition. (The phrase `or any similar agreement' has been added to the definitions of `forward contract,' `commodity contract,' `repurchase agreement,' and `securities contract' for the same reason.) To clarify this, subsection (a)(1) expands the definition of `swap agreement' to include `any agreement or transaction that is similar to any other agreement or transaction referred to in [Section 101(53B) of the Bankruptcy Code] and that is of a type that has been, is presently, or in the future becomes, the subject of recurrent dealings in the swap markets' and [that] is a forward, swap, future, or option on one or more rates, currencies, commodities, equity securities or other equity instruments, debt securities or other debt instruments, quantitative measures associated with an occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency associated with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence, or economic or financial indices or measures of economic or financial risk or value.'
The definition of `swap agreement' in this subsection should not be interpreted to permit parties to document non-swaps as swap transactions. Traditional commercial arrangements, such as supply agreements, or other non-financial market transactions, such as commercial, residential or consumer loans, cannot be treated as `swaps' under the FDIA, the FCUA, or the Bankruptcy Code because the parties purport to document or label the transactions as `swap agreements.' These definitions, and the characterization of a certain transaction as a `swap agreement,' are not intended to affect the characterization, definition, or treatment of any instruments under any other statute, regulation, or rule including, but not limited to, the statutes, regulations or rules enumerated in subsection (a)(1)(C). Similarly, the definitions of `securities contract,' `repurchase agreement,' and `commodity contract' and the characterization of certain transactions as such a contract or agreement, are not intended to affect the characterization, definition, or treatment of any instrument under any other statute, regulation, or rule including, but not limited to, the statutes, regulations or rules enumerated in subsection (f).
The definition also includes any security agreement or arrangement, or other credit enhancement, related to a swap agreement, including any guarantee or reimbursement obligation related to a swap agreement. This ensures that any such agreement, arrangement or enhancement is itself deemed to be a swap agreement, and therefore eligible for treatment as such for purposes of termination, liquidation, acceleration, offset and netting under the Bankruptcy Code, the FDIA and the FCUA. Similar changes are made in the definitions of `forward contract,' `commodity contract,' `repurchase agreement,' and `securities contract.' An example of a security arrangement is a right of setoff; examples of other credit enhancements are letters of credit and other similar agreements. A security agreement or arrangement or guarantee or reimbursement obligation related to a `swap agreement,' `forward contract,' `commodity contract,' `repurchase agreement' or `securities contract' will be such an agreement or contract only to the extent of the damages in connection with such agreement measured in accordance with Section 562 of the Bankruptcy Code (added by the Act). This limitation does not affect, however, the other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (including Section 362(b)) relating to security arrangements in connection with agreements or contracts that otherwise qualify as `swap agreements,' `forward contracts,' `commodity contracts,' `repurchase agreements' or `securities contracts.'
The use of the term `forward' in the definition of `swap agreement' is not intended to refer only to transactions that fall within the definition of `forward contract.' Instead, a `forward' transaction could be a `swap agreement' even if not a `forward contract.'
Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) amend the Bankruptcy Code definitions of `securities contract' and `commodity contract,' respectively, to conform them to the definitions in the FDIA.
Subsection (a)(2), like the amendments to the FDIA and the FCUA, amends the definition of `securities contract' expressly to encompass margin loans, to clarify the coverage of securities options and to clarify the coverage of repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions. The inclusion of `margin loans' in the definition is intended to encompass only those loans commonly known in the securities industry as `margin loans,' such as credit permitted in a margin account under the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation T (whether or not effected in that account) or arrangements where a financial intermediary--a stockbroker, financial institution, financial participant, or securities clearing agency--extends credit in connection with the purchase, sale, carrying, or trading of securities. `Margin loans' do not include, however, other loans that happen to be secured by securities collateral. The reference in subsection (b) to a `guarantee' by or to a `securities clearing agency' is intended to cover other arrangements, such as novation, that have an effect similar to a guarantee. The reference to a `loan' of a security in the definition is intended to apply to loans of securities, whether or not for a `permitted purpose' under margin regulations. The reference to `repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions' is intended to eliminate any inquiry under section 555 and related provisions as to whether a repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction is a purchase and sale transaction or a secured financing. Repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions meeting certain criteria are already covered under the definition of `repurchase agreement' in the Bankruptcy Code. Repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions on all securities (including, for example, equity securities, asset-backed securities, corporate bonds and commercial paper) are included under the definition of `securities contract.' A repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction which is a `securities contract' but not a `repurchase agreement' would thus be subject to the `counterparty limitations' contained in section 555 of the Bankruptcy Code (i.e., only stockbrokers, financial institutions, securities clearing agencies and financial participants can avail themselves of section 555 and related provisions).
Subsection (a)(2) also specifies that purchase, sale and repurchase obligations under a participation in a commercial mortgage loan do not constitute `securities contracts.' While a contract for the purchase, sale or repurchase of a participation may constitute a `securities contract,' the purchase, sale or repurchase obligation embedded in a participation agreement does not make that agreement a `securities contract.' Section 907(a) clarifies the reference to guarantee or reimbursement obligation.
Section 907(b) amends the Bankruptcy Code definitions of `financial institution' and `forward contract merchant.' The definition for `financial institution' includes Federal Reserve Banks and the receivers or conservators of insolvent depository institutions. With respect to securities contracts, the definition of `financial institution' expressly includes investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
Subsection (b) also adds a new definition of `financial participant' to limit the potential impact of insolvencies upon other major market participants. This definition will allow such market participants to close-out and net agreements with insolvent entities under sections 362(b)(6), 555, and 556 even if the creditor could not qualify as, for example, a commodity broker. Sections 362(b)(6), 555 and 556 preserve the limitations of the right to close-out and net such contracts, in most cases, to entities who qualify under the Bankruptcy Code's counterparty limitations. However, where the counterparty has transactions with a total gross dollar value of at least $1 billion in notional or actual principal amount outstanding on any day during the previous 15-month period, or has gross mark-to-market positions of at least $100 million (aggregated across counterparties) in one or more agreements or transactions on any day during the previous 15-month period, sections 362(b)(6), 555 and 556 and corresponding amendments would permit it to exercise netting and related rights irrespective of its inability otherwise to satisfy those counterparty limitations. This change will help prevent systemic impact upon the markets from a single failure, and is derived from threshold tests contained in Regulation EE promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board in implementing the netting provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act. It is intended that the 15-month period be measured with reference to the 15 months preceding the filing of a petition by or against the debtor.
`Financial participant' is also defined to include `clearing organizations' within the meaning of FDICIA (as amended by the CFMA and Section 906 of the Act). This amendment, together with the inclusion of `financial participants' as eligible counterparties in connection with `commodity contracts,' `forward contracts' and `securities contracts' and the amendments made in other Sections of the Act to include `financial participants' as counterparties eligible for the protections in respect of `swap agreements' and `repurchase agreements,' take into account the CFMA and will allow clearing organizations to benefit from the protections of all of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code relating to these contracts and agreements. This will further the goal of promoting the clearing of derivatives and other transactions as a way to reduce systemic risk. The definition of `financial participant' (as with the other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code relating to `securities contracts,' `forward contracts,' `commodity contracts,' `repurchase agreements' and `swap agreements') is not mutually exclusive, i.e., an entity that qualifies as a `financial participant' could also be a `swap participant,' `repo participant,' `forward contract merchant,' `commodity broker,' `stockbroker,' `securities clearing agency' and/or `financial institution.'
Section 907(c) of the Act adds to the Bankruptcy Code new definitions for the terms `master netting agreement' and `master netting agreement participant.' The definition of `master netting agreement' is designed to protect the termination and close-out netting provisions of cross-product master agreements between parties. Such an agreement may be used: (i) to document a wide variety of securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements and swap agreements, or (ii) as an umbrella agreement for separate master agreements between the same parties, each of which is used to document a discrete type of transaction. The definition includes security agreements or arrangements or other credit enhancements related to one or more such agreements and clarifies that a master netting agreement will be treated as such even if it documents transactions that are not within the enumerated categories of qualifying transactions (but the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code relating to master netting agreements and the other categories of transactions will not apply to such other transactions). A `master netting agreement participant' is any entity that is a party to an outstanding master netting agreement with a debtor before the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
Subsection (d) amends section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to protect enforcement, free from the automatic stay, of setoff or netting provisions in swap agreements and in master netting agreements and security agreements or arrangements related to one or more swap agreements or master netting agreements. This provision parallels the other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that protect netting provisions of securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, and repurchase agreements. Because the relevant definitions include related security agreements, the references to `setoff' in these provisions, as well as in section 362(b)(6) and (7) of the Bankruptcy Code, are intended to refer also to rights to foreclose on, and to set off against obligations to return, collateral securing swap agreements, master netting agreements, repurchase agreements, securities contracts, commodity contracts, or forward contracts. Collateral may be pledged to cover the cost of replacing the defaulted transactions in the relevant market, as well as other costs and expenses incurred or estimated to be incurred for the purpose of hedging or reducing the risks arising out of such termination. Enforcement of these agreements and arrangements free from the automatic stay is consistent with the policy goal of minimizing systemic risk.
Subsection (d) also clarifies that the provisions protecting setoff and foreclosure in relation to securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swap agreements, and master netting agreements free from the automatic stay apply to collateral pledged by the debtor but that cannot technically be `held by' the creditor, such as receivables and book-entry securities, and to collateral that has been repledged by the creditor and securities re-sold pursuant to repurchase agreements.
Subsections (e) and (f) of section 907 of the Act amend sections 546 and 548(d) of the Bankruptcy Code to provide that transfers made under or in connection with a master netting agreement may not be avoided by a trustee except where such transfer is made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud and not taken in good faith. This amendment provides the same protections for a transfer made under, or in connection with, a master netting agreement as currently is provided for margin payments, settlement payments and other transfers received by commodity brokers, forward contract merchants, stockbrokers, financial institutions, securities clearing agencies, repo participants, and swap participants under sections 546 and 548(d), except to the extent the trustee could otherwise avoid such a transfer made under an individual contract covered by such master netting agreement.
Subsections (g), (h), (i), and (j) of section 907 clarify that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that protect: (i) rights of liquidation under securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts and repurchase agreements also protect rights of termination or acceleration under such contracts, and (ii) rights to terminate under swap agreements also protect rights of liquidation and acceleration.
Section 907(k) of the Act adds a new section 561 to the Bankruptcy Code to protect the contractual right of a master netting agreement participant to enforce any rights of termination, liquidation, acceleration, offset or netting under a master netting agreement. These rights include rights arising: (i) from the rules of a derivatives clearing organization, multilateral clearing organization, securities clearing agency, securities exchange, securities association, contract market, derivatives transaction execution facility or board of trade; (ii) under common law, law merchant; or (iii) by reason of normal business practice. This reflects the enactment of the CFMA and the current treatment of rights under swap agreements under section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code. Similar changes to reflect the enactment of the CFMA have been made to the definition of `contractual right' for purposes of Sections 555, 556, 559, and 560 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Subsections (b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(B) of new Section 561 limit the exercise of contractual rights to net or to offset obligations where the debtor is a commodity broker and one leg of the obligations sought to be netted relates to commodity contracts traded on or subject to the rules of a contract market designated under the Commodity Exchange Act or a derivatives transaction execution facility registered under the Commodity Exchange Act. Under subsection (b)(2)(A) netting or offsetting is not permitted in these circumstances if the party seeking to net or to offset has no positive net equity in the commodity accounts at the debtor. Subsection (b)(2)(B) applies only if the debtor is a commodity broker, acting on behalf of its own customer, and is in turn a customer of another commodity broker. In that case, the latter commodity broker may not net or offset obligations under such commodity contracts with other claims against its customer, the debtor. Subsections (b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(B) limit the depletion of assets available for distribution to customers of commodity brokers. Subsection (b)(2)(C) provides an exception to subsections (b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(B) for cross-margining and other similar arrangements approved by, or submitted to and not rendered ineffective by, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, as well as certain other netting arrangements.
For the purposes of Bankruptcy Code sections 555, 556, 559, 560, and 561, it is intended that the normal business practice in the event of a default of a party based on bankruptcy or insolvency is to terminate, liquidate or accelerate securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swap agreements and master netting agreements with the bankrupt or insolvent party. The protection of netting and offset rights in sections 560 and 561 is in addition to the protections afforded in sections 362(b)(6), (b)(7), (b)(17), and (b)(28) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Under the Act, the termination, liquidation or acceleration rights of a master netting agreement participant are subject to limitations contained in other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code relating to securities contracts and repurchase agreements. In particular, if a securities contract or repurchase agreement is documented under a master netting agreement, a party's termination, liquidation and acceleration rights would be subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code relating to orders authorized under the provisions of SIPA or any statute administered by the SEC. In addition, the netting rights of a party to a master netting agreement would be subject to any contractual terms between the parties limiting or waiving netting or set off rights. Similarly, a waiver by a bank or a counterparty of netting or set off rights in connection with QFCs would be enforceable under the FDIA.
New section 561 of the Bankruptcy Code clarifies that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code related to securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swap agreements and master netting agreements apply in a proceeding ancillary to a foreign insolvency proceeding under new section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Subsections (l) and (m) of section 907 of the Act clarify that the exercise of termination and netting rights will not otherwise affect the priority of the creditor's claim after the exercise of netting, foreclosure and related rights.
Subsection (n) amends section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code to clarify that the acquisition by a creditor of setoff rights in connection with swap agreements, repurchase agreements, securities contracts, forward contracts, commodity contracts and master netting agreements cannot be avoided as a preference. This subsection also adds setoff of the kinds described in sections 555, 556, 559, 560, and 561 of the Bankruptcy Code to the types of setoff excepted from section 553(b).
Section 907(o), as well as other subsections of the Act, adds references to `financial participant' in all the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code relating to securities, forward and commodity contracts and repurchase and swap agreements.
The amendment codifies portions of policy statements issued by the FDIC regarding the application of section 13(e), which codifies the `D'Oench Duhme' doctrine. With respect to QFCs, this codification recognizes that QFCs often are subject to collateral and other security arrangements that may require posting and return of collateral on an ongoing basis based on the mark-to-market values of the collateralized transactions. The codification of only portions of the existing FDIC policy statements on these and related issues should not give rise to any negative implication regarding the continued validity of these policy statements.
Section 562 provides an exception to the rules in (i) and (ii) if there are no commercially reasonable determinants of value as of such date or dates, in which case damages are to be measured as of the earliest subsequent date or dates on which there are commercially reasonable determinants of value. Although it is expected that in most circumstances damages would be measured as of the date or dates of either rejection or liquidation, termination or acceleration, in certain unusual circumstances, such as dysfunctional markets or liquidation of very large portfolios, there may be no commercially reasonable determinants of value for liquidating any such agreements or contracts or for liquidating all such agreements and contracts in a large portfolio on a single day. It is expected that measuring damages as of a date or dates before the date of liquidation, termination, or acceleration will occur only in very unusual circumstances.
The party determining damages is given limited discretion to determine the dates as of which damages are to be measured. Its actions are circumscribed unless there are no `commercially reasonable' determinants of value for it to measure damages on the date or dates of either rejection or liquidation, termination or acceleration. The references to `commercially reasonable' are intended to reflect existing state law standards relating to a creditor's actions in determining damages. New section 562 provides that if damages are not measured as of either the date of rejection or the date or dates of liquidation, termination or acceleration and the trustee challenges the timing of the measurement of damages by the non-defaulting party determining the damages, then the non-defaulting party, rather than the trustee, has the burden of proving the absence of any commercially reasonable determinants of value.
New section 562 is not intended to have any impact on the determination under the Bankruptcy Code of the timing of damages for contracts and agreements other than those specified in section 562. Also, section 562 does not apply to proceedings under the FDIA, and it is not intended that Section 562 have any impact on the interpretation of the provisions of the FDIA relating to timing of damages in respect of QFCs or other contracts.
[Footnote] a defined term. 168
[Footnote] This form of bankruptcy relief permits eligible family farmers, under the supervision of a bankruptcy trustee, 169
[Footnote] to reorganize their debts pursuant to a repayment plan. 170
[Footnote] The special attributes of chapter 12 make it better suited to meet the particularized needs of family farmers in financial distress than other forms of bankruptcy relief, such as chapter 11 171
[Footnote] and chapter 13. 172
[Footnote]
[Footnote 167: 11 U.S.C. Sec. 109(f).]
[Footnote 168: 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(19).]
[Footnote 169: 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1202.]
[Footnote 170: 11 U.S.C. Sec. 1222.]
[Footnote 171: For example, chapter 12 is typically less complex and expensive than chapter 11, a form of bankruptcy relief generally utilized to effectuate large corporate reorganizations.]
[Footnote 172: Chapter 13, a form of bankruptcy relief for individuals seeking to reorganize their debts, limits its eligibility to debtors with debts in lower amounts than permitted for eligibility purposes under chapter 12. Cf. 11 U.S.C. Sec. 109(e), 101(18).]
Chapter 12 was enacted on a temporary 7-year basis as part of the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986 173
[Footnote] in response to the farm financial crisis of the early- to mid-1980's. 174
[Footnote] It was subsequently reenacted and extended on several occasions. The most recent extension, authorized as part of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, provides that chapter remains in effect until December 31, 2002. 175
[Footnote]
[Footnote 173: Pub. L. No. 99-554, Sec. 255, 100 Stat. 3088, 3105 (1986).]
[Footnote 174: See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, INFO. BULL. NO. 724-09, ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL FINANCE: DO FARMERS NEED A SEPARATE CHAPTER IN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE? (Oct. 1997).]
[Footnote 175: Pub. L. No. 107-171, Sec. 10814 (2002).]
Section 1001(a) of the Act reenacts chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code and provides that such reenactment takes effect as of July 1, 2005. Section 1001(b) makes a conforming amendment to section 302 of the Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. As a result of this provision, chapter 12 becomes a permanent form of relief under the Bankruptcy Code.
It is anticipated that if the estate of the debtor lacks the funds to pay for the costs and expenses related to the above, the trustee may recover such costs and expenses under section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Paragraph (5) of section 1201 concerns single asset real estate debtors. A single asset real estate chapter 11 case presents special concerns. As the name implies, the principal asset in this type of case consists of some form of real estate, such as undeveloped land. Typically, the form of ownership of a single asset real estate debtor is a corporation or limited partnership. The largest creditor in a single asset real estate case is typically the secured lender who advanced the funds to the debtor to acquire the real property. Often, a single asset real estate debtor resorts to filing for bankruptcy relief for the sole purpose of staying an impending foreclosure proceeding or sale commenced by the secured lender. Foreclosure actions are filed when the debtor lacks sufficient cash flow to service the debt and maintain the property. Taxing authorities may also have liens against the property. Based on the nature of its principal asset, a single asset real estate debtor often has few, if any, unsecured creditors. If unsecured creditors exist, they may have only nominal claims against the single asset real estate debtor. Depending on the nature and ownership of any business operating on the debtor's real property, the debtor may have few, if any, employees. Accordingly, there may be little interest on behalf of unsecured creditors in a single asset real estate case to serve on a creditors' committee.
In 1994, the Bankruptcy Code was amended to accord special treatment for single asset real estate debtors. It defined this type of debtor as a bankruptcy estate comprised of a single piece of real property or project, other than residential real property with fewer than four residential units. The property or project must generate substantially all of the debtor's gross income. A debtor that conducts substantial business on the property beyond that relating to its operation is excluded from this definition. In addition, the definition fixed a monetary cap. To qualify as a single asset real estate debtor, the debtor could not have noncontingent, liquidated secured debts in excess of $4 million. Subparagraph (5)(A) amends the definition of `single asset real estate' to exclude family farmers from this definition. Paragraph (5)(B) amends section 101(51B) of the Bankruptcy Code to eliminate the $4 million debt limitation on single asset real estate. The present $4 million cap prevents the use of the expedited relief procedure in many commercial property reorganizations, and effectively provides an opportunity for a number of debtors to abusively file for bankruptcy in order to obtain the protection of the automatic stay against their creditors. As a result of this amendment, creditors in more cases will be able to obtain the expedited relief from the automatic stay which is made available under section 362(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Paragraph (6) of section 1201, together with section 1214, respond to a 1997 Ninth Circuit case, in which two purchase money lenders (without knowledge that the debtor had recently filed an undisclosed chapter 11 case that was subsequently converted to chapter 7), funded the debtor's acquisition of an apartment complex and recorded their purchase-money deed of trust immediately following recordation of the deed to the debtors. 176
[Footnote] Specifically, it amends the definition of `transfer' in section 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code to include the `creation of a lien.' This amendment gives expression to a widely held understanding since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 177
[Footnote] that is, a transfer includes the creation of a lien.
[Footnote 176: Thompson v. Margen (In re McConville), 110 F.3d 47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 966 (1997).]
[Footnote 177: Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 178: For a description of these errors, see the appropriate footnote and amendment notes in the United States Code.]
[Footnote] allowed the trustee to `reach-back' and avoid a transfer to a noninsider creditor made within the 90-day to one-year time frame if an insider benefitted from the transfer in some way. This had the effect of discouraging lenders from obtaining loan guarantees, lest transfers to the lender be vulnerable to recapture by reason of the debtor's insider relationship with the loan guarantor. Section 202 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 addressed the DePrizio problem by inserting a new section 550(c) into the Bankruptcy Code to prevent avoidance or recovery from a noninsider creditor during the 90-day to one-year period even though the transfer to the noninsider benefitted an insider creditor. The 1994 amendments, however, failed to make a corresponding amendment to section 547, which deals with the avoidance of preferential transfers. As a result, a trustee could still utilize section 547 to avoid a preferential lien given to a noninsider bank, more than 90 days but less than one year before bankruptcy, if the transfer benefitted an insider guarantor of the debtor's debt. Accordingly, section 1213 of the Act makes a perfecting amendment to section 547 to provide that if the trustee avoids a transfer given by the debtor to a noninsider for the benefit of an insider creditor between 90 days and one year before filing, that avoidance is valid only with respect to the insider creditor. Thus both the previous amendment to section 550 and the perfecting amendment to section 547 protect the noninsider from the avoiding powers of the trustee exercised with respect to transfers made during the 90-day to one year pre-filing period. This provision is intended to apply to any case, including any adversary proceeding, that is pending or commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act.
[Footnote 179: Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Ray v. City Bank and Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989).]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 180: See supra notes 86 and 176 and accompanying text.]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 181: For a description of the error, see the appropriate footnote and amendment notes in the United States Code.]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 182: For a description of the errors, see the appropriate footnote and amendment notes in the United States Code.]
Sec. 1225. Amendment to Section 362 of Titile11, United States Code. Section 1225 of the Act amends section 362(b) of the Bankruptcy Code to except from the automatic stay the creation or perfection of a statutory lien for an ad valorem property tax or for a special tax or special assessment on real property (whether or not ad valorem) that is imposed by a governmental unit, if such tax or assessment becomes due after the filing of the petition.
Section 1231(b) amends section 586(e) of title 28 of the United States Code to permit a chapter 13 trustee to obtain judicial review of certain final agency actions relating to claims for actual, necessary expenses under section 586(e). The trustee may commence an action in the United States district court where the trustee resides. The agency's decision must be affirmed by the district court unless it is unreasonable and without cause based on the administrative record before the agency. It directs the Attorney General to prescribe procedures to implement this provision.
To address these problems, section 1233 of the Act amends section 158(d) of title 28 to establish a procedure to facilitate appeals of certain decisions, judgments, orders and decrees of the bankruptcy courts to the circuit courts of appeals by means of a two-step certification process. The first step is a certification by the bankruptcy court, district court, or bankruptcy appellate panel (acting on its own motion or on the request of a party, or the appellants and appellees acting jointly). Such certification must be issued by the lower court if: (1) the bankruptcy court, district court, or bankruptcy appellate panel determines that one or more of certain specified standards are met; or (2) a majority in number of the appellants and a majority in number of the appellees request certification and represent that one or more of the standards are met. The second step is authorization by the circuit court of appeals. Jurisdiction for the direct appeal would exist in the circuit court of appeals only if the court of appeals authorizes the direct appeal.
This procedure is intended to be used to settle unresolved questions of law where there is a need to establish clear binding precedent at the court of appeals level, where the matter is one of public importance, where there is a need to resolve conflicting decisions on a question of law, or where an immediate appeal may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding. The courts of appeals are encouraged to authorize direct appeals in these circumstances. While fact-intensive issues may occasionally offer grounds for certification even when binding precedent already exists on the general legal issue in question, it is anticipated that this procedure will rarely be used in that circumstance or in an attempt to bring to the circuit courts of appeals matters that can appropriately be resolved initially by district court judges or bankruptcy appellate panels.
For a period not to exceed 24 months from the effective date of the Act, the Board is required to establish and maintain a toll-free telephone number (or provide a toll-free telephone number established and maintained by a third party) for use by creditors that are depository institutions (as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), including a Federal or state credit union (as defined in section 101 of the Federal Credit Union Act), with total assets not exceeding $250 million. Not later than six months prior to the expiration of the 24-month period, the Board must submit a report on this program to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. In addition, section 1301(a) requires the Board to establish a detailed table illustrating the approximate number of months that it would take to repay an outstanding balance if a consumer pays only the required minimum month payments and if no other advances are made. The table should reflect a significant number of different annual percentage rates, and account balances, minimum payment amounts. The Board must also promulgate regulations providing instructional guidance regarding the manner in which the information contained in the tables should be used to respond to a request by an obligor under this provision. Section 1301(a) provides that the disclosure requirements of this provision are inapplicable to any charge card account where the primary purpose of which is to require payment of charges in full each month.
Section 1301(b)(1) requires the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate regulations implementing section 1301(a)'s amendments to section 127. Section 1301(b)(2) specifies that the effective date of the amendments under subsection (a) and the regulations required under this provision shall not take effect until the later of 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act or 12 months after the publication of final regulations by the Board.
Section 1301(c) authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to conduct a study to determine the types of information available to potential borrowers from consumer credit lending institutions regarding factors qualifying potential borrowers for credit, repayment requirements, and the consequences of default. The provision specifies the factors that should be considered. The study's findings must be submitted to Congress and include recommendations for legislative initiatives, based on the Board's findings.
With respect to non-open end credit extensions, section 1302(b)(1) amends section 128 of the Truth in Lending Act to require that a consumer receive a specified statement at the time he or she applies for credit with respect to a consumer credit transaction secured by the consumer's principal dwelling and where the credit extension may exceed the fair market value of the dwelling. The statement must disclose that the interest on the portion of the credit extension that exceeds the dwelling's fair market value is not tax deductible for Federal income tax purposes and that the consumer should consult a tax advisor for further information regarding the deductibility of interest and charges. Section 1302(b)(2) requires certain advertisements disseminated in paper form to the public or through the Internet that relate to a consumer credit transaction secured by a consumer's principal dwelling where the extension of credit may exceed the dwelling's fair market value to contain specified statements. These statements advise that the interest on the portion of the credit extension that is greater than the fair market value of the dwelling is not tax deductible for Federal income tax purposes and that the consumer should consult a tax advisor for further information regarding the deductibility of interest and charges.
Section 1302(c)(1) requires the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate regulations implementing the amendments effectuated by this provision. Section 1302(c)(2) provides that these regulations shall not take effect until the later of 12 months following the Act's enactment date or 12 months after the date of publication of such final regulations by the Board.
The second and third provisions described above do not apply to any listing of a temporary annual percentage rate on an envelope or other enclosure in which an application or solicitation to open a credit card account is mailed. With respect to an application or solicitation to open a credit card account for which disclosure is required pursuant to section 127(c)(1) of the Truth in Lending Act, section 1303(a) specifies that certain statements be made if the rate of interest is revocable under any circumstance or upon any event. The statements must clearly and conspicuously appear in a prominent manner on or with the application or solicitation. The disclosures include a general description of the circumstances that may result in the revocation of the temporary annual percentage rate and an explanation of the type of interest rate that will apply upon revocation of the temporary rate.
To implement this provision, section 1303(b) amends section 127(c) of the Truth in Lending Act to define various relevant terms and requires the Board to promulgate regulations. The provision does not become effective until the earlier of 12 months after the Act's enactment date or 12 months after the date of publication of such final regulations.
Section 1304(b) requires the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate regulations implementing this provision. It also provides that the amendments effectuated by section 1304 do not take effect until the later of 12 months after the Act's enactment date or 12 months after the date of publication of such regulations.
Section 1305(b) requires the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate regulations implementing this provision. The amendments effectuated by this provision and the regulations promulgated thereunder shall not take effect until the later of 12 months after the Act's enactment date or 12 months after the date of publication of the regulations.
Section 1306(b) requires the Federal Reserve Board to promulgate regulations implementing the amendments effectuated by section 1306(a) and provides that they do not become effective until the later of 12 months after the Act's enactment date or 12 months after the date of publication of such final regulations.
Section 1307(b) provides that the Federal Reserve Board, in preparing its report, may include analysis of section 909 of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to the extent this provision is in effect at the time of the report and the implementing regulations. In addition, the analysis may pertain to whether any voluntary industry rules have enhanced or may enhance the level of protection afforded consumers in connection with such unauthorized use liability and whether amendments to the Electronic Fund Transfer Act or implementing regulations are necessary to further address adequate protection for consumers concerning unauthorized use liability.
Section 1309(b) provides that regulations promulgated under section 1309(a) shall include examples of clear and conspicuous model disclosures for the purpose of disclosures required under the Truth in Lending Act provisions set forth therein.
Section 1309(c) requires the Federal Reserve Board, in promulgating regulations under this provision, to ensure that the clear and conspicuous standard required for disclosures made under the Truth in Lending Act provisions set forth in section 1309(a) can be implemented in a manner that results in disclosures which are reasonably understandable and designed to call attention to the nature and significance of the information in the notice.
Chap. | Sec. |
1. | |
General Provisions | |
101 | |
* * * * * * * | |
[Struck out->][ 12.
] [<-Struck out] | |
Adjustment of Debts of Family Farmers with Regular Annual Income | |
1201 | |
12. | |
Adjustments of Debts of a Family Farmer or Family Fisherman with Regular Annual Income | |
1201 | |
* * * * * * * | |
15. | |
Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases | |
1501 |
Sec. |
101. Definitions. |
* * * * * * * |
111. Nonprofit budget and credit counseling agencies; financial management instructional courses. |
112. Prohibition on disclosure of name of minor children. |
[ In this title--
]
[<-Struck out] In this title the following
definitions shall apply:
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
* * * * * * *
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
* * * * * * *
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
* * * * * * *
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ (12A) `debt for child support'
means a debt of a kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title for
maintenance or support of a child of the debtor;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ (14) `disinterested person'
means person that-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) is not a creditor, an
equity security holder, or an insider;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) is not and was not an
investment banker for any outstanding security of the debtor;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (C) has not been, within
three years before the date of the filing of the petition, an investment
banker for a security of the debtor, or an attorney for such an investment
banker in connection with the offer, sale, or issuance of a security of
the debtor; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (D) is not and was not,
within two years before the date of the filing of the petition, a
director, officer, or employee of the debtor or of an investment banker
specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (E) does not have an
interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate or of any class
of creditors or equity security holders, by reason of any direct or
indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor or
an investment banker specified in subparagraph (B) or (C) of this
paragraph, or for any other reason; ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
* * * * * * *
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ $1,500,000
]
[<-Struck out] $3,237,000 and not
less than [Struck out->][ 80
]
[<-Struck out] 50 percent of whose
aggregate noncontingent, liquidated debts (excluding a debt for the
principal residence of such individual or such individual and spouse
unless such debt arises out of a farming operation), on the date the case
is filed, arise out of a farming operation owned or operated by such
individual or such individual and spouse, and such individual or such
individual and spouse receive from such farming operation more than 50
percent of such individual's or such individual and spouse's gross income
[Struck out->][ for the taxable year preceding
the taxable year ]
[<-Struck out]
for--
[ $1,500,000
]
[<-Struck out] $3,237,000 and not
less than [Struck out->][ 80
]
[<-Struck out] 50 percent of its
aggregate noncontingent, liquidated debts (excluding a debt for one
dwelling which is owned by such corporation or partnership and which a
shareholder or partner maintains as a principal residence, unless such
debt arises out of a farming operation), on the date the case is filed,
arise out of the farming operation owned or operated by such corporation
or such partnership; and
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
* * * * * * *
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ (22) the term `financial
institution'-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) means--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (i) a Federal reserve bank
or an entity (domestic or foreign) that is a commercial or savings bank,
industrial savings bank, savings and loan association, trust company, or
receiver or conservator for such entity and, when any such Federal
reserve bank, receiver, conservator, or entity is acting as agent or
custodian for a customer in connection with a securities contract, as
defined in section 741 of this title, the customer; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (ii) in connection with a
securities contract, as defined in section 741 of this title, an
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940;
and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) includes any person
described in subparagraph (A) which operates, or operates as, a
multilateral clearing organization pursuant to section 409 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (23) `foreign proceeding'
means proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and whether or not
under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile,
residence, principal place of business, or principal assets were located at
the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an
estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or
effecting a reorganization; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (24) `foreign representative'
means duly selected trustee, administrator, or other representative of an
estate in a foreign proceeding; ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ means a contract
]
[<-Struck out] means--
[ , or any combination thereof or
option thereon; ]
[<-Struck out] , or any
other similar agreement;
[ (26) `forward contract
merchant' means a person whose business consists in whole or in part of
entering into forward contracts as or with merchants in a commodity, as
defined in section 761(8) of this title, or any similar good, article,
service, right, or interest which is presently or in the future becomes the
subject of dealing in the forward contract trade;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[
; ]
[<-Struck out] .
* * * * * * *
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
* * * * * * *
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ paragraphs (21B) and (33)(A)
]
[<-Struck out] paragraphs (23) and
(35) of this subsection) [Struck out->][ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
* * * * * * *
[ ; and
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ; and
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
* * * * * * *
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ on any day during the period beginning 90
days before the date of ]
[<-Struck out] at
any time before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding
repurchase agreement with the debtor [Struck
out->][ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ (47) `repurchase agreement'
(which definition also applies to a reverse repurchase agreement) means an
agreement, including related terms, which provides for the transfer of
certificates of deposit, eligible bankers' acceptances, or securities that
are direct obligations of, or that are fully guaranteed as to principal and
interest by, the United States or any agency of the United States against
the transfer of funds by the transferee of such certificates of deposit,
eligible bankers' acceptances, or securities with a simultaneous agreement
by such transferee to transfer to the transferor thereof certificates of
deposit, eligible bankers' acceptances, or securities as described above, at
a date certain not later than one year after such transfers or on demand,
against the transfer of funds; ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ; ]
[<-Struck
out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ thereto having aggregate
noncontingent, liquidated secured debts in an amount no more than
$4,000,000; ]
[<-Struck out] .
[ (51C) `small business' means a
person engaged in commercial or business activities (but does not include a
person whose primary activity is the business of owning or operating real
property and activities incidental thereto) whose aggregate noncontingent
liquidated secured and unsecured debts as of the date of the petition do not
exceed $2,000,000; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ (53B) `swap agreement' means--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) an agreement (including
terms and conditions incorporated by reference therein) which is a rate
swap agreement, basis swap, forward rate agreement, commodity swap,
interest rate option, forward foreign exchange agreement, spot foreign
exchange agreement, rate cap agreement, rate floor agreement, rate collar
agreement, currency swap agreement, cross-currency rate swap agreement,
currency option, any other similar agreement (including any option to
enter into any of the foregoing); ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (B) any combination of the
foregoing; or ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (C) a master agreement for
any of the foregoing together with all supplements;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ (54) `transfer' means every
mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary,
of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property,
including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the
debtor's equity of redemption; ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ the term
]
[<-Struck out] The term `uninsured
State member bank' means a State member bank (as defined in section 3 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act) the deposits of which are not insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation [Struck
out->][ ; and
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ and 523(a)(2)(C)
]
[<-Struck out] 522(f)(3) and 522(f)(4),
522(n), 522(p), 522(q), 522(f)(3) and 522(f)(4), 523(a)(2)(C), 541(b),
547(c)(9), 707(b), 1322(d), 1325(b), and 1326(b)(3) of this title and section
1409(b) of title 28 immediately before such April 1 shall be
adjusted--
* * * * * * *
[ and
523(a)(2)(C) of this title ]
[<-Struck out]
522(f)(3) and 522(f)(4), 522(n), 522(p), 522(q), 522(f)(3) and 522(f)(4),
523(a)(2)(C), 541(b), 547(c)(9), 707(b), 1322(d), 1325(b), and 1326(b)(3) of
this title and section 1409(b) of title 28.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ , may
]
[<-Struck out] --
[ (1) hold a status conference
regarding any case or proceeding under this title after notice to the
parties in interest; and ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ 922, 1201, or
]
[<-Struck out] 922, 1201, or 1301 of
this title, as the case may be, with respect to such claim.
[ subsection (c) or (d) of
]
[<-Struck out] section 301 of the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958, credit union, or industrial bank or similar
institution which is an insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, except that an uninsured State member bank,
or a corporation organized under section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act,
which operates, or operates as, a multilateral clearing organization
pursuant to section 409 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 may be a debtor if a petition is filed at the
direction of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; or
[ (3) a foreign insurance
company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings and loan association,
building and loan association, homestead association, or credit union,
engaged in such business in the United States.
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ or an employee of an
attorney ]
[<-Struck out] for the debtor or an
employee of such attorney under the direct supervision of such
attorney, who prepares for compensation a document for filing;
and* * * * * * *
[ (2) A bankruptcy petition
preparer who fails to comply with paragraph (1) may be fined not more than
$500 for each such failure unless the failure is due to reasonable cause.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) For purposes
]
[<-Struck out] (2)(A) Subject to subparagraph
(B), for purposes of this section, the identifying number of a bankruptcy
petition preparer shall be the Social Security account number of each
individual who prepared the document or assisted in its preparation.
[ (3) A bankruptcy petition
preparer who fails to comply with paragraph (1) may be fined not more than
$500 for each such failure unless the failure is due to reasonable cause.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (d)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] (d) A bankruptcy petition
preparer shall, not later than the time at which a document for filing is
presented for the debtor's signature, furnish to the debtor a copy of the
document.
[ (2) A bankruptcy petition
preparer who fails to comply with paragraph (1) may be fined not more than
$500 for each such failure unless the failure is due to reasonable cause.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) A bankruptcy petition
preparer may be fined not more than $500 for each document executed in
violation of paragraph (1). ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (f)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] (f) A bankruptcy petition
preparer shall not use the word `legal' or any similar term in any
advertisements, or advertise under any category that includes the word `legal'
or any similar term.
[ (2) A bankruptcy petition
preparer shall be fined not more than $500 for each violation of paragraph
(1). ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (g)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] (g) A bankruptcy petition
preparer shall not collect or receive any payment from the debtor or on behalf
of the debtor for the court fees in connection with filing the petition.
[ (2) A bankruptcy petition
preparer shall be fined not more than $500 for each violation of paragraph
(1). ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (1) Within 10 days after the
date of the filing of a petition, a bankruptcy petition preparer shall file a
]
[<-Struck out] (2) A declaration under
penalty of perjury by the bankruptcy petition preparer shall be filed
together with the petition, disclosing any fee received from or on behalf
of the debtor within 12 months immediately prior to the filing of the case,
and any unpaid fee charged to the debtor. If rules or guidelines setting a
maximum fee for services have been promulgated or prescribed under paragraph
(1), the declaration under this paragraph shall include a certification that
the bankruptcy petition preparer complied with the notification requirement
under paragraph (1).
[ (2) The court shall disallow and
order the immediate turnover to the bankruptcy trustee of any fee referred to
in paragraph (1) found to be in excess of the value of services rendered for
the documents prepared. An individual debtor may exempt any funds so recovered
under section 522(b). ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (3)
]
[<-Struck out] (4) The debtor, the
trustee, a creditor, [Struck out->][ or the United
States trustee ]
[<-Struck out] the United
States trustee (or the bankruptcy administrator, if any) or the court, on the
initiative of the court, may file a motion for an order under paragraph
(2).
[ (4)
]
[<-Struck out] (5) A bankruptcy petition
preparer shall be fined not more than $500 for each failure to comply with a
court order to turn over funds within 30 days of service of such order.
[ (i)(1) If a bankruptcy case or
related proceeding is dismissed because of the failure to file bankruptcy
papers, including papers specified in section 521(1) of this title, the
negligence or intentional disregard of this title or the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure by a bankruptcy petition preparer, or if a bankruptcy
petition preparer violates this section or commits any fraudulent, unfair, or
deceptive act, the bankruptcy court shall certify that fact to the district
court, and the district court, on motion of the debtor, the trustee, or a
creditor and after a hearing, shall order the bankruptcy petition preparer to
pay to the debtor-- ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ a
violation of which subjects a person to criminal penalty
]
[<-Struck out] ;* * * * * * *
[ or has not paid a penalty
]
[<-Struck out] has not paid a penalty
imposed under this section, or failed to disgorge all fees ordered by the
court the court may enjoin the person from acting as a bankruptcy
petition preparer.
[ (3)
]
[<-Struck out] (4) The court shall award
to a debtor, trustee, or creditor that brings a successful action under this
subsection reasonable [Struck out->][ attorney's
]
[<-Struck out] attorneys' fees and costs
of the action, to be paid by the bankruptcy petition preparer.* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--COMMENCEMENT OF A CASE |
Sec. |
301. Voluntary cases. |
* * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ 304. Cases ancillary to
foreign proceedings. ] [<-Struck out] |
* * * * * * * |
308. Debtor reporting requirements. |
SUBCHAPTER II--OFFICERS |
321. Eligibility to serve as trustee. |
* * * * * * * |
332. Consumer privacy ombudsman. |
333 Appointment of ombudsman. |
SUBCHAPTER III--ADMINISTRATION |
341. Meetings of creditors and equity security holders. |
* * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ 346. Special tax provisions.
] [<-Struck out] |
346. Special provisions related to the treatment of State and local taxes. |
* * * * * * * |
351. Disposal of patient records. |
[ The commencement of a voluntary case under a
chapter of this title constitutes an order for relief under such chapter.
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ if such claims
]
[<-Struck out] if such noncontingent,
undisputed claims aggregate at least $10,000 more than the value of any
lien on property of the debtor securing such claims held by the holders of
such claims;* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (k) Notwithstanding subsection
(a) of this section, an involuntary case may be commenced against a foreign
bank that is not engaged in such business in the United States only under
chapter 7 of this title and only if a foreign proceeding concerning such bank
is pending. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ Sec. 304. Cases ancillary to
foreign proceedings ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (a) A case ancillary to a
foreign proceeding is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a
petition under this section by a foreign representative.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (b) Subject to the provisions of
subsection (c) of this section, if a party in interest does not timely
controvert the petition, or after trial, the court may--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (1) enjoin the commencement or
continuation of-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) any action against--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (i) a debtor with respect
to property involved in such foreign proceeding; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (ii) such property; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) the enforcement of any
judgment against the debtor with respect to such property, or any act or
the commencement or continuation of any judicial proceeding to create or
enforce a lien against the property of such estate;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) order turnover of the
property of such estate, or the proceeds of such property, to such foreign
representative; or ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (3) order other appropriate
relief. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (c) In determining whether to
grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the court shall be guided
by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of such
estate, consistent with-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (1) just treatment of all
holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) protection of claim
holders in the United States against prejudice and inconvenience in the
processing of claims in such foreign proceeding;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (3) prevention of preferential
or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (4) distribution of proceeds
of such estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this
title; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (5) comity; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (6) if appropriate, the
provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual that such
foreign proceeding concerns. ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (2)(A) there is pending a
foreign proceeding; and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) the factors specified in
section 304(c) of this title warrant such dismissal or suspension.
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ , 304, ]
[<-Struck
out] or 305 of this title does not submit such foreign representative to the
jurisdiction of any court in the United States for any other purpose, but the
bankruptcy court may condition any order under section 303 [Struck
out->][ , 304, ]
[<-Struck
out] or 305 of this title on compliance by such foreign representative with
the orders of such bankruptcy court.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (A) In
]
[<-Struck out] In determining the amount
of reasonable compensation to be awarded to an examiner, trustee under
chapter 11, or professional person, the court shall consider the nature,
the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant
factors, including--
* * * * * * *
[
and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (E)
]
[<-Struck out] (F) whether the
compensation is reasonable based on the customary compensation charged by
comparably skilled practitioners in cases other than cases under this
title.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (b) Prior to the commencement of
a case under this title by an individual whose debts are primarily consumer
debts, the clerk shall give written notice to such individual that indicates
each chapter of this title under which such individual may proceed.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ , but the failure of such notice to contain
such information shall not invalidate the legal effect of such notice
]
[<-Struck out] . If the notice concerns an
amendment that adds a creditor to the schedules of assets and liabilities, the
debtor shall include the full taxpayer identification number in the notice
sent to that creditor, but the debtor shall include only the last 4 digits of
the taxpayer identification number in the copy of the notice filed with the
court.
* * * * * * *
[ Sec. 346. Special tax provisions
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (a) Except to the extent
otherwise provided in this section, subsections (b), (c), (d), (e), (g), (h),
(i), and (j) of this section apply notwithstanding any State or local law
imposing a tax, but subject to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (b)(1) In a case under chapter
7, 12, or 11 of this title concerning an individual, any income of the estate
may be taxed under a State or local law imposing a tax on or measured by
income only to the estate, and may not be taxed to such individual. Except as
provided in section 728 of this title, if such individual is a partner in a
partnership, any gain or loss resulting from a distribution of property from
such partnership, or any distributive share of income, gain, loss, deduction,
or credit of such individual that is distributed, or considered distributed,
from such partnership, after the commencement of the case is gain, loss,
income, deduction, or credit, as the case may be, of the estate.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) Except as otherwise provided
in this section and in section 728 of this title, any income of the estate in
such a case, and any State or local tax on or measured by such income, shall
be computed in the same manner as the income and the tax of an estate.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (3) The estate in such a case
shall use the same accounting method as the debtor used immediately before the
commencement of the case. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (c)(1) The commencement of a
case under this title concerning a corporation or a partnership does not
effect a change in the status of such corporation or partnership for the
purposes of any State or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income.
Except as otherwise provided in this section and in section 728 of this title,
any income of the estate in such case may be taxed only as though such case
had not been commenced. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) In such a case, except as
provided in section 728 of this title, the trustee shall make any tax return
otherwise required by State or local law to be filed by or on behalf of such
corporation or partnership in the same manner and form as such corporation or
partnership, as the case may be, is required to make such return.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (d) In a case under chapter 13
of this title, any income of the estate or the debtor may be taxed under a
State or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income only to the debtor,
and may not be taxed to the estate. ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (e) A claim allowed under
section 502(f) or 503 of this title, other than a claim for a tax that is not
otherwise deductible or a capital expenditure that is not otherwise
deductible, is deductible by the entity to which income of the estate is taxed
unless such claim was deducted by another entity, and a deduction for such a
claim is deemed to be a deduction attributable to a business.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (f) The trustee shall withhold
from any payment of claims for wages, salaries, commissions, dividends,
interest, or other payments, or collect, any amount required to be withheld or
collected under applicable State or local tax law, and shall pay such withheld
or collected amount to the appropriate governmental unit at the time and in
the manner required by such tax law, and with the same priority as the claim
from which such amount was withheld was paid.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (g)(1) Neither gain nor loss
shall be recognized on a transfer-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (A) by operation of law, of
property to the estate; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) other than a sale, of
property from the estate to the debtor; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (C) in a case under chapter 11
or 12 of this title concerning a corporation, of property from the estate to
a corporation that is an affiliate participating in a joint plan with the
debtor, or that is a successor to the debtor under the plan, except that
gain or loss may be recognized to the same extent that such transfer results
in the recognition of gain or loss under section 371 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) The transferee of a transfer
of a kind specified in this subsection shall take the property transferred
with the same character, and with the transferor's basis, as adjusted under
subsection (j)(5) of this section, and holding period.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (h) Notwithstanding sections
728(a) and 1146(a) of this title, for the purpose of determining the number of
taxable periods during which the debtor or the estate may use a loss carryover
or a loss carryback, the taxable period of the debtor during which the case is
commenced is deemed not to have been terminated by such commencement.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (i)(1) In a case under chapter
7, 12, or 11 of this title concerning an individual, the estate shall succeed
to the debtor's tax attributes, including--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) any investment credit
carryover; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) any recovery exclusion;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (C) any loss carryover;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (D) any foreign tax credit
carryover; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (E) any capital loss
carryover; and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (F) any claim of right.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) After such a case is closed
or dismissed, the debtor shall succeed to any tax attribute to which the
estate succeeded under paragraph (1) of this subsection but that was not
utilized by the estate. The debtor may utilize such tax attributes as though
any applicable time limitations on such utilization by the debtor were
suspended during the time during which the case was pending.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (3) In such a case, the estate
may carry back any loss of the estate to a taxable period of the debtor that
ended before the order for relief under such chapter the same as the debtor
could have carried back such loss had the debtor incurred such loss and the
case under this title had not been commenced, but the debtor may not carry
back any loss of the debtor from a taxable period that ends after such order
to any taxable period of the debtor that ended before such order until after
the case is closed. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (j)(1) Except as otherwise
provided in this subsection, income is not realized by the estate, the debtor,
or a successor to the debtor by reason of forgiveness or discharge of
indebtedness in a case under this title. ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (2) For the purposes of any
State or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income, a deduction with
respect to a liability may not be allowed for any taxable period during or
after which such liability is forgiven or discharged under this title. In this
paragraph, `a deduction with respect to a liability' includes a capital loss
incurred on the disposition of a capital asset with respect to a liability
that was incurred in connection with the acquisition of such asset.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (3) Except as provided in
paragraph (4) of this subsection, for the purpose of any State or local law
imposing a tax on or measured by income, any net operating loss of an
individual or corporate debtor, including a net operating loss carryover to
such debtor, shall be reduced by the amount of indebtedness forgiven or
discharged in a case under this title, except to the extent that such
forgiveness or discharge resulted in a disallowance under paragraph (2) of
this subsection. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (4) A reduction of a net
operating loss or a net operating loss carryover under paragraph (3) of this
subsection or of basis under paragraph (5) of this subsection is not required
to the extent that the indebtedness of an individual or corporate debtor
forgiven or discharged-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) consisted of items of a
deductible nature that were not deducted by such debtor; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) resulted in an expired net
operating loss carryover or other deduction that--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (i) did not offset income
for any taxable period; and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (ii) did not contribute to a
net operating loss in or a net operating loss carryover to the taxable
period during or after which such indebtedness was discharged.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (5) For the purposes of a State
or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income, the basis of the
debtor's property or of property transferred to an entity required to use the
debtor's basis in whole or in part shall be reduced by the lesser of--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A)(i) the amount by which the
indebtedness of the debtor has been forgiven or discharged in a case under
this title; minus ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (ii) the total amount of
adjustments made under paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) the amount by which the
total basis of the debtor's assets that were property of the estate before
such forgiveness or discharge exceeds the debtor's total liabilities that
were liabilities both before and after such forgiveness or discharge.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (6) Notwithstanding paragraph
(5) of this subsection, basis is not required to be reduced to the extent that
the debtor elects to treat as taxable income, of the taxable period in which
indebtedness is forgiven or discharged, the amount of indebtedness forgiven or
discharged that otherwise would be applied in reduction of basis under
paragraph (5) of this subsection. ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (7) For the purposes of this
subsection, indebtedness with respect to which an equity security, other than
an interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership, is issued to the
creditor to whom such indebtedness was owed, or that is forgiven as a
contribution to capital by an equity security holder other than a limited
partner in the debtor, is not forgiven or discharged in a case under this
title-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) to any extent that such
indebtedness did not consist of items of a deductible nature; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) if the issuance of such
equity security has the same consequences under a law imposing a tax on or
measured by income to such creditor as a payment in cash to such creditor in
an amount equal to the fair market value of such equity security, then to
the lesser of-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (i) the extent that such
issuance has the same such consequences; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (ii) the extent of such fair
market value. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ in the
converted case, with allowed secured claims
]
[<-Struck out] only in a case converted to a
case under chapter 11 or 12, but not in a case converted to a case under
chapter 7, with allowed secured claims in cases under chapters 11 and
12 reduced to the extent that they have been paid in accordance with
the chapter 13 plan [Struck out->][ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; and
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ the
debtor ]
[<-Struck out] a corporate debtor's
tax liability for a taxable period the bankruptcy court may determine or
concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable
period ending before the date of the order for relief under this
title.
[ (2) under subsection (a) of
this section-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) of the commencement or
continuation of an action or proceeding for--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (i) the establishment of
paternity; or ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (ii) the establishment or
modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) of the collection of
alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the
estate; ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ financial institutions,
]
[<-Struck out] financial institution,
financial participant, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt
and claim under or in connection with commodity contracts, as defined in
section 761 of this title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as
defined in section 741 of this title, that constitutes the setoff of a claim
against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined in section 101, 741, or
761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741
of this title, arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or
securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held
by, pledged to, under the control of, or due from such commodity
broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, [Struck
out->][ financial institutions,
]
[<-Struck out] financial institution,
financial participant, or securities clearing agency to margin,
guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or
securities contracts;
* * * * * * *
[ (17) under subsection (a) of
this section, of the setoff by a swap participant, of any mutual debt and
claim under or in connection with any swap agreement that constitutes the
setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment due from the debtor
under or in connection with any swap agreement against any payment due to
the debtor from the swap participant under or in connection with any swap
agreement or against cash, securities, or other property of the debtor held
by or due from such swap participant to guarantee, secure or settle any swap
agreement; or ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (18) under subsection (a) of
the creation or perfection of a statutory lien for an ad valorem property
tax imposed by the District of Columbia, or a political subdivision of a
State, if such tax comes due after the filing of the petition.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (e), and (f)
]
[<-Struck out] (e), (f), and (h) of this
section--
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ;
(aa) file or amend the petition or other documents as required by this title or the court without substantial excuse (but mere inadvertence or negligence shall not be a substantial excuse unless the dismissal was caused by the negligence of the debtor's attorney);
(bb) provide adequate protection as ordered by the court; or
(cc) perform the terms of a plan confirmed by the court; or
(aa) if a case under chapter 7, with a discharge; or
(bb) if a case under chapter 11 or 13, with a confirmed plan that will be fully performed; and
[ or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) the debtor has commenced
monthly payments to each creditor whose claim is secured by such real
estate (other than a claim secured by a judgment lien or by an unmatured
statutory lien), which payments are in an amount equal to interest at a
current fair market rate on the value of the creditor's interest in the
real estate. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (h) An
]
[<-Struck out] (k)(1) Except as provided in
paragraph (2), an individual injured by any willful violation of a stay
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and
attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive
damages.
[ . ]
[<-Struck out]
, except that if the debtor in connection with offering a product or a
service discloses to an individual a policy prohibiting the transfer of
personally identifiable information about individuals to persons that are not
affiliated with the debtor and if such policy is in effect on the date of the
commencement of the case, then the trustee may not sell or lease personally
identifiable information to any person unless--
* * * * * * *
[ only to the
extent not inconsistent with any relief granted under section 362(c), 362(d),
362(e), or 362(f) of this title. ]
[<-Struck out]
only--
* * * * * * *
[ (o)
]
[<-Struck out] (p) In any hearing under
this section--
* * * * * * *
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] other than a default that is
a breach of a provision relating to the satisfaction of any provision (other
than a penalty rate or penalty provision) relating to a default arising from
any failure to perform nonmonetary obligations under an unexpired lease of
real property, if it is impossible for the trustee to cure such default by
performing nonmonetary acts at and after the time of assumption, except that
if such default arises from a failure to operate in accordance with a
nonresidential real property lease, then such default shall be cured by
performance at and after the time of assumption in accordance with such
lease, and pecuniary losses resulting from such default shall be compensated
in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph;* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
penalty rate or provision ]
[<-Struck out]
penalty rate or penalty provision relating to a default arising
from any failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary obligations under the
executory contract or unexpired lease.* * * * * * *
[ ; or
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ (4) such lease is of
nonresidential real property under which the debtor is the lessee of an
aircraft terminal or aircraft gate at an airport at which the debtor is the
lessee under one or more additional nonresidential leases of an aircraft
terminal or aircraft gate and the trustee, in connection with such
assumption or assignment, does not assume all such leases or does not assume
and assign all of such leases to the same person, except that the trustee
may assume or assign less than all of such leases with the airport
operator's written consent. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (4) Notwithstanding paragraphs
(1) and (2), in a case under any chapter of this title, if the trustee does
not assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property under
which the debtor is the lessee within 60 days after the date of the order for
relief, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such
60-day period, fixes, then such lease is deemed rejected, and the trustee
shall immediately surrender such nonresidential real property to the lessor.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (5) Notwithstanding paragraphs
(1) and (4) of this subsection, in a case under any chapter of this title, if
the trustee does not assume or reject an unexpired lease of nonresidential
real property under which the debtor is an affected air carrier that is the
lessee of an aircraft terminal or aircraft gate before the occurrence of a
termination event, then (unless the court orders the trustee to assume such
unexpired leases within 5 days after the termination event), at the option of
the airport operator, such lease is deemed rejected 5 days after the
occurrence of a termination event and the trustee shall immediately surrender
possession of the premises to the airport operator; except that the lease
shall not be deemed to be rejected unless the airport operator first waives
the right to damages related to the rejection. In the event that the lease is
deemed to be rejected under this paragraph, the airport operator shall provide
the affected air carrier adequate opportunity after the surrender of the
premises to remove the fixtures and equipment installed by the affected air
carrier. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (6) For the purpose of paragraph
(5) of this subsection and paragraph (f)(1) of this section, the occurrence of
a termination event means, with respect to a debtor which is an affected air
carrier that is the lessee of an aircraft terminal or aircraft gate--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) the entry under section
301 or 302 of this title of an order for relief under chapter 7 of this
title; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) the conversion of a case
under any chapter of this title to a case under chapter 7 of this title; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (C) the granting of relief
from the stay provided under section 362(a) of this title with respect to
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, or spare parts, as
defined in section 40102(a) of title 49, except for property of the debtor
found by the court not to be necessary to an effective reorganization.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (7) Any order entered by the
court pursuant to paragraph (4) extending the period within which the trustee
of an affected air carrier must assume or reject an unexpired lease of
nonresidential real property shall be without prejudice to--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) the right of the trustee
to seek further extensions within such additional time period granted by the
court pursuant to paragraph (4); and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (B) the right of any lessor or
any other party in interest to request, at any time, a shortening or
termination of the period within which the trustee must assume or reject an
unexpired lease of nonresidential real property.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (8) The burden of proof for
establishing cause for an extension by an affected air carrier under paragraph
(4) or the maintenance of a previously granted extension under paragraph
(7)(A) and (B) shall at all times remain with the trustee.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (9) For purposes of determining
cause under paragraph (7) with respect to an unexpired lease of nonresidential
real property between the debtor that is an affected air carrier and an
airport operator under which such debtor is the lessee of an airport terminal
or an airport gate, the court shall consider, among other relevant factors,
whether substantial harm will result to the airport operator or airline
passengers as a result of the extension or the maintenance of a previously
granted extension. In making the determination of substantial harm, the court
shall consider, among other relevant factors, the level of actual use of the
terminals or gates which are the subject of the lease, the public interest in
actual use of such terminals or gates, the existence of competing demands for
the use of such terminals or gates, the effect of the court's extension or
termination of the period of time to assume or reject the lease on such
debtor's ability to successfully reorganize under chapter 11 of this title,
and whether the trustee of the affected air carrier is capable of continuing
to comply with its obligations under section 365(d)(3) of this title.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (10)
]
[<-Struck out] (5) The trustee shall
timely perform all of the obligations of the debtor, except those specified in
section 365(b)(2), first arising from or after 60 days after the order for
relief in a case under chapter 11 of this title under an unexpired lease of
personal property (other than personal property leased to an individual
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes), until such lease is
assumed or rejected notwithstanding section 503(b)(1) of this title, unless
the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case,
orders otherwise with respect to the obligations or timely performance
thereof. This subsection shall not be deemed to affect the trustee's
obligations under the provisions of subsection (b) or (f). Acceptance of any
such performance does not constitute waiver or relinquishment of the lessor's
rights under such lease or under this title.* * * * * * *
[
subsection ]
[<-Struck out] subsections (b)
and (c) of this section, notwithstanding a provision in an executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that
prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or lease,
the trustee may assign such contract or lease under paragraph (2) of this
subsection [Struck out->][ ; except that the trustee
may not assign an unexpired lease of nonresidential real property under which
the debtor is an affected air carrier that is the lessee of an aircraft
terminal or aircraft gate if there has occurred a termination event
]
[<-Struck out] .* * * * * * *
[
subsection (b) ]
[<-Struck out] subsections (b)
and (c) of this section, a utility may not alter, refuse, or discontinue
service to, or discriminate against, the trustee or the debtor solely on the
basis of the commencement of a case under this title or that a debt owed by
the debtor to such utility for service rendered before the order for relief
was not paid when due.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--CREDITORS AND CLAIMS |
Sec. |
501. Filing of proofs of claims or interests. |
* * * * * * * |
511. Rate of interest on tax claims. |
* * * * * * * |
SUBCHAPTER II--DEBTOR'S DUTIES AND BENEFITS |
521. Debtor's duties. |
* * * * * * * |
526. Restrictions on debt relief agencies. |
527. Disclosures. |
528. Requirements for debt relief agencies. |
* * * * * * * |
SUBCHAPTER III--THE ESTATE |
541. Property of the estate. |
* * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ 555. Contractual right to
liquidate a securities contract. ] [<-Struck
out] |
[Struck out->][ 556. Contractual right to
liquidate a commodity contract or forward contract.
] [<-Struck out] |
555. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a securities contract. |
556. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a commodities contract or forward contract. |
* * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ 559. Contractual right to
liquidate a repurchase agreement. ] [<-Struck
out] |
[Struck out->][ 560. Contractual right to
terminate a swap agreement. ] [<-Struck out]
|
559. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a repurchase agreement. |
560. Contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a swap agreement. |
561. Contractual right to terminate, liquidate, accelerate, or offset under a master netting agreement and across contracts; proceedings under chapter 15. |
562. Timing of damage measure in connection with swap agreements, securities contracts, forward contracts, commodity contracts, repurchase agreements, or master netting agreements. |
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (A) the actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or
commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case;
]
[<-Struck out] (A) the actual, necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate including--
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ;
* * * * * * *
[ or ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ; or
[ (b)
]
[<-Struck out] (2) A trustee may request
a determination of any unpaid liability of the estate for any tax incurred
during the administration of the case by submitting a tax return for such tax
and a request for such a determination to the governmental unit charged with
responsibility for collection or determination of such tax at the address
and in the manner designated in paragraph (1). Unless such return is
fraudulent, or contains a material misrepresentation, the estate, the
trustee, the debtor, and any successor to the debtor are discharged from any
liability for such tax--
[ (1)
]
[<-Struck out] (A) upon payment of the tax
shown on such return, if--
[ (A)
]
[<-Struck out] (i) such governmental
unit does not notify the trustee, within 60 days after such request, that
such return has been selected for examination; or
[ (B)
]
[<-Struck out] (ii) such governmental
unit does not complete such an examination and notify the trustee of any
tax due, within 180 days after such request or within such additional time
as the court, for cause, permits;
[ (2)
]
[<-Struck out] (B) upon payment of the
tax determined by the court, after notice and a hearing, after completion by
such governmental unit of such examination; or
[ (3)
]
[<-Struck out] (C) upon payment of the
tax determined by such governmental unit to be due.
* * * * * * *
[ (1) First
]
[<-Struck out] (2) Second,
administrative expenses allowed under section 503(b) of this title, and any
fees and charges assessed against the estate under chapter 123 of title
28.
[ (2) Second
]
[<-Struck out] (3) Third, unsecured
claims allowed under section 502(f) of this title.
[ (3) Third
]
[<-Struck out] (4) Fourth, allowed
unsecured claims, but only to the extent of [Struck
out->][ $4,000
]
[<-Struck out] $10,000 for each
individual or corporation, as the case may be, earned within [Struck
out->][ 90 ]
[<-Struck
out] 180 days before the date of the filing of the petition or the
date of the cessation of the debtor's business, whichever occurs first,
for--
[ ;
]
[<-Struck out] .
[ (4) Fourth
]
[<-Struck out] (5) Fifth, allowed
unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan--
[ $4,000
]
[<-Struck out] $10,000;
less
[ (3)
]
[<-Struck out] (4) of this
subsection, plus the aggregate amount paid by the estate on behalf of
such employees to any other employee benefit plan.
[ (5) Fifth
]
[<-Struck out] (6) Sixth, allowed
unsecured claims of persons--
* * * * * * *
[ (6) Sixth
]
[<-Struck out] (7) Seventh, allowed
unsecured claims of individuals, to the extent of $1,800 for each such
individual, arising from the deposit, before the commencement of the case,
of money in connection with the purchase, lease, or rental of property, or
the purchase of services, for the personal, family, or household use of such
individuals, that were not delivered or provided.
[ (7) Seventh, allowed claims
for debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony
to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with
a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record,
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent
that such debt-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) is assigned to another
entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) includes a liability
designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is
actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ for a taxable year
ending on or before the date of the filing of the petition
]
[<-Struck out] for which a return, if
required, is last due, including extensions, after three years before
the date of the filing of the petition;
[ (ii) assessed within 240
days, plus any time plus 30 days during which an offer in compromise
with respect to such tax that was made within 240 days after such
assessment was pending, before the date of the filing of the petition;
or ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ assessed
]
[<-Struck out] incurred before the
commencement of the case and last payable without penalty after one year
before the date of the filing of the petition;* * * * * * *
[ (3)
]
[<-Struck out] (4) of this subsection
earned from the debtor before the date of the filing of the petition,
whether or not actually paid before such date, for which a return is last
due, under applicable law or under any extension, after three years before
the date of the filing of the petition;* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (a)(1) ]
[<-Struck
out] (a)(2) of this section arising from the stay of action against
such property under section 362 of this title, from the use, sale, or lease of
such property under section 363 of this title, or from the granting of a lien
under section 364(d) of this title, then such creditor's claim under such
subsection shall have priority over every other claim allowable under such
subsection.* * * * * * *
[ (a)(3)
]
[<-Struck out] (a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(5),
(a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(8), or (a)(9) of this section is not subrogated to the
right of the holder of such claim to priority under such subsection.
[ (a) If a creditor receives, in a
foreign proceeding, payment of, or a transfer of property on account of, a
claim that is allowed under this title, such creditor may not receive any
payment under this title on account of such claim until each of the other
holders of claims on account of which such holders are entitled to share
equally with such creditor under this title has received payment under this
title equal in value to the consideration received by such creditor in such
foreign proceeding. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (b)
]
[<-Struck out] If a creditor of a partnership
debtor receives, from a general partner that is not a debtor in a case under
chapter 7 of this title, payment of, or a transfer of property on account of,
a claim that is allowed under this title and that is not secured by a lien on
property of such partner, such creditor may not receive any payment under this
title on account of such claim until each of the other holders of claims on
account of which such holders are entitled to share equally with such creditor
under this title has received payment under this title equal in value to the
consideration received by such creditor from such general partner.* * * * * * *
[ (1) file a list of creditors,
and unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities,
a schedule of current income and current expenditures, and a statement of
the debtor's financial affairs; ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ consumer
]
[<-Struck out] debts which are secured by
property of the estate--
[ forty-five days
after the filing of a notice of intent under this section
]
[<-Struck out] 30 days after the first
date set for the meeting of creditors under section 341(a), or within
such additional time as the court, for cause, within such [Struck
out->][ forty-five day
]
[<-Struck out] 30-day period fixes,
the debtor shall perform his intention with respect to such property, as
specified by subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; and
[ , and
]
[<-Struck out] ;
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ;
[ (b) Notwithstanding
]
[<-Struck out] (b)(1) Notwithstanding
section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of
the estate the property listed in either paragraph [Struck
out->][ (1) ]
[<-Struck
out] (2) or, in the alternative, paragraph [Struck
out->][ (2) ]
[<-Struck
out] (3) of this subsection. In joint cases filed under section 302
of this title and individual cases filed under section 301 or 303 of this
title by or against debtors who are husband and wife, and whose estates are
ordered to be jointly administered under Rule 1015(b) of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, one debtor may not elect to exempt property listed in
paragraph [Struck out->][ (1)
]
[<-Struck out] (2) and the other debtor
elect to exempt property listed in paragraph [Struck
out->][ (2) ]
[<-Struck
out] (3) of this subsection. If the parties cannot agree on the
alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph [Struck
out->][ (1) ]
[<-Struck
out] (2), where such election is permitted under the law of the
jurisdiction where the case is filed. [Struck
out->][ Such property is--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (1) property that is specified
under subsection (d) of this section, unless the State law that is
applicable to the debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection
specifically does not so authorize; or, in the alternative,
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2)(A) any property
]
[<-Struck out]
[ 180 days
]
[<-Struck out] 730 days immediately
preceding the date of the filing of the petition [Struck
out->][ , or for a longer portion of such 180-day
period than in any other place ]
[<-Struck out]
or if the debtor's domicile has not been located at a single State for
such 730-day period, the place in which the debtor's domicile was located
for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day period or for a longer
portion of such 180-day period than in any other place; [Struck
out->][ and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; and
[ (1) a debt of a kind specified
in section 523(a)(1) or 523(a)(5) of this title;
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (b)(1) ]
[<-Struck
out] (b)(2) of this section:
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ --
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (i) to a spouse, former
spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or
support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation
agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record,
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit, or property settlement agreement; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (ii) to the extent that such
debt-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (I) is not assigned to
another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (II) includes a liability
designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is
actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support.; or
]
[<-Struck out] of a kind that is
specified in section 523(a)(5); or* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ subsection (f)(2)
]
[<-Struck out] subsection (f)(1)(B) of
this section.* * * * * * *
[ 507(a)(2)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(3) or 507(a)(8)
of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or
allowed;
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (C) for purposes of
subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, consumer debts owed to a single
creditor and aggregating more than $1,000 for `luxury goods or services'
incurred by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order for
relief under this title, or cash advances aggregating more than $1,000
that are extensions of consumer credit under an open end credit plan
obtained by an individual debtor on or within 60 days before the order for
relief under this title, are presumed to be nondischargeable; `luxury
goods or services' do not include goods or services reasonably acquired
for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
an extension of consumer credit under an open end credit plan is to be
defined for purposes of this subparagraph as it is defined in the Consumer
Credit Protection Act; ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (5) to a spouse, former
spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support
of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce
decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance
with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement
agreement, but not to the extent that--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) such debt is assigned to
another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise (other than
debts assigned pursuant to section 408(a)(3) of the Social Security Act,
or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a
State or any political subdivision of such State); or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) such debt includes a
liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such
liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support;
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (8) for an educational benefit
overpayment or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or
made under any program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or
nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds received as an
educational benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless excepting such debt from
discharge under this paragraph will impose an undue hardship on the debtor
and the debtor's dependents; ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ motor vehicle
]
[<-Struck out] motor vehicle, vessel, or
aircraft if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was
intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance;* * * * * * *
[ unless--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) the debtor does not have
the ability to pay such debt from income or property of the debtor not
reasonably necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support of the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor is engaged in a
business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation,
preservation, and operation of such business; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) discharging such debt
would result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental
consequences to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor;
]
[<-Struck out] ;
[ dwelling
]
[<-Struck out] unit that has condominium
ownership [Struck out->][ or
]
[<-Struck out] , in a share of a cooperative
[Struck out->][ housing
]
[<-Struck out] corporation, [Struck
out->][ but only if such fee or assessment is
payable for a period during which-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (A) the debtor physically
occupied a dwelling unit in the condominium or cooperative project; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) the debtor rented the
dwelling unit to a tenant and received payments from the tenant for such
period, ]
[<-Struck out] or a lot in a
homeowners association, for as long as the debtor or the trustee has a
legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest in such unit, such
corporation, or such lot,
[ by a
court ]
[<-Struck out] on a prisoner by any
court for the filing of a case, motion, complaint, or appeal, or for
other costs and expenses assessed with respect to such filing, regardless of
an assertion of poverty by the debtor under [Struck
out->][ section 1915(b) or (f)
]
[<-Struck out] subsection (b) or (f)(2) of
section 1915 of title 28 (or a similar non-Federal law), or
the debtor's status as a prisoner, as defined in section 1915(h) of title 28
(or a similar non-Federal law);
[ (18) owed under State law to a
State or municipality that is-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (A) in the nature of
support, and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) enforceable under part D
of title IV of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 601 et seq.); or
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (6), or (15)
]
[<-Struck out] or (6) of subsection (a)
of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed,
and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted
from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), [Struck
out->][ (6), or (15)
]
[<-Struck out] or (6), as the case may
be, of subsection (a) of this section.* * * * * * *
[ a insured
]
[<-Struck out] an insured depository
institution shall be considered to be acting in a fiduciary capacity with
respect to the purposes of subsection (a)(4) or (11).
* * * * * * *
[ section 523, 1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1) of
this title, or that ]
[<-Struck out] section
523, 1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1), or that would be so excepted,
determined in accordance with the provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d)
of this title, in a case concerning the debtor's spouse commenced on the
date of the filing of the petition in the case concerning the debtor,
whether or not discharge of the debt based on such community claim is
waived.* * * * * * *
[ (2)(A) such agreement contains
a clear and conspicuous statement which advises the debtor that the
agreement may be rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within sixty
days after such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later,
by giving notice of rescission to the holder of such claim; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) such agreement contains a
clear and conspicuous statement which advises the debtor that such agreement
is not required under this title, under nonbankruptcy law, or under any
agreement not in accordance with the provisions of this subsection;
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ the program operated under part B, D, or E
of ]
[<-Struck out] any program operated
under title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 or a similar program
operated under State or local law.
* * * * * * *
[ or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (5)
]
[<-Struck out] (9) any interest in cash
or cash equivalents that constitute proceeds of a sale by the debtor of a
money order that is made--
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (c) Except as provided in
subsection (d) of this section, the rights and powers of a trustee under
sections 544(a), 545, 547, and 549 of this title are subject to any statutory
or common-law right of a seller of goods that has sold goods to the debtor, in
the ordinary course of such seller's business, to reclaim such goods if the
debtor has received such goods while insolvent, but--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (1) such a seller may not
reclaim any such goods unless such seller demands in writing reclamation of
such goods-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) before 10 days after
receipt of such goods by the debtor; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) if such 10-day period
expires after the commencement of the case, before 20 days after receipt
of such goods by the debtor; and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (2) the court may deny
reclamation to a seller with such a right of reclamation that has made such
a demand only if the court-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (A) grants the claim of such
a seller priority as a claim of a kind specified in section 503(b) of this
title; or ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) secures such claim by a
lien. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ under a swap agreement
]
[<-Struck out] , made by or to a swap participant
or financial participant, [Struck out->][
in connection with a swap agreement ]
[<-Struck out]
under or in connection with any swap agreement and that is made
before the commencement of the case, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this
title.
[ (g)
]
[<-Struck out] (h) Notwithstanding the
rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 547, 549, and 553,
if the court determines on a motion by the trustee made not later than 120
days after the date of the order for relief in a case under chapter 11 of this
title and after notice and a hearing, that a return is in the best interests
of the estate, the debtor, with the consent of a creditor and subject to
the prior rights of holders of security interests in such goods or the
proceeds of such goods, may return goods shipped to the debtor by the
creditor before the commencement of the case, and the creditor may offset the
purchase price of such goods against any claim of the creditor against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.
[
subsection (c) ]
[<-Struck out] subsections (c)
and (i) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property--
* * * * * * *
[ (2) to the extent that such
transfer was-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) in payment of a debt
incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial
affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) made in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (C) made according to
ordinary business terms; ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ 20 ]
[<-Struck
out] 30 days after the debtor receives possession of such
property;* * * * * * *
[ (7) to the extent such
transfer was a bona fide payment of a debt to a spouse, former spouse, or
child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such
spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree
or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with
State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement
agreement, but not to the extent that such debt--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) is assigned to another
entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) includes a liability
designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is
actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ; or
* * * * * * *
[ 10 ]
[<-Struck
out] 30 days after, such time, except as provided in subsection
(c)(3)(B);
[ 10
]
[<-Struck out] 30 days; or
[ 10
]
[<-Struck out] 30 days after such
transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee.* * * * * * *
[ one year
]
[<-Struck out] 2 years before the date of
the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily--
* * * * * * *
[
or ]
[<-Struck out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; or
* * * * * * *
[ one year
]
[<-Struck out] 2 years before the date of
the filing of the petition, to a general partner in the debtor, if the debtor
was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation.* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; and
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ such property
]
[<-Struck out] such real property,
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, could not
acquire an interest that is superior to [Struck
out->][ the interest
]
[<-Struck out] such interest of such good
faith purchaser. A good faith purchaser without knowledge of the commencement
of the case and for less than present fair equivalent value has a lien on the
property transferred to the extent of any present value given, unless a copy
or notice of the petition was so filed before such transfer was so
perfected.* * * * * * *
[ product
]
[<-Struck out] products, offspring, or
profits of such property, then such security interest extends to such
proceeds, [Struck out->][ product
]
[<-Struck out] products, offspring, or
profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the
extent provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy
law, except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based
on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ 362(b)(14),
]
[<-Struck out] 362(b)(17), 362(b)(27), 555,
556, 559, 560, 561, 365(h), 546(h), or 365(i)(2) of this title, if a
creditor offsets a mutual debt owing to the debtor against a claim against the
debtor on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition,
then the trustee may recover from such creditor the amount so offset to the
extent that any insufficiency on the date of such setoff is less than the
insufficiency on the later of--
* * * * * * *
[ Sec. 555. Contractual right to
liquidate a securities contract ]
[<-Struck out]
[ liquidation
]
[<-Struck out] liquidation, termination, or
acceleration of a securities contract, as defined in section 741 of this
title, because of a condition of the kind specified in section 365(e)(1) of
this title shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of
any provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in
any proceeding under this title unless such order is authorized under the
provisions of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 or any statute
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission. [Struck
out->][ As used in this section, the term
`contractual right' includes a right set forth in a rule or bylaw of a
national securities exchange, a national securities association, or a
securities clearing agency. ]
[<-Struck out] As
used in this section, the term `contractual right' includes a right set forth
in a rule or bylaw of a derivatives clearing organization (as defined in the
Commodity Exchange Act), a multilateral clearing organization (as defined in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991), a national
securities exchange, a national securities association, a securities clearing
agency, a contract market designated under the Commodity Exchange Act, a
derivatives transaction execution facility registered under the Commodity
Exchange Act, or a board of trade (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act),
or in a resolution of the governing board thereof, and a right, whether or not
in writing, arising under common law, under law merchant, or by reason of
normal business practice.
[ Sec. 556. Contractual right to
liquidate a commodities contract or forward contract
]
[<-Struck out]
[ liquidation
]
[<-Struck out] liquidation, termination, or
acceleration of a commodity contract, as defined in section 761 of this
title, or forward contract because of a condition of the kind specified in
section 365(e)(1) of this title, and the right to a variation or maintenance
margin payment received from a trustee with respect to open commodity
contracts or forward contracts, shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise
limited by operation of any provision of this title or by the order of a court
in any proceeding under this title. [Struck out->][
As used in this section, the term `contractual right' includes a right set
forth in a rule or bylaw of a clearing organization or contract market or in a
resolution of the governing board thereof and a right,
]
[<-Struck out] As used in this section, the
term `contractual right' includes a right set forth in a rule or bylaw of a
derivatives clearing organization (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act),
a multilateral clearing organization (as defined in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991), a national securities
exchange, a national securities association, a securities clearing agency, a
contract market designated under the Commodity Exchange Act, a derivatives
transaction execution facility registered under the Commodity Exchange Act, or
a board of trade (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act) or in a resolution
of the governing board thereof and a right, whether or not evidenced in
writing, arising under common law, under law merchant or by reason of normal
business practice.* * * * * * *
[ Sec. 559. Contractual right to
liquidate a repurchase agreement ]
[<-Struck out]
[
liquidation ]
[<-Struck out] liquidation,
termination, or acceleration of a repurchase agreement because of a
condition of the kind specified in section 365(e)(1) of this title shall not
be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any provision of this
title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under
this title, unless, where the debtor is a stockbroker or securities clearing
agency, such order is authorized under the provisions of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 or any statute administered by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. In the event that a repo participant or financial
participant liquidates one or more repurchase agreements with a debtor
and under the terms of one or more such agreements has agreed to deliver
assets subject to repurchase agreements to the debtor, any excess of the
market prices received on liquidation of such assets (or if any such assets
are not disposed of on the date of liquidation of such repurchase agreements,
at the prices available at the time of liquidation of such repurchase
agreements from a generally recognized source or the most recent closing bid
quotation from such a source) over the sum of the stated repurchase prices and
all expenses in connection with the liquidation of such repurchase agreements
shall be deemed property of the estate, subject to the available rights of
setoff. [Struck out->][ As used in this section, the
term `contractual right' includes a right set forth in a rule or bylaw,
applicable to each party to the repurchase agreement, of a national securities
exchange, a national securities association, or a securities clearing agency,
and a right, ]
[<-Struck out] As used in this
section, the term `contractual right' includes a right set forth in a rule or
bylaw of a derivatives clearing organization (as defined in the Commodity
Exchange Act), a multilateral clearing organization (as defined in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991), a national securities
exchange, a national securities association, a securities clearing agency, a
contract market designated under the Commodity Exchange Act, a derivatives
transaction execution facility registered under the Commodity Exchange Act, or
a board of trade (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act) or in a resolution
of the governing board thereof and a right, whether or not evidenced in
writing, arising under common law, under law merchant or by reason of normal
business practice.
[ Sec. 560. Contractual right to
terminate a swap agreement ]
[<-Struck out]
[ termination of a swap agreement
]
[<-Struck out] liquidation, termination, or
acceleration of one or more swap agreements because of a condition of the
kind specified in section 365(e)(1) of this title or to offset or net out any
termination values or payment amounts arising under or [Struck
out->][ in connection with any swap agreement
]
[<-Struck out] in connection with the
termination, liquidation, or acceleration of one or more swap agreements
shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any
provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any
proceeding under this title. [Struck out->][ As used
in this section, the term `contractual right' includes a right,
]
[<-Struck out] As used in this section, the
term `contractual right' includes a right set forth in a rule or bylaw of a
derivatives clearing organization (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act),
a multilateral clearing organization (as defined in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991), a national securities
exchange, a national securities association, a securities clearing agency, a
contract market designated under the Commodity Exchange Act, a derivatives
transaction execution facility registered under the Commodity Exchange Act, or
a board of trade (as defined in the Commodity Exchange Act) or in a resolution
of the governing board thereof and a right, whether or not evidenced in
writing, arising under common law, under law merchant, or by reason of normal
business practice.
SUBCHAPTER I--OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATION |
Sec. |
701. Interim trustee. |
* * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ 707. Dismissal.
] [<-Struck out] |
707. Dismissal of a case or conversion to a case under chapter 11 or 13. |
SUBCHAPTER II--COLLECTION, LIQUIDATION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE |
* * * * * * * |
[Struck out->][ 728. Special tax provisions.
] [<-Struck out] |
SUBCHAPTER III--STOCKBROKER LIQUIDATION |
* * * * * * * |
753. Stockbroker liquidation and forward contract merchants, commodity brokers, stockbrokers, financial institutions, financial participants, securities clearing agencies, swap participants, repo participants, and master netting agreement participants. |
SUBCHAPTER IV--COMMODITY BROKER LIQUIDATION |
* * * * * * * |
767. Commodity broker liquidation and forward contract merchants, commodity brokers, stockbrokers, financial institutions, financial participants, securities clearing agencies, swap participants, repo participants, and master netting agreement participants. |
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ;
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ Sec. 707. Dismissal
]
[<-Struck out]
[ but not at the request or suggestion of
]
[<-Struck out] trustee (or bankruptcy
administrator, if any), or any party in interest, may dismiss a case
filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily
consumer debts, or, with the debtor's consent, convert such a case to a
case under chapter 11 or 13 of this title, if it finds that the granting
of relief would be [Struck out->][ a substantial
abuse ]
[<-Struck out] an abuse of the
provisions of this chapter. [Struck out->][ There
shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the
debtor. ]
[<-Struck out] In making a determination
whether to dismiss a case under this section, the court may not take into
consideration whether a debtor has made, or continues to make, charitable
contributions (that meet the definition of `charitable contribution' under
section 548(d)(3)) to any qualified religious or charitable entity or
organization (as that term is defined in section 548(d)(4)).
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ before the date on which the trustee
commences distribution under this section;
]
[<-Struck out] on or before the earlier
of--
* * * * * * *
[ 1009, ]
[<-Struck
out] 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title, a claim allowed under section 503(b)
of this title incurred under this chapter after such conversion has priority
over a claim allowed under section 503(b) of this title incurred under any
other chapter of this title or under this chapter before such conversion and
over any expenses of a custodian superseded under section 543 of this
title.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ six ]
[<-Struck
out] 8 years before the date of the filing of the petition;
[ or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ;
* * * * * * *
[ or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; or
* * * * * * *
[ Sec. 728. Special tax provisions
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (a) For the purposes of any
State or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income, the taxable period
of a debtor that is an individual shall terminate on the date of the order for
relief under this chapter, unless the case was converted under section 1112 or
1208 of this title. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (b) Notwithstanding any State or
local law imposing a tax on or measured by income, the trustee shall make tax
returns of income for the estate of an individual debtor in a case under this
chapter or for a debtor that is a corporation in a case under this chapter
only if such estate or corporation has net taxable income for the entire
period after the order for relief under this chapter during which the case is
pending. If such entity has such income, or if the debtor is a partnership,
then the trustee shall make and file a return of income for each taxable
period during which the case was pending after the order for relief under this
chapter. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (c) If there are pending a case
under this chapter concerning a partnership and a case under this chapter
concerning a partner in such partnership, a governmental unit's claim for any
unpaid liability of such partner for a State or local tax on or measured by
income, to the extent that such liability arose from the inclusion in such
partner's taxable income of earnings of such partnership that were not
withdrawn by such partner, is a claim only against such partnership.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (d) Notwithstanding section 541
of this title, if there are pending a case under this chapter concerning a
partnership and a case under this chapter concerning a partner in such
partnership, then any State or local tax refund or reduction of tax of such
partner that would have otherwise been property of the estate of such partner
under section 541 of this title-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (1) is property of the estate
of such partnership to the extent that such tax refund or reduction of tax
is fairly apportionable to losses sustained by such partnership and not
reimbursed by such partner; and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (2) is otherwise property of
the estate of such partner. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (7) `securities contract'
means contract for the purchase, sale, or loan of a security, including an
option for the purchase or sale of a security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the
value thereof), or any option entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currencies, or the guarantee of any settlement of cash
or securities by or to a securities clearing agency;
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ 507(a)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2) of this title
that are attributable to the administration of such customer property.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ or
]
[<-Struck out]* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ 507(a)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2) of this title
that are attributable to the administration of customer property. Such
distribution shall be in the form of--
* * * * * * *
[ 507(a)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2) of this title
that are attributable to the administration of such customer property;
and
[
507(a)(1) ]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2) of
this title that are attributable to the administration of member property or
customer property.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ 507(a)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2), 509, 510,
524(a)(1), 524(a)(2), 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549(a), 549(c), 549(d), 550,
551, 552, 553, 555, 556, 557, 559, 560, 561, 562, 1102,
1103, 1109, 1111(b), 1122, 1123(a)(1), 1123(a)(2), 1123(a)(3), 1123(a)(4),
1123(a)(5), 1123(b), 1123(d), 1124, 1125, 1126(a), 1126(b), 1126(c),
1126(e), 1126(f), 1126(g), 1127(d), 1128, 1129(a)(2), 1129(a)(3), 1129(a)(6),
1129(a)(8), 1129(a)(10), 1129(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(A), 1129(b)(2)(B), 1142(b),
1143, 1144, and 1145 of this title apply in a case under this chapter.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ 507(a)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2) of this title
will receive on account of such claim cash equal to the allowed amount of
such claim;* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATION |
Sec. |
1101. Definitions for this chapter. |
* * * * * * * |
1115. Property of the estate. |
1116. Duties of trustee or debtor in possession in small business cases. |
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ or ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; or
* * * * * * *
[ (1) perform the duties of a
trustee specified in sections 704(2), 704(5), 704(7), 704(8), and 704(9) of
this title; ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; and
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (b) Except as provided in
subsection (c) of this section, on request of a party in interest or the
United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator, and after notice and a
hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under
chapter 7 of this title or may dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is
in the best interest of creditors and the estate, for cause, including--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (1) continuing loss to or
diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of
rehabilitation; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) inability to effectuate a
plan; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (3) unreasonable delay by the
debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (4) failure to propose a plan
under section 1121 of this title within any time fixed by the court;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (5) denial of confirmation of
every proposed plan and denial of a request made for additional time for
filing another plan or a modification of a plan;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (6) revocation of an order of
confirmation under section 1144 of this title, and denial of confirmation of
another plan or a modified plan under section 1129 of this title;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (7) inability to effectuate
substantial consummation of a confirmed plan;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (8) material default by the
debtor with respect to a confirmed plan;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (9) termination of a plan by
reason of the occurrence of a condition specified in the plan; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (10) nonpayment of any fees or
charges required under chapter 123 of title 28.
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ appoint
]
[<-Struck out] order the appointment of a
committee of retired employees if the debtor seeks to modify or not pay the
retiree benefits or if the court otherwise determines that it is appropriate,
to serve as the authorized representative, under this section, of those
persons receiving any retiree benefits not covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. The United States trustee shall appoint any such
committee.* * * * * * *
[ (l)
]
[<-Struck out] (m) This section shall not
apply to any retiree, or the spouse or dependents of such retiree, if such
retiree's gross income for the twelve months preceding the filing of the
bankruptcy petition equals or exceeds $250,000, unless such retiree can
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the court that he is unable to obtain
health, medical, life, and disability coverage for himself, his spouse, and
his dependents who would otherwise be covered by the employer's insurance
plan, comparable to the coverage provided by the employer on the day before
the filing of a petition under this title.
* * * * * * *
[ On
]
[<-Struck out] (1) Subject to paragraph (2),
on request of a party in interest made within the respective periods
specified in subsections (b) and (c) of this section and after notice and a
hearing, the court may for cause reduce or increase the 120-day period or the
180-day period referred to in this section.
[ (e) In a case in which the
debtor is a small business and elects to be considered a small business--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (1) only the debtor may file a
plan until after 100 days after the date of the order for relief under this
chapter; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) all plans shall be filed
within 160 days after the date of the order for relief; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (3) on request of a party in
interest made within the respective periods specified in paragraphs (1) and
(2) and after notice and a hearing, the court may--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) reduce the 100-day
period or the 160-day period specified in paragraph (1) or (2) for cause;
and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) increase the 100-day
period specified in paragraph (1) if the debtor shows that the need for an
increase is caused by circumstances for which the debtor should not be
held accountable. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ 507(a)(1), 507(a)(2)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2), 507(a)(3), or
507(a)(8) of this title, and classes of interests;* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ; and
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (D)
]
[<-Struck out] (E) does not otherwise
alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to which such claim or
interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest.
[ a
hypothetical reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interests
]
[<-Struck out] such a hypothetical
investor of the relevant class to make an informed judgment about the
plan, but adequate information need not include such information about any
other possible or proposed plan and in determining whether a disclosure
statement provides adequate information, the court shall consider the
complexity of the case, the benefit of additional information to creditors
and other parties in interest, and the cost of providing additional
information; and* * * * * * *
[ (f) Notwithstanding subsection
(b), in a case in which the debtor has elected under section 1121(e) to be
considered a small business-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (1) the court may
conditionally approve a disclosure statement subject to final approval after
notice and a hearing; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) acceptances and rejections
of a plan may be solicited based on a conditionally approved disclosure
statement as long as the debtor provides adequate information to each holder
of a claim or interest that is solicited, but a conditionally approved
disclosure statement shall be mailed at least 10 days prior to the date of
the hearing on confirmation of the plan; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (3) a hearing on the
disclosure statement may be combined with a hearing on confirmation of a
plan. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ 507(a)(1) or 507(a)(2)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(3)
of this title, on the effective date of the plan, the holder of such claim
will receive on account of such claim cash equal to the allowed amount of
such claim;
[ 507(a)(3)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(1), 507(a)(4),
507(a)(5), 507(a)(6), or 507(a)(7) of this title, each holder of a claim
of such class will receive--
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ deferred cash payments,
over a period not exceeding six years after the date of assessment of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the
allowed amount of such claim. ]
[<-Struck out]
regular installment payments in cash--
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ The confirmation of a plan
does not discharge an individual debtor ]
[<-Struck
out] A discharge under this chapter does not discharge a debtor who is an
individual from any debt excepted from discharge under section 523 of
this title.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (a) For the purposes of any
State or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income, the taxable period
of a debtor that is an individual shall terminate on the date of the order for
relief under this chapter, unless the case was converted under section 706 of
this title. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (b) The trustee shall make a
State or local tax return of income for the estate of an individual debtor in
a case under this chapter for each taxable period after the order for relief
under this chapter during which the case is pending.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (c)
]
[<-Struck out] (a) The issuance,
transfer, or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an
instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section 1129 of this
title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.
[ (d)
]
[<-Struck out] (b) The court may
authorize the proponent of a plan to request a determination, limited to
questions of law, by a State or local governmental unit charged with
responsibility for collection or determination of a tax on or measured by
income, of the tax effects, under section 346 of this title and under the law
imposing such tax, of the plan. In the event of an actual controversy, the
court may declare such effects after the earlier of--
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ section 11347
]
[<-Struck out] section 11326(a) of title
49.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ section 11347
]
[<-Struck out] section 11326(a) of title
49.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; and
* * * * * * *
[
if the property is farmland or farm equipment
]
[<-Struck out] if the property is farmland,
farm equipment, or property used to carry out a commercial fishing operation
(including a commercial fishing vessel), except that the proceeds of such
sale shall be subject to such interest.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
or ]
[<-Struck out]
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ; and
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (2) provide for the full
payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority under
section 507 of this title, unless the holder of a particular claim agrees to
a different treatment of such claim; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; and
* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (11)
]
[<-Struck out] (12) include any other
appropriate provision not inconsistent with this title.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; and
[ or ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; or
* * * * * * *
[ 507(a)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2) of this title;
and* * * * * * *
[ As
]
[<-Struck out] Subject to subsection (d),
as soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments
under the plan, and in the case of a debtor who is required by a judicial
or administrative order, or by statute, to pay a domestic support obligation,
after such debtor certifies that all amounts payable under such order or such
statute that are due on or before the date of the certification (including
amounts due before the petition was filed, but only to the extent provided for
by the plan) have been paid, other than payments to holders of allowed
claims provided for under section 1222(b)(5) or 1222(b)(10) of this title,
unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor
after the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall grant the
debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan allowed under section
503 of this title or disallowed under section 502 of this title, except any
debt--
* * * * * * *
[ At
]
[<-Struck out] Subject to subsection (d),
at any time after the confirmation of the plan and after notice and a
hearing, the court may grant a discharge to a debtor that has not completed
payments under the plan only if--
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (a) For the purpose of any State
or local law imposing a tax on or measured by income, the taxable period of a
debtor that is an individual shall terminate on the date of the order for
relief under this chapter, unless the case was converted under section 706 of
this title. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (b) The trustee shall make a
State or local tax return of income for the estate of an individual debtor in
a case under this chapter for each taxable period after the order for relief
under this chapter during which the case is pending.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (c)
]
[<-Struck out] (a) The issuance,
transfer, or exchange of a security, or the making or delivery of an
instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section 1225 of this
title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar tax.
[ (d)
]
[<-Struck out] (b) The court may
authorize the proponent of a plan to request a determination, limited to
questions of law, by [Struck out->][ a State or
local governmental unit ]
[<-Struck out] any
governmental unit charged with responsibility for collection or
determination of a tax on or measured by income, of the tax effects, under
section 346 of this title and under the law imposing such tax, of the plan. In
the event of an actual controversy, the court may declare such effects after
the earlier of--
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATION, AND THE ESTATE |
Sec. |
1301. Stay of action against codebtor. |
* * * * * * * |
1308. Filing of prepetition tax returns. |
* * * * * * * |
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; and
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ or ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ; or
* * * * * * *
[ (e)
]
[<-Struck out] (f) The court may not
convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this
title if the debtor is a farmer, unless the debtor requests such
conversion.
[ (f)
]
[<-Struck out] (g) Notwithstanding any
other provision of this section, a case may not be converted to a case under
another chapter of this title unless the debtor may be a debtor under such
chapter.
* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; and
* * * * * * *
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (10)
]
[<-Struck out] (11) include any other
appropriate provision not inconsistent with this title.* * * * * * *
[ (d) The plan may not provide for
payments over a period that is longer than three years, unless the court, for
cause, approves a longer period, but the court may not approve a period that
is longer than five years. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ After
]
[<-Struck out] (a) Except as provided in
subsection (b) and after notice, the court shall hold a hearing on
confirmation of the plan. A party in interest may object to confirmation of
the plan.
* * * * * * *
[ (i) the plan provides
that the holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim; and
]
[<-Struck out] (i) the plan provides
that--
[ or ]
[<-Struck
out] and
[ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ;
[
three-year period ]
[<-Struck out] applicable
commitment period beginning on the date that the first payment is due
under the plan will be applied to make payments to unsecured
creditors under the plan.
[ (2) For purposes of this
subsection, `disposable income' means income which is received by the debtor
and which is not reasonably necessary to be expended--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) for the maintenance or
support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor, including charitable
contributions (that meet the definition of `charitable contribution' under
section 548(d)(3)) to a qualified religious or charitable entity or
organization (as that term is defined in section 548(d)(4)) in an amount not
to exceed 15 percent of the gross income of the debtor for the year in which
the contributions are made; and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (B) if the debtor is engaged
in business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation,
preservation, and operation of such business.
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (a)(1) Unless the court orders
otherwise, the debtor shall commence making the payments proposed by a plan
within 30 days after the plan is filed. ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (2) A payment made under this
subsection shall be retained by the trustee until confirmation or denial of
confirmation of a plan. If a plan is confirmed, the trustee shall distribute
any such payment in accordance with the plan as soon as practicable. If a plan
is not confirmed, the trustee shall return any such payment to the debtor,
after deducting any unpaid claim allowed under section 503(b) of this title.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ 507(a)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2) of this title;
[Struck out->][ and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ; and
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ As
]
[<-Struck out] Subject to subsection (d),
as soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments
under the plan, and in the case of a debtor who is required by a judicial
or administrative order, or by statute, to pay a domestic support obligation,
after such debtor certifies that all amounts payable under such order or such
statute that are due on or before the date of the certification (including
amounts due before the petition was filed, but only to the extent provided for
by the plan) have been paid, unless the court approves a written waiver
of discharge executed by the debtor after the order for relief under this
chapter, the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided
for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title, except any
debt--
[ (1) provided for under section
1322(b)(5) of this title; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (2) of the kind specified in
paragraph (5), (8), or (9) of section 523(a) of this title; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (3) for restitution, or a
criminal fine, included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction of a crime.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ At
]
[<-Struck out] Subject to subsection (d),
at any time after the confirmation of the plan and after notice and a
hearing, the court may grant a discharge to a debtor that has not completed
payments under the plan only if--
* * * * * * *
[ or ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ; or
* * * * * * *
[ three
years ]
[<-Struck out] the applicable commitment
period under section 1325(b)(1)(B) after the time that the first payment
under the original confirmed plan was due, unless the court, for cause,
approves a longer period, but the court may not approve a period that expires
after five years after such time.* * * * * * *
Sec. |
1501. Purpose and scope of application. |
SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS |
1502. Definitions. |
1503. International obligations of the United States. |
1504. Commencement of ancillary case. |
1505. Authorization to act in a foreign country. |
1506. Public policy exception. |
1507. Additional assistance. |
1508. Interpretation. |
SUBCHAPTER II--ACCESS OF FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES AND CREDITORS TO THE COURT |
1509. Right of direct access. |
1510. Limited jurisdiction. |
1511. Commencement of case under section 301 or 303. |
1512. Participation of a foreign representative in a case under this title. |
1513. Access of foreign creditors to a case under this title. |
1514. Notification to foreign creditors concerning a case under this title. |
SUBCHAPTER III--RECOGNITION OF A FOREIGN PROCEEDING AND RELIEF |
1515. Application for recognition. |
1516. Presumptions concerning recognition. |
1517. Order granting recognition. |
1518. Subsequent information. |
1519. Relief that may be granted upon filing petition for recognition. |
1520. Effects of recognition of a foreign main proceeding. |
1521. Relief that may be granted upon recognition. |
1522. Protection of creditors and other interested persons. |
1523. Actions to avoid acts detrimental to creditors. |
1524. Intervention by a foreign representative. |
SUBCHAPTER IV--COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN COURTS AND FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES |
1525. Cooperation and direct communication between the court and foreign courts or foreign representatives. |
1526. Cooperation and direct communication between the trustee and foreign courts or foreign representatives. |
1527. Forms of cooperation. |
SUBCHAPTER V--CONCURRENT PROCEEDINGS |
1528. Commencement of a case under this title after recognition of a foreign main proceeding. |
1529. Coordination of a case under this title and a foreign proceeding. |
1530. Coordination of more than 1 foreign proceeding. |
1531. Presumption of insolvency based on recognition of a foreign main proceeding. |
1532. Rule of payment in concurrent proceedings. |
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
Sec. |
151. Definition. |
* * * * * * * |
158. Designation of United States attorneys and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to address abusive reaffirmations of debt and materially fraudulent statements in bankruptcy schedules. |
* * * * * * *
[ . ]
[<-Struck
out] ; and
[ this title
]
[<-Struck out] title 11.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ The United States court
of appeals for the circuit shall appoint bankruptcy judges for the judicial
districts established in paragraph (2) in such numbers as are established in
such paragraph. ]
[<-Struck out] Each bankruptcy
judge to be appointed for a judicial district, as provided in paragraph (2),
shall be appointed by the court of appeals of the United States for the
circuit in which such district is located. Such appointments shall be
made after considering the recommendations of the Judicial Conference
submitted pursuant to subsection (b). Each bankruptcy judge shall be appointed
for a term of fourteen years, subject to the provisions of subsection (e).
However, upon the expiration of the term, a bankruptcy judge may, with the
approval of the judicial council of the circuit, continue to perform the
duties of the office until the earlier of the date which is 180 days after the
expiration of the term or the date of the appointment of a successor.
Bankruptcy judges shall serve as judicial officers of the United States
district court established under Article III of the Constitution.
Districts | Judges |
* * * * * * * | |
Georgia: | |
Northern | 8 |
Middle | [Struck out->][ 2
] [<-Struck out] 3 |
Southern | 2 |
[Struck out->][ Middle and Southern
] [<-Struck out] |
1 |
* * * * * * * |
Sec. |
151. Designation of bankruptcy courts. |
* * * * * * * |
159. Bankruptcy statistics. |
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[
and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ .
]
[<-Struck out] ; and
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ Subject to subsection
(b), ]
[<-Struck out] Subject to subsections (b)
and (d)(2), each appeal under subsection (a) shall be heard by a 3-judge
panel of the bankruptcy appellate panel service established under subsection
(b)(1) unless --
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
Sec. |
581. United States trustees. |
* * * * * * * |
589b. Bankruptcy data. |
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ or 13
]
[<-Struck out] 13, or 15 of title 11
by, whenever the United States trustee considers it to be
appropriate--
* * * * * * *
[
and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (H)
]
[<-Struck out] (I) monitoring
applications filed under section 327 of title 11 and, whenever the United
States trustee deems it to be appropriate, filing with the court comments
with respect to the approval of such applications;* * * * * * *
[ and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (6) make such reports as the
Attorney General directs. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (1) 27.42 percent of the fees
collected under section 1930(a)(1) of this title;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ one-half
]
[<-Struck out] 75 percent of the fees
collected under section 1930(a)(3) of this title;* * * * * * *
[ one-half
]
[<-Struck out] 100 percent of the fees
collected under section 1930(a)(5) of this title;* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ Notwithstanding
]
[<-Struck out] Except as provided in
subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers
exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts,
the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all
civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases
under title 11.
[ Nothing in
]
[<-Struck out] Except with respect to a case
under chapter 15 of title 11, nothing in this section prevents a district
court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State
courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular
proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under
title 11.* * * * * * *
[ made under this subsection
]
[<-Struck out] made under subsection (c)
(other than a decision not to abstain in a proceeding described in subsection
(c)(2)) is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals under
section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 of this title or by the Supreme Court of the
United States under section 1254 of this title. [Struck
out->][ This subsection
]
[<-Struck out] Subsection (c) and this
subsection shall not be construed to limit the applicability of the stay
provided for by section 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section
applies to an action affecting the property of the estate in bankruptcy.
[ (e) The district court in which
a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the
commencement of such case, and of property of the estate.
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ $5,000,
]
[<-Struck out] $15,000, or a debt (excluding a
consumer debt) against a noninsider of less than $10,000, only in the
district court for the district in which the defendant resides.
[ Sec. 1410. Venue of cases
ancillary to foreign proceedings ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (a) A case under section 304 of
title 11 to enjoin the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding
in a State or Federal court, or the enforcement of a judgment, may be
commenced only in the district court for the district where the State or
Federal court sits in which is pending the action or proceeding against which
the injunction is sought. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (b) A case under section 304 of
title 11 to enjoin the enforcement of a lien against a property, or to require
the turnover of property of an estate, may be commenced only in the district
court for the district in which such property is found.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (c) A case under section 304
of title 11, other than a case specified in subsection (a) or (b) of this
section, may be commenced only in the district court for the district in
which is located the principal place of business in the United States, or
the principal assets in the United States, of the estate that is the subject
of such case. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ Notwithstanding section 1915
of this title, the ]
[<-Struck out] The
parties commencing a case under title 11 shall pay to the clerk of the
district court or the clerk of the bankruptcy court, if one has been certified
pursuant to section 156(b) of this title, the following filing fees:
[ (1) For a case commenced under
chapter 7 or 13 of title 11, $155. ]
[<-Struck
out]
* * * * * * *
[ $800 ]
[<-Struck
out] $1000.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
-
[ pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
1930(b) and 33.87 percent of the fees hereafter collected under 28 U.S.C.
section 1930(a)(1) and 25 percent of the fees hererafter collected under 28
U.S.C. section 1930(a)(3) shall be deposited as offsetting receipts to the
fund established under 28 U.S.C. section 1931
]
[<-Struck out] under section 1930(b) of title
28, United States Code, 31.25 of the fees collected under section
1930(a)(1)(A) of that title, 30.00 percent of the fees collected under section
1930(a)(1)(B) of that title, and 25 percent of the fees collected under
section 1930(a)(3) of that title shall be deposited as offsetting receipts to
the fund established under section 1931 of that title and shall remain
available to the Judiciary until expended to reimburse any appropriation for
the amount paid out of such appropriation for expenses of the Courts of
Appeals, District Courts, and other Judicial Services and the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts. The Judicial Conference shall report to
the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the
Senate on a quarterly basis beginning on the first day of each fiscal year
regarding the sums deposited in said fund.* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ paragraph (10)
]
[<-Struck out] paragraphs (9) and
(10) of this subsection and notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act (other than subsection (d)(9) of this section and section 13(e)),
any other Federal law, or the law of any State, no person shall be stayed
or prohibited from exercising--
[ to cause the
termination or liquidation ]
[<-Struck out]
such person has to cause the termination, liquidation, or
acceleration of any qualified financial contract with an insured
depository institution which arises upon the appointment of the
Corporation as receiver for such institution at any time after such
appointment;
[ (ii) any right under any
security arrangement relating to any contract or agreement described in
clause (i); or ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ subsection--
]
[<-Struck out] subsection, the following
definitions shall apply:
[ (ii) SECURITIES CONTRACT-
The term `securities contract'-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (I) has the meaning
given to such term in section 741 of title 11, United States Code,
except that the term `security' (as used in such section) shall be
deemed to include any mortgage loan, any mortgage-related security (as
defined in section 3(a)(41) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934),
and any interest in any mortgage loan or mortgage-related security;
and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (II) does not include
any participation in a commercial mortgage loan unless the Corporation
determines by regulation, resolution, or order to include any such
participation within the meaning of such term.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (iii) COMMODITY CONTRACT-
The term `commodity contract' has the meaning given to such term in
section 761 of title 11, United States Code.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (iv) FORWARD CONTRACT- The
term `forward contract' has the meaning given to such term in section
101 of title 11, United States Code.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (v) REPURCHASE AGREEMENT-
The term `repurchase agreement'-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (I) has the meaning
given to such term in section 101 of title 11, the United States Code,
except that the items (as described in such section) which may be
subject to any such agreement shall be deemed to include
mortgage-related securities (as such term is defined in section
3(a)(41) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), any mortgage loan,
and any interest in any mortgage loan; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (II) does not include
any participation in a commercial mortgage loan unless the Corporation
determines by regulation, resolution, or order to include any such
participation within the meaning of such term.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (vi) SWAP AGREEMENT- The
term `swap agreement'-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (I) means any agreement,
including the terms and conditions incorporated by reference in any
such agreement, which is a rate swap agreement, basis swap, commodity
swap, forward rate agreement, interest rate future, interest rate
option purchased, forward foreign exchange agreement, rate cap
agreement, rate floor agreement, rate collar agreement, currency swap
agreement, cross-currency rate swap agreement, currency future, or
currency option purchased or any other similar agreement, and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (II) includes any
combination of such agreements and any option to enter into any such
agreement. ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (vii) TREATMENT OF MASTER
AGREEMENT AS 1 SWAP AGREEMENT- Any master agreement for any agreements
described in clause (vi)(I) together with all supplements to such master
agreement shall be treated as 1 swap agreement.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (viii) TRANSFER- The term
`transfer' has the meaning given to such term in section 101 of title
11, United States Code. ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ other than paragraph (12) of this
subsection, subsection (d)(9) ]
[<-Struck out]
other than subsections (d)(9) and (e)(10) of this section, and
section 13(e) of this Act), any other Federal law, or the law of any
State, no person shall be stayed or prohibited from exercising--
[ (ii) any right under any
security arrangement relating to such qualified financial contracts; or
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (9) TRANSFER OF QUALIFIED
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS- In making any transfer of assets or liabilities of a
depository institution in default which includes any qualified financial
contract, the conservator or receiver for such depository institution shall
either-- ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) transfer to 1 depository
institution (other than a depository institution in default)--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (i) all qualified
financial contracts between-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (I) any person or any
affiliate of such person; and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (II) the depository
institution in default; ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (ii) all claims of such
person or any affiliate of such person against such depository
institution under any such contract (other than any claim which, under
the terms of any such contract, is subordinated to the claims of general
unsecured creditors of such institution);
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (iii) all claims of such
depository institution against such person or any affiliate of such
person under any such contract; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (iv) all property securing
any claim described in clause (ii) or (iii) under any such contract; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) transfer none of the
financial contracts, claims, or property referred to in subparagraph (A)
(with respect to such person and any affiliate of such person).
]
[<-Struck out]
[ the conservator or receiver
shall use such conservator's or receiver's best efforts to notify any
person who is a party to any such contract of such transfer by 12:00, noon
(local time) on the business day following such transfer.
]
[<-Struck out] the conservator or receiver
shall notify any person who is a party to any such contract of such
transfer by 5:00 p.m. (eastern time) on the business day following the
date of the appointment of the receiver in the case of a receivership, or
the business day following such transfer in the case of a
conservatorship.
[ (B)
]
[<-Struck out] (D) BUSINESS DAY
DEFINED- For purposes of this paragraph, the term `business day' means any
day other than any Saturday, Sunday, or any day on which either the New
York Stock Exchange or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is
closed.
[ (11)
]
[<-Struck out] (12) CERTAIN SECURITY
INTERESTS NOT AVOIDABLE- No provision of this subsection shall be construed
as permitting the avoidance of any legally enforceable or perfected security
interest in any of the assets of any depository institution except where
such an interest is taken in contemplation of the institution's insolvency
or with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the institution or the
creditors of such institution.
[ (12)
]
[<-Struck out] (13) AUTHORITY TO
ENFORCE CONTRACTS-
* * * * * * *
[ (13)
]
[<-Struck out] (14) EXCEPTION FOR
FEDERAL RESERVE AND FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANKS- No provision of this subsection
shall apply with respect to--
* * * * * * *
[ (14)
]
[<-Struck out] (15) SELLING CREDIT CARD
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE-
* * * * * * *
[ (15)
]
[<-Struck out] (16) CERTAIN CREDIT CARD
CUSTOMER LISTS PROTECTED-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (2) PUBLIC DEPOSITS- An
agreement to provide for the lawful collateralization of deposits of a
Federal, State, or local governmental entity or of any depositor referred to
in section 11(a)(2) shall not be deemed to be invalid pursuant to paragraph
(1)(B) solely because such agreement was not executed contemporaneously with
the acquisition of the collateral or with any changes in the collateral made
in accordance with such agreement. ]
[<-Struck
out]
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ paragraph (12)
]
[<-Struck out] paragraphs (9) and
(10) of this subsection and notwithstanding any other provision of
this Act (other than subsection (b)(9) of this section and section
208(a)(3)), any other Federal law, or the law of any State, no person
shall be stayed or prohibited from exercising--
[ to cause the
termination or liquidation ]
[<-Struck out]
such person has to cause the termination, liquidation, or
acceleration of any qualified financial contract with an insured
credit union which arises upon the appointment of the Board as
liquidating agent for such credit union at any time after such
appointment;
[ (ii) any right under any
security arrangement relating to any contract or agreement described in
clause (i); or ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ subsection--
]
[<-Struck out] subsection, the following
definitions shall apply:
[ (ii) SECURITIES CONTRACT-
The term `securities contract'-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (I) has the meaning
given to such term in section 741 of title 11, United States Code,
except that the term `security' (as used in such section) shall be
deemed to include any mortgage loan, any mortgage-related security (as
defined in section 3(a)(41) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and any interest in any mortgage loan or mortgage-related security;
and ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (II) does not include
any participation in a commercial mortgage loan unless the Board
determines by regulation, resolution, or order to include any such
participation within the meaning of such term.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (iii) FORWARD CONTRACT-
The term `forward contract' has the meaning given to such term in
section 101 of title 11, United States Code.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (iv) REPURCHASE AGREEMENT-
The term `repurchase agreement'-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (I) has the meaning
given to such term in section 101 of title 11, the United States Code,
except that the items (as described in such section) which may be
subject to any such agreement shall be deemed to include
mortgage-related securities (as such term is defined in section
3(a)(41) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, any mortgage loan,
and any interest in any mortgage loan; and
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (II) does not include
any participation in a commercial mortgage loan unless the Board
determines by regulation, resolution, or order to include any such
participation within the meaning of such term.
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (v) TRANSFER- The term
`transfer' has the meaning given to such term in section 101 of title
11, United States Code. ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ other than paragraph (12) of this
subsection, subsection (b)(9) ]
[<-Struck out]
other than subsections (b)(9) and (c)(10) of this section, and
section 208(a)(3) of this Act), any other Federal law, or the law of any
State, no person shall be stayed or prohibited from exercising--
[ (ii) any right under any
security arrangement relating to such qualified financial contracts; or
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (9) TRANSFER OF QUALIFIED
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS- In making any transfer of assets or liabilities of a
credit union in default which includes any qualified financial contract, the
conservator or liquidating agent for such credit union shall either--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (A) transfer to 1 credit
union (other than a credit union in default)--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (i) all qualified
financial contracts between-- ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (I) any person or any
affiliate of such person; and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (II) the credit union in
default; ]
[<-Struck out]
[ (ii) all claims of such
person or any affiliate of such person against such credit union under
any such contract (other than any claim which, under the terms of any
such contract, is subordinated to the claims of general unsecured
creditors of such credit union); ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (iii) all claims of such
credit union against such person or any affiliate of such person under
any such contract; and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (iv) all property securing
any claim described in clause (ii) or (iii) under any such contract; or
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (B) transfer none of the
financial contracts, claims, or property referred to in subparagraph (A)
(with respect to such person and any affiliate of such person).
]
[<-Struck out]
[ the conservator or
liquidating agent shall use such conservator's or liquidating agent's best
efforts to notify any person who is a party to any such contract of such
transfer by 12:00, noon (local time), on the business day following such
transfer. ]
[<-Struck out] the conservator
or liquidating agent shall notify any person who is a party to any such
contract of such transfer by 5:00 p.m. (eastern time) on the business day
following the date of the appointment of the liquidating agent in the case
of a liquidation, or the business day following such transfer in the case
of a conservatorship.
[ (B)
]
[<-Struck out] (D) BUSINESS DAY
DEFINED- For purposes of this paragraph, the term `business day' means any
day other than any Saturday, Sunday, or any day on which either the New
York Stock Exchange or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is
closed.
[ (11)
]
[<-Struck out] (12) CERTAIN SECURITY
INTERESTS NOT AVOIDABLE- No provision of this subsection shall be construed
as permitting the avoidance of any legally enforceable or perfected security
interest in any of the assets of any credit union except where such an
interest is taken in contemplation of the credit union's insolvency or with
the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the credit union or the creditors of
such credit union.
[ (12)
]
[<-Struck out] (13) AUTHORITY TO
ENFORCE CONTRACTS-
* * * * * * *
[ (13)
]
[<-Struck out] (14) EXCEPTION FOR
FEDERAL RESERVE AND FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANKS- No provision of this subsection
shall apply with respect to--
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (B) a branch or agency as
defined in section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978;
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (C)
]
[<-Struck out] (D) a corporation
chartered under section 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act; or
[ (D)
]
[<-Struck out] (E) a corporation
having an agreement or undertaking with the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System under section 25 of the Federal Reserve
Act.* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ (i) means a contract or
agreement between 2 or more financial institutions or members, that--
]
[<-Struck out]
[ (I) is governed by the
laws of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision of
any State, and ]
[<-Struck
out]
[ (II) provides for
netting present or future payment obligations or payment entitlements
(including liquidation or close-out values relating to the obligations
or entitlements) among the parties to the agreement; and
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (a) GENERAL RULE-
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the covered contractual payment
obligations and the covered contractual payment entitlements between any 2
financial institutions shall be netted in accordance with, and subject to the
conditions of, the terms of any applicable netting contract.
]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
[ (a) GENERAL NETTING RULE-
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the covered contractual payment
obligations and covered contractual payment entitlements of a member of a
clearing organization to and from all other members of a clearing organization
shall be netted in accordance with and subject to the conditions of any
applicable netting contract. ]
[<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ 407
]
[<-Struck out] 407A. NATIONAL
EMERGENCIES.
* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
[ 507(a)(1)
]
[<-Struck out] 507(a)(2) of title 11 of
the United States Code.* * * * * * *
-
* * * * * * *
[ (f) REPEAL OF CHAPTER 12 OF
TITLE 11- Chapter 12 of title 11 of the United States Code is repealed on
October 1, 1998. All cases commenced or pending under chapter 12 of title 11,
United States Code, and all matters and proceedings in or relating to such
cases, shall be conducted and determined under such chapter as if such chapter
had not been repealed. The substantive rights of parties in connection with
such cases, matters, and proceedings shall continue to be governed under the
laws applicable to such cases, matters, and proceedings as if such chapter had
not been repealed. ]
[<-Struck out]-
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
* * * * * * *
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House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
--Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Committee will be in order, and a working quorum is present.
Pursuant to notice, I now call up the bill Senate 256, the `Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,' for purposes of markup and move its favorable recommendation to the House. Without objection, the bill will be considered as read and open for amendment at any point.
[The bill, S. 256, the `Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,' is not reprinted here but can be accessed at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--cong--bills&docid=f:s256rfh.txt.pdf:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the Chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes to explain the bill.
Today we consider a bill with an extensive history before this Committee and the Congress. S. 256, the `Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005' represents the culmination of nearly 8 years of intense and detailed consideration by this Committee. Over the course of the last four Congresses, this legislation has benefitted immensely from an exhaustive hearing and amendment process as well as meaningful bipartisan and bicameral negotiations.
Last week, the Senate passed this legislation by a vote of 74 to 25, marking the fifth time that body has registered its overwhelming support for bankruptcy reform legislation in the last four Congresses. The House has also repeatedly expressed its overwhelming support. To date, the House has passed bankruptcy reform measures on eight occasions since the 105th Congress. This legislation reflects the product of intensive process before this Committee. Over the past four Congresses, the Judiciary Committee and the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law have held 18 hearings on the need for bankruptcy reform, 11 of which were devoted specifically to predecessors of S. 256. In addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee has held 11 hearings on bankruptcy reform, including a hearing held last month.
During the 106th Congress, this Committee entertained 59 amendments over the course of a 5-day markup on H.R. 833, which included 29 recorded votes. Of these amendments, 27 were agreed to. On the floor, 11 more amendments were considered. After passage on the House floor during the 106th Congress, conferees spent nearly 7 months engaged in an informal conference to reconcile differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions of bankruptcy reform legislation. During the 107th Congress, this Committee considered an additional 18 amendments during the course of its markup on S. 256 predecessor, and five more amendments were considered on the House floor.
After House passage of bankruptcy reform legislation in the 107th Congress, conferees formally met on three occasions and ultimately agreed, after an 11-month period of negotiation, to a bipartisan conference report. Finally, during the last Congress, the Judiciary Committee entertained nine amendments to bankruptcy legislation, and the House considered five more.
It's no secret that I will strongly encourage Members of this Committee to vigorously oppose all amendments to S. 256 as passed by the Senate based on this extensive record. The reasons are obvious. As the record makes clear, this legislation is the product of exhaustive consideration by the Congress. It is a well-crafted package of extensive bipartisan and bicameral negotiation and compromise.
As introduced, the bill is substantively identical to legislation that passed the House by an overwhelming vote margin, not on one but on two occasions in the last Congress. Although the Senate-passed bill we consider today includes a series of amendments, they all received bipartisan support and many were agreed to by unanimous consent.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the need for bankruptcy reform is long overdue and crucial to our Nation's economy and the well-being of our citizens. Every day that goes by without these reforms, more abuse and fraud goes undetected. Every abusive bankruptcy filing adversely affects hard-working Americans in the form of higher interest rates and increased cost of goods and services. America's economy should not suffer any longer from the billions of dollars of losses associated with profligate and abusive bankruptcy filings. We need to close the so-called mansion loophole now. We need to ensure that deadbeat parents can no longer use bankruptcy to shed their child and spousal support obligations. We need to make Chapter 12, a specialized form of bankruptcy relief for family farmers, a permanent component of the Bankruptcy Code and need to extend that relief to family fishermen. And we need to enact important administrative reforms by direct appeals, streamlined reorganization procedures, and additional bankruptcy judges that will reduce unnecessary burdens upon the current system by those who must administer and use it.
In short, we need to restore a measure of personal responsibility and accountability to the bankruptcy system, and S. 256 advances this crucial goal. I will, accordingly, urge my colleagues to report this bill without amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time and recognize the gentleman from Michigan for 5 minutes.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members. This is the first time I've heard us urge that amendments be rejected before they've even been named, identified, or offered. So I suppose this is a very serious effort as the majority continues their assault on the American consumer. Last month, and starting from this Committee, we passed into law special interest class legislation--class action legislation which slams the door on court statehouses for millions of individuals harmed by fraud, deception, civil rights, and labor abuses.
Now, today we take up the bankruptcy bill which massively tilts the playing field in favor of credit card companies and against ordinary workers and families.
Last year, nearly 1.5 million ordinary working individuals filed for bankruptcy. Their average income was less than $25,000, and the principal causes for their filings were layoffs and medical bills. In my judgment, it would be a grave mistake to punish these individuals while rewarding credit card companies and business lobbyists at a time when corporate greed is being reported regularly and has already destroyed or harmed the lives of millions of American workers.
To those who think the bill is a fair compromise that only punishes wealthy debtors, then check on how this bill gives creditors massive new rights to bring threatening motions against low-income debtors, how the bill permits credit card companies to reclaim common household goods, if anybody would want them, of little value to anybody but themselves but very important to the debtor's family.
Check in this legislation we are considering how it makes next to impossible for people below the poverty line to keep their house or their car in bankruptcy. For those who might think that the bill protects alimony and child support problems in families, look and see if they find where the bill, as I have found, creates major new categories of non-dischargeable debt that compete directly against the collection of child support and alimony payments; whether they're--we're aware of the fact the bill allows landlords to evict even battered women without bankruptcy court approval, even if the eviction poses a threat to the woman's physical well-being.
If you think the bill cracks down on creditor abuse, then look again because the bill does absolutely nothing to discourage abusive, underage lending, nothing to discourage reckless lending to the developmentally disabled, nothing to regulate the price of so-called sub-prime lending to persons with no means or little ability to repay their debt, and nothing to crack down on unscrupulous payday lenders that prey on the members of our Armed Forces.
The bill--does the bill fix the problems of homestead exemption abuse? Well, look again, because there we don't repeal or even cap homestead--the homestead exemption. The bill does nothing to prevent the very worst abuses of the Bankruptcy Code, for example, avoiding claims for bilking seniors out of billions of dollars of their life savings or denying workers their hard-earned pension payments. It ignores in this legislation, after all these years, the asset trust loophole whereby high-income individuals stash away millions of dollars in special trusts to avoid their debts in bankruptcy as we go after ordinary workers who may have been forced into bankruptcy by medical bills.
I urge every Member of this Committee to reconsider the real-life consequences of what we're doing in one of the worst consumer bills I have ever had the sorrow to have to speak against in this Committee. This is a bad bill. The time has come that we stop writing these bills for credit card companies and that these businesses that use their political muscle must be stopped. Here's a great place to do it today.
I thank the Chairman.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentleman has expired. Without objection, all Members may insert opening statements in the record at this point.
Are there amendments?
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CANNON. If I could enter into colloquy with the Chairman, I am pleased that we are reporting this legislation today, but I would note that the bankruptcy judgeship numbers in the Senate bill are outdated and do not reflect the current numbers submitted by the Judicial Conference this year. Additional judgeships are sorely needed in a number of districts across the country, including in my State of Utah. I am wondering, Mr. Chairman, if we can deal with this issue in some manner, either a technical bill or a free-standing bill, and if the Chairman will commit to doing that in the near future.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. CANNON. Certainly.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. It is the hope of the Chairman that additional judgeships and not just bankruptcy judges can be dealt with later on this year in response to an updated Judicial Conference recommendation where the judgeships are needed, and this includes article III judges as well.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there amendments?
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. CONYERS. I have an amendment.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Michigan. The clerk will report the amendment.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256 offered by Mr. Conyers, page 687, after line 18, insert the following: `(and make such technical and conforming change as may be appropriate'----
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the amendment be considered as read.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.
[The amendment follows:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much.
Ladies and gentlemen of the Committee, this is going to be the amendment that just checks where we all are and what the temperature is in the room. This is an amendment in support of our military personnel to crack down on unscrupulous payday lenders that circle our military bases, who target members of our armed services with high interest rate loans. It would deny these companies a claim in bankruptcy where they make a loan secured by a military paycheck, pension, or disability payment if the annual interest rate and fees exceed 36 percent a year, a number that I don't think anybody in this room would even think twice about signing up for.
This is happening to our military personnel as we meet today. The military service constitutes a significant and real hardship for soldiers and their families that are called into action. We have had 16,000 active-duty members of the military who've had to file for bankruptcy relief over a 12-month period. The Pentagon found that 4 years ago nearly a third of all military families reported a drop in income, obviously, when a spouse was deployed. For members of the National Guard and Reserve, the rate was even higher. More than 40 percent reported lost income when a provider--a spouse provider was deployed to active duty.
If you need another reason, it is this: The greedy payday lenders are directly and aggressively targeting our Nation's armed services. The National Consumer Law Center report found that scores of consumer-abusing businesses directly target the active-duty military men and women daily. These payday lenders are the loan sharks of the 21st century that offer small, short-term loans at interest rates that are incredible. They use deceptive names, like `Force One Lending,' `Armed Forces Loans.' They go after military members because they know they have a steady source of income, small as it is, and many of these military members are young, have family obligations, and are often strapped for cash and are easy to find.
During a time of war, it's imperative that we go to the extra mile to protect the men and women of our armed forces. These individuals face not only the challenge of protecting our country, but the difficulty of managing their finances when they are called to service. When the Soldier and Sailors Relief Act can be used to delay tax payments, suspend legal proceedings, and reduce interest payments, none of the relief is automatic. Moreover, these protections only apply if the service member can establish that he or she has not been materially affected, quote-unquote, by being called to duty and ends as soon as the duty ends. Unlike the bankruptcy laws, the Relief Act buys some time, but not forgiveness.
The last thing we should be doing is putting our military personnel into this kind of loan shark debacle, and I am urging the Members that if you want to disregard one of the Chairman's requests that you vote down all amendments, that this be the one amendment that you do support. And I return my time.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, on the amendment? Mr. Chairman?
Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first express----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you. Let me first of all express my concern for the issue raised by the gentleman from Michigan, which is a profoundly important issue. I've been surprised around the country at the proliferation of these check-cashing, lending institutions which I think are a terrible problem, and I would hope that the gentleman would recognize that I and all the Members of this full Committee recognize the problem that our servicemen have. It is a difficult problem, a complex problem. We deal with it here in Congress on many different levels. For instance, we've dealt with the pay issue with legislation here. In the past we have amended recently the servicemen--Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, and that provides for a cap on interest rates at 6 percent on debts incurred prior to a person's active entry into military service and sets forth procedures for requesting a reduction and clarifies how that works.
So we as a Congress, as a body, I don't think there's any question but that left and right, Republicans and Democrats, are all concerned about military and the burdens that they have as they serve our country. And so I want to first of all express my agreement with Mr. Conyers and about his expression of concern.
But this is a complex issue, and as we deal with bankruptcy, I think we just need to be thoughtful and careful about how we deal with it. This amendment was included in Mr. Durbin's amendment in the Senate, and that was defeated 38 to 58, not because people have a problem with military, but because of the complexity of the bill that we're dealing with today. The Sessions amendment, which was submitted in lieu of the Durbin amendment, passed by 63 to 32 on the other side. So we have dealt with the issue, I think, to some degree. But in this complex environment, I just think it's important that we recognize that we need to get a bill passed today. And I suspect in the end much of this debate is going to be--and Mr. Conyers himself has pointed out that the issue here is, you know, are we going to do something with this bill, and the answer is America needs a bill, and we need a bill that we can get signed by the President, which means I think there ought to be a fairly high threshold before we make changes.
There are protections in the current bill. It has a needs-based test which includes numerous safe harbors and exceptions for special circumstances. As amended, the special circumstances exception specifically mentions a debtor who is subject to a call or order to active duty in the armed services. As amended, the needs-based test has a special exception just for debtors who are disabled veterans if the indebtedness occurred primarily during a period when the debtor was on active duty or performing a homeland defense activity.
As amended, the bill specifies that the absolute safe harbor from all types of dismissal motions under section 707(b) applies to a veteran, and, as amended, the bill excuses a debtor if he or she is on active military duty in a military combat zone from the mandatory credit counseling and financial management training requirements.
I think we have done a number of things along this line. I think the bill is good. We can't make--we can't legislate a perfect bill that is going to deal with all the circumstances of everybody in America.
Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentleman, my friend, yield for a moment?
Mr. CANNON. I would be pleased to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. CONYERS. First of all, the Durbin bill--the Durbin amendment had lots of other things surrounded with it. That's why I took it out. I took out the military exemption.
Number two, tell me what it is you don't like about exempting military people unequivocally, not playing around, from bankruptcy from these loan sharks?
Mr. CANNON. Well, reclaiming my time, the gentleman has expressed the issue with great clarity. I appreciate that. And the answer is that all people who deal with debt have to have some responsibility. And a blanket exemption for any group, including a group as large as the military, I think is problematic. So what we need to do is deal with the possibilities for assisting and protecting them from extreme activities, but not removing any kind of personal responsibility from their lives which, as I understand your amendment, it would do.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Ms. WATERS. On the amendment?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentleman yield back?
Mr. CANNON. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from California.
Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am so pleased and so happy about John Conyers' amendment. This is a subject that I've spent an awful lot of time on, and it's a subject that needs to be addressed by the Congress of the United States.
I am shocked that the gentleman from Utah could even come up with any excuses about why we can't protect the military from these scavengers who surround our military bases and who place----
Mr. CANNON. Would the gentlelady yield?
Ms. WATERS. No, I will not. Who place up neon signs about easy money, green money, come and get it as fast as you can. They have some of the most outrageous advertisements where they solicit our military. They have set them up as sitting ducks all over America at these military bases. They are paying between 400 and 1,000 percent interest when you calculate it on a yearly basis. For those people who wave the red, white, and blue flag and talk about how much they love America, how much they care about our military, how much they want to be of assistance to our military families, and yet cannot take this bill, this bankruptcy legislation, which is--actually should be named the `Credit Card Company Protection Act of 2005,' and do something for our military is just shameful. It is outright shameful.
And I want every Member of this Committee and everybody that is looking or listening to pay attention today to what is going on. We have a very simple amendment by John Conyers that would deal with the fact that military families are ladened with debt from these scavengers, many of whom are supporters of too many Members of Congress with their big military--with their big contributions, and who seem to have some measure of protection from the Members of Congress who won't go after them. Whether it is this Committee or the Financial Services Committee, for those people who will not stand up for our military against these scavengers, it needs to be noted everywhere, and the press needs to pay an awful lot of attention to this, because this is a way by which we could give them some kind of help. These are unsuspecting families.
Do you know that we are recruiting young people who are 19 and 20 and 21 years old who have never managed any money, who have never had any debt, who have never had any credit? And the first thing that happens to them, they go into the military, some at 21 years old, with a wife and maybe two children, find out that the military pay does not carry them to the end of the month, and there the scavengers are waiting for them with bait. And they lend them money, and they have to sign a personal check. And if they don't come back within 2 weeks and pay that $200 or $300, then they threaten them with the personal check that they're going to put them in jail if they don't pay the money.
And then they flip the loan if they can't pay it, and they pile on more interest to it, and that's where you get this 400 to 1,000 percent interest that piles up for these military people.
Unfortunately, my friend on the opposite side of the aisle from Utah has no excuse, and that which he pointed to, to try and make you believe that there is some protection for the military is not protection. There's nothing in this bill, unless we adopt John Conyers' amendment, that would protect these poor military families from these scavengers and these people who are gouging them for the meager pay that they get to take care of their families. And to tell you the truth, whenever someone who votes against this amendment stands up and talks about how much they love the military, I'm going to call them out on it, and I'm going to call them out on the fact that they had an opportunity here today to do just a little something for these military families.
These payday loan scavengers are the worst.
Mr. CANNON. Would the gentle----
Ms. WATERS. No, I will not yield----
Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentlelady yield?
Ms. WATERS. No, I will not yield. I will yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. CONYERS. I just want to make it clear what you said about what's in the bill helping military people get a break in bankruptcy. It applies only to the disabled military, only, and nobody else. So there is no protection in----
Ms. WATERS. On my own time, yes, Mr. Leader, I know. That's why I wanted to make it clear, because the gentleman from Utah tried to confuse the public and make them think that somehow it was already covered.
Now, anybody who says it's too complicated, the bill, to cover them----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of----
Ms. WATERS- does not make good sense.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER- the gentlewoman has expired.
Ms. WATERS. And so I would ask everybody to please vote----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Who seeks recognition?
Ms. WATERS- for this amendment?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ISSA. And I do rise--I won't stand, but I do rise in opposition to this amendment. And if the gentlelady will take note, I am a veteran. My brother is a disabled veteran. And I have 40,000 Marines, more than half of whom are serving in Iraq right now. And looking at this piece--this amendment, I have serious reservations on its merit. And I would like to speak to that. This fairly narrow piece of legislation looks good until you see that it is not talking about interest. It is talking about interest and fees. With all due respect to the gentlelady's example, if you were to borrow $200 for 2 weeks and they were simply to charge you $2 as a fee as part of writing up the paperwork, which is not an insignificant thing, that's 26 percent all by itself.
The fact is that when you look at 36 percent--I have a problem with usury-type interest, but when you write a piece of legislation and you include fees on an extremely short-term loan--because if this were a 1-week loan on $200, and they said, well, you know, I'll give you $198 today for your $200 promissory note, well, that's 52 percent. And that's the practical reality that on small loans for short periods of time, a very small fee, a reasonable fee, particularly considering the potential risk, can, in fact, end up being in excess of what seems to be an extraordinarily high number.
I would love to deal with this piece of legislation--or this amendment in another piece of legislation, and I'd love to deal with it in a way in which it would clearly still allow the small loans, if appropriate, to go to somebody without including the fee language which makes it essentially----
Mr. CONYERS. Would my friend----
Mr. ISSA- impossible to make small loans----
Mr. CONYERS- from California yield for one question.
Mr. ISSA. I certainly would yield to----
Mr. CONYERS. And I thank you. Now, look, let's be frank here. Let's take the fee out of the amendment that I offered. Would you support it then?
Mr. ISSA. I look forward to----
Mr. CONYERS. Would you support it then?
Mr. ISSA. Reclaiming my time, I look forward to this type of reform being something that we work on in a comprehensive way. I would be more than happy to work with the gentleman to author a separate piece of legislation--I suspect the Chairman would help support it--that would look at these issues very specifically, as I said, without the fee or with some sort of a reasonable thing on the fee, and I think that would be wonderful.
Mr. CANNON. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. ISSA. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you. I suspect that the place to deal with this would be the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, and I think it's highly appropriate to deal with it in that regard.
If I might take another moment of the gentleman's time?
Mr. ISSA. Please.
Mr. CANNON. I appreciate the fact that Ms. Waters referred to me as `a friend' because I think that she is. We've gained a significant amount of respect for each other, and I appreciate that. I think that the debate cast in harsh terms like `shame' is unfortunate because this is not a matter of shame. This is a matter of policy, and there may be a difference of opinion about how policy affects the world. But I think, Mr. Issa, what you're suggesting is that there needs to be ways for people to get credit who need credit. And the last thing we want to do on either side of the aisle is shove people out of the market either because the costs are too high or because the risks are so great that no one will take the cost. And so it's, I believe, a much more complicated issue, as you've able expressed, Mr. Issa, than it is portrayed to be at this point.
Let me just point out that 19-year-olds who enter the military, and older people, may be young, may be inexperienced, but they're not dumb. And they have the ability to make decisions. And if we try and insulate them from the effects of the decisions, they will make bad decisions for their whole lives. I've trained my kids in their credit card usage--very painfully, I might point out, mostly for them. But if they don't have some pain in their lives over these issues, they don't learn.
And I have enormous respect for the military, enormous respect for the young people who join the military. They come from all kinds of backgrounds and from all kinds of decision perspectives. And because of that, I think that we owe it to them to not include this----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. CANNON- amendment. I would request that the Committee vote against the amendment.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time belongs to the gentleman from California.
Mr. ISSA. Reclaiming my time, and in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with the gentleman from Michigan on these types of issues in the days to come, and will be voting against the amendment, urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment because this is not the right place, right time. But I would like us all to agree to work on this in the future, and I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.
Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I very much urge support for the gentleman's amendment. It illustrates just one of the imbalances in this bill, which is simply a collection of 60 or 70 different ways to stick one's hands into the pockets of low- and middle-income people in a time of distress and take the money out and give it to the big banks and credit card companies.
One of the things this bill does in many different ways it to make a discharge in bankruptcy more elusive. Making discharge in bankruptcy more elusive will make it harder for consumers to get a fresh start and continue to make consumer purchases, which is one of the mainsprings of our economy. Household debt has reached record levels. With that come more bankruptcies, but no serious economist would argue that a precipitous drop in consumer spending would help our economy.
Bankruptcy is a tradeoff. The safety net encourages risk taking in business, allows distressed families to remain in the economy, and maintains demand for products businesses must sell to survive. Bankruptcy doesn't cause default any more than a hospital causes people to be sick.
We have been told as a justification for this bill that bankruptcy is a free ride. The facts are the contrary. A debtor in Chapter 7 must give up all non-exempt assets in order to obtain a discharge. Secured debts must be paid, or the property is subject to foreclosure. The bankruptcy remains on the debtor's record for 10 years, and the debtor may not refile for 6 years. It is harder to get a job, an apartment, or a loan. As a majority witness who had been a debtor told the Committee a few years ago, had she known the consequences of filing, she might not have done so.
No one believes that people should avoid paying their debts if they can afford to do so. The question is, rather, does this bill make sense? Members should ask themselves why the overwhelming majority of bankruptcy professionals, scholars, trustees, creditor lawyers, corporation lawyers, and judges are appalled with this bill. There is a terrible disconnect between Congress and the people who actually have to make the system function. Regardless of their role or interest, they almost universally oppose this bill. Yet here in Congress, the demands of the special interests who have a stake in some provision in this bill are generally viewed as a great idea that requires no further consideration.
Over the years, we have heard from, among other people, Ken Klee, one of the leading bankruptcy scholars and business bankruptcy lawyers in the country, former Republican bankruptcy counsel to this Committee. He has drafted Supreme Court briefs signed by Members of this House, and he strongly opposed the bill.
We have heard from consumer rights organizations, women's groups, child advocacy groups, unions, civil rights groups, and every national bankruptcy organization in the country that this bill will hurt consumers, businesses, families, children, employees, minorities, and the economy. It will raise costs to the system and disrupt the efficient management of bankruptcy proceedings. This bill would turn the Government into a debt collector for private industry.
Let me remind you what George Wallace, a representative of the Creditors Coalition, told this Committee a few years ago. I asked him if he was familiar with the many ways under current law that a creditor could pursue his rights in bankruptcy, including obtaining documents, examining the debtor under oath, and objecting to a discharge of debts. He said, and I quote, `I have done these things, and they take a fair amount of time, and I bill my clients for them. They're expensive.'
I asked him, `Why should the Government spend money to do the job that creditors should be doing?' He responded, `Because it is a Government program. It is not the job of the creditor.'
That's what this bill is--a Government program for big banks who don't want to spend their own money to collect their own debts, the debts that they freely entered into. Talk about welfare cheats.
Mr. Chairman, we know, unfortunately, this bill is going to pass. It's going to pass with a good number of votes. Someone asked me the other day why he should vote against this bill despite the manifold demerits in the bill, when it was clear it was going to pass anyway. And I think that the answer is that when this bill really takes hold, 2, 3, 4 years down the road, when middle-income people, low-income people, our constituents, start finding out it's impossible to get a fresh start, they cannot get out from under their credit card debts, they're paying higher and higher interest rates, more and more money, it costs more money to file, there are more and more coercive instruments on the part of the creditor's lawyers to force debtors to reaffirm debts and to surrender their rights, and the bankruptcy system becomes less and less usable for people, they're going to ask, `Who the heck did this?' And I hope that Members of Congress--that too many Members of Congress won't have to be ashamed in front of their constituents, as I am sure they will.
So I urge adoption of this amendment and defeat of this bill because this is a day of shame, and when we pass it on the floor, it will be a day of worse shame that will probably go down in history as one of the worst days in the history of the Congress in this century.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to participate in the legislative process. And I do not say this with reflection on the responsibility that we have inasmuch as the Senate has moved forward on this legislation. But I will say the speed at which we're now addressing this particular legislation, the speed in which it will find its way to the floor of the House, and the sense that I am getting from my colleagues on the other side of the aisle--and might I welcome two new Democrats who I see are sitting on this side. It gives us a good number. Thank you. Mr. Inglis, I am delighted, my Chairman. We welcome you and look forward to you supporting our amendments. But it gives me great hope and inspiration.
But as I look at the speed in which we move to the floor of the House--I understand we might be on the floor as early as the beginning of April--might I simply say that the fix is in, that this is a prime example of class warfare, because this bill is wrapped with special interests. It clearly does not evidence thoughtfulness as it relates to the crux of the need for helping Americans save and helping Americans understand credit and balancing between Americans who consume credit and those who market credit. I would use a lesser word, but I think I'll keep it at a level of sophistication at this point.
I support the Conyers amendment, and I am so disappointed and saddened, frankly, by my colleagues who I know have spent time in Iraq and Afghanistan, and if they have spent time in Iraq and Afghanistan, they have spoken not only to young soldiers, but they've spoken to reservists, Mr. Chairman. If you speak to reservists, you will know that they have been taken out of their prime of their life or they have been called into battle in the midst of their life where they have wives or husbands or family responsibility. In taking them out of their cycle of income, they have caused them to lose a major part of the breadwinner's contribution to the family, jeopardized them and put them in the line for bankruptcy.
Therefore, many of them have turned to the scavengers who have accelerated the rates on payday loans. It is a conspicuous and large problem. It saddens me to think that because it was associated with Senator Durbin rather than an issue that might have come to the attention of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, and now in the wisdom of our Ranking Member, Mr. Conyers has put it forward as a single standing amendment, we can't get the support.
Allow me to put into the record the words of David Broder of The Washington Post. His headline says, `A Bankrupt `Reform,'--`reform' in quotes. `A Bankrupt `Reform.'
This reform, which parades as an effort to stop folks from spending lavishly and then stiffing creditors by filing for bankruptcy protection, is a perfect illustration of how the political money system tilts the law against average Americans. The simple fact that for 8 straight years it has gained a place on a crowded congressional calendar is testimony to the impact of the millions of dollars that banks and credit card companies have spent on lobbyists and campaign contributions. Two terms ago, it was $4 million that was utilized to lobby Members of Congress to vote for this legislation. I would imagine it is now double that amount.
We have a long list of individuals who oppose this legislation, and the reason why it will pass with no amendments is because, as I said, the fix is in. The American middle class is the backbone of America, yet this bankrupt legislation is going to exercise a means test to stand in the doorway of disallowing individuals to come in and to file bankruptcy.
One of the bloggers said, if this doesn't teach Americans not to have medical emergencies or get laid off, I don't know what will. Come to my city in 2003 and 2002, and watch the 4,000 Enron employees that were laid off, losing most of their livelihood, putting them in a dastardly downspin, causing them to lose their homes, having college students to come out of college, and simply driving them to the depths of depression. How you can pass this legislation in the light of devastation of our communities, middle class and others, is a tragedy. I would only hope that this particular amendment would reach the levels of common sense and have you think back on the soldiers that are now on the front line without the resources to pay their bills, taken advantage of by payday loans, and then being denied--having these payday loan--loaners come after them in a bankruptcy proceeding.
This is a common-sense amendment. This legislation will listen to us today. It will almost sound like blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, because, in fact, the legislation will pass out of this Committee. Very few amendments will pass out of this Committee. And the theme of class warfare will again be victorious, as this makes its way to the floor of the House and the people of America will suffer----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I hope the amendment passes. I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the Conyers amendment. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no? In the----
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, may I demand a record vote?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. You may. The question is on agreeing to the Conyers amendment. Those in favor will, as your names are called, answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. LUNGREN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. INGLIS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Issa?
Mr. ISSA. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
Mr. FLAKE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
Mr. PENCE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. King?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
Ms. LOFGREN. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren, aye. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. MEEHAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH OF WASHINGTON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their vote? The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble.
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Bachus?
Mr. BACHUS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller?
Mr. KELLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Iowa, Mr. King.
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes?
Mr. FORBES. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
[Pause.].
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner?
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Weiner is not recorded.
Mr. WEINER. I vote aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their vote?
[No response.]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will try again to report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 15 ayes and 20 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed to.
Are there further amendments?
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might be recognized to strike the last word.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. WATT. I have some amendments, but there are a couple of things, points that I want to make that I really can't make in the context of an amendment, and I don't want to violate the rules.
As the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee that this bill original--or some bankruptcy bill originally originated in, this one didn't make it to our Subcommittee because of the expedited consideration.
I just want to express generally the major concern that I have with this legislation, and I can't do it in the context of an amendment because it would go so basically to the structure of the bill that it would just--basically dismantle the whole bill.
The most troubling thing about this bill from my perspective--and I've said it before, and I hope people are listening to it--is that at the outset we acknowledge that there were major abuses and problems in the bankruptcy system and that those abuses needed to be addressed across the board.
Because the industry knew that it was going to be impossible to get a bill passed without cutting a deal with the consumer groups on behalf of the poorest people, basically what happened was a deal was cut to encourage the consumer groups to go away and be quiet, and that deal was that we would impose something called a means test, which basically exempts people below the means test from virtually every provision in this bill.
The result of that is very troubling in this sense: First of all, it goes absolutely contrary to everything I have heard my Republican colleagues say they stand for related to individual responsibility because basically what it says is if you fall below the means test, you are going to be exempted from worrying about the abuses that you engage in and so, therefore, we're just going to look the other way. And so abuses that are taking place in the system now for people who fall below the means test can continue unabated.
At the same time, people above the means test get a bunch of rules applied to them regardless of whether they are abusing the bankruptcy system or not. So the whole purpose that we set out to achieve to do bankruptcy reform was missed because of this means test thing.
But a more troubling thing is a public policy concern that I think is just--is devastating because the effect of this means test is that you're going to end up with two bankruptcy courts, in effect. You're going to end up with a pauper's bankruptcy court and a higher-income bankruptcy court, and it's going to give judges and courts the authority to treat people so differently even though their problems in bankruptcy theoretically should be viewed as the same.
It is so contrary to our whole system of principles that it is just troubling as a matter of public policy.
Mr. CANNON. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. WATT. No, let me just----
Mr. CANNON. Because I agree with you.
Mr. WATT. And I just--I couldn't----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentleman----
Mr. WATT. I ask unanimous consent for 30 seconds to take back the time that----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.
Mr. WATT. I couldn't--I couldn't structure an amendment to deal with this, but I think the public needs to know how terrible a public policy we are creating in this bill. It has nothing to do with the content of the bill that you can amend and correct. But the structure of this bill is so contrary to everything that our legal system stands for and everything that our bankruptcy system has historically stood for that it is absolutely incredible.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of----
Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be granted another 30 seconds.
Mr. WATT. And I'll yield it to my gentleman friend----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Reluctantly, without objection.
Mr. WATT. I yield it to my----
Mr. CANNON. I appreciate the yielding and also the Chairman's willingness to go on. Let me just say that what Mr. Watt has said is profound, and it's true, and it's very important. We disagree only on the point of creating two courts. I think as a practical matter that may happen. I hope that our bankruptcy judges are not--don't fall into that trap. But the issue truly for me is twofold here: personal responsibility--and a means test does exactly what Mr. Watt has suggested, and I think that's a problem, but it's a problem we have to deal with in a practical way.
And so in the first place, a means test--or the individual responsibility is important. Secondly, availability of credit is important. That's fundamentally important in this process----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentleman has once again expired.
Mr. WATT. I ask unanimous consent for 30 additional seconds and yield it to the gentleman from Utah.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.
Mr. CANNON. And I will only finish by saying that the availability of credit to all people--you know, people start out poor in life. I started out very poor. Many people do. But the availability of credit is a way for people to get out of that trap, and in part, this bill is about reducing that cost.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Watt.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of all of the gentlemen have really expired.
By my calculation, we have approximately an hour's worth of votes and a debate on a motion to recommit on the supplemental appropriation bill. And, thus, I think it is time to recess the Committee until either 12:30 or 30 minutes after the end of the last vote, whichever comes later.
The Committee stands recessed.
Mr. WATT. Did you say whichever comes later, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Yes, sir.
[Recess.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
[12:47 p.m.]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Committee will be in order. A working quorum is present.
When the Committee recessed for the lunch hour and the votes, pending was a motion to report the bill Senate 256 favorably to the House. Are there further amendments? The gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at the desk.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
Mr. WATT. Amendment 01a.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
Mr. WATT. 01a.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. That's `A' as in apple?
Mr. WATT. Yes.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256, offered by Mr. Watt and Mr. Delahunt----
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is considered as read.
[The amendment follows:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this actually follows very closely on with the Conyers amendment that was considered before we broke for the votes.
I have the honor of serving both on this Judiciary Committee and on the Financial Services Committee, and Representative Miller from North Carolina and myself, also from North Carolina, have been trying to structure, in consultation with Republicans and Democrats, a bipartisan predatory lending bill in the Financial Services Committee so that we could create a national predatory lending standard. Some States have different standards, and we're trying to craft something that will be either a national floor or a national standard. Depending on who you talk to, there's some disagreement about whether it ought to be preemptive or not.
But be that as it may, the gist of this amendment would be to exempt the predatory loans that have interest rates in excess of 50 percent. The gentleman from California had some concerns about fees. This interest is solely about interest rates. It doesn't involve fees.
It's surprising to know that there are extensions of credit which are made where the interest rate is above 50 percent per year. And this bill does nothing to address that, obviously. If we had had hearings, we probably would have determined--gotten into the record that during the 8 years since this legislation was first introduced, the number of credit card solicitations in this country has doubled to 5 billion a year. Between 1993 and 2000 consumers increased their credit from $77 billion to $3 trillion. During that 8-year period bankruptcy petitions increased by 17 percent. But credit card company profits increased by 163 percent. And while I don't indict the entire credit card industry, we can't ignore the evidence of exorbitant interest rates imposed on modest extensions of credit. Ordinary citizens desperate for help are being taken advantage of by companies charging from 300 to over 1,000 percent interest on some loans.
And so I think this is a problem that needs to be addressed, and we need to not make people have to pay or acknowledge in bankruptcy these predatory loans that there is a growing agreement within the industry and outside the industry are just getting out of control and out of hand.
Now, I heard very clearly that the Chairman is not desirous of having any amendments to this bill, so I am patently aware that all of this is perhaps a charade. But if there's ever anything we're going to do to the bill, I certainly hope that we will send this message that interest rates of over 50 percent per year just are unacceptable, and I would ask your support for this amendment in that regard.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you. May I just direct a question to the Chair and the Ranking Member? In the prior amendment, I think we heard virtually all of the general arguments. I understand there are some technical arguments that may relate to some of the future amendments. But we've heard most of the arguments that were made last cycle.
Has the Chair and the Ranking Member, have you come to any kind of a conclusion about how many amendments we might expect today?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Well, if the gentleman will yield, from the Chair's standpoint I know of no amendments on the Republican side of the aisle.
Mr. CANNON. We're amazed at the discipline that you have created on this side. Do we have any----
Mr. WATT. If the gentleman would yield, I will tell him how many I have.
Mr. CANNON. Please.
Mr. WATT. That's all I can speak for. I think I have six. And actually, a lot of them relate to things that have occurred in the interim since we started considering this bill 8 years ago. I mean, you all's argument has been that there's no need to make any--to have any hearings, but there are substantial changed conditions that have taken place over the--over the period of time that we've been debating this bill. And this bill has been kind of marching in place, same construct, same problems, same concerns, but times have changed. And some of those times involve industry practices such as increased predatory lending that hopefully all of us agree are just unacceptable. And if we had gone to a hearing and a markup in our Subcommittee, or--well, I understand you all started this bill on the other side so that you wouldn't make any amendments over here. But if somebody had had some hearings on it, maybe some of these things could have been done.
Mr. CANNON. Well, reclaiming my time, if I might, Mr. Watt, just ask a question. When you talk about preemption, that refers to the--if there's a State interest limit law that is higher than 50 percent, then you would preempt that with this bill? I doubt that there are any State laws with a 50 percent rate, but when you mention preemption, that is, preempting State law, that is what you're referring to, I take it?
Mr. WATT. No, that's--I was actually giving you all background about other things that are going on. This deals with outstanding loans that have interest rates of 50 percent or above.
Mr. CANNON. Okay.
Mr. WATT. It's not about preemption or non-preemption. We're going to deal with that issue when we do the general predatory lending bill in the Financial Services Committee. This is about bankruptcy and----
Mr. CANNON. But it would----
Mr. WATT- whether you discharge loans that have interest rates above 50 percent or don't do that.
Mr. CANNON. Let me just urge my colleagues to vote against the amendment. In the first place, on the Senate this was debated and a similar amendment with a 30-percent usury cap was voted down 24 to 74. I guess----
Mr. WATT. That's why we raised it.
Mr. CANNON. Pardon me. I guess part of the problem is what Mr. Issa talked about earlier, which is how do you calculate the interest rate when you've got costs involved and if you----
Mr. WATT. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. CANNON. In just a moment. I think Mr. Issa pointed out that if you take a $2 fee on a $200 loan for a week because it's a paycheck loan, that is a 100%--or, no, it's a very high interest rate. And so--it's 52. I've got to do the numbers here. I'm not as quick as you, Darrell.
So I am concerned about that. I don't think the amendment does what the gentleman would like it to do, which is, I think we have a general agreement that personal responsibility is significant, and people need to be responsible for what kind of loans they are. In our market what we--what I'm trying to do here is create a market for loans where people get much, much lower-cost capital because they are responsible for themselves. And I have a few seconds left. I'd be happy to yield.
Mr. WATT. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would just point out to him that this says nothing about fees. This is all about interest rates. And if the credit card companies and the lenders don't know how to calculate interest, we're in real, real trouble. We know what interest is. And if the construct of the bill really dealt with personal responsibility for everybody, I mean, we had that discussion before we----
Mr. CANNON. Could I reclaim my time just briefly on this point? Because what will happen then is that short-term lenders will raise their costs, their fees, and so you'll have a lower interest rate. I mean, how do we deal with that for the record here today? Since what will happen is you'll get a higher fee----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman----
Mr. WATT. Would the gentleman yield? I ask unanimous consent for 30 additional seconds.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.
Mr. WATT. So I can answer to the--answer the question that was asked. Does the gentleman yield?
Mr. CANNON. Certainly.
Mr. WATT. I would just say to you that we are dealing with an existing problem, not what happens in the future. These are outstanding loans, not prospective loans, right?
Mr. CANNON. But people will make loans this week and next week and the week after that, and as soon as we pass this law, I think----
Mr. WATT. I mean, you----
Mr. CANNON. I would urge the Members of the Committee to reject this amendment. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman----
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I mean, as I sit here listening to the debate, I think Mr. Watt has been very clear that this does not involve fees. It doesn't involve penalties. It simply involves interest. I mean, we're talking about 50 percent interest. And we should remind ourselves that, you know, 3-month Treasury bills are now about 2.75 percent, a 30-year mortgage is 5.6 percent. How can we really in good conscience reject this? I mean, 50 percent interest, I mean, that's--that's Mafia figures. I mean, this should be the--let's crack down on the Mafia amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina. I mean, this isn't interest. Maybe you're right. This isn't interest. This is the vig.
Mr. CANNON. Would the gentleman yield just for a question?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Of course.
Mr. CANNON. I don't have to go cash my check--in fact, I think ours is--mine is done electronically. But many, many people in America are doing that. Are you familiar with that system and what's going on there? I mean, I don't understand how this quite general language helps poor people who are in a State where they need to get a check cashed or have some other very short-term, high-cost credit?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time, because the gentleman has been very clear, I think, in indicating that those costs, as you just described them now, are not part of the calculation that goes into interest. Now, we talked a lot about personal responsibility, and I concur. But I think why we have a division in terms of whether this bill is good sound policy is that there has been no discussion about corporate responsibility.
Mr. WATT. Would the gentleman yield for a second?
Mr. DELAHUNT. I yield.
Mr. WATT. I just want to make clear, you make it sound like I'm trying to do something to help poor people. If somebody poor is abusing the bankruptcy system--I made this point before we left for lunch--I think that's a real problem with this bill. There's really no way to deal with that because you've exempted them under the means test.
This is about personal responsibility or corporate responsibility of lenders that are charging 50 percent per year, and so it's not about personal responsibility of individuals. I don't think it is reasonable for lenders to be charging 50 percent a year. And so to turn the question to one as if it's about personal responsibility of individuals is to just acknowledge that personal responsibility or corporate responsibility of lenders is somehow sacrosanct and off limits; whereas, personal responsibility of individuals is the highest priority.
I just don't understand that. That doesn't fit in my value system. Now, if it fits in yours, then I think you ought to vote against this amendment.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Reclaiming my time, I think what we're saying to those lenders that have no scruples, have no parameters, just go to it, by rejecting this amendment. And again, we're talking about 50-percent interest. We're saying the door is open, do whatever you want. And it sends a message to the American people that large credit companies do not have to be concerned because Congress is with them and supports them, and yet somebody who has an income of $25,000 a year and is trying to pay off a credit card bill of $10,000, given the kind of interest rates that we all know are assessed, as well as the fees and the penalties, they can't do it.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentleman yield back?
Mr. DELAHUNT. I yield back.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, let me rise to support the gentleman from North Carolina's and Mr. Delahunt's amendment on predatory lending and utilize the terminology that I used earlier today, which is the unfortunateness of this legislation being a poster child for class warfare.
The middle class happened to be known as the backbone of America. These predatory lending incidences or opportunities really do confront the working and middle class, particularly in African American communities and other communities that happen to be minority or urban-centered. And it would seem, if this is going to be a bill that talks about responsibility, that we should take responsibility for the abusive, usurious rates that plague communities who are attempting to secure, whether it be loans to pay off other bills or whether it be to take advantage of a credit system that allows them to buy furniture or to secure a property, we should be responsible for allowing the recklessness of this system to burden individuals who are simply trying to participate in the American dream. And then they wind up waking up one morning with a family of four or six or seven or eight, and the property that they bought or the washing machine that they thought they would get, making payments on a weekly basis or a monthly basis because of the way they have to do it, maybe their income, maybe they are the working poor, maybe they are lower middle class, and then to come up against this usurious rate, some catastrophic incident has occurred, a medical need, a divorce, and they wind up with this debt. And the bulk of the debt is interest.
If we are trying to put forward legislation that is thoughtful and really does answer the concerns of those who are coming to the debtors court, if we want to take away all of the jurisdiction of the judges which might look at this burdensome process, then this is an appropriate amendment.
So I'd ask my colleagues in the course of their deliberation--and, again, the fix is in, but we're going to process ourselves through the process. I think the gentlemen's--plural--Mr. Watt and Mr. Delahunt's amendment is completely appropriate because it does provide some balance to this legislation for those who would be severely burdened by usurious rates not of their causing, because they attempted simply to participate in this credit system and to pay off debts by getting another loan or to buy furniture or to buy property.
With that, I yield back my time.
Mr. CANNON. Would the gentlelady yield? Would the gentlelady yield?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I'd be happy to yield for an inquiry.
Mr. CANNON. I'd actually just like to make a couple comments. You have a little bit of time left, and that would save an extra 5 minutes, I think, of time, if----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I'm yielding to the gentleman.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you. I appreciate that.
You know, we have a really interesting discussion here, and I expressed my appreciation earlier for what Mr. Watt said, which I thought was very, very thoughtful. To add to that, people are poor for many reasons. The biggest reason for being poor is because people are young, because they're getting their education, they're getting started, they're maybe having a family early. Many, many people started out life poor. There are other reasons--people who have mental incapacity or who have lack of education. A lot of things affect poverty.
In the environment of personal responsibility, what I want to see and what I think this bill does to a very large degree is create a market that is unfettered, and in that market people have choices, and they have a choice to prepare themselves for good credit and lower-cost credit over time. You expect as a young person to pay more for your credit than you do when you're older and you have more opportunities because you've been careful with your credit.
It seems to me that that's the core of the kind of debate that we ought to be dealing with here.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would the gentleman--I'd like to reclaim my time.
Mr. CANNON. Could I make just one other comment?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. If you'd make it quickly. I want to reclaim my time.
Mr. CANNON. You're almost out. Thank you. I----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have to respond to the gentleman on that point. I didn't not hear Mr. Watt's earlier point. But let me just say this: Your focus on responsibility is somewhat distorted. People are vulnerable in coming to the bankruptcy courts because they've been taken advantage by the bombardment of credit cards, with no criteria, usurious rates, and a system of capitalism that encourages people to purchase. I don't know how you can--I believe in personal responsibility as well. But when you issue out credit cards like candy, when you don't allow people to pay for a rent-a-car with cash, and every system of government or every process of purchase people are asking for a credit card, then you are building us on a house of cards of credit. And, therefore, I think it is wrong to suggest that people are irresponsible or should be responsible when they are being victimized by this onslaught of credit card poisoning.
And so I would simply say this bill is unbalanced, Mr. Chairman, and it needs to be balanced toward those who are victimized by those who use them as simply puppets to their system.
Thank you for the credit cards that do good things, but let them realize that this bill does not regulate them. It just allows them to burden and to up the usurious rates and----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman for his indulgence. I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no? The noes appear to have it.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a recorded vote.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A recorded vote will be ordered. Those in favor of the Watt amendment will, as your names are called, answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, do we have a quorum, a voting quorum on an amendment?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. We have a working quorum, which is 14.
Mr. WATT. Is that enough to vote on an amendment? I don't know. I'm not----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Yes. A working quorum is necessary to debate and vote on amendments. A reporting quorum, which is 21, is necessary to report the bill.
The clerk will call the roll. The question is on the Watt amendment.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. LUNGREN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Issa?
Mr. ISSA. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Pence?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. MEEHAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there Members who wish to cast or change their vote? The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Green, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 9 ayes and 15 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed to.
Are there further amendments?
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
Mr. WATT. Watt 02.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256, offered by Mr. Watt----
Mr. WATT. I ask unanimous consent the amendment be considered as read.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman will hold off until the amendment is at least distributed to some Members.
The CLERK. On page 10----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is considered as read.
[The amendment follows:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And my good friend from Utah couldn't have provided a more appropriate segue into this amendment than to remind us that most people are poor because they are young and uneducated. And this amendment goes directly to that point.
Under the current version of this bill, school expenses for minor children up to $1,500 per child annually are allowable as expenses under the means test. My amendment expands----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman will suspend. We have a problem with your microphone.
Mr. WATT. That is probably a blessing, considered a blessing by most people.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Well, we do have the court reporter to record your comments for posterity.
[Pause.]
Mr. WATT. Are we okay? Testing. `O, say can you see'----
[Laughter.]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. I think the gentleman from North Carolina is auditioning for a free ticket to the Nationals to sing the National Anthem there.
Mr. WATT. I was trying to see if you all would stand.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized.
[Laughter.]
Mr. WATT. Trying to get people to stand, Mr. Chairman. That's all.
I'm not sure where you all ceased to hear me, but I wanted to thank my friend from Utah for setting the stage for this amendment by reminding us that most people are poor because they are young and uneducated. The current version of the bill allows up to $1,500 per child for school expenses under the means test. However, most college-age students remain dependent on their parents and rely upon parental support to attend college or other postsecondary institutions. A college degree is a valuable investment? I think Mister--my good friend from Utah would agree with that, and often is the key for lower-income Americans to break the cycle of poverty.
Unfortunately, the average cost of a year's tuition, room and board, and fees at a private college last year was $22,541. The average cost of a year's tuition, room and board, and fees at a public university last year was $8,470. That information, by the way, comes from the College Board, not from me. I didn't make it up. For 2004-2005 school year, tuition fees in 4-year public universities soared at 11 percent, while at private universities they rose 6 percent, according to the College Board. And if I can just give you a personal experience, when my kids went to college, the increase in their tuition from 1 year to the next was more than I paid per year to go to the State university that I went to. So that gives you some appreciation that I have some personal appreciation for this.
So all we're doing is trying to get you all to allow us to help people break this cycle of poverty that my good friend from Utah referred to that keeps so many people poor, and not visit the sins of parents--if you think that incurring debt and going into bankruptcy is a sin, don't visit the sins of the parents on the children, because then you are punishing other folks who--they didn't incur these debts.
So, please, consider this amendment and I ask for your support and yield back. Sorry I serenaded you.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you. I enjoyed----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. He does not have to sing, by the way.
Mr. CANNON. I enjoyed the music, but Mel does this a lot better than I do so I'm not going to sing. Thank you.
I appreciate what the gentleman is saying. College costs have gone up. Just two points.
One is that this eliminates any kind of cap--there's a $1,500 cap in the current bill, and it's for essentially adults. Now, I grant you that 18-year-olds are young people, but, again, I hope that my children have a rough experience with the world as they get to be 18 and beyond so that they realize that there's nothing out there to protect them other than their own wit and capabilities and that Government, I think, is not a very good protector. And so I would urge people to vote against this amendment. This is a finely crafted bill. I think what we have in the bill is really a very appropriate number, and while I'd like to be able to solve all the problems of everyone in the world of getting access to education, we've done much with Pell grants and with loans and other support, and I think that the place to deal with that issue is not in this bill but in other aspects of what we're doing here in Congress generally.
So I would urge people to vote against this amendment and yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the Watt amendment. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no? The noes appear to have it.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a recorded vote.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A recorded vote will be ordered. Those in favor of the Watt amendment will, as your names are called, answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. BACHUS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Issa?
Mr. ISSA. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Pence?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher?
Mr. BOUCHER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher, no. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. MEEHAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. WEINER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Members who wish to cast or change their votes? The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Coble.
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller.
Mr. KELLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Green, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. LUNGREN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 10 ayes and 17 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed to.
Are there further amendments?
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, may I be recognized for a unanimous consent request?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina, for what purpose do you seek recognition?
Mr. WATT. To ask unanimous consent to insert in the record at this point a copy of a report entitled `Robbing Perkins to Pay Pell: The Bush College Aid Proposal,' and a letter from Ranking Member Obey and Ranking Member George Miller talking about the results of that report.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the material referred to by the gentleman from North Carolina will be included in the record.
[The material referred to follows:]
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there further amendments? The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.
Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at the desk, Nadler number 1.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
Mr. NADLER. Nadler number 1.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256 offered by Mr. Nadler. At an appropriate place, insert the following (`and'----
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, move to dispense with the reading.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Let's look at it first.
Mr. NADLER. Okay.
The CLERK. `(and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate): Section--Nondischargeability of debts incurred through violations of civil rights laws. (a) Debts incurred through violations of civil rights laws- Section 523(a) of title 11, United States Code, as amended by section 224, is amended--(1) in paragraph (18) by strike `or' at the end; (2) in paragraph (19) by striking the period at the end and inserting'----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is considered as read.
[The amendment follows:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah?
Mr. NADLER. Excuse me. Don't I have a chance to explain the bill.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah?
Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve a point of order.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman--a point of order is reserved. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This amendment would make debts arising from civil--from judgments from civil rights violations nondischargeable. The amendment includes every civil rights violation listed in the Federal criminal code, any civil judgment arising under a civil rights violation, including a section 1983 action, which is to say a judgment against someone for violating someone's civil rights under color of law, or an intentional violation of a valid court order enforcing a civil rights law described in the amendment. It also includes offenses under State law that consist of conduct that would be a civil rights crime described in the Federal criminal codes. Finally, it repairs an omission in the current code that makes fines and restitution ordered under the Federal criminal code nondischargeable, but does not make fines and restitution ordered under State law nondischargeable. My amendment would add the State law.
So if you violate the right to vote, the right to work, the rights of a person wearing the uniform of the United States military, the right to the free exercise of religion, the right of freedom of access to clinic entrances, or any other federally protected civil rights, you will not be able to abuse the Bankruptcy Code either to escape your debts or to force your victims to chase you across the country through bankruptcy courts trying to collect lawful judgments.
We know that is a common strategy, and even where it fails, the uncertainty in the law gives the tort feasors the opportunity to inflict more damage and more expense on their victims. This bill expands the types of nondischargeable debts. It makes nondischargeable even small cash advances leading up to the filing of a case. It's not enough money to keep your kids in Huggies, Mr. Chairman, but we're protecting the helpless credit card companies.
If you use--anyway, this is the wrong page. This amendment simply makes all these different judgments arising from State or Federal civil rights violations not dischargeable in bankruptcy, including violations of 1983, which is a violation of civil rights under color of law, and that's an abuse of the code and we should not allow it, and I urge the amendment.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentleman from Utah insist upon his point of order?
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd make a point of order that the amendment does not amend a specific section or specific text.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. You wish to argue in favor of your point of order?
Mr. NADLER. I don't understand the point of order. What do you mean it doesn't amend a specific section?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah has the right to argue in favor of his point of order.
Mr. NADLER. I'm just asking a question.
Mr. CANNON. I think it's fairly obvious. The amendment on its face says that `at the appropriate place insert,' and makes--I believe that the rules of Committee----
Mr. NADLER. It doesn't say that.
Mr. CANNON. No, the amendment says `at an appropriate place insert the following (and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate.' I believe the rules of the Committee require that an amendment specifically amend a section or particular language within a section.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentleman from New York wish to be heard in opposition to the point of order?
Mr. NADLER. Yes. This----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Or does he wish to concede the point of order?
Mr. NADLER. No. I wish to contest the point of order. This is a standard form of amendment. We do it all the time in this Committee, and I'm not aware of the rule you're talking about. And if there is such a rule, it's never enforced. This is a standard form that is done every week in this Committee. If you look at all the amendments we've done, probably half of them are done in this form.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Well, the Chair is prepared to rule.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Chair is prepared to rule. Chapter 27 of Deschler's Precedents, Section 1.2/8, says that an amendment must contain instructions to the clerk as to the portion of the text it seeks to amend. This amendment does not do that, and the Chair is prepared to sustain the point of order----
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I'll withdraw the amendment. It'll be resubmitted in a few minutes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Okay. The amendment----
Mr. NADLER. In proper form.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The amendment is withdrawn.
Are there further amendments?
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York.
Mr. NADLER. I have an--now, let me make sure that this is drafted in the same--not in the same way. No, it's okay.
I have an amendment at the desk, amendment number 2.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
Mr. NADLER. Number 2.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report Nadler number 2.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256, offered by Mr. Nadler, `Page 213, line 11, strike the close quotation marks and the period at the end.'
`Page 213, after Line 11, inst the following (and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate):'
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is considered as read.
[The amendment follows:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the gentleman from New York is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, the Judiciary Committee has received testimony from many sources, most recently from the Commercial Law League of America, the Nation's oldest creditors rights organization, that the business provisions in this bill will destroy businesses, especially small businesses. The substitute--that is, this amendment--would correct this problem by giving distressed companies the needed flexibility that will enable many of them to reorganize successfully as opposed to liquidate in a Chapter 11 proceeding.
Organized labor has also spoken out against the small business provisions of this bill because they recognize that a failed reorganization hits workers the hardest. They're the ones who lose their jobs. They're the ones who lose their benefits. They're the ones who see their pensions evaporate.
If you have had a large and small business bankruptcy in your district, you know what happens when a company goes under. Preserving value in a company through successful rehabilitation where it is possible benefits everyone--the employees, the creditors, the communities. This bill, however, has rigid and inflexible deadlines that is not found in the current code, especially those dealing with the time in which a company may propose a plan of reorganization. It also places absolute limits on the time in which a business must decide whether to assume or reject a commercial lease, even if they are current in their rent payments. That limit could prove disastrous in cases involving businesses with hundreds of stores. Does anyone know about the Kmart bankruptcy or the Cinema Multiplex bankruptcies? How would arbitrary deadlines have affected those cases?
Other arbitrary rules that would force the conversion of a case to liquidation are dangerous to our economy and to American business, especially small businesses. When this bill first appeared in 1997, everyone was singing `Happy days are here again.' There were few fears that massive bankruptcies in our airline industry, the collapse of much of our tech industry, the implosion of such market bellwethers as Enron and WorldCom or the coal or steel industries were just over the horizon.
It would be foolhardy for the Members of this Committee to ignore what is going on in the real world just because we have voted for this bill in the past. In the case of these business provisions, they could mean the loss of thousands of jobs, the unnecessary liquidation as opposed to reorganization of valuable and still viable businesses, and the loss of business and value for trade creditors and communities.
Let's take an example from the business pages--from the financial pages. The last time we marked up this bill, I noted that that morning's New York Times had reported that United Airlines was seeking an extension on its April 8th deadline for filing a plan of reorganization until October 6th. Why were they seeking this extension? According to the report, the extra time would give United the chance to gauge the consequences of any war with Iraq on the airline industry, unquote.
Is there anyone here other than one of United's competitors who does not think that that made sense at that time? Would we have wanted to insist that United file a plan without getting a handle on what is about to happen? Would the Members of the Committee prefer to just liquidate the whole thing?
According to the Times, `The Air Transport Association said in a report yesterday that a long conflict could prompt the industry to cut 70,000 more jobs on top of the 100,000 lost since the September 11th attacks in 2001.' It said, `Several carriers could be forced in bankruptcy along with United and US Airways, which had filed for Chapter 11 protection last summer.' In fact, an ATA spokesman was quoted in the London Financial Times as stating that the war could add another $4 billion to airline losses on top of the $5.7 billion forecast and cut a further 2,200 daily flights.
In court papers, United requested the extension to avoid premature formulation of a Chapter 11 plan and to ensure that the formulated plan takes into account the interests of the company, its employees, and its creditors. That was then.
Judge Weidoff is still keeping United in the air and people are still working. Could you imagine what would have happened if we had tied his hands the way this bill would? Is there any doubt what would have happened to that case? United would have been liquidated, the employees laid off, and the creditors not gotten their debts repaid. Shouldn't the law allow courts to review the facts and decide whether or not such flexibility as in the Bankruptcy Code has long required in the best interest of the creditors and the estate?
Mr. Chairman, our job is to make the system work better, not to wreck it. Chapter 11 is a model that other countries are trying to emulate. They look to our system of rehabilitating going concerns values where possible as preferable to their emphasis on liquidation. Just as the rest of the world is realizing that our system encourages risk taking and promotes the rehabilitation of distressed businesses, this bill--or this provision would take our system back in the other direction. Perhaps this Committee could listen to the sound of the market forces before acting.
I urge the adoption of this amendment to allow the system to remain somewhat flexible so that businesses can be saved instead of liquidated. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Section 404 of the bill, under current law, Chapter--this refers to section 404. Under current law, a Chapter 11 debtor or lessee must assume or reject a nonresidential lease within 60 days. This 60-day period, however, can be and often is routinely extended by the court. Section 404 of the current bill fixes the deadline by which the debtor must assume or reject a lease. It requires a nonresidential lessee to either assume or reject within 120 days of the filing of bankruptcy or by the date that the court confirms the plan of reorganization. This period can be extended for an additional 90 days on the motion of the lessee or the lessor. And then there are further provisions for extension.
Let me just point out that section 404 is a result of extensive negotiation over the preceding three Congresses. This bill is not hostile to lessees. As a matter of fact one of the principal groups of nonresidential lessees, the National Retail Federation, is one of the bill's strongest supporters on this particular point.
The provision gives landowners greater certainty in dealing with bankrupt tenants because it sets a firm time frame by which the debtor must decide whether to continue with a lease of a shopping center and the ability it produces means ultimately we get better rates more equitable rates, and promotes competition among landlords. Bankruptcy Code section 502 limits the amount of damages that a landlord can claim as an administrative expense, priority if a tenant assumes a lease, and then rejects the lease at a later time. This prevents landlords from getting a financial windfall at the expense of unsecured creditors. It's a well-thought-out and well-balanced part of the whole bill.
Now, many of these issues deal with small businesses, and we have very, very wide-ranging groups supporting these small business provisions, like the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Executive Office of the United States Trustees, bankruptcy judges, the National Association of Credit Management, and the American Bankruptcy Institute.
This section gives teeth to those charged with the oversight of these cases, including the courts, the United States trustees and parties in interest. It only requires small business debtors to do what they should do and be doing while they're in Chapter 11, that is, pay their post-petition obligations as they become due and make progress toward confirmation.
Deadlines in these provisions are not absolute. Most can be extended upon a proper showing of cause. And this streamlines the process by providing for flexible rules for disclosure statements and plans.
Again, the bill can be criticized at various points and narrow perspectives, but as a whole, and in particular with this section, the section that's attempted to be amended here by Mr. Nadler, the bill is well considered and well balanced, and I would urge my colleagues to reject this amendment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Move to strike the last word.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. BERMAN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, the provisions--what's wrong with the provisions in the bill that this seeks to enact is that they are rigid. One, first of all, most of what Mister--the gentleman from Utah talked about was lessees. Lessees and lessors are only one part of what we're talking about here. And if you look at the amendment, it says repeatedly the court may extend the time period specified in this paragraph if the debtor established by clear and convincing evidence that an extension is justified by circumstances beyond the debtor's control that were not foreseeable on the date for the order of relief.
Again, unless the debtor established by clear and convincing evidence that there are circumstances beyond the debtor's control that were not foreseeable on the date of the order of relief. Unless the debtor established by clear and convincing evidence that there are--et cetera.
The court may extend the time period specified in paragraph 2 if the debtor established by clear and convincing evidence that an extension is justified by circumstances beyond the debtor's control that were not foreseeable.
In other words, we're giving the judge in this amendment the ability--in the interest of the creditors, in the interest of the debtors, in the interest of the employees, in the interest of everybody, the ability in case of unforeseeable developments, the ability to extend otherwise rigid deadlines, deadlines that in the abstract may make sense. Deadlines that may say 90 days and then a one-time extension of another 60 days may sound reasonable but in a given case may not prove to be reasonable.
The code has always given the judges some discretion, and all this amendment says, the burden of proof is on the debtor. The burden of proof for a debtor who wants an extension of time is on the debtor to prove by clear and convincing evidence. The second highest standard of evidence that he needs the extension because of circumstances beyond his control that were not foreseeable at the time of the order.
And if the judge believes that he has established that beyond--by clear and convincing evidence, at that point why shouldn't the judge have the ability to extend a deadline and maybe save a company, save the jobs, save the community, get the creditors the ability to have more of their debts repaid? It doesn't make sense to be this rigid.
Now, judges are going to be reluctant to extend deadlines repeatedly, especially when you put the burden of proof on the debtor and say not only does it have to be clear and convincing evidence, but it has to be circumstances that are beyond his control and totally unforeseeable at the time the order was given. I don't see what sense it makes to deny some flexibility when you may save 20,000 jobs or a community or get--or for that matter, that may redound to the benefit of the creditor, too.
So why wouldn't we give this kind of flexibility--I shouldn't say `give'--keep this kind of flexibility in the system?
I yield back to the gentleman. I thank him for yielding.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentleman from California yield back?
Mr. BERMAN. I do.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.
Mr. WATT. I won't take 5 minutes. I just want to make the point that this discussion has pointed up once again how we miss opportunities to address problems by not having hearings and going through regular order. I don't think either one of these gentlemen is trying to do anything unreasonable, but we are operating in a system here that you all have set that basically is making a mockery of the legislative process. It's clear that you're not going to allow one comma, one period, one capital letter, anything to be done to this bill because you don't want it to go to conference. I understand that. But it makes this markup a charade. And it makes us look like we're just--this is just an irrelevant process, that the Senate has shaped this bill, and this bill is too important to the American consumer, debtor, and creditor to have this happen to it. And our institution is too important for us to make our institution have this kind of impact.
So, I mean, I--if I sound a little frustrated, it's because I am a little frustrated, because we're just playing games here. And so I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no? The noes appear to have it. The noes--a rollcall will be ordered. Those in favor of the Nadler amendment will, as your names are called, answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. LUNGREN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. INGLIS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Keller?
Mr. KELLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. Mr. Issa?
Mr. ISSA. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Pence?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
[No response.]
The CLERK. aye. Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. MEEHAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
Mr. WEXLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH OF WASHINGTON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Members who wish to cast or change their vote? The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Bachus.
Mr. BACHUS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Green, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Weiner.
Mr. WEINER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 13 ayes and 18 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed to. Are there further amendments?
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr. Smith.
Mr. SCHIFF. Schiff.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Schiff. I'm sorry.
Mr. SCHIFF. It is going to be very confusing on this Committee now.
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk numbered 006.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256 offered by Mr. Schiff. Page 19, after line 21, insert the following (and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate):
`(8)(A) No judge, United States trustee'----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection the amendment will be considered as read and the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.
[The amendment follows:]
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. My amendment would simply provide that if at least 51 percent of the creditor claims against you in bankruptcy are the result of identity theft, you should not be forced out of the protections of Chapter 7. This is an amendment similar to that offered by Senator Nelson of Florida, but is significantly narrower than the amendment that was offered in the Senate.
A few years ago the manager of an identity theft program at the FTC commented on how identity theft was becoming rampant in the country. She commented that not only can identity theft wreak havoc on the credit of a victim, but it can even force them into bankruptcy. Since then the problem has grown at epidemic rates. Identity theft has now topped the list of consumer complaints filed with the FTC for the last 4 years in a row. In September 2003 the FTC released a comprehensive survey concluding that a staggering 27 million Americans have been the victims of identity theft in at least the 5 years, costing consumers and businesses an estimated $53 billion in 2002 alone.
In fact, the home States of several Members of this Committee are at the top of the list of identity theft victims, with Texas ranking No. 4, Florida ranking No. 5, and my own home State of California ranking No. 3 in the number of victims of identity theft per capita, with over 37,000 complaints reported by consumers, costing over $40 million just last year.
We've also heard of the recent breaches of massive databases holding personal information. Identity thieves posing as legitimate customers gained access to ChoicePoint's database of 19 billion public records. The company has acknowledged that hackers had access to data on 145,000 people and that stolen information has since been used in at least 750 identity theft scams.
Just last week databases belonging to LexisNexis were also compromised with hackers stealing information on at least 32,000 people. With these epidemic level increases comes the likelihood that more innocent individuals will be forced to file bankruptcy.
Just last month a man was sentenced in New York to 2 years in prison for using a former girlfriend's identity to commit fraud. The scheme lasted several months, during which the perpetrator took out three personal loans from private loan agencies in the victim's name, purchased an Audi and a Chevy pickup truck. Ultimately the fraud resulted in the theft of over 300,000, forcing the victim to declare bankruptcy.
There are a great many examples of this. November of last year a women in Pennsylvania similarly victimized, similarly forced to file bankruptcy right before Christmas.
We shouldn't turn our backs on these individuals. Last year this Committee supported legislation Mr. Carter and I sponsored to crack down on criminals who perpetrate identity theft. Now this Committee has the opportunity to directly address the plight of some of the victims of this crime forced into bankruptcy. The amendment is simple and very narrowly drawn. It merely says that if at least 51 percent, slightly more than half of the claims against you in bankruptcy are the result of bankruptcy--the result of identity theft, something you had no control over, you should not be forced out of the protections of Chapter 7.
I know that there has been a desire among the majority to keep the bill in its pristine state, but this is a good amendment. I think it's one that ought to enjoy bipartisan support, as our identity theft did last year, and I would urge you to accept it. This is more narrow than what was offered in the Senate. It would specifically address the problem where the major reason why you would be forced out of Chapter 7 is because you are a victim of identity theft, and I urge my colleagues to join support, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman will have to yield back.
Mr. SCHIFF. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm just sort of working through this amendment now, and it's obviously--it's obvious to me that it's an important idea and maybe something that we'd want to consider in the context of future changes, a technical blurb, something like that. For the purposes of this bill, besides the fact that we want to do a reasonable bill, and I think that this bill is available to amend if we get new reasons. Thus far I don't think we've heard many.
But this is a new issue, and I appreciate the fact that it is more narrowly drafted than the Senate counterpart, but there's some problems that I have in this bill, and I think those are substantial, and that's why I think if we do anything with this we'd have to do it--I would encourage the Members to vote against it so we can deal with it at some future time.
In the first place we're fairly vague about the identity theft and how it's established and what that means. In the second place, what happens if a person has a significant amount of identity theft--losses caused by identity theft and then becomes wealthy and has the ability to otherwise deal with these things? And so----
[Laughter.]
Mr. SCHIFF. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. CANNON. Yes, in just a moment. Let me just say in summary from my perspective, I don't, I don't have a handle on how we deal with this, how it would fit in, and it would clearly disrupt the whole process of moving forward a bill. So I would encourage my colleagues to reject this amendment. And who asked to----
Mr. SCHIFF. I asked the gentleman if he would yield.
Mr. CANNON. Oh, certainly, Mr. Schiff.
Mr. SCHIFF. This is a, you know, rough replay of a scenario that took place in this Committee a couple years ago when I offered and amendment to this bill, to just do a study of whether those trying to get child support would be adversely impacted by the bill. It just called for a GAO study of the issue. The author of the bill at that time was Mr. Gekas. He made comments very similar to yours, along the lines of this may not be a bad idea, this may be a good idea, but we don't want anything added to the bill.
Mr. CANNON. Reclaiming my time, I think the point between the time that Mr. Gekas was here and now is there's been a lot of time to develop that idea, and if somebody wanted to do it, it could have been developed. I don't know that this issue has come up in the hearings that we've had or in the negotiations or discussions we've had anywhere. This has been an issue out there, but that hasn't had an advocate in the context of this bill.
Mr. SCHIFF. Will the gentleman yield again?
Mr. CANNON. Certainly.
Mr. SCHIFF. You know, I know the gentleman, with all due respect, is really reaching for a rationale to vote down the amendment, and, you know, I--Mr. Gekas, in the last scenario, offered to take up my amendment in the manager's amendment. It went up to the Rules Committee as part of this package. It came down from the Rules Committee, having been deleted from the package. And when I asked him why, he said, `You know, I thought I was the author of this bill, but it essentially is being controlled by the interest behind the bill,' and he could not even succeed with an amendment he supported.
I hope we're not to that point. This is a very simple amendment that says----
Mr. CANNON. Reclaiming my time, I just--Mr. Gekas is not here to defend himself. That is an extraordinary statement. I knew Mr. Gekas very well. I've taken over the Subcommittee that he chaired earlier. I don't mean to challenge your credibility on the issue, but beyond Mr. Gekas we need to have a process, and we have not talked about this issue. I don't know if you've talked with other people that are engaged in the bill, but the issue has not, that is the issue of identity theft and how we fit it in the bill, has not been raised in a context where we could vet it and deal with it.
So part of the reason I'm stretching is because it's a new issue, and I don't know how it fits into--and I grant that I'm stretching. I don't know how it fits in. I don't know what it does to the bill. If it's going to be dealt with, it needs to be dealt with in the context to determine----
Mr. SCHIFF. Will the----
Mr. CANNON. Pardon me, just if I can finish. We need to deal with it in a context where we can consider the implications for the whole bill. And so I have a little bit of time left.
Mr. SCHIFF. I appreciate the gentleman yielding, and I'm not impugning at all Mr. Gekas' credibility, who fought for my amendment, and I'm appreciative to him. But I do challenge the process that's going on here where we have a markup. We spend hours here. And if the majority has made the decision that we will accept no amendments no matter how meritorious, then this really is a futile exercise, and we are all too busy to engage in a futile exercise.
Mr. CANNON. Reclaiming the last few moments that I have, it is a futile exercise if there's nothing new or if we can't make a clear and compelling case for something, which I don't think you can do with an issue like this at this time with the limited debate here. But we have a process.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the----
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.
Mr. WATT. I move to strike the last word.
Senator Carper. The gentleman's recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. WATT. And I really didn't intend to just get on this and stay on it, but we're getting to the point of just being ridiculous here, and you know, I think we all are beginning to have our sensibilities insulted. And to be honest with you and very blunt, the Republicans are beginning to do a disservice to themselves by looking like robots, and that's unfortunate.
This bill and the substance of this bill is too important to the American people to treat it like this, and I, I mean I think there's more integrity just to say, `Look, we're not going to amend this bill, you know, call the previous question,' you know, which you all have done before. You try to do it when you can blame it on us. We're trying to be constructive here, offer really good amendments that a number of people have said are really good amendments, and--but there's no flexibility here, and I don't know what we are doing. This is a charade.
And I'm embarrassed because this is out of--I mean bankruptcy started out--I guess I'm taking the lead on this because bankruptcy is the subject matter of Commercial and Administrative Law, which I am the Ranking Member of, and I don't want to see my Chair, Mr. Cannon, continue to embarrass himself like this. There's no rational reason for what's being----
Mr. CANNON. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. WATT. I'm happy to yield to him if he can tell me he's not embarrassing himself.
Mr. CANNON. You know, I actually find it embarrassing that we make an issue out of, out of the failure of an amendment that hasn't had any development. This is not a heavy-handed process that has culminated over 7 years to where we are today.
Mr. WATT. Reclaiming my time.
Mr. CANNON. This is a 7-year process.
Mr. WATT. Reclaiming my time, I am making an issue of the fact that you all are making a charade of the legislative process on an important public policy such as bankruptcy. I'm embarrassed by this, and I think you should be embarrassed by it. So I, you know, I'm--this is not the first time I've said this today. This is not about this particular amendment but the cumulative effect of what you are doing is embarrassing to yourself, and, you know, I'm going to keep offering these amendments as long as you all sit here and embarrass yourself, but at some point you're going to have to just say to the American people, `Regardless of how meritorious an amendment is on this bill, we are not going to amend the bill because our leadership has told us that. Mr. Delay or whoever is calling the shots has told us we are not going to amend this bill.'
And I don't know why we fight for the jurisdiction of our Committee if our Committee can't do anything with the jurisdiction. What good is jurisdiction if you're not going to do anything?
Mr. BACHUS. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. WATT. We are legislators.
Mr. BACHUS. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. WATT. I'm happy to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. BACHUS. We've been amending this bill for 8 years, have we not? I mean this bill, we amended this bill this year and last year and the year before. So I mean it's not----
Mr. WATT. Keep embarrassing yourself.
Mr. BERMAN. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. WATT. I'm happy to yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. BERMAN. Would the gentleman--if the gentleman from North Carolina would yield to the gentleman from Alabama, could he explain to me why an amendment that says if 51 percent of your debts occurred because somebody stole your identity and that the ripple implications of accepting that amendment will so upset the delicate balance of this pristine bill that--in ways that we can never know. Just give us a coherent reason why an amendment as narrow and specific as this should be rejected on its face? I can understand accepting it and fine tuning it. I can understand--but you see the impression that we get over here?
Mr. BACHUS. I appreciate the gentleman----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina has expired.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Chair moves to strike the last word----
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER- and recognizes himself.
First, there has been plenty of process on this bill over 8 years, and all of the paper that has been generated, hearings, markups, Committee reports and debates on the floor are on the clerk's desk. And if you're having trouble seeing the clerk over the pile of papers, it shows that there has been plenty of information that has been submitted.
Now, second, relative to the amendment that has been offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, a person is not responsible for debts that he or she did not incur. So if the debt was run up by somebody else as a result of identity theft, the person in whose name the debt was run up is not responsible for it. And if there is identity theft, that is a factual issue that the bankruptcy judge can determine, and even without this amendment, the bankruptcy judge can disallow the claim that has been made against the bankrupt's estate. That is simple law.
Now, everybody knows what the process is here. The people who don't like this bill want to amend it to send it back to the other body because they know the other body will have to spend two more weeks jumping through the hoops to get a piece of legislation passed.
This bill has been hanging around here for 8 years. It is a bill that has gotten overwhelming support in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. There has been rollcall after rollcall, and I've added up the score in both the House and the Senate. Since the 105th Congress the aggregate total of votes on bankruptcy legislation has been 2,455 ayes to 871 nays.
We're getting close to the goal line on this. Most of these arguments have been ventilated repeatedly in the past. I think that this amendment is merely an attempt to try to kill the bill because everybody knows that a debtor is not responsible for the debts he didn't incur. The amendment should be voted down.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters.
Ms. WATERS. I move to strike the last word.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the gentlewoman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, if in fact this amendment does no harm, and if in fact it would be a restatement of existing law, then I don't see why it could not be considered for adoption.
However, I think there are a few things that you, Mr. Chairman, said that would help everyone here to understand that you have no intentions of accepting any amendments on this bill today. You talk about the number of votes that have been taken. You talk about how high the paper is stacked before the clerk, and you basically have said to us that we're here today convened simply to vote this bill out, and that you will do that because you have the numbers, you have the majority of this Committee. You're not going to accept any amendments. And why then are we going through allowing us to take our good time to offer these amendments when you have decided the fate of our amendments already?
I think it is worse than a charade, and I think it is, as Mr. Watt has said, embarrassing to us all, and I feel a little bit bad for the jockey of the bill over there from Idaho, who cannot defend--from Iowa--who cannot--where's he from? I'm sorry, Utah, somewhere out there. Who cannot defend his objections to the--cannot defend his objections to the amendment.
So, Mr. Chairman, is a motion in order to move that we close down the Committee and we just vote the bill out?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlewoman move the previous question on the bill and the amendments?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentlelady--Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlewoman make that motion?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman?
Ms. WATERS. The gentlewoman is prepared to make the motion. I hear some objections from my colleagues on this side of the aisle.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Well, then should we vote on it and see what----
Ms. WATERS. Well, let me just--let me, let me just get a nod from--where's my leader on this? Where's Mr. Conyers? Is he here?
Mr. CONYERS. Yes, he is here.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Conyers, what would you have me do?
Mr. CONYERS. Well, I'd ask you to yield to me first.
Ms. WATERS. I will yield to you on this before I offer this motion.
Mr. CONYERS. I'd like to point out about this large number of reports and other documents that have been put on the table, the witness table, that I've counted 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 new Members on this Committee for the 109th session. I can't recall how many are new Members from the 108th session. But for the years that this bill has been going on, to now come up in the first part of the 109th session and say we've been working on this bill for 6 or 7 or 8 years, and so therefore, we've had enough discussion, let's get this on with, is perhaps not the best congressional or legislative procedure that we can engage in.
Mr. INGLIS. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. CONYERS. No. I know you're a, you're a new old Member, and so we'll give you the credit you deserve.
But I think that that should be--I think that this should be taken into consideration. The amendment I offered earlier about veterans, I don't recall it being offered before. We haven't had any hearings in this session.
Ms. WATERS. Reclaiming my time. I think what I hear the Ranking Member advising me is not to offer the motion, so, Mr. Conyers, what I would like to do is make a suggestion to the Members on our side of the aisle, and that is, take up all your amendments, find some more, put your staffs to work so that they can create some more, and let's just stay here for a couple of days.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlewoman yield back the balance of her time so that she can do that?
Ms. WATERS. If the gentlewoman had intended to do that, she would have let you know.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentleman has--gentlewoman has expired. We're about 10 minutes away from four votes on the floor.
Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Who seeks recognition? The gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Chairman, I'm one of those old new or new old Members that the Ranking Member referred to, and I consider very importantly my obligation to act in the best interest of my constituents and the people of this Nation. I must remark that I'm surprised that the gentlelady from California is yielding to the iron clad rule of a Ranking Member. I thought we should independently make our decisions as to what is best.
But let me just say this. I have----
Ms. WATERS. They dare not take independence when they are doing what they are told.
Mr. LUNGREN. I understand, I understand. I might say that I have been absent from this chamber for 16 years, although interestingly enough, one of the elevator operators noted me on the elevator the other day, and asked where I'd been because she hadn't seen me around for a little while. So I told her it had been 16 years.
And I understand the frustration of the minority because I was there for 10 years, and I understand being on the losing side of votes. But, you know, it's not a charade when the votes are taken and you're on the losing side because there's more on the other side than there are on your side. That's sort of the result of what happened in November.
The frustration that you feel is probably a mirror image of the frustration that those of us feel on this side who have seen this work done on a major effort to reform a Bankruptcy Code that drastically needs to be reformed. There's a consensus in this country. And to see that happen year after year after year and be tangled up in disputes, I mean, let's be real. The reason we don't have a reform of the Bankruptcy Code over the last number of years was because of actions taken by some in the other body on the abortion issue, and there was an effort to make sure that that social issue was driven and driven and driven and driven and driven, despite all of the facts, despite all of the necessity for us to do something with the Bankruptcy Code.
And so that's why we're here now. We know that there's a need to have a Bankruptcy Code reform. We know that the best chance we have of doing that is to basically minimize any differences between ourselves and the Senate, particularly on a piece of work that has really the earmarks of Members of this body, Members of this Committee over the last number of years. As I understand it--and I stand to be corrected--this product has a number of amendments brought by both the majority and the minority over the last number of years that have been voted on either by recorded vote or voice vote.
So that's what we're talking about, and I understand what my friends on the other side are doing, trying to make sure that we're put in a position of voting against the aged and the poor and the young and kids and veterans and everybody else. And we understand that's being done, and you have every right to do it, and I wouldn't refer to it as a charade. But the fact of the matter is we are either going to have a major reform of the Bankruptcy Code or we are not, And if we repeat what's been done in this Congress over the last five or six congresses, we will not have it, and that ill serves the American people, it ill serves the people I represent.
So, yes, I am exercising some discipline not to offer amendments, and not to support certain amendments that I might otherwise wish to because I do not want to see my pursuit of the perfect ensure that we defeat the good. And we have made a good job of defeating the good in this Congress in the last number of years. And so I appreciate what my friends have said, but, frankly, it's not a charade when one makes a judgment that in order to actually have a bill on the President's desk that does a lot of good, rather than no bill once again, that we exercise discipline individually, and not support some things that we may otherwise wish to support.
Mr. CONYERS. Would my friend, Mr. Lungren yield?
Mr. LUNGREN. I would be happy.
Mr. CONYERS. And I thank you.
Mr. LUNGREN. And I want to say one thing. In the time that I was out of this chamber, whenever I visited, the Ranking Member was probably the most gracious in recognizing me when I was here, and I just wanted to say that for the record. I appreciate that.
Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman. Would you review, at your leisure, sir, the organizations that are supporting the position that has been made clear by those of us on this side of the Committee room and the names of the organizations, lobbyists, banks and credit card organizations, commercial organizations that represent what you asserted was a majority of people. I think you'd find, my friend from California, that when the National Bankruptcy Conference, the American Bankruptcy Institute, the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, the National Association of Chapter 13 Trustees, the National Association of----
Mr. LUNGREN. Okay, reclaiming my time, I object to----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman's time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman----
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes. I'm going to yield in just 30 seconds to the gentleman from--Schiff, who's the author of this particular amendment. But in response to what--the observations by Mr. Lungren, I mean I would suggest that the amendments that have been offered today deal with obvious issues and egregious problems that I would concluded that if there was not the exercise of discipline, there would be nearly unanimous agreement in terms of the adoption of these particular amendments.
You know, I'm listening to Mr. Cannon, whom I consider a friend and one of the better Members of this Committee, you know, speak about his children and the fact that Government is not a good protector. And yet today we're here rejecting the amendment put forth by Mr. Watt and myself relative to the discharge, the dischargeability of debts implicating interest over 50 percent. I mean we haven't protected the American citizen today from the predatory lender. And to speak about the marketplace in terms of the need for credit and suggesting that putting some boundaries, in imposing some accountability in terms of the lending community, I would suggest that's not doing what we ought to be doing. That's not protecting the people, all of the people of this country.
And that's not about the marketplace. As I said earlier, that is right up there with, you know, what the mafia did, we reject it. How--if we adopted that amendment, how could the other body, other body not agree to that particular amendment? And the reality is--and we have heard example after example over the course of the last three or 4 months, that that in fact is happening to people all over the country. With that, I'll yield to the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and somehow my amendment seems to have provoked a disagreement between the Chair of the Subcommittee and the Chair of the full Committee. The Chair of the Subcommittee maintaining that my amendment, the problem with my amendment is that it may somehow do harm, the Chairman maintaining that the problem with my amendment is that it does nothing at all, that is the existing law. The Chairman of the Subcommittee maintaining that the problem is that this issue has never been explored, the problem as addressed by the Chairman is that this issue and every other has already been explored. It can't be both.
And the charade that my colleagues from California refers to--and charade is a stronger term than I would use--is not that you win a vote or we lose a vote. The illusion is that this is a markup, that this is a Committee that today is really deliberating the amendments and making decisions. That's the illusion. The reality is that the deal was made before we ever came into the Committee room.
And the reason I brought up the history, at least my little amendment some years ago in the 107th Congress, is that this has been the history as long as I've been here, on this bill. When I offered an amendment in the 107th Congress, two congresses ago, I was given much the same response, which is this issue has already been decided before the markup, so why are you offering something in the markup, good idea, bad idea, no idea at all? Where were you when we decided this in the back room before we got into the Committee?
And you know, for most of us in the minority we're not part of that discussion. The financial interests are part of the discussion, the majority is part of the discussion, the minority is not. My colleague from California referred to his years in the minority, and I can only say, as we found in 1994, majorities are fleeting. Ours was, yours may be as well, and it would be worthwhile to consider what it's like to stand in your colleague's shoes.
And I would only urge that if you feel the amendment has weight, support it. If you feel the amendment is somehow superfluous, vote against it, but let's have a real markup where the Committee can do real work, where those of us who are not invited to the back room can have input in the work product that goes out of the Committee.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff. Those in favor will say aye.
Opposed, no.
The noes appear to have it.
Mr. Chairman, I request a recorded vote.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A recorded vote will be ordered. Those in favor of the Schiff amendment will, as your names are called, answer aye, those opposed no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Lungren said no.
The CLERK. Oh, I'm sorry. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. BACHUS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. INGLIS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Green?
Mr. GREEN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Green, no. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Issa?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Pence?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Waters?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. MEEHAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. WEINER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH OF WASHINGTON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their votes? The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Mr. Chairman, I vote no.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Any further Members? Gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report. Oh, the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Bachus?
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bachus is--Mr. Bachus votes no, has voted no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Aye. I wanted to be recorded. I wasn't recorded. Is that all right?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Of course.
Mr. WATT. Thank you.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Anybody else who wishes to cast or change their vote? Going once, going twice, and the clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 13 ayes and 15 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed to.
We have four votes on the floor. The Chair asks Members to return promptly after the last vote so that we can get going. There is a hearing that has been noticed for 2:00 p.m. in the Subcommittee on the Constitution. That will be postponed until after the markup is completed today, and the Committee stands recessed.
[Recess.]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Committee will be in order. A working quorum is present. Pending at the time of the recess was a motion to report the bill, Senate 256 favorably. Are there further amendments?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at the desk. It's numbered Delahunt 003.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256 offered by Mr. Delahunt. Page 507, after line 6, insert the following (and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate):
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is considered as read, and the gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 5 minutes.
[The amendment follows:]
Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the Chairman, and I think my final comment prior to the vote was that we haven't protected citizens today because we will be passing a bankruptcy bill that while there is a focus on personal responsibility, there is none on corporate responsibility. But I'm also concerned that we're establishing, for lack or failure to address a particularly egregious abuse that favors the affluent in this country, for failure to do that we're creating two bankruptcy systems, one for the more affluent and one for the rest of America.
So I would hope that all of my colleagues would support me in this change to eliminate what has been described euphemistically as a millionaire's loophole by addressing the issue of so-called asset protection trust. They are trusts that a person creates to shield assets for his or her own benefit. In other words, it's a financial planning to design for the more well to do who are concerned about potential bankruptcy. And currently there is no limit to the value of assets that can be shielded from bankruptcy by this particular device. The amendment is simple. It seeks to limit that value of assets up to $125,000. Now, let me emphasize that this amendment does not adversely affect retired Americans or take anything away from their retirement secretary such as IRAs, et cetera.
It also protects charitable, educational and other trusts set aside for legitimate purposes. As some experts have said, asset protection is just another term for making one self judgment proof. I would suggest that it is simply abuse of the existing system, or better yet, it's nothing more than gaming the current bankruptcy system.
This is a new development that has occurred in the last several years. The loophole is the result of laws that were adopted in five States exempting the so-called asset protection trusts from the Federal Bankruptcy Code. So for those that are interested, take note that in Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Rhode Island and Utah, all have laws protecting stashed assets, and what's really amazing to me is you don't even have to live there to take advantage of them. Now, that's a good deal if you have a lot of money.
So if we're truly serious about abuse, bankruptcy law should not allow individuals to decide how much they want to keep away from creditors by setting up a self-created trust to do exactly that. That is doing financial planning and taking advantage of the current system to secure advantages.
This loophole is, in my judgment, evidence of how the current system provides two bankruptcy laws, one for the well connected and one for middle class families. Remember, more than half of middle class Americans who declare bankruptcy do so because of massive hospital bills or other catastrophic health care costs that they didn't expect or could not anticipate. Another third of all bankruptcies are the result of job losses. Nonetheless, the bill before this Committee today creates a special rule for millionaires. Whether the assets are villas or yachts or sport cars, investments or just suitcases full of cash, they're untouchable in the bankruptcy reorganizations of the well to do, who utilize these asset protection trusts, and neither creditors nor the courts can reach them.
The right way to address this bill is to put forth--this problem rather, is to put forward a bankruptcy protection bill with one standard, one standard for everyone that treats all Americans the same regardless of income and regardless of circumstances. You know, what message does it send when Congress submits middle class debtors to a means test irrespective of State law, while permitting the wealthy to continue to place huge sums out of reach of creditors. I don't believe we want to do that. And we can address it here today.
And I would hope that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle would listen, would reflect. I dare say if this particular amendment was passed and it was returned to the Senate, you would have your bill, and at the same time we would eliminate this mechanism for abuse from the system as it now is constituted and we could hold our heads high. I see my time has expired.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. That it is.
The gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I appreciate your clarifying the State from which I come.
[Laughter.]
Mr. CANNON. This is an issue that has been debated in the Senate and soundly defeated. And let me just talk a little bit about background here. The Bankruptcy Code, section 541, generally defines what assets constitute property of the bankruptcy estate that can be made available to pay the claims of creditors. It also specifies what assets do not constitute property of the bankruptcy estate. For example, section 541(c)(2) provides that a trust is not property of the estate if the debtor's access to the trust is restricted. Thus, for example, a spendthrift trust, which is defined as a trust by the terms of the trust or by statute, a valid restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the interest that the beneficiary's imposed--pardon me for all the `legalese' but it gets to the point of where we're going I think--is established by the debtor before filing for bankruptcy relief, it would not constitute the property of the bankruptcy estate.
Under the Restatement of Trusts, a self-settled trust is a trust created by a person for his or her own benefit with a provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of person's interest, so the Restatement provides that such trust can be pierced by the person's creditors. Nevertheless, five States, Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, Rhode Island and Utah, have enacted laws that permit their citizens to establish self-settled trusts where they can place their assets outside the reach of their creditors including their homes as permitted under Delaware law. The State laws provide that property placed in such trust cannot be reached by creditors with exceptions that vary by State. Some except child, spousal support claimants and persons who suffered injury or death as a result of the settler's actions, for example.
It also appears that fraudulent transfers made by the settler to an asset protection trust may be avoided under applicable State laws as well as pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 548. Alaska appears to allow such transfers to be set aside upon the showing of actual fraud. Delaware, on the other hand, appears to allow such transfers to be set aside based on either actual or constructive fraud, including a transfer of property for less than reasonably equivalent value which is similar to Bankruptcy Code section 548.
The bill as amended closes the self-settled trust loophole. An amendment by Senator Talent authorizing the bankruptcy trustee to avoid any transfer of property by a debtor to a self-settled trust made within 10 years preceding the filing--which is the same period that the amendment suggests, by the way--preceding the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy case if the debtor is a beneficiary of such trust, and the debtor made such transfer with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor.
So what is an asset protection trust or self-settled trust? Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor the entire United States Code contain any reference to either of these terms. This is a matter of State law. To the extent that a--or an asset protection trust is a creature of State law, then this issue inherently involves States rights. The States should be able to determine for themselves what property their citizens can protect from the claims of creditors. This is not only implicit in the homestead exemption, but with regard to the status of all types of items of property including household goods and furnishings, livestock, family Bibles and church pews is determined under State law to be exempt property.
For example, according to CRS, Delaware only gives its citizens $5,000 homestead exemption, while Utahans only have a $10,000 homestead exemption. Why should these States be allowed--why shouldn't these States be allowed to have their citizens provide for their retirement nest egg by placing their assets in a trust fund, when in other States like Texas you have a huge homestead exemption?
States that have authorized asset protection trusts appear to be extremely supportive of them. Alaska's legislature announced that it had hoped to become the financial service center for the world as s result of authorizing such trusts. So why do we have such outrage? Senator Kennedy successfully had a provision included in the pending bankruptcy legislation, section 224, that protects up to $1 million in IRAs and other similar pension plans. An asset protection trust may be the only way for some individuals who live in a State with a nominal homestead exemption and no IRA exemption to protect assets from creditors. The issue should be studied and determined. We need to work on this. The fact is if we're going to move a bill out today, this is an issue that has been dealt with, has been debated, has been argued. It's been considered. The bill has been amended to include the basic provisions here, and I urge my colleagues to vote no on the amendment.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. WATT. I move to strike the last word.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman's recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman and Members, all of what Mr. Cannon said would probably be a lot more rational if the underlying bill didn't set a national standard for homesteads too, and so we set a national standard for homestead exemptions at $125,000, yet what he's saying is that people ought to be able to be allowed to pour all of their non-homestead assets into these trusts and have them exempt because it's a matter of State law.
That is just absolutely inconsistent. I mean if you're going to have a national standard on homestead exemptions, it seems to me rational that you would have a national standard on non-homestead assets, and I think that's the only thing that Mr. Delahunt's trying to get at here. It is interesting that when some of us were trying to protect States' rights in many, many, many other contexts, it didn't mean a hill of beans to the people on this Committee. Yet when it's convenient to hide behind States' rights, all of a sudden we're out here talking about States' rights again, and you know, I thought we had this debate on the homestead. We resolved this debate on the homestead. So why would we have a different standard for non-homestead assets than we have for homestead assets?
I for the life of me can't understand that. So I would just encourage my colleagues to at least try to be consistent about this stuff, and encourage them to support this amendment. And I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt. Those in favor will say aye.
Opposed, no.
The noes appear to have it. The noes have it. The amendment's not agreed to.
Are there further amendments?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A recorded vote is ordered. Those in favor of the Delahunt amendment will, as your name are called, answer aye. Those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. LUNGREN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Issa?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Flake?
Mr. FLAKE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. FORBES. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
Mr. BOUCHER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher, no. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. WEINER. Yes.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their votes? Gentleman from Florida, Mr. Keller?
Mr. KELLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from Florida, Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. I reported. I shouted out from the back and I wasn't clear whether she got it.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, I did not have Mr. Watt.
Mr. WATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 10 ayes and 15 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed to. Are there further amendments?
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr. Berman.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment, Berman-Meehan amendment at the desk.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256 offered by Mr. Berman and Mr. Meehan. Page 194, after line 2, insert the following (and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate): section 322----
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will continue to read until some of the Members get the amendment.
The CLERK. Exemption for medically distressed debtors. Section 522 of title XI, United States Code as amended by sections 224, 308 and 322, is amended by adding at the end the following: R(1), for a debtor who is a medically distressed debtor, if the debtor elects to exempt property----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is considered as read and the gentleman from California will be recognized for 5 minutes.
[The amendment follows:]
Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Basically this is about creating a uniform Federal floor for homestead exemptions of $150,000 or less, $150,000 basically for medically distressed debtors. The statistics clearly point out that there have been large increases in medical debt and bankruptcy cases, caused by medical debts, coupled with significant increases in real estate prices, and that has led to a new and rapidly-growing problem ignored by this bill.
This amendment would create a uniform Federal floor for homestead exemptions of $150,000, applicable only to debtors who have had very substantial medical debts or a very substantial loss of income due to medical problems, losses of over 50 percent of household income. This amendment would simply permit those homeowners who have suffered serious medical problems under the standards of this bill, with losses again over 50 percent of household income to file for bankruptcy without having to give us homes where they have $150,000 or less of equity.
The notion of forcing people out of their homes after illnesses or accidents is made more outrageous by the fact that this bill does nothing to deal with the handful of States where debtors of all kinds, famous sports figures, physicians who drop their medical malpractice insurance, real estate tycoons, can save millions of dollars in homestead. Americans, particularly those who face serious medical problems, are entitled to a more evenhanded justice. Families who face insurmountable debt problems following serious medical problems are confronted with the fact that they can obtain relief from their debts and bankruptcy only if they give up their homes. In nearly half of all States homestead exemptions are under $25,000. There are no escapes for families with high debts and home equity that exceeds that for instance very low homestead exemption. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case a family with equity greater than the State exemption limits, which in some States are under $10,000, must give up its home. In Chapter 13 the family must pay the creditors the amount equal to the greater equity which it can usually not afford. A family should not have to lose its home to obtain relief from debts caused by serious medical problems.
The amount of equity a homeowner can protect in bankruptcy has not kept up with the rise in home prices. While the value of even modest homes climbs in some areas, the protection of the law does not, leaving even people of modest means with a choice between a home or discharging medical debts. This falls particularly hard on elderly and disabled homeowners who often live solely on Social Security benefits. With incomes of 800 or $1,000 per month they could live in their current homes which may be paid off or have low monthly costs, but if they are forced out of these homes, they cannot afford to rent a decent place to live, and in fact, these homeowners would have no bankruptcy relief available to them.
The purpose of this amendment is to rectify it.
Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. BERMAN. I'd be happy to yield.
Mr. CONYERS. I want to commend the gentleman for this amendment because it specifically covers the problem of people with severe health care, and the recent study in bankruptcy revealed that one half of the people forced into bankruptcy is because of medical bills or immediate hospital costs, and I wanted the gentleman to know that the gentlelady from California, Zoe Lofgren, is entirely supportive of this amendment and will submit her own statement in support of it. She's unduly delayed and in----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the statement of Ms. Lofgren will appear in the record at this time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lofgren follows:]
Many of us have loved ones who have battled a grave illness or serious injury. If you've ever had the misfortune of being in that situation, you know that it is an incredibly stressful experience, both on the mind and the pocketbook. But incredibly, this bill chooses to treat those families the same as spendthrifts.
A recent study conducted by professors at Harvard Medical and Law Schools demonstrated that about half of all personal bankruptcies today can be traced to severe medical illnesses or injuries. Among those, average unreimbursed medical costs totaled nearly $12,000. Nevertheless, the study found that these families did everything they could to pay their medical bills and avoid bankruptcy. One in five skipped meals. One-third had their electricity cut off. Almost half lost their phone service.
Incredibly, these families also cut back on needed medications. In fact, half went without needed prescriptions, and a full 60% went without a needed doctor appointment.
I cannot understand why the proponents of this bill want to treat these families the same as irresponsible spendthrifts. They are hard-working, middle class Americans who have had the misfortune of facing illness without adequate medical insurance. Yet this bill treats them the same as those who went on a spending spree. I think we should distinguish between a parent who has to pay for their child's cancer treatments and a 22-year-old who bought too many plasma screen televisions.
I had planned to offer an amendment today that would have exempted from the harsh means test those families facing bankruptcy due to a serious medical hardship. Unfortunately, I was not able to do so because of a conflicting commitment. However, I have no doubt that the Majority would have rejected that amendment just as they rejected Rep. Berman and Rep. Meehan's medical homestead amendment and every other reasonable amendment offered to this bill.
I am extremely disappointed that the Committee chose to abrogate its responsibilities and ignore families struggling to make ends meet in the face of a medical crisis. Unfortunately, once again, the power and influence of large corporations took precedence over average Americans in the Republican-controlled Congress.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from Utah. Gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just begin by saying we are, everyone on this Committee is extraordinarily aware of the particular burden that medical problems cause and the resulting bankruptcies. But if I could clarify a couple of things, Mr. Berman, by asking a couple of questions.
As I read this, this overrides State law and creates a new Federal exemption for people that have medical emergencies that cause bankruptcy; is that right?
Mr. BERMAN. And I amends the Federal Bankruptcy Bill that will become Federal bankruptcy law, to provide a $150,000 equity exemptions so that people--for those people who have over 50 percent of their income lost because of medical bills or because of an injury that costs----
Mr. CANNON. Right. But that would preempt State laws in those cases that have a different homestead?
Mr. BERMAN. For purposes of bankruptcy, not for purposes of other issues, just for purposes of bankruptcy, which is a Federal issue.
Mr. CANNON. Certainly bankruptcy is, but bankruptcy has always recognized homestead as a State issue, and the effect of this, if I understand it--I'm just looking it over now--but the effect would be that a couple filing jointly for bankruptcy would have a $300,000 exemption as I read your language.
Mr. BERMAN. $150,000.
Mr. CANNON. But if you had a joint filing would that not double to 300,000?
Mr. BERMAN. No, no.
Mr. CANNON. Can you help me with where the language is that makes it the single, because you talk about the debtor's aggregate interest.
Mr. BERMAN. You have to get back to the base bill. Why don't we do it the other way around? Why don't you show me why it would?
Mr. CANNON. Okay. We'll----
Mr. BERMAN. You got a base bill----
Mr. CANNON. I actually don't think I have the burden. It seems to me--and I'll let just the Members of the Committee make the judgment--that, as I read it very quickly here----
Mr. BERMAN. It deals with household and the home equity. It's not, in other words it's about----
Mr. CANNON. Reclaiming my time, we disagree and we'll just have to have people exercise their judgment on that.
It also--you know, people sometimes get ill and then get healthy and they overcome their problems.
Mr. BERMAN. Yeah, that's a real problem.
Mr. CANNON. I don't see how we--well, it is a wonderful thing that happens I guess occasionally and maybe even often. We agree, I might say, that home prices have gone up, but the States have the responsibility under the homestead relationship with the Bankruptcy Act to deal with that.
And just I'd like to submit for the record, Mr. Chairman, a letter to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, from the U.S. Department of Justice, signed by Mr. Will Moschella, that relates to the study that Mr. Conyers referred to, and if I could just read one paragraph of that----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection. The letter will be included in the record.
[The material referred to follows:]
Mr. CANNON. `In general, the data describing medical-related expenses contained in official documents filed by chapter 7 debtors reveal that slightly more than 5 percent of their general unsecured debt is medical-related. The conclusion that almost 50 percent of consumer bankruptcies are `medical related' requires a broad definition and generally is not substantiated by the official documents filed by debtors.'
So I----
Mr. BERMAN. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CANNON. Yes.
Mr. BERMAN. Two points. One, although the gentleman is wrong on the larger issue, he, it turns out, is correct. If they are filing jointly, then each gets the $150,000 exemption, so I wanted to clarify that.
And who wrote that report? That's a very familiar name.
Mr. CANNON. Yes. I think everybody here would know Will Moschella----
Mr. BERMAN. Used to work on the majority side, right?
Mr. CANNON. He certainly, because we have a Republican President who has--who names people to political positions, but I think everyone here would also recognize that Mr. Moschella is a very thoughtful and reasonable person and he's gone down on record, so if you disagree with the conclusion you might want to check with him.
Mr. Smith, did you want----
Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. If the gentleman will yield just for a minute.
Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to add a couple of other points. One is that this amendment was offered in the Senate last week and was defeated on a bipartisan vote of 58-39, so that's a good example of an amendment that received bipartisan opposition. Second of all, it does override States' rights. And third of all, as the Chairman has pointed out repeatedly today, this fractures the very closely crafted compromise that existed to try to get this bill through today.
Mr. BERMAN. Does the gentleman promise----
Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. And for those reasons I'd oppose the amendment as well.
Mr. CANNON. Reclaiming my time I urge my colleagues to vote no on the----
Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentleman has expired. Gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I move to strike the last word.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. DELAHUNT. I just can't allow that comment about this overrules States' rights. I think it was my friend from Texas that made that comment, when over the course of the past months, years, this Committee has preempted State law in terms of torts, securities litigation, they want to do it in terms of medical malpractice. They want to do it in terms of whatever--class actions. I mean with all due respect to my friend from Texas, give me a break. I mean that argument, that dog just simply doesn't hunt, as the Chairman of the Crime Subcommittee would understand.
Mr. WATT. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. DELAHUNT. And I'll yield to my friend from North Carolina.
Mr. WATT. Isn't it true that this bill already sets a national standard for bankruptcy--for homesteads? It doesn't do that?
Mr. BERMAN. No. It allows----
Mr. WATT. It caps it, doesn't it?
Mr. BERMAN. No, it allow--well, it does in certain situations, but basically----
Mr. WATT. It caps it I mean.
Mr. BERMAN. In limited situations, but it allows States with enormous homestead exemptions that allow wealthy people to avoid paying off their debts and still keep huge mansions in those States like I think Texas, to continue to do so.
It's just another one of the deficiencies in a bill which I actually am happy is being pushed through in the fashion that it is, because it--in a perverse way it reminds me of why I'm a Democrat.
Mr. DELAHUNT. The time is still mine, and----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. I could always count on the gentlelady from Texas, my friend, Sheila Jackson Lee. I yield to her what time I have left.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. You certainly can, Mr. Delahunt. Thank you and you were amazed at the comment regarding States' rights. I'm amazed at the comments that seem to suggest a particularly orchestrated process that we can't do anything to improve the legislation because there's some sort of external commitment to riding the backs of the Senate. And I've always had the understanding that these are two distinct bodies with two distinct lines of reasoning. And if this is all that we're doing in the Judiciary Committee, then shame on us again.
I think the gentleman's amendment is a very thoughtful amendment, and the reason is it is well documented that the middle class are most burdened in the instances of bankruptcies by catastrophic illnesses. It is clear.
Now, we can either concede today and ignore this amendment, and say that what we want to do is to put every family out in the streets, and continue then the pathway of destruction, or we can be reasoned and establish ourselves as an independent thinking body and support Mr. Berman's amendment. I think Mr. Meehan--I'm not sure--is that on that amendment.
Mr. MEEHAN. Yes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And make a very good point about what this bill should be standing for. It's helping people rebuild their lives, not helping people destroy their lives.
With that, I yield to the distinguished gentleman his time if he desires to have it. Mr. Delahunt, I yield back to you if you desire to have it.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Who is moving?
Mr. MEEHAN. It's me.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Oh, the other gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. MEEHAN. I am also a cosponsor of this amendment, and I was out at another hearing when the amendment was brought up. I want to correct something that Mr. Smith said, and this is not the same amendment that was debated in the Senate. In the Senate it was a quarter, the standard was a quarter of the income on medical bills. This is one-half a person's income towards medical bills.
We're saying that medical costs are not spending sprees, not personal irresponsibility, but the single largest causes of bankruptcy. About half of the filers cite medical costs as a major factor of their bankruptcy. The average unreimbursed medical costs were $12,000. 45 million people in America go without health insurance every day. They are one accident or one illness away from financial ruin. But as this study found done by Harvard University, most people whose health care costs drove them to bankruptcy were uninsured but still had thousands of dollars in medical bills.
I believe that the Congress's failure to expand health care coverage in America and bring down health care costs are one of the reasons why medical bankruptcies have increased 2,200 percent since 1980. This amendment inserts a teeny bit of compassion and common sense to this bill. For debtors who are medically distressed, it provides a modest homestead exemption. Under this bill wealthy people can move to States with unlimited homestead exemptions, declare bankruptcy and shield their assets, even if they have mansions. But a family who has someone who falls ill can't afford the hospital bills, would lose their modest home, and that's entirely unfair. This amendment is narrowly tailored to apply only to--with majority medical expense.
To be defined here as medically distressed, you either have to be out of work for more than a month due to an illness in your family, or have medical bills that are more than 50 percent of your household income, which is different than the Senate bill. The amendment gives a reasonable household exemption of $150,000 for medically distressed debtors.
Nearly half of all States, the homestead exemption is less than 25,000, and several States don't have any homestead exemption. So this bill sets the floor at 150,000 in home equity, and despite what proponents of this bill would like to suggest, most people who file for bankruptcy because of medical expenses are not irresponsible. They're families who have had complications with the birth of a child. They're working men and women caring for a sick spouse or an elderly parent, or they're seniors who are living on a fixed Social Security check.
So I support this amendment, would urge my colleagues to support the amendment. And I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California, Mr. Berman. Those in favor will say aye.
Opposed, no.
The noes appear to have it. rollcall is ordered. All those in favor of the Berman amendment will as your names are called answer aye, those opposed no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. LUNGREN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. BACHUS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. INGLIS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Keller?
Mr. KELLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. Mr. Issa?
Mr. ISSA. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
Mr. FLAKE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Flake, no. Mr. Pence?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. FORBES. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye.
[Pause.]
The CLERK. Oh. Mr. Boucher, no. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. MEEHAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
Mr. WEXLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. WEINER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their vote? Gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Green?
Mr. GREEN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Green, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 13 ayes and 18 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed to. Are there further amendments? The gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk. We'll try again on the redrafted amendment No. 1 that hopefully will satisfy Mr- --
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report.
Mr. NADLER- Cannon.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Second attempt.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256 offered by Mr. Nadler. Page 210, after line 13, insert the following (and make such technical and conforming----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is considered as read and the gentleman from New York will be recognized for 5 minutes.
[The amendment follows:]
Mr. NADLER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I'll be brief. I started describing this amendment earlier before the point of order.
This amendment would make debts arising from civil rights violations nondischargeable. It includes in the amendment the civil rights violations listed in the Federal Criminal Code, any civil judgment arising under civil rights violation including a 1983 violation action that is an action for violation of civil rights under color of law, or an intentional violation of a valid court order enforcing civil rights law described in the amendment.
It also includes offenses under State law that consists of conduct that would be a civil rights crime described in the Federal Criminal Code.
Finally, it repairs an omission in the current code that makes fines and restitution ordered under the Federal Criminal Code nondischargeable, but not under State law. My amendment would clarify that that includes fines and restitution ordered under State law.
So if you violate the right to vote, the right to work, the rights of a person wearing the uniform of the United States military, the right to the free exercise of religion, freedom of--access to clinic entrances or any other federally protected rights, you will not be able to abuse the Bankruptcy Code either to escape your debts or to force your victims to chase you across the country through bankruptcy courts trying to collect lawful judgments.
We know that that is now a common strategy, and even where it fails, the uncertainty in the law gives tort fees as the opportunity to inflict more damage and more expense on the victims through abuse of the Bankruptcy Code.
Mr. Chairman, this bill, the underlying bill greatly expands the kinds of debts that are deemed nondischargeable. It makes nondischargeable even small cash advances on credit cards prior to the filing of a case. It may not be enough money to keep your kids in Huggies, but it's enough to be nondischargeable. We're protecting the helpless credit card companies. If you use your credit card to pay your taxes online, something the IRS has been urging us to do for years, that would become a nondischargeable debt. We seem to have found ways to make all sorts of debts nondischargeable in this bill.
I would hope that with this amendment we could go on record and make the law crystal clear that if all these other things can become nondischargeable, then debts incurred as a result of the deliberate violations of Federal or State law to violate people's civil rights should also be nondischargeable so that you cannot violate people's civil rights and use the bankruptcy courts to evade your responsibilities under the law.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. I move to strike the last word.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman's recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won't use the 5 minutes. My colleague indicated that he wouldn't be real extensive in his arguments, so I won't be either. I'll keep mine brief.
I would rise in opposition to this amendment. This really, this amendment is just a revised version of the Schumer amendment, which has been responsible for scuttling the bankruptcy--passage of the entire bankruptcy bill for some time now. And it was defeated, this amendment was defeated in the Senate last week by a vote of 46 yeas and 53 noes.
The Bankruptcy Code already prevents the discharge of most types of debts resulting from violent or destructive activities. Current law already clearly applies to willful and malicious acts of violence committed by, for example, pro-life activists at an abortion clinic, that would result in injury either to a person or to property. In fact, there is no reported case specifying otherwise. CRS, for example, has stated that the specific intent requirement necessary to establish a violation of face would arise from behavior comparable to an intentional tort, and thus would be nondischargeable under 11 USC 532(a)(6). That provides that a debt for willful and malicious injury by a debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity is nondischargeable.
So in other words, willful or wanton acts, malicious acts, would already be nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code, so this amendment is unnecessary and really adds nothing. And as I indicated originally, this was the very amendment which scuttled the passage of this very important legislation before, so I would urge my colleagues to vote no.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman yield back?
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from Ohio yield back? Gentleman from Ohio, do you yield back?
Mr. CHABOT. I yield back, yes.
Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from California.
Mr. BERMAN. Move to strike the last word.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman's recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. BERMAN. Yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, the remarks that we just heard from the distinguished Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee really don't bear on this amendment. It is true the current code makes nondischargeable malicious and violent torts, but we're not talking necessarily about malicious and violent torts. We're talking about deliberate violations of civil rights of all kinds. And, yes, this would include within it some of what the Schumer amendment in the Senate--which I would remind the distinguished Chairman originated in this Committee a number of years ago as the Nadler amendment before they took it up in the Senate--would cover.
But this considerably broader and it is saying that if you deliberately the civil rights of someone else and there is a--and violates the law, the Federal or State law, and there's a judgment against you, you cannot abuse the bankruptcy courts to get rid of that judgment.
Now, the argument that this scuttles the bill, that's not an argument to the policy. The bill ought to say if credit cards debt incurred to pay your taxes on line is nondischargeable, then certainly you shouldn't be able to get rid of a court judgment against you for a deliberate offense against someone else's civil rights by use of the Bankruptcy Code.
The principle is sound, and we are to improve the bill, which is a bad enough bill, but make it a little better, by adopting this amendment.
I yield back. I thank the gentleman and I yield back to him.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California yield back? The time belongs to the gentleman from California.
The question is on the Berman--excuse me--the Nadler amendment. Now, this is the Nadler amendment, it's not the Schumer amendment. Those in favor will say aye.
Opposed, no?
The noes appear to have it. The noes--okay, a rollcall will be ordered. Those in favor of the Nadler amendment will as your names are called answer aye, those opposed no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. LUNGREN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. BACHUS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Keller?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Issa?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Pence?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. FORBES. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
Mr. BOUCHER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher, no. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Waters?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. MEEHAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
Mr. DELAHUNT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, aye. Mr. Wexler?
Mr. WEXLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Wexler, aye. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. WEINER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Members who wish to cast or change their vote? The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Green, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report. Gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their vote? The clerk will try again to report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 11 ayes and 17 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed to. Are there further amendments?
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have an amendment at the desk, No. 004.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256 offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia. Page 13, after line 23, insert the following (and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate): E, subparagraphs (a) through (c) shall not apply----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection the amendment is considered as read, the gentleman from Virginia will be recognized for 5 minutes.
[The amendment follows:]
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, the rest of the reading would have said that the court may not dismiss or convert a case based on any form of means testing if the substantial portion of the indebtedness was incurred as a result of illness of the debtor, a dependent of the debtor or the debtor's spouse if not the dependent of the debtor.
Mr. Chairman, we're talking about bankruptcy abuse. Bankruptcy filings have increased lately in recent years, and some of the people who file for bankruptcy haven't been financially responsible, but the more likely explanation is that the consumer bankruptcy results were something beyond their control such as a divorce, major illness or job loss.
The truth is that many people are just one paycheck away or a job loss away or an uncovered medical catastrophe away from bankruptcy. We know at the present time there are about 1.5 million people who go into bankruptcy every year. Half of those people who go into bankruptcy go into bankruptcy because of medical bills. About three-fourths of those who go into bankruptcy because of medical bills even have insurance. But nonetheless the explosion of health care costs have added such a burden to these families that they've ended up in bankruptcy.
Mr. Chairman, if the purpose of the legislation is to deal with spendthrifts who are abusers of credit, we ought to distinguish them from the hard working Americans, basically middle class working families who have health insurance, or those on the right of the margin who wish they had health insurance, and those who are irresponsible in acquiring debt.
Mr. Chairman, if we don't adopt this amendment we'll be sending the message that if you get sick, you're abusing the system. Mr. Chairman, we need to make sure that individuals who are afforded the protection of Chapter 7 bankruptcy, if a substantial portion of their bills were incurred as a result of illness, and I would hope we would adopt the amendment.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentlemen from Utah.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I might ask, Mr. Scott, on line 3 it says `on any form of means testing if, the a substantial portion,' but I take it the comma and the `the' should be stricken? I don't know that it makes sense otherwise.
Mr. SCOTT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think the after--`if' the comma should not be there.
Mr. CANNON. And the `the' should not be there either?
Mr. SCOTT. If the--right.
Mr. CANNON. So it means testing----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection the amendment is modified.
Mr. SCOTT. To delete the comma and the `the' on line 3.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again we're dealing with issues that are similar to what we just dealt with prior to the last amendment, and I'm not going to belabor it except to encourage my--Members of the Committee to vote against this amendment. It prevents the--which prevents the case filed by a debtor from being dismissed under the means test. The special circumstances provision in section 102(a) addresses the concerns that are raised by this amendment I believe, and the amendment does not address circumstances where the debtor is currently healthy, and what happens if the debtor's a millionaire? That we're not dealing with--that's been raised significantly here.
This is on page 12 of the bill. The paragraph beginning with line 5 deals with those special medical--those circumstances such as a serious medical condition which I think deals with this issue appropriately.
Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman make that citation again, please?
Mr. CANNON. Yeah. On page 12 of the printed bill, it's a--line 5, capital B(i) or 1, and it's really line 7 that says `such as a serious medical condition' is one of those special circumstances. So I think that we've actually dealt with this issue in this bill. So I would encourage the Members of the Committee to vote against this amendment, and yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the adoption of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in favor will say aye.
Opposed, no.
The noes appear to have it. The noes have it and the amendment is not agreed to. Are there further amendments?
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott.
Mr. SCOTT. I have an amendment at the desk, 003.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
Mr. SCOTT. And, Mr. Chairman, under the--in light of the actions of the majority I'd want to take up 005 at the same time and take them en bloc.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report amendments 003 and 005, and while the clerk is doing that, the staff will distribute both amendments. The clerk will read.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256 offered by Mr. Scott of Virginia. Page 13, after line 23, insert the following (and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate:) E, subparagraphs (a) through (c) shall not apply and the court may not dismiss or----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection the amendments will be considered en bloc and without objection the amendments will be considered as read, and the gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes.
[The en bloc amendments follow:]
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 003 allows a spouse to file for bankruptcy if their--a person to file for bankruptcy if their spouse--if a substantial of the bills are due to business losses incurred by a spouse who has died or deserted. For example, if a wife co-signs some business loans on behalf of her husband, and the husband--the business fails because the husband died or disappears and deserts the wife, the wife is left holding the bag and bills she can never pay.
The bill would deny bankruptcy relief for the spouse if the person is making more than the median amount, say, $50,000. If they co-signed $500,000 worth of bills that spouse would be left holding the bag and unable to declare bankruptcy. If they can pay a couple hundred dollars a month, $10,000 over 5 years, they would not be able to file bankruptcy. That essentially means that everything over food and rent would be garnisheed from the person because they had the bad judgment to co-sign their spouse's business loans. It may be bad judgment but it's certainly not abusive.
The other amendment, Mr. Chairman, is if your bills are due, if you've gotten into financial difficulty because you lost your job through no fault of your own, you shouldn't be denied the opportunity to file for bankruptcy. After Enron and WorldCom we found that a lot of people lose their jobs through no fault of their own because their companies went bankrupt. Traditionally in the midst of--or if it's a downward economy, traditionally we deal with widespread job loss by protecting the employees by doing such things as extending unemployment benefits. Now we're punishing the employee by protecting the creditors and bills they can't pay. American families would be well served if Congress addressed the widespread economic insecurity that households face rather than close this door to an option of last resort.
Mr. Chairman, this job loss amendment would apply if the indebtedness was a result of unforeseen loss of employment through no fault of the debtor. So, Mr. Chairman, we should not deny bankruptcy relief if you lose your job through no fault of your own, or because you had the bad judgment to co-sign your spouse's business loan and you got deserted, or the spouse died and the business went under.
I would hope the we would adopt these two amendments.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman yield back?
Mr. SCOTT. I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm working hard on understanding this. As the other side knows, I'm a slow reader and relatively dim-witted, and I'll acknowledge that but still try and help get an understanding of where we're going and why I don't think these amendments are necessary.
As I understand this, this would create an exemption to the needs based test as a grounds for dismissal so people would not be dismissed if this happened. I have a couple of problems with them in particular. In first place they are vague, so that what if the debtor is Mr. or Mrs. Trump or a widowed Mr. or Mrs. Trump? Why are we dealing with business losses in the first----
Mr. SCOTT. Will the gentleman yield on that point, on that point?
Mr. CANNON. Certainly.
Mr. SCOTT. If it's Mrs. Trump and she's co-signed the bills and he deserts here and she's left with billions of dollars or indebtedness, she would be unable to file for bankruptcy because she can pay $2,000 a year for the next 5 years.
Mr. CANNON. I think this amendment, as I understand it, Mr. Scott, is dealing with the same section and deals with a similar situation as the last amendment, and I believe that that would be taken care of by the special needs section that we just quoted a few moments ago, so that we already have the situation where the debtor can be discharged of the indebtedness under these circumstances as I read them.
Mr. SCOTT. So a spouse deserting you as part of a special circumstance is defined?
Mr. CANNON. If you're looking at that section B(i), and as you go down to line 9, to the extent that such special circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative. So if a spouse dies, if there's a huge business debt, I believe that would be covered by the language that is currently in the bill, and specifically the job loss. So you have adjustments of current monthly income which is job loss, as I read----
Mr. SCOTT. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. CANNON. Certainly.
Mr. SCOTT. Is it your statement that the legislative intent of the bill is to cover people in this--as a special circumstance who lose their job through no fault of their own?
Mr. CANNON. Well, I think yes. I'm comfortable with that given the language of the section on line 10 that justifies. So you have to prove it, but I think that's a relatively straightforward process and deals with the issues that you've--that you're suggesting here, and so I would ask my colleagues on the Committee to reject these amendments, and yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendments en bloc offered by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. Those in favor will say aye.
Opposed, no.
The noes appear to have it, the noes have it. The amendment's not agreed to.
Are there further amendments?
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan.
Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
Mr. MEEHAN. Designated 001, Conyers 001.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256 offered by Mr. Meehan. Page 13, strike lines 14 through 23, and insert the following (and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate:) D, subparagraphs (a) through (c) shall not----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection the amendment will be considered as read, and the gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 5 minutes.
[The amendment follows:]
Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This amendment is intended to protect injured or disabled veterans from the harsh and humiliating procedures established for debtors under the newly established means test.
This bankruptcy bill is based on the presumption that people who go into bankruptcy are just trying to abuse the system, and that's why it sets up an artificial means test to prevent people from trying to get a fresh start under Chapter 7. I believe that members of the military who swear to defend this country and risk their lives overseas, the presumption should be that they are responsible people. And so this amendment aims to exempt, all veterans returning home disabled, from the artificial means test.
According to the GAO in recent years about 16,000 active duty service members have filed for bankruptcy annually. But with our military extended from Iraq to Afghanistan and reservists separated from their families and jobs for long stretches of time, that number is sure to increase.
There were efforts in the Senate to protect all service members from the means test and the abusive practices by lenders, but many of them were turned back. Ultimately the Senate agreed on a more narrowly tailored protection for only disabled service members. The Senate amendment said that disabled veterans filing for bankruptcy, whose indebtedness occurred primarily while on active duty are exempt from means test. But the Senate amendment fails to exempt disabled service members who accumulated, amounted debt after their return home but because of the injury or the disability sustained while on active duty.
We all know that the members of the military who serve oftentimes have injuries that are diagnosed when they get back to the United States. There's been a lot of attention on PTSD, post traumatic stress syndrome. This amendment builds on the Senate compromise. It protects disabled veterans whose indebtedness occurred while on active duty as well as those whose indebtedness primarily as a result of their injuries or disabilities. More than a million service members have served in Iraq. More than 11,000 have been wounded. According to the New England Journal of Medicine, 16 percent of Iraq combat veterans are returning home with post traumatic stress disorder or other psychological conditions.
Now, I've gone to Walter Reed Hospital and visited kids who are missing arms and missing legs. They're struggling to recover. They might be unable to work for months or years, and they may have enormous personal costs associated with their ongoing medical treatments. This means test in this bill establish its completely arbitrary cost for expenses that have nothing to do with the kinds of new expenses that disabled service members might actually be facing. All this amendment does is protect the rights that disabled service members have when they file for bankruptcy. It gives judges the discretion to determine whether they should be eligible for Chapter 11, Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, and does not presume that they are trying to game the system.
I urge my colleagues to adapt--to adopt this amendment, and I urge them to look at the language that we're talking about, the indebted--what the Senate language says is the indebtedness occurred primarily during a period when he or she was in active duty. This language simply says that the indebtedness occurred primarily as a result of an injury or disability resulting from active duty. Clearly, a minimum we ought to be able to do for a man or a woman who's injured in Iraq, who comes home only to find out they have injuries that they weren't aware of, that we can excuse them from this means test, this arbitrary means test set up in this bill.
Now, surely, even a rush to get this bill out no matter what the amendments that are offered, surely we can consider this amendment.
Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. MEEHAN. I would yield to the ranking----
Mr. CONYERS. I only want to underscore the importance of us supporting those members of the armed services who are not just protecting us but putting their lives at risk in an effort to fight a very difficult kind of war, unlike any that we've been forced to deal with before. And I concur completely in the excellent way that he has put forward the logic in this amendment.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. MEEHAN. And again, it's overwhelming evidence that----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.
Mr. MEEHAN- these members get PTSD and everything else.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize just for a moment here. We apparently got the wrong amendment initially here, so I've just been looking this over. And if I might ask Mr. Meehan just one question.
On line 12 of your amendment it says: result of an injury or disability resulting from (1) active duty and then performing homeland defense. Does `resulting from' mean that it happened while on either active or performing, or----
Mr. MEEHAN. No. The question----
Mr. CANNON. Does it have to be something involved--that, you know, if a guy is on active duty but he's out at a bar and he gets in a fistfight and gets disabled, do you have--what do you mean by that?
Mr. MEEHAN. No. The injury would be resulting from active duty. In other words, if somebody, as we all know from veterans coming back develop PTSD, and the question also is when the indebtedness occurred. But, no, this is anyone whose injured primarily as a result of, injury primarily the result of active duty. And oftentimes when a service member comes home and it's determined that they have PTSD, for example, then that is an injury that occurred as a result of active duty. Yet, if the indebtedness was not incurred while they were on active duty, then they don't get any relief under this amendment. That's a fundamental flaw in what the Senate adopted, and I think we ought to correct it here.
Mr. CANNON. May I just ask, so if someone who is on active duty is in a bar and gets in a fight, does that result from the active duty since it's--you know, he's in the theater, but it's, you know, a different circumstance than what we normally think of as post--PTSD. I don't--I'm just trying to understand where you're going with----
Mr. MEEHAN. Well, I can tell you that PTSD, the military has changed their policy. We now require, when soldiers come back, to have a full examination----
Mr. CANNON. Reclaiming my time, I'm not talking about PTSD so much as trying to understand, do you intend to cover everything that happens while a person is on active duty----
Mr. MEEHAN. Only if the injury is as a result of their service on active duty. In other words----
Mr. CANNON. So the fight in a bar in Iraq is not going to qualify--that is a fight with another American----
Mr. MEEHAN. Well, if it's in Iraq, it may well qualify, it may well qualify. But here's--you're missing the point. What this is about is when the indebtedness occurred, so even under the Senate amendment if the indebtedness occurred while this soldier was in Iraq, I believe he's covered by the Senate language.
However, if a soldier comes back to the United States, it's determined he has PTSD, and the indebtedness occurs after that disability has been diagnosed, and the indebtedness starts to build once a soldier comes back to the United States, they wouldn't get relief under the Senate language.
Mr. CANNON. Reclaiming my time, I think I understand where you're coming from on that. I'm unclear as to the scope, but let me just point out that the bill already has very substantial protections for the military in it. The bill's needs-based test includes numerous safe harbors and exceptions for special circumstances. As amended, the special circumstances exception specifically mentions a debtor who is subject to a call or order to active duty in the armed forces. And, as amended, the needs-based test has a special exception just for debtors who are disabled veterans if indebtedness occurred primarily during a period when the debtor was on active duty or performing a homeland defense activity.
As amended, the bill specifies that the absolute safe harbor from all types of dismissal motions, under section 707(b), applies to a veteran. As amended, the bill excuses a debtor if he or she is on active military duty in a military combat zone from the mandatory credit counseling and financial management training requirements.
I think we've done what we can do for our members of the military, and so I would encourage the Members of the Committee to vote no on this amendment.
Mr. MEEHAN. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. CANNON. Certainly.
Mr. MEEHAN. But what I'm talking about here is people who have been injured or have a disability as a result of service, for example, in Iraq. If you want language, for example, to exempt anyone who gets in a bar fight in Iraq, I would be glad to do that, but what----
Mr. CANNON. No. I'm just trying to understand what you want to do but----
Mr. MEEHAN. What I'm talking about is if a soldier who serves in Iraq and comes home without a leg or another--without an arm, as they have at Walter Reed Hospital, literally thousands of them, and they have PTSD, as many of them do, and their indebtedness starts to grow when they get back from active duty, they ought to be covered by the same kind of exemption here.
Mr. CANNON. Are you suggesting that--you've talked about post traumatic stress syndrome----
Mr. MEEHAN. As one example.
Mr. CANNON. As an example, but is that because----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Meehan. Those in favor will say aye.
Opposed, no.
The noes appear to have it.
Mr. MEEHAN. rollcall, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. rollcall will be ordered. The question is on the Meehan amendment. Those in favor will as your names are called answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. LUNGREN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. BACHUS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler?
Mr. HOSTETTLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Hostettler, no. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Keller?
Mr. KELLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. Mr. Issa?
Mr. ISSA. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Pence?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. FORBES. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. MEEHAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. WEINER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their votes? Gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Boucher?
Mr. BOUCHER. Votes no.
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from California, Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Am I recorded?
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Jackson Lee is not recorded.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members in the--gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Mr. Chairman, I vote no.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Inglis.
Mr. INGLIS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Any other Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. Aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Is Ms. Waters recorded?
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Waters is recorded with aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 19 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed to. Are there further amendments?
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Can I have a parliamentary inquiry, pleases? What is the order of selecting people to do amendments?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The order is at the discretion of the Chair. The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. That's what I notice, so let me say that I reject the discretion of the Chair. I've had my hand up forever and ever----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from Texas is out of order.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. You need to be fair.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from--the Chair has always been fair and----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Not really.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Well, the clerk will report the amendment of the gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I'm planning on staying here all evening till you call on me.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from Texas will be called on in due course. Which amendment does the----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, it will be 12 tonight and I'll be right here waiting to be called on. You're rudely unfair.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Had my hand up forever.
Mr. SCHIFF. The amendment is numbered 002.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment of the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. Amendment to S. 256 offered by Mr. Schiff. Page 92, after line 5, insert the following (and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate:).
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is considered as read, and the gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.
[The amendment follows:]
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I will keep this very brief and it won't consume 5 minutes.
This amendment would authorize a study by the GAO to determine any effects the bill may have on the ability of a parent to pay child support or the ability of a parent to collect child support. Probably the most significant concern about the bill for me is the collateral consequence of the bill, where those trying to collect child support may be placed in indirect or direct competition with credit card companies or others who are in a much stronger position to collect on outstanding debts than those who are entitled to child support.
This amendment is identical to the one I offered 4 years ago that made it into the manager's amendment but was later removed from the manager's amendment. It would merely require that a study be conducted so that we can determine, after a suitable period of time elapses, if there has been an adverse impact in this area. Some have asserted that portions of the bill will actually help those attempting to collect child support, but I think it is still unclear what the impact will be on those who are entitled to child support and maybe unable to collect it. This amendment will provide for a good and objective analysis to help us determine whether subsequent legislation as a follow up would be prudent.
The bill only calls for a study. It does not impede the date of enactment of the bill or implementation of the bill.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield the balance of my time.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Cannon.
Mr. CANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me respond by just submitting for the record a National Child Support Enforcement Association statement supporting the bill. This is from, I think this is from 2002, but I think the principles are the same.
Let me just point out that this study can be had just by a request from Congress. We could even do a bipartisan request of GAO, and I assure the gentleman from California that I would be happy to sign that request with him if he'd like to do that.
We do not need to amend the study--or amend the bill to get a study like this, and so I would encourage my colleagues to vote against this amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
[The material referred to follows:]
Mr. CONYERS. Could the gentleman from Utah yield, please?
Mr. CANNON. Mr. Conyers, I'd be happy to yield to you in just a moment, but may I suggest to the gentleman that he might want to withdraw the amendment. And I'd be happy to sign a letter asking for the study.
Mr. SCHIFF. If the gentleman will yield, I'd be happy to yield to the--I was going to say I'm--unless my colleague objects, I'd be happy to withdraw the amendment and join my colleague in----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there further amendments? The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.
Mr. CONYERS. I wanted to just make--strike the last word.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. CONYERS. After the distinguished gentlelady from Texas is recognized, and after the Ranking Member of Commercial and Administrative Law Subcommittee, Mr. Watt, makes an important presentation on his amendment, it is my inclination to call for the previous question. And I yield back my time.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentleman from Michigan yield back?
Mr. CONYERS. Yes, sir. I do.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. For what purpose does the gentlewoman from Texas seek recognition?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have an amendment at the desk.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is 001, and I have five amendments.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendments are considered en bloc.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I am not asking him for them to be considered en bloc.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report the amendment.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. 001, please.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256 offer by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas. Page 10, line 22, strike `$1,500' and insert `$3,000.'
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 minutes.
[The amendment follows:]
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman very much. I would like to have recorded--well, let me just make a statement. I was unavoidably detained for the Schiff amendment dealing with identity theft. I'd like to be recorded as voting aye if I had been present. And I was detained for the Nadler amendment. I'd like to be recorded as having voted yes.
With that in mind, to my colleagues, I think that this amendment is a very straightforward and simple amendment, and would generate, I would hope, bipartisan support. My amendment simply increases the amount of relief that is given to those parents who have children in private and parochial schools, raising the amount that is protected from $1,500 to $3,000.
Let me share with my colleagues what has been recently noted as private school dollars. In looking at a list of schools from Texas, you will find that most private schools, that is, primary schools, are anywhere from $3,500 to $5,000. The $1,500 would simply throw children out of school and eliminate--or burden children who are not responsible for the difficulties of their parents. The mean test mechanism, the principal mechanism aimed at the bankruptcy filing rate is the means test under section 11, which denies access to Chapter 7 bankruptcy to those debtors who are deemed able to repay their debts. The test has been described by proponents as a flexible test to assess an individual's ability to repay his debts and as a remedy to irresponsible consumerism and lax bankruptcy law.
The Jackson Lee amendment seeks to remove one aspect of its inflexibility and outdatedness. The means test limits private or parochial school tuition expenses up to $1,500 per year. According to a study by the National Center for Educational Statistics, even in 1993, $1,500 would not have covered the average tuition for virtually any category of parochial school--of any parochial school or private school. Today it would not come close for any particular school. In order to yield a few dollars for credit card issuers, this bill would force many struggling families to take their children from private or parochial school, often in violation of deeply held religious beliefs, for 3 to 5 years in order to conform or confirm a Chapter 13 plan.
My amendment, as I indicated, would simply increase this tuition payment ceiling to $3,000 to account for inflation as well as the current cost of parochial tuition. The average cost to educate one elementary school student is $3,100, which is double what it was 10 years ago.
As I look at the crisis of education in America, it would certainly be shameful if we stood in this room to deny individuals the opportunity to be educated.
Let me share as well some food for thought for my colleagues in their understanding or in their deliberation on the final resolution of this particular legislation. We realize that if you are with a bad credit score and you do accept a credit card, which they are given to anyone that literally breathes in America, you are usually paying usurious rates, 29 percent, 24 percent. Those interest rates are in essence an insurance against those who may get themselves into trouble. That means this is the insurance that is given to the credit card company when there are those who default. And what is strange about this is that the credit card companies collect this risk premium year in and year out, but when the risk actually happens and the borrower cannot pay, the lenders want the Federal Government to intervene to force the debtor to pay. That is the ludicrous--the ridiculousness of this legislation. Credit card companies go off scot free, and those who are victimized have to pay.
I would like to--and that is by Elizabeth Warren, at least the comment that I read. I don't want to put the other comments--the comment that I read about the risk actually happens is a notation by Elizabeth Warren.
I would like to put into the record what was written by David Broder, and I'd ask unanimous consent to put his entire article into the record.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.
[The material referred to follows:]
Ms. JACKSON LEE. One of the paragraphs reads, `For 2 weeks the Senate sponsors shot down virtually every attempt to separate the sheep from the goats and carve out protections for the average family trapped by circumstances. The dry language of the Congressional Record recites a series of one-sided votes rejecting amendments `to protect service members and veterans . . . to exempt debtors whose financial problems were caused by serious medical problems . . . to preserve existing bankruptcy protections for individuals experiencing'----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman's time has----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I don't want to follow the----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER- expired.
Ms. JACKSON LEE- Senate. I'd ask you to support my amendment.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman's time has expired. The question is on the Jackson Lee amendment. Those in favor will say aye?
Those opposed, no?
The noes appear to have it. The noes----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. rollcall vote.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Those in favor of the Jackson Lee amendment will, as your names are called, answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. LUNGREN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. BACHUS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. INGLIS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Keller?
Mr. KELLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. Mr. Issa?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Pence?
Mr. PENCE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. FORBES. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
Mr. BOUCHER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher, no. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, aye. Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. WEINER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, aye. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, aye. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their vote? The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Green, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Goodlatte.
Mr. GOODLATTE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their vote? The gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Issa, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 12 ayes and 21 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendment is not agreed to.
Are there further amendments?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have an amendment at the desk, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from Texas. The clerk will report the amendment.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. It is 003.
The CLERK. Amendment to S. 256, offered by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas. Page 20, line 24, insert `assistance funds received by the debtor as a victim of a natural disaster'----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendment is considered as read.
[The amendment follows:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman, and I thank the Ranking Member.
Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentlelady yield to the Ranking Member momentarily?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I'd be happy to yield. I'd be happy to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. CONYERS. I'd ask all of my colleagues to either put all of their amendments en bloc or strike the last word, put the amendment and the argument in so that it will be there, because we have two other very important pieces of legislation after we finish this bill. If you could consider that, I'd be grateful.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I'd be delighted, if I could do this one, and I'll put the other en bloc and be finished. Would that meet--how can I accommodate----
Mr. CONYERS. That would delight me no end.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. All right. I will do this very quickly, and then I have three others and I will put them en bloc.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentleman very much for his kindness.
Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. My friends, this is a circumstance that will confront all of our States, whether it is a flood, a hurricane, certainly any natural disaster that we can imagine has confronted individual States. We know recently that--we know recently that Florida suffered a historic three hurricanes or more in 2004. Families that are affected by natural disasters such as a hurricane in Florida or the mudslides in California should not have to apply their scarce relief effort monies to bankruptcy debt. The intent in providing Federal and State monies to families who are victims of such natural disasters is to relieve the burden that the disaster has caused, not to increase their net worth.
Bankruptcy reform should address many specific issues, such as the negligent mismanagement of money, but hurt those who are already suffering from flooding or collapsed roof or house that has gone out to sea is absolutely ridiculous.
I'd ask my colleagues to support this, which exempts the benefits that you've received if you have suffered a natural disaster. Again, I started out my concern about this legislation in that it is class warfare. I simply ask my colleagues to find some sense of balance to be able to balance this legislation with those middle-class and working families who are simply trying to make ends meet. We have already denied veterans and those returning from Iraq. We've denied those with catastrophic injuries. I can't imagine that there's not one of us that has not been in a community that has suffered a natural disaster.
I ask my colleagues to support this amendment.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlewoman yield back?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I yield back.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The question is on the amendment. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no? The noes appear to have it. The noes have it. The amendment is not agreed to.
The gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I have three amendments at the desk, 002, 004, and 006.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Excuse me----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER- amendments will be considered en bloc. Hearing none, so ordered. The clerk will report the amendments.
The CLERK. Amendments to S. 256 offered by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas. At an appropriate place, insert the following `(and make such technical and conforming changes as may be appropriate):'
`Section. Debts incurred as a result of sex offenses against minors.'
`Section 523(a) of title 11, United States Code, as amended by section'----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendments are considered as read en bloc.
[The en bloc amendments follow:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the gentlewoman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Although we may have an opportunity to address this on the floor of the House, I think my amendments are self-explanatory. Might I make note for the audience that I have a great deal of respect for the Chairman of the Subcommittee, but I think it is beneath the process of this body when you offer an amendment and there is not even the courtesy and the respect to have a response by the opposition.
But this is the low level of which we have reached in this body, and I always believed that when you reach to go over the edge, when you abuse your power, I can assure you that it's going to come back to you. We're here debating the lives of people, the lives of people who are simply going to be crushed by this oppressive, destructive, and special interest legislation. And if there are any credit card companies in the audience, it's not personal. But for you to spend this amount of money to generate this kind of ugly, one-sided legislative initiative is an absolute disgrace.
Let me cite the testimony from Elizabeth Warren, who spoke before the Committee on the Judiciary on February 10, 2005, an outstanding scholar at Harvard University Law School: `The overreaching problem with this bill is that time and the American economy has passed it by. We don't need this legislation. It is a complete misnomer. It is nothing but a payoff to credit card companies who have spent $4 million and more for this legislation.'
In the 8 years since this bill was introduced, new cases have burst on the scene. The names are burned into our collective memories: Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, United Airlines, US Airways, TWA, LTV Steel, Kmart, Polaroid, Global Crossing. While the number of consumer bankruptcy cases have declined slightly in the past year, many of the largest corporate bankruptcy cases in American history have occurred since the Senate has last re-evaluated the bankruptcy laws, and some of those cases are already legend for the corporate scandals that accompany them.
My friends on the other side of the aisle, my amendments are simple. Do not eliminate the debt of someone or allow someone to stand behind bankruptcy when they have a liability because of a sexual assault. Do not allow those who receive dollars because they're injured in cases relating to tobacco to have to use those dollars in getting rid of their credit debt or their other debt. And if someone is impacted by--though we wish they would not, by some nuclear accident, under the Price-Anderson Act, the PAA, let us not have those dollars subjected to the bankruptcy laws, meaning that they would have to utilize them to pay off their debt.
In this instance, I would simply say that Elizabeth Warren is right. She was right 8 years ago, and she is right now. We have seen a decrease in consumer bankruptcies. We already have an insurance plan as it relates to the credit card companies by their charging of usurious rates. You get any credit card invitation, and what you get in the mail is a complete, if you will, scandalous request for you to join their family. It is in blind need that you sign up for it, 30 percent, 29 percent.
And so we have this 512-page document that gives little relief to anyone other than those who simply want to break the backs of the middle class. Let me tell you, my friends, that this company runs--excuse me, this country, this Nation runs on the backs of the middle class. They are the working people. They're the ones that generate the economy. And, yes, they are the consumers. I already said that the credit card companies create a house of cards. That's what they do. You can't buy or sell without a credit card. This country is going to find itself overridden by not debt but by the system that doesn't allow you to use your simple dollars to buy and sell.
This bill makes it happen for sure, and all I would say is that I'd ask for the thoughtfulness in this process. This is not about whether the Chairman likes you or doesn't like you, likes your philosophy or doesn't like your philosophy, likes your style or doesn't like your style. This is the legislative process, and I'm representing people who cannot speak for themselves.
Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentlelady----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I will not be silenced on that basis. I'd be happy to yield.
Mr. CONYERS. I'd like to say that you've presented three very important amendments that have not been considered in any way, and I don't want anyone to confuse the fact that you have introduced them en bloc with the fact that they are any less important than any of the other amendments that you have put forward today. And I thank the lady for cooperating with the parliamentary process, and I support the amendments without exception.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank you for your leadership. I ask my colleagues to support the three amendments and speak on behalf of the American people.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman's time has expired. The question is on agreeing to the Jackson Lee amendments en bloc. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no? The noes----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. rollcall.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER- appear to have it--rollcall will be ordered. The question is on agreeing to the three Jackson Lee amendments en bloc. Those in favor will, as your names are called, answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, no. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, no. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, no. Mr. Goodlatte?
Mr. GOODLATTE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, no. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. LUNGREN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, no. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, no. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, no. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. BACHUS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, no. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. INGLIS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, no. Mr. Hostettler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Green?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Keller?
Mr. KELLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Keller, no. Mr. Issa?
Mr. ISSA. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Pence?
Mr. PENCE. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Pence, no. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. FORBES. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, no. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. No.
The CLERK. Mr. King, no. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, no. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, no. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, no. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, aye. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Berman, aye. Mr. Boucher?
Mr. BOUCHER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher, no. Mr. Nadler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, aye. Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, aye. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, aye. Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Waters, aye. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. MEEHAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, aye. Mr. Delahunt?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. WEINER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, aye. Mr. Schiff?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, aye. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their vote? The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. CHABOT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from California, Mr. Issa.
Mr. ISSA. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Issa, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Other Members in the chamber who wish to cast or change their vote? If not, the clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Jackson Lee--Mr. Chairman, Ms. Jackson Lee is recorded as aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 9 ayes and 20 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the amendments en bloc are not agreed to.
For what purpose does the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters, seek recognition?
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I have three amendments that I will offer en bloc.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk----
Ms. WATERS. They're at the desk, and if I may identify them as stay of eviction for victims of domestic abuse, homestead exemption for seniors, and under-age credit card amendment.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the----
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, as to the last amendment, I'd like to reserve a point of order.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. A point of order is--well, without objection, the first two amendments are considered en bloc, and the clerk will report them.
The CLERK. Amendments to S. 256 offered by Ms. Waters. Page 159, line 13, insert the following before the semicolon: `unless the debtor certifies under penalty of perjury that the debtor is a victim of domestic violence and that the physical well-being of the debtor or of a child of the debtor would be threatened if'----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the two amendments considered en bloc are considered as read. Without objection, the third amendment will be considered en bloc, and a point of order is reserved against the third amendment.
[The en bloc amendments follow:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the gentlewoman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. WATERS. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman and Members, the homestead exemption for seniors is pretty self-explanatory. My amendment would set a mandatory $30,000 Federal minimum homestead exemption for debtors who are 62 or older and would allow such debtors in bankruptcy to protect some or all of the value of their homes from credentials.
It seems to me that we're forever talking about protecting seniors. If we cannot protect seniors and keep them in their homes, then we have done nothing. So without going any further, that's what that amendment is all about. I would ask for an aye vote en bloc on that amendment also.
The second amendment is a stay of eviction for victims of domestic abuse. My amendment would modify the Bankruptcy Code to secure better protection for domestic abuse victims by granting them relief from summary eviction from their housing. This relief would only be available if a domestic violence debtor certifies under penalty of perjury that the debtor is, in fact, a victim of domestic abuse and that their physical well-being or the physical well-being of the debtor's child would be threatened if this debtor were evicted. This amendment would provide a safe harbor for those victims who face the threat of more violence and extreme danger if their homes were taken.
I would ask for an aye vote for these two amendments en bloc.
Mr. CONYERS. Would the gentlelady yield to me?
Ms. WATERS. Yes, I yield.
Mr. CONYERS. I want to make a point here, that these three amendments are original and are not duplicative of any of the amendments that have occurred before: homestead exemption for seniors, abuse, domestic violence, victims of abuse, which is a large area, not understood by all, and that they are valid, each of them in their own right, and I urge the careful consideration of the Committee in support of these amendments. And thank the gentlelady.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlelady yield back her time?
Ms. WATERS. The gentlelady yields back the time.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentleman from Alabama insist on his point of order against the third amendment being considered en bloc?
Mr. BACHUS. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman will make his point of order, quickly.
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, the amendment--the credit card amendment violates house rule XVI(7) and is not germane. The fundamental purpose of the amendment is not germane to the fundamental purpose of the bill. The amendment, in fact, amends the Truth in Lending statute, and jurisdiction for that statute is outside the jurisdiction of this Committee. And as such, the amendment is not germane.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Does the gentlewoman from California wish to speak on the point of order?
Ms. WATERS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I do wish to speak on the point of order, and I really don't know why I'm going through this charade because it really doesn't make any difference. We're not allowed any amendments here today anyway. They're going to be voted down. So I guess it doesn't make any difference whether it's done on a point of order or whether you call the roll for the vote. But----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Okay. The----
Ms. WATERS. But I think--I have not finished, Mr. Chairman. I think it is important to note that I think the gentleman from Alabama is opposing it because he knows that when this Committee hears about these under-age students who are being solicited by these credit card companies, running up this debt, and basically setting up all kind of obstacles to their being able to be successful when they graduate from college, then he knows he's embarrassed by that. So he may have a point of order that you probably will rule in his favor. So be it. It doesn't matter how it dies. It's going to die one way or the other.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Chair--the Chair is prepared to rule. One of the tests of germaneness of an amendment is whether the amendment, if introduced as free-standing legislation, would be referred by the parliamentarians and the Speaker to the Committee that is considering the bill for amendment. The amendment--the third amendment that is proposed by the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters, is an amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, I believe, which is not in the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee, but is in the jurisdiction of the Financial Services Committee. Therefore, the amendment is not germane, and the Chair sustains the point of order by the gentleman from Alabama relative to the third amendment being considered en bloc. The question is on agreeing to the other two amendments----
Mr. BACHUS. Mr. Chairman, it's the Truth in Lending Act.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The Chair stands corrected on that. The question is on agreeing to the other two amendments offered en bloc by the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no? The noes appear to have it. The noes have it, and the amendment is not agreed to.
Are there further amendments? The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I call up amendments--Watt amendments 04, 06, and 06 and request their consideration en bloc.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the amendments will be considered en bloc, and the clerk will report the amendments.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, I have 03 and 04.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina?
Mr. WATT. I'm looking at 04, 05, and 06.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Would the gentleman from North Carolina briefly describe the subject matter? That might help the clerk.
Does the clerk have them now? No.
Mr. WATT. 04 is the one that says `04' in the corner. 05 is the one that says----
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, I have 03, 04, and 06.
Mr. WATT- `05' in the corner. 06 is the one that says `06' in the corner.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. I believe the clerk's got what the gentleman from North Carolina wishes to offer, and the clerk will report the amendments considered en bloc.
The CLERK. Amendments to S. 256
Mr. WATT. I ask unanimous consent the amendments be considered as read.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection.
[The en bloc amendments follow:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. WATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Amendment 04, which is supported by the American Bar Association and a whole host of other people, accomplishes two things. It eliminates provisions in the bill that would require the debtor's attorney to certify the accuracy of the debtor's schedules under penalty of harsh court sanctions, and it modifies provisions that would require attorneys to certify a debtor's ability to make future payments under a reaffirmation agreement.
Section 102 unnecessarily imposes a harsher standard on debtor attorneys to certify pleadings filed on behalf of the debtor. No similar heightened standard is imposed on credential attorneys, nor for attorneys outside the bankruptcy context. By holding the debtor's attorney personally liable for the accuracy of their clients' schedules, these provisions would force the attorney to hire private investigators and appraisers to verify information, adding thousands of dollars to the cost of representing a debtor in bankruptcy. Without this amendment, I believe that the bankruptcy representation--that bankruptcy representation would become unaffordable for most debtors.
Also, the impact on the pro bono bar providing bankruptcy services would dwindle with the likely result that thousands of pro se debtors would clog up the court system or debtors will not seek the relief they need at all.
Amendment 05 corrects the provisions that would require bankruptcy attorneys to identify and advertise themselves as debt relief agencies and comply with intrusive new regulations that would interfere with the confidential attorney-client relationship. Sections 227 and two twenty--through 229 of the bill would seriously interfere with the attorney-client relationship by prohibiting debtor's bankruptcy attorneys and many non-bankruptcy attorneys from giving their clients certain proper bankruptcy planning advice. These provisions would also have a chilling effect on debtor's lawyers and their firms by requiring all of their newsletters, seminars, advertising materials to include awkward and misleading statements identifying themselves as debt relief agencies.
Amendment 06 would make a--is a technical amendment that seeks to close an unintended, I suppose, loophole in the current bill that would allow sensitive personal consumer information to be sold on the eve of a corporate bankruptcy. The sale of consumer lists is not a new method to increase the capital available to failing companies, and as we have seen with the recent debacle with ChoicePoint, such lists are highly sensitive and the distribution of personal information included can be disastrous to consumers. Lists of consumer information can be worth millions of dollars, a tempting asset to liquidate when a company is on the way into bankruptcy.
It is for these reasons that the privacy policy enforcement in the Bankruptcy Act of 2000 sought to exclude personally identifiable information from the assets of the debtor----
Mr. CANNON. Would the gentleman yield----
Mr. WATT. The bill prohibited--let me just finish and I'll be through, and then you'll have 5 minutes.
The bill prohibits the sale or disclosure--the amendment--I'm sorry. The bill prohibited the sale or disclosure of personally identifiable information if doing so violates a privacy policy of the debtor in effect at the time at which such information was collected. The Consumer Privacy Act also protected consumer information in the same manner. However, this bill doesn't do that, and I'm happy to yield to the gentleman----
Mr. CANNON. Thank you. I might suggest, you know, I have concerns about some of these issues. I don't want to see the bill amended at this point in time. If the gentleman----
Mr. WATT. That is quite obvious at the end of the day.
Mr. CANNON. If the gentleman would consider withdrawing the amendments, I can assure him that I'd be willing to work with him in the Subcommittee without making any commitments for the full Committee on the issue to take a look at some of these things.
Mr. WATT. Well, I would hope that the gentleman will just do as he has all throughout the day and just vote these things down and still if it's a problem take them up in the Subcommittee. I hope the gentleman is not saying he's going to punish me for offering an amendment by not----
Mr. CANNON. Absolutely no.
Mr. WATT- taking up something that he thinks is important.
Mr. CANNON. Let me just suggest these are--there are issues here that we need to consider. We'll look at those in the order----
Mr. WATT. Well, I'm not going to ask for a recorded vote. You all are going to vote them down and--you know.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman's time has expired. The question is on the amendments en bloc offered by the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Watt. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no? The noes appear to have it. The----
Mr. WATT. See, I told you.
[Laughter.]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The noes do have it, and the amendments en bloc are not agreed to.
Are there further amendments? If there are no further amendments, the question----
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman? I don't have an amendment. I'd like to put something in the record. I ask to strike the last word for submission----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I wanted to add into the record, Mr. Chairman, the complete testimony of Professor Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, February 10, 19--excuse me, February 10, 2005. And I wanted to----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Where--well, if the gentlewoman will yield, where was this testimony presented?
Ms. JACKSON LEE. In the United States Senate.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Because the rules prohibit us including in the record proceedings in the other body, I would ask the gentlewoman to withdraw her unanimous consent request. The Senate has published that hearing, and it is a part of the record of the Senate consideration of this legislation.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I will at this time withdraw that request, Mr. Chairman, and I've made mention of it. I want to make sure that I did have included, however, a bankrupt reform article. I believe I did, but I want to double check, and that's by David S. Broder, and that's Sunday, March 13, 2005.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman has already asked unanimous consent to include that in the record and has received it from the Committee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there further----
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Waters.
Ms. WATERS. I, too, would seek unanimous consent to submit for the record my statements on the bills that I introduced. I did not give the complete statements in the interest of time, and I----
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the statements of the gentlewoman from California will be included in the record.
[The prepared statements of Ms. Waters follow:]
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the reading be dispensed with so that I may explain my amendment.
Mr. Chairman, the very modest amendment I am now offering will help protect seniors who have to file for bankruptcy from losing their homes. My amendment sets a mandatory $30,000 federal minimum `homestead exemption' for debtors who are 62 or older, and would allow such debtors in bankruptcy to protect some or all of the value of their homes from creditors. It also would substantially decrease the likelihood that many of these seniors must sell their homes.
Mr. Chairman, many of our seniors have been driven into bankruptcy because of huge medical expenses that they could not pay, job losses, and other events beyond their control.
When these seniors face the misfortune of bankruptcy because of medical expenses, they should not also have to lose virtually all of the equity in their home, equity that many of them have saved and struggled throughout their lifetime to build.
Nor should they be forced to sell their home if they file for a bankruptcy, a result that frequently is the case in states with low homestead exemptions. In many cases, a home may be an older person's only significant asset, representing an entire life savings.
My amendment sets a $30,000 nationwide floor on the homestead exemption for seniors, debtors who are 62 years old or older. States, like California, that have a more generous homestead exemption would not be affected by my amendment, but my amendment would protect more of the equity of older debtors who live in states like Ohio, with low homestead exemptions.
Mr. Chairman, some states have very low homestead exemptions. Ohio has an exemption of $5,000, and North Carolina has an exemption of $10,000. Currently, only two states have a higher exemption for the elderly. California's regular exemption is $50,000, but it is $150,000 for seniors. Maine's exemption is $35,000, but $70,000 for the elderly. Wisconsin's homestead exemption is $40,000 across the board. Florida and Texas have an unlimited dollar value homestead exemption while many states, like Ohio, have exemptions as low as $5,000.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that Federal law should provide additional protection to seniors in states where the homestead exemption is very low. A senior debtor should be entitled to a decent degree of basic protection for his home equity, wherever that senior happens to live.
Many of our seniors have scrimped and saved for a lifetime to buy their homes. We should do all that we can to help protect them from having to sell their home because illness or job loss required them to file for bankruptcy.
Mr. Chairman, the pain and burden for our seniors of dealing with huge, unexpected medical expenses or job loss is enormous. Let's not add insult to injury by making them suffer the loss of their homes as well. Please join me in preserving the dignity of our seniors by supporting my homestead exemption for seniors' amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
-
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the reading be dispensed with so that I may explain my amendment.
Mr. Chairman, this is an unbalanced, unfair anti-consumer bill that is tilted way too far in favor of the credit card companies. My amendment makes a modest attempt at restoring some balance by holding credit card companies responsible for their reckless extensions of credit to young people without regard to their capacity to handle such credit card debt.
My amendment would that an application for a credit card by someone under 21 have the signature of the young person's parent or guardian, that is, that there be a co-signer, or the submission of financial information by the under 21 year old consumer that demonstrates that this young applicant has the financial capacity to repay the credit sought. Under my amendment, no credit card could be issued to anyone under twenty one whose application did not meet this requirement.
Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned that because of the reckless practices of the credit card companies, many young people with little financial education or sophistication end up with huge debts that they simply cannot handle. The credit card companies, with their relentless marketing campaigns and endless television ads, seduce our young people with promises of the good life, without taking any responsibility for those who cannot responsibly handle the credit that they extend.
In recent years, there has been a huge effort by the credit card companies to market their cards to college students, and many students just starting out are being saddled with huge credit card debts that they cannot repay, debts that drive some of them into bankruptcy.
All of us know about the t-shirt giveaways, the low `teaser' rates that are used to entice young people, and the large number of marketing representatives who appear on college campuses at sporting events and other venues to push credit cards.
Mr. Chairman, for all too many of our young people, these cards are not so-called `convenience' cards that are paid in full every month. They often result in the creation of long term debt that these students lack the means to repay. My amendment would provide a means to significantly decrease the chance that a young borrower would get into financial trouble.
Let's do something meaningful to protect our young people from being victimized by the credit card companies. I urge all of my colleagues to support this common sense amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
-
Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the reading be dispensed with so that I may explain my amendment.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment would provide a safe harbor for the many victims of domestic abuse whose physical well-being or their children's well-being would be greatly threatened by summary eviction procedures authorized under this bill.
Mr. Chairman, women and children who are victims of domestic violence join the ranks of the homeless every day. For women are so desperate to flee domestic abuse that they too often find themselves without funds with which to support themselves and their children. Victims often have a difficult time finding room at domestic violence shelters. Furthermore, domestic violence victims have a difficult time finding affordable long term housing because of the severe shortage of long-term affordable housing.
Mr. Chairman, domestic violence victims also find it extremely difficult to find and keep jobs. Their batterers often harass them at their places of work, which frequently results in the loss of their jobs. This directly affects their economic stability and often results in the inability to pay for life's basic necessities--such as housing.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment would provide protection for the overwhelming number of women and children who are trying to escape and survive domestic abuse and would greatly aid in allowing these victims to start a new life for themselves and their children. It would keep more of them in a safe and secure home.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment would modify the bankruptcy code to secure better protection for domestic abuse victims by granting them relief from summary eviction from their housing. Please note, this relief would only be available if a domestic violence debtor certifies, under penalty of perjury, that the debtor is, in fact, a victim of domestic abuse and that their physical well-being or the physical well-being of the debtor's child would be threatened if this debtor were evicted. This amendment would provide a safe harbor for those victims who face the threat of more violence and extreme danger if their homes were taken.
Mr. Chairman, we must recognize that these victims face the threat of losing their lives due to abuse and violence. They should not be forced from their homes dues to financial difficulties that are often out of their hands. Domestic abuse victims need the chance to start a new life free from violence, in a safe and secure home. Please support my amendment to carve out an exemption for domestic violence victims from summary eviction procedures authorized by this bill.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. WATT. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. WATT. I ask unanimous consent to submit for the record a letter from the American Bar Association dated March 11, 2005, to Chairman Sensenbrenner and to John Conyers related to one of the three amendments.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, that letter will be included in the record.
[The material referred to follows:]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there further amendments? If there are no further amendments, a reporting quorum is present. The question is on reporting the bill Senate 256 favorably to the full House. Those in favor will say aye? Opposed, no?
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a recorded vote?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The ayes appear to have it, and a recorded vote will be ordered. Those in favor of reporting the bill favorably to the full House will, as your names are called, answer aye, those opposed, no, and the clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Coble?
Mr. COBLE. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Coble, aye. Mr. Smith?
Mr. SMITH OF TEXAS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Smith, aye. Mr. Gallegly?
Mr. GALLEGLY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Gallegly, aye. Mr. Goodlatte?
Mr. GOODLATTE. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Goodlatte, aye. Mr. Chabot?
Mr. CHABOT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Chabot, aye. Mr. Lungren?
Mr. LUNGREN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Lungren, aye. Mr. Jenkins?
Mr. JENKINS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Jenkins, aye. Mr. Cannon?
Mr. CANNON. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Cannon, aye. Mr. Bachus?
Mr. BACHUS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Bachus, aye. Mr. Inglis?
Mr. INGLIS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Inglis, aye. Mr. Hostettler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Green?
Mr. GREEN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Green, aye. Mr. Keller?
Mr. KELLER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Keller, aye. Mr. Issa?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Flake?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Pence?
Mr. PENCE. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Pence, aye. Mr. Forbes?
Mr. FORBES. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Forbes, aye. Mr. King?
Mr. KING. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. King, aye. Mr. Feeney?
Mr. FEENEY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Feeney, aye. Mr. Franks?
Mr. FRANKS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Franks, aye. Mr. Gohmert?
Mr. GOHMERT. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Gohmert, aye. Mr. Conyers?
Mr. CONYERS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Conyers, no. Mr. Berman?
Mr. BERMAN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher?
Mr. BOUCHER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Boucher, aye. Mr. Nadler?
Mr. NADLER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Nadler, no. Mr. Scott?
Mr. SCOTT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Scott, no. Mr. Watt?
Mr. WATT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Watt, no. Ms. Lofgren?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Ms. Waters?
Ms. WATERS. No.
The CLERK. Ms. Waters, no. Mr. Meehan?
Mr. MEEHAN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Meehan, no. Mr. Delahunt?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Wexler?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner?
Mr. WEINER. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Weiner, no. Mr. Schiff?
Mr. SCHIFF. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Schiff, no. Ms. Sanchez?
Ms. SANCHEZ. No.
The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez, no. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen?
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen, no. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Are there Members who wish to cast or change their vote? The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake.
Mr. FLAKE. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Flake, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish--the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. No.
The CLERK. Ms. Jackson Lee, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their votes? If not, the clerk will report. And while the clerk is adding up, I would remind the Members that we have one more bill that needs to be considered that will go very briefly. It's a resolution of--is the gentleman from California, Mr. Issa, recorded?
Mr. ISSA. On final passage?
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Yes.
Mr. ISSA. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Issa, aye.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Okay. The clerk will report--the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. DELAHUNT. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Delahunt, no.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. Further Members who wish to cast or change their vote?
[No response.]
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. The clerk will report.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, there are 22 ayes and 13 noes.
Chairman SENSENBRENNER. And the motion to report favorably is agreed to. Without objection, the staff is directed to make any technical and conforming changes, and all Members will be given 2 days, as provided by the House rules, in which to submit additional dissenting, supplemental, or minority views.
[Intervening business.]
The business scheduled before the Committee having been completed, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:42 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
In addition to the concerns raised in the general dissenting views, we remain disappointed by the Committee's consistent refusal to put an end to two of the most notorious abuses of the bankruptcy system--the financial planning strategy by which debtors are able to purchase expensive homes in States which allow a debtor to exempt an interest in a primary residence of a unlimited dollar value, 1
[Footnote] and the development of `asset protection trusts,' which would allow individuals to set up a trust for which they are the sole beneficiaries, and potentially place substantial assets outside the estate, and beyond the reach of the creditors.
[Footnote 1: The following are the States that have unlimited homestead exemptions: Florida, Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, Texas, and the District of Colombia.]
The unlimited homestead exemption, known s the `millionaires' loophole,' has allowed the very wealthy to shield from their creditors vast sums of money in palatial homes. The current Code allows a debtor to claim a State's exemptions. 2
[Footnote] A State may `opt out' and bar a debtor from using the federal exemptions in sec. 522(d), which are, in many cases, lower than exemptions allowed under State law. 3
[Footnote]
[Footnote 2: 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(2)(A).]
[Footnote 3: 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(1).]
Over the years, many of us have offered amendments that would have placed an overall limit on State homestead exemptions, or repealed State opt-out so that debtors would be able to avail themselves of the federal exemptions if they are higher than applicable State law. 4
[Footnote] In each case, these proposals have been rejected. A proposal to place an absolute cap on State homestead exemptions in the amount of $1 million was even rejected by House conferees to H.R. 333 in the 107th Congress. Apparently, the proponents of this legislation believe that there is no amount too high for the wealthiest debtors to shelter in their homesteads, and that the poorest debtors are not entitled to even the modest floor provided by federal law. 5
[Footnote]
[Footnote 4: Rep. Waters offered an amendment setting a $30,000 Federal minimum homestead exemption for debtors 62 and older to protect some or all of the value of their homes from credentials in bankruptcy. The amendment was rejected by voice vote. Rep. Berman and Rep. Meehan offered an amendment to create a uniform Federal floor for homestead exemptions of $150,000 for debtors with substantial medical debts or a substantial loss in income, alimony, or child support due to medical problems. The amendment was rejected with 13 ayes and 18 noes.]
[Footnote 5: 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(1) allows a debtor to exempt up to $18,450 in value in the debtor's residence.]
These proposals would have, respectively, helped to eliminate the biggest loophole in the Bankruptcy Code, and eliminate a significant inequity for homeowners of the most modest means. The proposals reflect the recommendations of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, that Congress provide a meaningful cap on homestead exemptions as well as a federal floor. 6
[Footnote]
[Footnote 6: BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, Recommendation 1.2.2, at 125-133 (Oct. 20, 1997). The Commssion recommended a national cap of $100,000, and a national floor of $20,000.]
The rationale that has been given for the so-called `needs-based' reforms proposed in S. 256 is to eliminate abuses of the bankruptcy laws-abuses which proponents of the legislation have characterized as the use of the Bankruptcy Code as a `financial planning tool.'
Yet while the bill would presume that debtors of modest means are abusing the system if they can pay general unsecured creditors as little as $100 a month in chapter 13, it continues to permit, indeed it endorses--the most notorious abuse of the consumer bankruptcy system of all.
If the sponsors were truly serious about curtailing abuses in bankruptcy, this is the place to start. Some of the more notorious cases have included:
[Footnote]
[Footnote 7: Larry Rohter, `Rich Debtors Finding Shelter Under a Populist Florida Law,' N.Y. Times A-1 (July 25, 1993).]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 8: Id.]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 9: Id.]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 10: David J. Morrow, `Key to a Cozier Bankruptcy: Location, Location, Location,' N.Y. Times, A-1 (Jan. 7, 1998).]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 11: Id.]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 12: Eliot Kleinberg, `Reynolds Gets Out from under Bankruptcy,' The Palm Beach Post, (Oct. 8, 1998)]
[Footnote]
[Footnote 13: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 220, (Written statement of Brady C. Williamson), at 6 (Feb. 8, 2001).]
The situation in Florida has become so notorious that one Miami bankruptcy judge told the New York Times, `You could shelter the Taj Mahal in this State and no one could do anything about it.' 14
[Footnote]
[Footnote 14: Judge A. Jay Cristol, quoted in Rohter, supra note 6.]
As the Wall Street Journal noted recently concerning the Kuhn case, `the bill that Congress will soon send to a welcoming President Bush would make [pre-bankruptcy planning using the unlimited homestead exemption] more difficult, but that's symbolic. Few people anticipating bankruptcy have the cash to pull off that maneuver. This is a national problem that demands a uniform solution. Without a nationwide cap, debtors who live in the 45 States that cap the exemption at $200,000 or less are free to relocate to one of the five so-called `debtors' paradises `that have no cap at all.' 15
[Footnote]
[Footnote 15: Footnote 10: David Wessel, `A Law's Muddled Course,' The Wall Street Journal, at 1 (Feb. 22, 2001).]
Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has ruled that even fraudulent transfers are protected by the unlimited homestead exemption under that State's constitution. 16
[Footnote]
[Footnote 16: Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill, No. SC 99-98 (June 21, 2001).]
The sponsors try to claim that they have closed the loophole by placing certain restrictions on State homestead exemptions. While true, these restrictions still leave the unlimited homestead exemption largely intact for most wealthy debtors. To the extent that the restrictions may prevent some forms of abuse, they will also have unintended consequences that might harm innocent debtors who inadvertently run afoul of the complex new rules attached to exempt property.
The bill does not place an absolute national dollar cap on homestead exemptions. People who, with the exceptions made in the bill as described below, would otherwise be entitled to an unlimited homestead exemption, would still be able to claim the exemption.
The bill does not alter the opt out rule in the Bankruptcy Code, so there is still no federal floor.
Domiciliary Requirement: The domiciliary requirement determines which State's exemptions the debtor is allowed to claim.
Sec. 307 of the bill requires a debtor to claim as a domiciliary the place of residence for the greater part of the 730 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition. This applies for claiming any property exemptions, not just the homestead exemption. Current law is 180 days.
While it would make pre-bankruptcy planning more difficult for a wealthy debtor seeking a jurisdiction with generous property exemptions, it would also have a substantial impact on a debtor who moves from a jurisdiction with a low exemption to a jurisdiction with a high exemption.
For example, a debtor who lives in New York and retires to Florida would get caught in this net. If the debtor sold her home in New York, moved to Florida, and purchased a home in Florida with the proceeds of the sale, became sick and had to file for bankruptcy (which is a common occurrence) within the 730 period, she would not be able to use the Florida exemption and keep the full value of her home. Instead, she would have to use the New York exemption of $10,000. The rest would be available to pay her creditors. If there is excess value (above the equity and transaction costs) the trustee would have a duty to sell the home to generate funds to pay creditors. The debtor would get a check for $10,000, and lose her home. This would be even less than the federal exemption of $18,450, so she would be harmed even more by the failure of Congress to adopt a federal floor.
Converting a non-exempt asset into an exempt homestead asset: The bill provides, in sec. 308, that a debtor who converted a non-exempt asset into an interest in an exempt homestead within the ten year period ending on the date of the filing of the petition, would have the allowed exemption reduced by the amount of that additional interest. This provision requires proof that the debtor did so with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor. Because this is such a high standard of proof, it is likely that this provision will be rarely enforced.
Example: Debtor has $100,000 in a bank account. Debtor closes the account and uses it to pay down a mortgage on her residence. She now $150,000 in the home, all of which is exempt. The debtor would get to claim the full amount as exempt unless a creditor is able to prove that the debtor moved the funds from the non-exempt asset (the bank account) to the exempt asset (the homestead) with the intent to hinder delay and defraud a creditor. If the creditor is able to meet that burden of proof, the debtor may claim only the $50,000 interest in the homestead as exempt.
Another domiciliary requirement and conversion of non-exempt assets limitation: Sec. 322 limits a debtor to $125,000 in a homestead exemption for any interest in a homestead that was acquired 1215 days before the date of the filing of the petition that exceeds in the aggregate $125,000 in value. It does not apply to a debtor who is a family farmer under ch. 12 of the Code, or a debtor who acquires the interest within the same State. It only applies to a debtor who acquires the interest in a homestead in a State other than the State in which the debtor lived within the look-back period. Thus, if a debtor who lived in Texas acquired an interest in a homestead in Texas during the look-back period, the $125,000 cap would not apply. It would, however, apply to a New York senior who sold her home, moved to Florida, purchased a home in Florida with the proceeds from the sale of the New York home, got sick and had to file within the 1,215-day period. Because she would have acquired an interest in the property in excess of $125,000, she would be limited to $125,000. The rest of her equity could be used to pay her creditors.
Cap on homestead exemption for certain types of wrongdoing: Sec. 322 also caps a debtor's homestead exemption at $125,000, if:
There is also a savings clause that a debtor who owes a debt of the kind described above would not lose her homestead exemption over $125,000, to the extent that the equity is reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor. It is an outrage that the same `reasonably necessary standard' that would protect the unlimited homestead exemption is the same one that the drafters of the bill specifically chose to remove from the Code, in favor the means test in sec. 102 of the bill, and the IRS standards to determine a debtor's allowed expenses.
While these amendments may eliminate a few of the abuses, they do not solve the problem. Wealthy debtors who are able to afford skillful legal advice, and are sophisticated enough to engage in complex pre-bankruptcy planning, will, in many cases, will be able to evade the paltry restrictions in this bill. Truly needy debtors, the kind whose life savings may be bound up in their residence, and who can afford neither sophisticated legal advice, or complex pre-bankruptcy planning, will get caught in the many twists and turns that will now be added to the Code. Far from eliminating the abuse of the unlimited homestead exemption, this bill will have the perverse effect of perpetuating it while creating new traps for the truly needy unsophisticated debtor.
What message does it send when Congress subjects middle-class debtors to a means test and other onerous changes to the Code, while permitting the wealthy to continue to place their millions out of reach of their creditors? A bill this rife with favoritism toward wealthy debtors and against middle class families is anything but a `Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act.'
If Congress is serious about curbing abuse, a national, absolute dollar amount cap, without any loopholes, is the only way to do it. The bill, as reported, fails this test and so bears the burden of treating poor and middle class families harshly while letting the wealthiest individuals, who are clearly abusing the system and defrauding their creditors, shelter millions of dollars.
Although this legislation is exceedingly draconian with respect to low and middle income debtors, the sponsors have consistently resisted amendments that would close loopholes for the wealthiest debtors.
One such loophole is the so-called `asset protection trusts,' which, under the law of five States, allows an individual to set up a trust account for which the person establishing the trust would also be the beneficiary. 17
[Footnote] Trusts, established under non-bankruptcy law, are not treated a property of the bankruptcy estate, and so are beyond the reach of creditors. 18
[Footnote] A debtor may, under the laws of these five States, establish such a trust, solely for the benefit of the debtor, and may be able to shield unlimited amounts of money from creditors. So long as the funds were not placed in the trust by means of a fraudulent transfer, the trustee might have no power to recover them for the benefit of the creditors.
[Footnote 17: Gretchen Morgenson, Proposed Law on Bankruptcy Has Loophole, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at C1.]
[Footnote 18: 11 U.S.C. 541(c)(2) (2004).]
Senator Schumer offered an amendment that would have limited the value of assets that could be shielded in these trusts to $125,000, if transferred within the ten years preceding the filing of the petition. 19
[Footnote] Rep. Delahunt offered a similar amendment during the Judiciary Committee's markup, limiting such trusts up to $125,000, while protecting conventional retirement funds currently exempt from federal taxation, charitable trusts, and educational trusts. The amendment was rejected with 10 ayes and 15 noes.
[Footnote 19: 151 CONG. REC. S1981 (daily ed. March 2, 2005) (statement of Sen. Schumer). The amendment excludes from its coverage trusts not for the benefit of the debtor that would otherwise be excluded from the estate, and trusts established for retirement purposes under the new 11 U.S.C. 522(d)(12).]
The rejection of these reasonable amendments by the Senate and by the House Judiciary Committee again demonstrate that, despite its lofty title, the bill does not target bankruptcy abuse by the wealthy and well connected.
Bankruptcy should provide a safety net for families truly in need of relief.
This legislation, which imposes stringent new rules on financially distressed
families, should not leave the most notorious loopholes for the very wealthy.
John Conyers, Jr.
Jerrold Nadler.
Robert C. Scott.
Melvin L.
Watt.
Martin T. Meehan.
Anthony D. Weiner.
Chris Van Hollen.
While I agree with the Minority Views to S. 256, I want to submit additional views to explain my dissent.
Once again we are attempting to push through the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, which despite its name provides little meaningful protection for consumers. We all can agree that the system needs revision, but this legislation is not the answer.
Bankruptcy filings have risen slightly in recent years and while some who file for bankruptcy have not been financially responsible, the overwhelming majority of people who file for bankruptcy do so as the result of a divorce, major illness or job loss. Many people are just one paycheck, job loss or medical catastrophe away from bankruptcy. We know at the present time there are 1.6 million people who go into bankruptcy every year. Half of those people go into bankruptcy because of medical bills. About three-quarters of those individuals who go into bankruptcy because of medical bills have health insurance, but nonetheless, the explosion of costs in health care have added such a burden to these families that they have had to go into bankruptcy.
If the purpose of this legislation is to try to deal with spendthrifts and those who are abusers of credit, we ought to be able to distinguish them from hard-working Americans who unfortunately became ill, those who have had an unforeseen change in their employment, and those whose spouses experienced business failures. Unfortunately, this legislation does not make those distinctions.
I believe that any meaningful bankruptcy reform ought to ensure that individuals are afforded the protection of Chapter 7 bankruptcy and are exempt from dismissal or conversion if: (1) a substantial portion of the indebtedness is due to business losses incurred by a spouse who has died or deserted the debtor; (2) a substantial portion of the indebtedness was incurred as a result of illness of the debtor, a dependant of the debtor, or the debtor's spouse if not a dependant of the debtor; or (3) a substantial portion of the indebtedness was a result of unforeseen loss of employment through no fault of the debtor.
Another category of citizens who will be adversely impacted by this legislation are small business entrepreneurs who go into business considering a risk/benefit ratio that includes the possibility of making a lot of money but also includes the possibility of losing everything and ending up in bankruptcy. With the passage of this legislation, those entrepreneurs and their families risk not only losing everything, but also remaining destitute.
Finally, we should consider the impact on society of increasing the number of people who conclude that they have nothing left to lose. It is ironic that the last time we debated bankruptcy reform on the Floor of the House of Representatives, a farmer had driven his tractor into a pond near Washington's monuments, tying up traffic in D.C. for several days. He was quoted as saying, `I'm broke. I'm busted.' He was also quoted as saying, `I've got the rest of my life to stay right here. I'm not going anywhere.' People who feel they have nothing left to lose often lack any incentive to be a productive member of society, and this can also create a potential danger to society. Denying bankruptcy protection to people who need a fresh start will only increase this category of citizens. Instead we should be providing them with the assistance they need to get back on their feet.
While the bankruptcy code clearly could benefit from reform and
modernization, this legislation does not differentiate between those who abuse
the system and those who truly need the aid it provides.
Robert C. Scott.